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  This dissertation argues that cooperatives in New Orleans have drawn on 
homegrown ethnic and religious communal traditions to confront the vagaries of 
capitalism and its fraught connections to race, class, and gender. To historically and 
theoretically anchor my project, I examine seven cooperatives whose shifting alliances 
with labor, political, and consumer activist networks sustained the movement’s 
commitment to fashioning a new, egalitarian society. In chapter one, I analyze how 
socialist Catholic Creole, Caribbean, and European cooperatives transcended racial and 
ethnic barriers to citywide labor organizing in the 1890s. Chapter two examines the racial 
and class assumptions undermining white female activists’ interwar cooperative 
movement. Chapter three explores multiracial, cross-class, and gender-inclusive Popular 
Front cooperatives to recuperate the history of the city’s integrated political 
organizations. Chapter four examines one family’s intergenerational cooperative career to 
reveal the influence of black cooperative enterprise on twentieth-century civil rights 
projects. Finally, chapter five studies the continuity and rupture between pre- and post-
 vi 
Hurricane Katrina cooperatives, as well as their vexed negotiation of neoliberal economic 
and political policies perpetuating systemic inequality.  
 While my dissertation highlights New Orleans’ contributions to U.S. cooperative 
and social movements, it expands economic history more broadly. Using the 
methodological interventions of gender studies, cultural geography, oral history, and 
critical race theory, I contend that neighborhood context affects cooperatives’ ability to 
implement economic alternatives, while cooperatives’ moral economy is also inscribed 
on the physical landscape of their community. Studying scenes of cooperative members’ 
daily lives reveals an accretion of ongoing political activity that contributes to a 
genealogy of social protest and grassroots mobilization. My dissertation offers a new, on-
the-ground perspective on how cooperatives remold communities to reflect and 
strengthen a larger ethical project of societal transformation in modern America.  
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 New Orleans is hailed for its wealth of beautifully preserved French Quarter 
townhouses, stately Uptown and Garden District mansions, and restored Creole shotgun 
homes, all bolstering the city’s well-cultivated image as a romantic, exotic, and deeply 
authentic place “where magic runs deep.”  In one 2014 New Orleans Tourism Marketing 
Corporation commercial, a narrator intones over scenes of a couple relaxing on a French 
Quarter balcony that “centuries-old architecture is a backdrop for a culture so 
invigorating it will rouse your spirit.”1  Yet, while one may spend days wending along the 
treacherous, tree-rooted brick sidewalks in Uptown and the Garden District, peeking 
through gates into luxurious gardens and wrap-around-porches, the city’s tradition of 
cooperative organizing has left few historical markers. 
 Traversing the landscape of cooperative New Orleans requires forging a path very 
different from the one most tourists take from their Canal Street hotels facing the French 
Quarter.  It requires stepping off the rattling St. Charles street car, leaving the clamor and 
neon lights of Bourbon Street, deviating from Magazine Street’s bustling thoroughfare of 
trendy boutiques and bars, and skirting Jackson Square’s cacophony of steamboat 
whistles, street performers, and palm readers, into areas often rendered blank in Fodor’s 
tourist maps and the city’s own “New Orleans: Official Guide” website.  It is a different 
geography than is vividly celebrated in either the New Orleans Tourism Marketing 
Corporation’s “Follow Your NOLA,” or elegiacally recalled in Spike Lee’s When the 
                                                





Levees Broke and David Simon’s Tremé.  To glimpse the cooperative geography is to 
look both into the past and forward into the future of grassroots social protest. 
Cooperatives and the Tourist Economy 
 In many ways, cooperative New Orleans is antithetical to the image of a teeming, 
vibrant, and illicit city plastered across travel magazines, American Horror Story: Coven, 
Interview with the Vampire, and a host of other pop culture ephemera.  While active 
before the Civil War, the cooperatives in my study emerged at the turn of the twentieth 
century, in tandem with the rise of New Orleans’ salacious regional reputation.2  For over 
a century, New Orleans cooperatives have consistently protested the ways in which 
industrial capitalism has embedded classed and raced inequality into the city’s 
geography.3  For example, in 1897, members of the cross-class and racially integrated 
Brotherhood of Co-operative Commonwealth resided and socialized in Tremé, close to 
the recently established Storyville, a lurid destination for regional tourists and residents 
indulging in vice and prostitution.4  The cooperative denounced commercial elites who 
spurred economic development by systematically dismantling both urban labor unions 
and the system of patronage the working-class relied upon to exert political influence.5 
                                                
2 Anthony J. Stanonis, Creating the Big Easy: New Orleans and the Emergence of Modern Tourism, 1918-
1945 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2006), 5-11. 
3 David Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996). 
4 Karl F. Seidman, Coming Home to New Orleans: Neighborhood Rebuilding After Katrina (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 199; Stanonis, Creating the Big Easy, 105-106. 
5 Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 




 After World War I, as Americans tired of political, religious, and cultural 
conservatism that had long branded cities as licentious and dangerous, and tourism itself 
became democratized, New Orleans began cultivating a mass tourist-based economy in 
earnest.6  At the same time, the city paid off its Reconstruction debts and experienced a 
period of unprecedented economic growth; over the next 20 years, municipal government 
aligned with local businessmen to initiate a massive public works program that would 
attract outside investment and modernize the city.7  Yet as New Orleans failed to secure 
industrial contracts on the scale of Atlanta or Dallas, it increasingly marketed its historic 
architecture and diverse culture as the cornerstone of its tourist economy.8 
 Simultaneously, during the 1910s and 1920s, the Housewives’ League, a 
Progressive organization of middle-class white women, attacked both the emerging 
tourist economy and industrial capitalist logic it felt exploited women consumers.  For 
example, despite the city’s desire to become a preeminent southern film production hub, 
the League helped launch a coalition of women’s groups that censored movies it feared 
damaged viewers’ moral character.9  At the same time, a national consumers’ movement 
coalesced to protest a pervasive corporate logic that had resulted in rapid inflation and 
                                                
6 Stanonis, Creating the Big Easy, 5-11. 
7 Corrine M. McConnaughy, The Woman Suffrage Movement in America: A Reassessment (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY, 2013), 187; George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New 
South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 236. 
8 J. Mark Souther, New Orleans on Parade: Tourism and the Transformation of the Crescent City (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 16. 
9 Isabella Jaye, “New Orleans Association of Commerce,” Media NOLA: A Project of Tulane University 
(April 8, 2013). http://medianola.org/discover/place/976/New-Orleans-Association-of-Commerce; 
“Parents Condemn Movie Thrillers,” Times Picayune (June 26, 1921): 14; Allison M. Parker, 
Purifying America: Women, Cultural Reform, and Pro-Censorship Activism, 1873-1933 (University of 




ballooning consumer prices after World War I.10  Middle-class women viewed themselves 
as ethical consumers who would reform working conditions for women and children and 
lobby for protective legislation that would democratize government and economic 
systems.  To that end, the League opened a cooperative grocery store as a politicized 
space explicitly at odds with local commercial and government goals to attract outside 
corporate investment while raising consumer prices. Uniting with labor unions, Populists, 
Progressive reformers, and Socialists, female-run consumer cooperatives dedicated 
themselves to physically constructing a more ethical world.  
 Subsequent cooperatives have also struggled to fairly distribute economic resources 
within their communities, force municipal governments to respond to marginalized 
citizens, and equalize class, gender, and racial relations within the city. By constructing 
new sites of ethical production and consumption, cooperatives attempt to humanize 
citizens’ daily encounters with each other and their built environment.  
Argument 
 The modern cooperative movement began in 1855 in Rochdale, England, when 
displaced tradesmen, responding to the Industrial Revolution and its proletarianization of 
skilled labor, opened a cooperative store to sell goods they otherwise could not afford.11  
The store’s member-owners guided its actions and shared equally in its profits.  The 
Rochdale model inspired thousands of Britons and Americans seeking an egalitarian 
                                                
10 Tracey Deutsch, Building a Housewife’s Paradise: Gender, Politics, and American Grocery Stores in 
the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 





corrective to economic and political inequality.  Yet cooperative leagues often view the 
South as the last frontier of cooperative organizing, casting the region as historically 
impoverished, backward, and in need of external uplift.  For example, writing in the 
1940s, cooperative proponent Ruth Morton characterized the South as an alien country; 
northern activists were ill equipped to confront the “rural provincialism of the South” and 
“a type of poverty unknown in the industrial and agricultural North.”12 In order to allow 
the “common man [to attain] his democratic ideal,” the national cooperative movement 
must “embed” cooperative principles “in the thinking of [southern] people.”  
 Similarly, historians generally characterize Louisiana’s cooperative movement in 
two ways: fractured, short-lived, and rooted in rural communities, or as a cipher for other, 
more established social movements.  Yet my dissertation argues that the urban South, 
specifically New Orleans, has been integral to the U.S. cooperative movement since the 
Civil War, when black and ethnic New Orleanians began organizing themselves into 
informal cooperatives such as social aid and pleasure clubs—mutual associations that 
provide insurance and funeral services to impoverished neighborhood residents.  Despite 
their invisibility, the city’s Creole of color cooperatives have long been critical advocates 
of black political equality and economic independence: Nineteenth- and twentieth-
century African American intellectuals have relied on the support networks of European, 
African, and Caribbean mutual aid and secret societies, cooperative enterprise, and 
                                                
12 Ruth A. Morton, letter to Ed Yeomans, 28 Nov. 1940, 3, folder 2, box 1, Southeastern Cooperative 
League Records, 1939-1952, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, University of North 




utopian communalists to craft an egalitarian society embodying French democratic 
ideals.13  Simultaneously, these cooperative institutions nourished democratic and 
participatory cultural and musical forms such as brass bands, second lines, and Mardi 
Gras Indian performances that constitute the backbone of the city’s tourism economy. As 
a regional banking, shipping, legal, and intellectual center with deep cooperative roots, 
New Orleans represents as a cosmopolitan, not provincial, center of cooperative activism. 
 My dissertation investigates the development of New Orleanian cooperatives from 
the 1890s to the present, examining their confrontation with capitalism and its fraught 
connections to race, class, and gender.  Whether rooted in local black benevolent 
associations, labor unions, or housewives’ leagues, cooperative organizers have 
positioned New Orleans as a moral battleground on which they would vanquish callous 
economic individualism.  Scholars such as Robin D.G. Kelley, Adam Fairclough, and 
Hasan Kwame Jeffries have argued that working-class black community organizations 
have served as recruiting and mobilization channels for a mass-based civil rights 
movement.14  While indebted to this scholarly tradition, I contend that rather than existing 
as mere precursors to established social movements, New Orleans cooperatives 
                                                
13 Rebecca Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge: President and 
Fellows of Harvard College, 2005); Gilles Vandal, “Black Utopia in Early Reconstruction New 
Orleans: The People’s Bakery,” Louisiana History 38, no. 4 (Autumn 1997); Jossianna Arroyo, 
Writing Secrecy in Caribbean Freemasonry (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Shirley 
Thompson, Exiles at Home (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
14 Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens 
and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1995); Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Bloody Lowndes: Civil 
Rights and Black Power in Alabama’s Black Belt (New York: New York University, 2009); Robin 
D.G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: The 




subscribed to their own project of social, economic, and political transformation that at 
once dovetailed with and transcended these social movements’ specific demands. 
 I rely upon the rich archival record of cooperative organizing, oral history 
interviews with modern cooperatives, and discourse analysis to advance three related 
arguments: 1) New Orleans cooperatives have appropriated the national cooperative 
movement’s economic, ethical, and political theories as they challenge the perceived 
rapaciousness of modern industrial capitalism. 2) Operating within New Orleans’ unique 
geographic, cultural, economic, and political context, cooperatives have also drawn on 
home-grown ethical and religious traditions to establish their credibility and address 
neighborhoods’ specific needs.  3) Even though they have been impacted by national 
economic and political trends, New Orleans cooperatives have built ethical enterprises 
that have concretely reshaped neighborhood and civic life in uniquely local ways. 
 By examining labor, political, and consumer contributions to cooperative history, 
my dissertation thus studies both the particularity of New Orleans cooperatives and the 
general characteristics of cooperative development to theorize how cooperatives adapt 
national imperatives to local conditions.  For example, New Orleans cooperatives 
inspired by Edward Bellamy and Socialist communitarianism aligned with national 
political figures such as Jacob Coxey and Eugene V. Debs to envision egalitarian 
relations between labor and capital.  At the same time, however, by working, socializing, 
and residing in racially diverse Creole of color and Cuban communities, cooperative 




neighborhood constituents.  Therefore, I chart the intensely local, lived experience of 
social movements to understand how social change happens and the role of cooperatives 
in structural transformation. 
 I also explore the shifting and unexpected alliances upon which New Orleans 
cooperatives have historically depended in order to create a new moral economy.  For 
instance, during the 1940s, Popular Front activists, black and white Freret Neighborhood 
residents, and unionized barbers formed a grocery cooperative that vocally critiqued 
corporate capitalism while participating in an international peace movement.  The 
cooperative also looked to regional and national cooperative leagues for vital 
organizational support, even as it struggled to fill local patrons’ needs. 
 At the same time, my study is cognizant of the limits of cooperative transformation.  
Although successive generations of cross-class and multiethnic cooperatives have 
coalesced around common experiences of economic and political disempowerment, most 
ultimately failed to bridge their members’ socioeconomic differences or thrive within a 
deeply racist and classist society.  For instance, continued economic depression and rising 
immigration rates dissolved the integrated 1890s Socialist cooperative as white members 
asserted racial privilege over their African American peers in order to claim scarce 
employment opportunities.  Years later, during 1940s, Socialist consumer cooperatives 
struggled to retain working-class members most interested in cheap food, while 
continuing to espouse political and economic revolution.  Simultaneously, white patrons 




racial demographic patterns.  This dissertation therefore examines the point of rupture for 
utopian cooperative enterprise. 
 While my dissertation highlights New Orleans’ contribution to U.S. cooperative 
and social movements, it rethinks cooperative development in general. Following Henri 
Lefebvre’s theory of dialectical social relations, I argue that the physical form cities take 
is shaped by the dynamic interaction between the “perceived space” of people’s everyday 
social practices and understanding of their neighborhood, the “conceived space” of city 
planners’ development goals, and a more transcendent “lived space” in which activists 
and residents creatively imagine an alternative to current land use policies. As Lefebvre 
and others have argued, to alter inequitable social relations and economic structures that 
underpin urban development plans, citizens must organize and act collectively.15 
 To that end, using the methodological interventions of gender studies, cultural 
geography, oral history, and critical race theory, I contend that a community’s gender, 
race, and class ideologies affect cooperatives’ ability to implement democratic economic 
alternatives, while cooperatives’ moral economy is also inscribed on the physical 
landscape of their neighborhood. A long historical view demonstrates that cooperatives 
can change how citizens physically experience their neighborhood: how and where they 
shop, live, work, and play, and the social interactions that govern resident experiences. 
Studying the conduct of people’s daily lives reveals an accretion of ongoing political 
                                                
15 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
26; Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social 
Movements (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984); Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the 
Geography of Difference; Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places 




activity that contributes to a genealogy of social protest and grassroots mobilization. My 
dissertation offers a new, on-the-ground perspective on how cooperatives have remolded 
communities to reflect a larger ethical project of societal transformation. Ultimately, my 
dissertation engages the most enduring questions about cooperative efficacy: are 
cooperatives a fundamental critique of markets and ownership, or are they a temporary 
form of resistance, subject to the caprice of economic and political forces? 
Geographic Erasure 
 Fundamentally opposed to an economy built around tourism and conspicuous 
consumption, cooperatives rarely survive the ravages of time.  First, New Orleans bills 
itself on its authenticity: its heady mix of black, French, Spanish, and Anglo influences 
are written into architecture, food, and music waiting to be consumed and enjoyed.16  As 
one 2013 commercial claims, New Orleans is “the most fun and authentic city in 
America, y’all!”17  In contrast, cooperatives have largely rejected the traditions of 
exclusion and inequality that built the city’s economy; they have adopted both indigenous 
cooperative practices and modern business models as they attempt to transform political 
and economic structures.  To black, immigrant, female, and Jewish activists, New 
Orleans’ traditions were built on gender, class, and racial exclusion and must be 
overhauled in order to create a truly egalitarian society.18  Indeed, unlike popular 
representations of New Orleans, which, as historian Jonathan Mark Souther observes, 
                                                
16 Souther, New Orleans on Parade, 11. 
17 New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau, “New Orleans—You’re Different Here.” 
18 Louisiana Communist Party, flyer, “One City Park For All,” 14 August 1952, Vertical File: Communist 




portray the city as “a relict village still basking in the glow of a bygone era,” cooperatives 
looked forward to a utopian future as they reformed contemporary society.19  In 
reimagining ideal economic and political relations, cooperatives cared less about wooing 
investors and tourists to a city they felt was fundamentally corrupt, than about making 
New Orleans sustainable and responsive to its most vulnerable residents. 
 Second, cooperative activists are rarely nostalgic about cultural traditions and 
economic systems from which they have been consistently excluded. A mix of 
immigrants, migrants, and marginalized native New Orleanians, cooperative activists 
often occupied the edges of society and constantly battled accusations of communism or 
foreign instigation in order to successfully democratize political and economic structures.  
Because they addressed residents’ daily needs rather than tourists’ desire for novelty and 
amusement, cooperatives frequently either existed deep within low-income 
neighborhoods or, in the case of cooperative breweries, bakeries, slaughterhouses, 
laundries, and factories, occupied the outskirts of the city in its manufacturing districts.  
Women, poor whites, and African Americans often lacked the capital necessary to invest 
in anything other than converted warehouses, shabby grocery stores, or members’ homes.  
Already financially unstable, most cooperatives shuttered when larger conglomerates 
undercut sales or weakened their sponsoring unions.20 
                                                
19 Souther, New Orleans on Parade, 15. 
20 “By Way of Comment,” Times Picayune (November 6, 1921): 46; Ad, “A Clean Cut Non-Speculative 
Investment: Peoples Co-operative Laundry, Inc.,” Times Picayune (June 20, 1920): 11; “Peonage in 
Laundries,” The Garment Worker 21 (April 28, 1922): 8; “Heads of Laundry Plants Charged with 
Conspiracy,” Times Picayune (September 27, 1922): 1; “Consumers’ Brewery Winding Up Business,” 




 Given cooperatives’ oppositional politics, their physical erasure reflects the 
constant struggle between grassroots countercultural community organizations and a 
capitalist regime built on racial, class, gender exclusions.  For example, the three-story 
cooperative sewing factory that female Knights of Labor unionists opened in 1882 is now 
the site of the upscale Shops at Canal Place.21   Further, in the 1920s, Globe Hall, the site 
of Cuban, European, and Afro-Caribbean cooperative organizing, was demolished along 
with a large swath of Tremé’s historic buildings to build a civic center.  It would be one 
of hundreds of culturally significant African American institutions, businesses, and 
residences that city officials and developers would raze to construct highways, segregated 
public housing, and other ill-funded municipal projects.22  Essentially, existing on the 
geographic and socioeconomic margins, cooperatives occupied neither “authentic” nor 
aesthetically appealing structures deemed worthy of preservation. 
Archival Invisibility 
 Cooperatives’ physical erasure is compounded by their archival invisibility. As 
enterprises formed by marginalized and often despised groups, few records of New 
Orleans cooperatives remain.  Unlike carefully preserved government, commercial, or 
institutional papers, cooperative records exist on the edges of the archive, either jumbled 
among various actors’ much larger repositories, or buried within newspaper editorials, 
notarial records, voting and marriage receipts, mayoral publicity photos, and lawyers’ 
                                                
21 “Woman’s World and Work,” Daily Picayune (November 13, 1887): 10; Edwin Whitfield Fay and 
William Preston Johnson, The History of Education in Louisiana (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1898), 179. 




documents.  They surface briefly in institutional encounters and are therefore interpreted 
through institutional lenses. Consequently, an entire history of grassroots organizing 
seems unrecoverable and unknowable. 
 Therefore, despite New Orleans cooperatives’ persistent opposition to exploitative 
political and economic institutions, southern social movement historians have too heavily 
depended on evidence of traditional institution building. Scholars tend to overlook the 
influence cooperatives have had on social movement formation, even though, for 
example, many civil rights organizations’ explicit cooperative and democratic structure 
framed their political goals.  Others subsume cooperatives within larger social movement 
history rather than discuss cooperatives as separate entities with their own goals and 
philosophical grounding.  For instance, in his analysis of Alabaman rural black mutual 
aid societies, social historian Hasan Kwame Jeffries argues that cooperatives served as 
recruiting channels for formal civil rights mobilization, thereby transforming local, 
informal protest into a “sustained, organized, public effort to secure freedom rights.”23  In 
contrast, I argue that preexisting New Orleanian cooperative traditions and outside forces 
combined to create a unique political apparatus pressing for extensive social change.24 
 To do so, I trace the continuity between New Orleans cooperatives, labor unions, 
Socialists, African Americans, and women to draw a more complete portrait of the city’s 
legacy of cooperative economics.  Scholars have paid little attention to cooperative 
                                                
23 Jeffries, Bloody Lowndes, 41-48. 




contributions to Louisiana’s labor movement.25  While David Roediger examines Socialist 
firebrand Covington Hall’s dual involvement in interracial labor organizing and 
cooperative labor education from the early 1900s to the 1930s, labor historians have 
missed the interconnections between Louisiana’s Socialist and cooperative activists.26 
 Daniel Rosenberg and Eric Arnesen have exhaustively documented New Orleans 
dockworkers’ unions and the racial collaboration that enabled them to organize massive 
strikes in the early 1900s, but they do not mention that cooperatives formed out of union 
benevolent societies and helped finance the labor movement.27  For instance, during a 
series of tumultuous New Orleans brewery workers strikes in 1902 and 1907, the 
Consumers’ Brewery Cooperative was one of the only breweries to sell union beer and 
employ union labor.28  Similarly, between the Great Depression and World War II, the 
New Orleans Socialist Party collaborated with radical unions and cooperative leagues as 
part of a Popular Front effort to end class disparity in the city, state, and nation. 
 As Arnesen himself observes, the scant scholarship on urban Louisiana labor 
reflects both the shrinking influence of labor unions and the fact that Louisiana’s labor 
                                                
25 John Curl, For All the People: Uncovering the Hidden History of Cooperation, Cooperative Movements, 
and Communalism in America (Oakland: PM Press, 2009). 
26 Covington Hall, Labor Struggles in the Deep South and Other Writings, ed. David R. Roediger 
(Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1999), 1; Eric Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New 
Orleans: Race, Class, and Politics, 1863-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Daniel 
Rosenberg, New Orleans Dockworkers: Race, Labor, and Unionism 1892-1923 (State University of 
New York Press: Albany, 1988). 
27 “The Mill Hands’ Strike May Result in the Interesting Experiment of a Co-operative Factory,” Daily 
Picayune (March 20, 1897): 10. 
28 “Seventy Saloonkeepers Give Warning That They May Seek Beer Elsewhere,” Times Picayune (July 




history refuses to “conform to established paradigms.”29  Indeed, as marginal enterprises 
struggling to survive, cooperatives depended on surprising and sometimes confounding 
alliances that could be explicitly at odds with their stated ethical principles and overall 
mission.  How does one make sense of the Brotherhood of Co-operative Commonwealth 
(BCC), for example, which in 1897 vigorously denounced capitalism while 
simultaneously courting economic leaders for employment?  Likewise, cooperatives’ 
broad self-definition makes them difficult to historically identify and describe; in the case 
of the BCC, the cooperative evolved from a utopian socialist experiment into an 
unemployed workers’ labor union, while working with striking trade unions to establish 
cooperative factories to compete with former employers. 
 Similarly, although women were at the forefront of national consumer protest, 
little has been written about southern women’s cooperative organizing, much less how 
their campaign to purify capitalism intersected with suffrage, temperance, or progressive 
reforms.  Casting the suffrage movement as isolated, class-bound, and racist, historians 
like Pamela Tyler argue that Louisiana’s female political activism dissipated after the 
ratification of the federal suffrage amendment in 1920.30  In doing so, scholars of 
Louisiana overlook the diversity of female activists and concrete cross-class alliances. 
 In contrast, Ellen Blue and Landon Storrs examine women’s clubs beyond 
explicitly suffragist-identified organizations to present a more nuanced portrait of female 
                                                
29 Eric Arnesen, “The Peculiar Waterfront: The Crescent City and the Rewriting of the History of Race 
and Labor in the United States,” in Working in the Big Easy: The History and Politics of Labor in New 
Orleans, ed. Thomas J. Adams (Lafayette: University of Louisiana at Lafayette Press, 2014), 28-31. 
30 Pamela Tyler, Silk Stockings and Ballot Boxes: Women & Politics in New Orleans, 1920–1963 (Athens 




New Orleanian economic and political cooperation.  Blue argues that the Progressive 
settlement home movement encouraged white middle-class women to experiment in 
communal living, collaborate with working-class women, and eventually push for civil 
rights and other political reformist projects well into the 1960s.31   Similarly, analyzing 
the National Consumers’ League, Storrs contends interwar southern members not only 
existed outside aristocratic planter-elite class governing southern social hierarchies, but 
they also sometimes espoused explicitly Socialist and anti-capitalist ideology.32   Further, 
if one explores women’s consumer activism and the constellation of related 
organizations, female political networks flourished long after 1920. 
 Consumer activism has been a primary site of grassroots organizing for women 
from a range of socioeconomic and racial backgrounds.33 Their cooperative politics made 
female organizers key allies of New Deal consumer agencies, which embraced 
cooperative economics to control the vagaries of the market.  As consumers mobilized to 
provide a range of cooperative utilities, financial, and medical services, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt lent consumer activists credibility by promoting cooperative 
grocery and retail stores to rehabilitate the plummeting economy.34  Therefore, looking at 
the cooperative careers of individual women rather than only their cooperatives’ fleeting 
                                                
31 Ellen Blue, St. Mark’s and the Social Gospel: Methodist Women and Civil Rights in New Orleans, 1865-
1965 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2011). 
32 Landon Storrs, Civilizing Capitalism: The National Consumers’ Leagues, Women’s Activism, and Labor 
Standards in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  
33 Curl, For All the People. 
34 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New 




institutional presence reveals the persistence of cooperative enterprise as a strategy for 
community-driven political and economic transformation. 
 One of the most explicit examples of the physical and historical erasure of New 
Orleans cooperatives is the Juvenile Co-operators Fraternals Benevolent Mutual Aid 
Association, which, between 1894 and 1967, served as a nexus for black cooperative and 
civil rights organizing in New Orleans’ Tremé Neighborhood.35 Confining its services to 
the Catholic Creoles of color residing in New Orleans’ Seventh Ward, the Juvenile Co-
operators operated within a black world bounded by religion and place.  Operating during 
a time when African Americans had little access to reliable and affordable healthcare, the 
Juvenile Co-operators provided health insurance, medical care, funeral services, and 
pensions to black members under the age of 25.36 Significantly, it strengthened the 
African American Seventh Ward community by improving the neighborhood’s health, 
supporting its businesses, and promoting civil rights.  
 Although the Juvenile Co-operators were deeply imbedded in the economic, 
political, and social fabric of Tremé’ for 70 years, there are few physical reminders of its 
presence.  Historians have noted that black cooperatives like the Juvenile Co-operators 
largely disappeared by the late 1960s, coinciding with the rise of affordable life and 
health insurance for African Americans.37  Yet there is another, overlooked, reason for 
                                                
35 Michael E. Crutcher, Tremé: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2010), 52; “Historical Notes,” 2-3, box 1, Juvenile Co-operators Fraternals Benevolent 
Mutual Aid Association Records, Xavier University, New Orleans, Louisiana.  Hereafter cited as 
JCFBMA Records. 
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black cooperatives’ decline in the 1960s: the erection of Interstate Highway 10 through 
North Claiborne Avenue, the main commercial thoroughfare of Tremé’s independent 
black businesses and cooperatives.38  Scholar Michael Crutcher links the broader backlash 
against the civil rights movement to large-scale urban renewal projects; taking advantage 
of inner city residents’ lack of political clout, high-level transportation officials promoted 
public road and slum clearance projects as serving the social good, while decimating 
black communities across the country.39  Former resident Harvey Reed argues that while 
Tremé residents were “waiting for civil rights, [white officials] were cutting off 
communities for commerce.”40 
 Prior to the interstate’s construction, hundreds of oak trees lined the neutral 
ground dividing Claiborne Avenue, from St. Bernard Avenue to Orleans Avenue.41  In 
addition to functioning as a vibrant social and economic hub, the wide street also enjoyed 
speedy and efficient mass transit, connecting Tremé to the rest of the city. However, in 
1956, the Department of Transportation and Bureau of Governmental Research and the 
New Orleans Central Area Committee proposed building a raised highway along the 
Mississippi River connecting the Central Business District to the outer suburbs.42  Part of 
the highway would run along Claiborne Avenue, bisecting Sixth Ward black 
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communities.43  Officials argued that the plan would curb urban decay and its attendant 
social evils by demolishing pockets of inner city black neighborhoods, and promoting 
free-flowing transportation and commerce in and out of the city.  After the highway 
proposal was approved in 1957, the city and developers began acquiring property along 
Claiborne without consulting affected Tremé citizens.44  Reed recalls that on a Sunday 
morning on August 1, 1966, city workers finally began uprooting 500 oak trees along 
Claiborne “while everyone was in church.  It was like a military operation.”45 
 The result of the highway, Reed remembers, was the swift decline of his 
community.46  The interstate was completed in April 1968, but not before demolishing 
125 buildings and displacing 170 residents and 50 businesses.47 Long-term construction 
closed off access to Claiborne’s black-owned businesses, and residents were forced to 
shop at Canal Street after these businesses relocated or were shuttered for good. Further, 
integration of businesses and public spaces also encouraged black consumers to shop 
downtown, which sped the dispersal of black commercial districts. While national citizen 
protest eventually led to the passage of the Federal Highway Act of 1968, which banned 
highways from displacing residents without providing replacement housing, the damage 
to the Sixth and Seventh Ward black community was irrevocable.  Their inability to 
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effectively protest the highway clearly revealed to black residents the extent of 
government neglect and the need for community action to redress systemic inequity.    
 While the Juvenile Co-operators’ offices no longer dot Tremé, the legacy of 
cooperative organizing lives on in residents its support network deeply touched.  Indeed, 
as historian Jessica Gordon Nembhard argues, post-Civil War mutual aid and benevolent 
societies offering social welfare services to fellow African Americans directly influenced 
citywide consumer cooperatives dedicated to black self-determination, and, eventually, 
civil rights organizations pressing for national political and economic justice.48 
Cooperatives and Urban Protest 
 Examining the working-class African American neighborhood of Central City and 
its cooperative history is akin to slicing an onion to reveal its separate but multi-layered 
membranes; over the course of 50 years, Central City’s public housing has been a locus 
for creative and cooperative innovation to ensure community survival. Black music 
cooperatives link New Orleans’ heritage of innovative, egalitarian cultural production to 
the principles of the national cooperative movement so that vulnerable citizens can assert 
economic and political power.   
 For example, growing up in the Magnolia housing project in the 1940s and 1950s, 
jazz musician Harold Battiste often snuck into the seminal black entertainment venue 
Dew Drop Inn at Washington Street and La Salle Avenue to hear local and national 
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rhythm ‘n’ blues and rock ‘n’ roll acts.49 Converting to the Nation of Islam in the mid-
1950s, Battiste would apply its theory of black cooperative economics both to a racially 
discriminatory record industry and the New Orleans’ black community in general.50 
Despite its vibrant music scene, Central City was in dire need of community-led 
revitalization. In 1960, the New Orleans Consumer League and Oretha Castle Haley 
boycotted white Central City businesses that refused to hire African Americans.51  Most 
white businesses closed rather than employ black staff, leaving storefronts vacant.  
 To stimulate the neighborhood’s shrinking economy, in 1961 Battiste incorporated 
All For One Records (AFO) and At Last Publishing.  He explicitly connected community 
economic cooperation and black musical creativity, identifying with Elijah Muhammad’s 
speeches “that often spoke to the need for our people to create wealth through ownership. 
It seemed that every ethnic group was identified with a product or service that they 
owned and controlled, and it seemed that the product generally attributed to us was 
music: jazz, blues, R&B, gospel.”52 Battiste recruited New Orleans luminaries like 
Barbara George and Prince Lala, “the then current crop of…world class musicians who 
might [otherwise] go unheard of among all the tasty flavors in the Gumbo.”53 
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 AFO cooperative members waived payment for sessions but became co-owners of 
their recordings and received percentage of the company’s earnings.54  The policy was 
much better than flat rate American Federation of Musicians session fee of $45, 
regardless of the musician’s contribution and the record’s success.  At Last Publishing 
also supervised recording sessions’ musical arrangements, orchestrations, musicians, and 
studio set-up.55 AFO hoped to create a black “conglomerate entertainment enterprise” that 
included recording, theater bookings, and management services. 
 Nonetheless, when AFO folded in 1963, Central City continued to decline.  White 
flight to the suburbs accelerated urban decay, as did manufacturing companies’ exodus to 
surrounding parishes.56  In response, black liberationist collectives joined traditional 
social aid and pleasure clubs and the civil rights movement to cultivate black self-
reliance.57  For example, Black Panthers criticized capitalism and strove for economic and 
political self-determination within African American communities.58 Accordingly, Black 
Panthers’ economic empowerment programs established free clinics, community centers, 
and free breakfast programs as cooperative social services in the Ninth Ward’s Desire 
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Housing Projects.59  Additionally, despite police surveillance and a state congressional 
probe into black Muslims’ “subversive” activities, New Orleanian chapters in the Ninth 
Ward and in Central City near the Magnolia Housing Project owned a cooperative 
bakery, fish market, and a restaurant, as they strove to achieve greater neighborhood self-
sufficiency.60 As George Mariscal observes, by forging a collective identity in response to 
local and external pressures, 1960s and 1970s grassroots activists created a “diffuse 
movement” devoted to a “wide range of social projects, from ethnic separatism to 
socialist internationalism, from electoral politics to institutional reform and even armed 
insurrection.”61 
 Further, cooperatives continued to organize black musicians and cultural 
performers living in public housing projects and low-income neighborhoods.  For 
example, between 1963 and the mid-1970s, the cultural liberationist Free Southern 
Theater Collective (FST) wedded radical communal performance to political action.62  
The cooperative provided professional development for black New Orleans creative 
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writers and playwrights and collaborated with like-minded black collectives to perform 
and publish their work.63  Similarly, in 1969 FST directors organized 
BLCKARTSOUTH, a writing lab for southern black writers headquartered across the 
street from the Ninth Ward’s Desire Housing Project.64  It published members’ works in 
its literary journal and workshopped their poetry and plays for the FST and national 
theater companies to perform.  By enabling performers to retain creative control over 
their art, the FST pushed New Orleans to the vanguard of the Black Arts movement.65 
 Across the city, community cooperatives and civil rights organizations continued 
to work together to reverse the effects of white flight and urban decay.  For example, 
Office of Equal Opportunities (OEO) administrator J. Baker believed that “the only 
solution for poor folk was to [establish] co-ops with competent management.”66  Over 
white conservative politicians’ objections, the OEO organized urban credit unions 
throughout New Orleans as community-led antipoverty measures.67   
 While War on Poverty administrators celebrated self-help cooperatives as tools to 
achieve broad-scale political and economic change, in New Orleans, young black and 
white civil rights organizers also embraced cooperatives as integral to achieving a 
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beloved community.68 For instance, moving to New Orleans after assisting desegregation 
efforts in rural Louisiana, VISTA volunteer Robert Ferris started a countercultural 
commune and cooperative school for impoverished African Americans in order to “effect 
major change in our society…in my own backyard.”69  Many white New Left collectives 
sympathized with women’s liberation, labor union strikes, anti-imperialist struggles in 
developing countries, as well as “the people of the black and brown and red communities 
within the U.S.” organizing “to seize control of their own communities.”70 By the 1970s, 
countercultural cooperatives studded the city, ranging from community bookstores and 
alternative presses, to food co-ops and childcare centers. 
 However, by the 1970s, New Orleans’ demographic patterns again shifted as 
growing numbers of professionals were drawn to new finance, real estate, and insurance 
jobs and inexpensive housing in the city center.71  African American enclaves in the 
Central Business District, the lower Garden District, and Old Algiers became sites of 
white preservation activism and simultaneously, gentrification.72  While revitalizing 
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disinvested communities can certainly benefit neighborhoods by diminishing crime, 
increasing city services, and refurbishing aging housing stock, New Orleans boosters 
often had shallow aims: to develop amenity-adjacent neighborhoods and spur tourism at 
the expense of low-income residents of color.73 Redevelopment not only raised property 
values, but increased neighborhood service rates and rental prices, consequently 
displacing renters, poor and elderly residents, and minorities.74 
 At the same time, community opposition to redevelopment stalled as the Housing 
Authority of New Orleans and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
began demolishing low-income housing projects under the HOPE VI Program to 
eradicate crime in impoverished neighborhoods.75  In Central City, the St. Thomas 
Housing Project was almost entirely razed by the late 1990s.  The George W. Bush 
administration further accelerated gentrification and displacement in Central City.76  
Despite community efforts to place the Magnolia Housing Project on the national historic 
register and attract tourism and investment to the nearby Dew Drop Inn historical site, 
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Republican campaign contributor McCormack Baron Salizar nonetheless bulldozed the 
complex and erected mixed-income units housing a minority of its previous residents.77 
Tourism and Gentrification After Hurricane Katrina 
 Today, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the city’s tourist economy is more 
powerful that ever, rewriting the historical narrative of the city and remolding its physical 
geography. The representation of New Orleans broadcasted to outside markets is one of 
nostalgia, erotic desires, and perpetual leisure, while the daily practices of the city’s 
denizens are rendered invisible.  For example, in the New Orleans Tourism Marketing 
Corporation’s 2014 commercial, “Follow Your NOLA,” images of iconic fleur-de-lis-
shaped waffles and snowballs flash on screen, portraying New Orleans as a site of 
colorful consumption that can literally be devoured.78  Black New Orleans r’n’b, jazz, and 
brass band music provide a cheerful, decontextualized soundtrack for French Quarter 
tourists’ commodified pleasure.  However, what the commercials skillfully elide is one of 
the greatest horrors of Hurricane Katrina: its brutal exposure of systematic racism and 
classism imbedded in the legacy of economic and political policies that structure 
residents’ lived experiences.  Ironically, New Orleans boosters celebrate the city’s black 
cultural traditions while rhetorically and physically obscuring the legacy of racial and 
class inequality and segregation that still shapes practitioners’ daily lives.79 
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 Critics charge that City rebuilding efforts have concentrated primarily on 
improving the tourist and service industry by expanding shopping centers, rehabilitating 
high trafficked tourist areas, and redeveloping the Mississippi riverfront rather than 
rehousing vulnerable residents.80  Further, the City continues to drastically reduce its 
affordable housing stock where performers and service workers largely reside.  Finally, 
expanding gentrification into black working-class neighborhoods threatens to displace 
low-income renters.  For example, the Felicity Group, Garden District investors, has been 
drawing affluent residents into Central City for several years.81  Community activist 
Damia Khanboubi observes that as the neighborhood began to feel safer, it became a 
magnet for artists, non-profit organizations, and upscale development.  Consequently, 
gentrifying neighborhood rental prices have jumped 25 percent, and because New 
Orleanians’ average income is a third lower than the national average, more than half of 
the city’s population cannot afford the inflated housing rates.82 
 Central City cooperative activists and public housing organizers argue that city 
administrators and developers evince a profound narrowness of vision when they tout the 
city’s creative potential while ignoring that performers can rarely live off their creative 
efforts.83  Second line parades and brass bands are sites of musical and performative 
expression that reaffirm black working-class communities and strengthen their political, 
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social, and economic networks.84  For example, an entire cooperative entrepreneurial and 
social system of black-owned bars and other small businesses rely on the second line 
parades to generate reliable commerce.  Cooperative activist Sally Stevens notes that 
“most people you see at second lines and BBQ lines, come Monday they work at catering 
in a hotel.  They dream to get out of the hotel, they know what they want to do…and who 
they want to do it with.  That’s what cooperation is all about.”85  Consequently, 
cooperative organizers have easily recruited public housing residents dissatisfied with 
low-wage service and hospitality jobs. 
 Simultaneously, city administrators decry public housing residents’ supposed lack 
of marketable skills and conveniently conflate black musicians with the “criminal 
underground economy” driving violence in many New Orleans communities.86  For 
example, although the TBC Brass Band had been continuously playing on the corner of 
Bourbon Street and Canal for the past nine years, in 2010 city officials barred their 
performances, citing noise curfew violations.87  Band member Joseph Maize Jr. 
exclaimed, “no one is in danger out here.  Everyone is having fun.”  He connected the 
strict policing of black residents in his home, the St. Bernard Projects, to musicians’ 
surveillance within the French Quarter. “We are at war with ourselves,” he stated grimly. 
As historian Joel Dinerstein argues, the post-Katrina repression of second line parades 
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and Mardi Gras Indians constitutes “aesthetic racism” by threatening not only the creative 
expression of working class black communities, but the possibility of rebuilding these 
neighborhoods as well.88 
 In contrast, as a form of communal expression and social critique, music 
cooperatives have mobilized public housing and low-income residents against 
underemployment, affordable housing shortages, gentrification, and other issues 
stemming from neoliberal economic policies. For example, in 2007 McCormack Baron 
Salizar formed the non-profit organization Urban Strategies to help locate and provide 
social services and job training for former Magnolia Public Housing residents 
“involuntarily displaced throughout Louisiana and neighboring by Hurricane Katrina” 
and now residing at the newly opened Harmony Oaks.89  It neglected to note, however, 
that by eliminating the majority of low-income units in 2008, the developer itself 
provided a strong disincentive for many needy families to return to Central City.90 
 Simultaneously, when developers announced plans to demolish 4,600 public 
housing units, a coalition of community groups paraded from City Hall to the St. Bernard 
Public Housing Project in peaceful protest.91  The “Party with a Purpose” second line 
danced to the Hot 8 Brass Band, and demonstrators sang, “I need my home/We need our 
homes/Don’t take my home away.”  While police broke up the demonstration and 
arrested protestors after they entered the St. Bernard property, brass bands and second 
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lines, as indigenous cooperative institutions, continue to operate as a significant site of 
black working-class resistance. 
 In contrast, community-based cooperatives like Rhythm Conspiracy model how 
predominantly black cooperatives can help marginalized residents demand government 
services and direct equitable neighborhood investment.92 The cooperative bridges social 
aid and pleasure clubs and second lines with the national cooperative movement to 
advocate a living wage for city musicians. In 2006, musicians from Central City’s former 
public housing projects Magnolia, St. Thomas, and Calliope created the Rhythm 
Conspiracy workers cooperative to legitimize their art while also advocating affordable 
housing and job training in non-performing aspects of the music business, such as 
merchandizing, event booking, and production management.  Additionally, Rhythm 
Conspiracy performers tour the nation to export New Orleans music to new markets.  
 Stevens has also formed the New Orleans Cooperative Development Project, a 
consortium of university professors, small business owners, economic and workforce 
development administrators, social aid and pleasure clubs, and citizens who 
democratically discuss how to expand the city’s cooperative economy.93 The Project 
mobilizes laborers across the city’s service and tourist industry to press for better 
working conditions. Ultimately, the cooperative believes, if “significant cultural services 
and products are coming out of the most marginalized neighborhoods, they can’t become 
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gentrified in ways that similar neighborhoods are being gentrified in cities around the 
country.”94 By establishing a local and national framework through which public housing 
residents can influence economic and urban development, Rhythm Conspiracy offers a 
potentially transformative model for citywide cooperative development. 
Chapter Organization 
 My first chapter argues that turn-of-the-century New Orleans cooperatives, 
specifically, the Brotherhood of Cooperative Commonwealth (BCC), were sites of 
exchange and conflict between indigenous and immigrant activists.  While historians 
have claimed that explosive racial tensions had decimated the city’s interracial labor 
movement in the mid- to late 1890s, the BCC bridged moments of integrated protest by 
providing an outlet for impoverished multiracial citizens to reclaim influence over 
corrupt political and economic institutions.  Cuban-American Eugene Bacarrise and 
German August Graf co-founded the BCC in 1897 at the end of a four-year-long national 
depression.  After organizing the Laboringman’s Protective Association as its direct 
action arm, the Socialist cooperative mobilized blacks, ethnic whites, and immigrants to 
demand unemployment benefits from the city.  The BCC countered an exploitative New 
Orleans industrial system by promoting a Socialist society free from capitalistic 
competition and labor demagoguery.  Drawing on Richard White’s (1991) concept of the 
“middle ground,” I demonstrate that black Creole, Caribbean, and European BBC 
                                                




officials used a language of inclusion and cooperation that briefly transcended racial and 
ethnic barriers to citywide labor organizing. 
 However, I also contend that persistent unemployment, a yellow fever outbreak, 
and lack of public legitimacy shattered BCC’s nascent multiracial and multiethnic 
cooperative movement.  By the end of 1897, the BCC had renamed itself the White 
Laboring Men’s Protective Association, ousted its black members, and proposed barring 
Sicilian immigration to protect “home labor.”  In studying the BCC, I analyze the true 
cost of Southern radicals’ decision to abandon their racially egalitarian “cooperative 
commonwealth” to instead address unemployed white laborers’ short-term needs. 
 Chapter two examines cooperatives’ sorely overlooked contributions to female 
political institution-building during New Orleans’ interwar years.  In the wake of World 
War I demilitarization, Americans’ cost of living skyrocketed as the federal government 
removed wartime price controls, and expanding chain grocery stores shuttered small 
businesses.  I argue that in response, female activists in New Orleans allied with the state 
apparatus and strategically deployed a rhetoric of white women’s superior morality in 
order to demand a national cooperative economy. 
 Specifically, I analyze three female cooperators’ efforts between 1919 and 1921 to 
simultaneously establish a women-owned cooperative grocery store and launch a 
Southern cooperative movement. New Orleans Housewives League members Inez 
MacMartin Meyers, Edna Egleston, and Ida Weis Friend collaborated with the Chamber 




supported network of ethical enterprises.  At the same time, they allied with leftist 
organizations like the Cooperative League of America, the National Consumers League, 
and labor unionists to foster a new moral economy that would revive civic engagement 
and community cooperation.  However, I also uncover the corrosive racial and class 
assumptions undergirding the Housewives’ League’s cooperative economy undermined 
their endeavors to engineer a national moral revolution. While middle-class white female 
cooperators largely avoided interracial organizing in the early 1920s, by the Great 
Depression, the city experienced a resurgence of interracial cooperative as a means to end 
racial and class inequality. 
 Chapter three charts Socialist barber Henry Hermes’s 50-year cooperative career.  
Between 1936 and 1987, Hermes spearheaded a multi-ethnic, biracial, and gender-
inclusive cooperative movement.  Fervently believing that public control over industry 
and government would revitalize Democracy and eradicate political repression, 
institutionalized racism, and corporate capitalism, Hermes established the Consumers’ 
Co-operative Union (CCU) in 1941 as the physical manifestation of his utopian vision.  
For ten years, the CCU not only functioned as a cooperative grocery store for working-
class Freret Neighborhood residents, but as a conceptual space for discussing economic 
cooperation, racial justice, and political reform.  Hermes depended on a far-reaching New 
Deal support network that transcended his neighborhood and bridged political, racial, 




 However, this coalition disintegrated in the face of white flight, anti-Communist 
hysteria, and urban economic decline in the 1950s.  Consequently, Hermes joined 
mainstream cooperatives like the Louisiana Credit Union League, whose social and 
economic policies reflected the Great Society’s moderate civil rights and anti-poverty 
programs.  After spending 30 years advocating credit unions to ameliorate racialized 
poverty, Hermes allied with anarchist and socialist cooperatives in the 1980s to assert 
public control over the city’s utilities company.  This radical contingent of cooperatives 
would revitalize the city’s flagging cooperative movement and defined cooperative 
organizing until Hurricane Katrina disrupted its fragile ecosystem. Although integrated 
cooperatives enabled African American members to participate in and even direct the 
organizations, persistent segregationist thought within Louisiana cooperative movement, 
and southern society more generally, hampered integrated cooperatives’ ability to fully 
address black constituent’s economic and political needs. 
 My fourth chapter highlights the cooperative careers of Dillard University president 
Albert W. Dent and his son, Thomas Dent, to examine the long history of black 
cooperative activism and its connections to racial justice organizing in New Orleans 
between the 1930s and 1980s.  Albert Dent formed the Flint-Goodridge Medical 
Cooperative in 1936 to provide New Orleans’ black residents access to hospitalization 
services.  Writer and playwright Tom Dent joined the Free Southern Theater (FST) in 
1965, a radical black theater collective serving New Orleans and the Deep South from 




Movement and black identity politics, I consider 1) the centrality of FST’s cooperative 
structure to its ethical worldview, 2) its deep ties to black cooperative traditions, and 3) 
its commitment to fostering a network of black Southern cooperatives.  In essence, the 
Flint-Goodridge Hospital cooperative and FST are anchors in a civil rights story that 
examines ruptures and continuities in cooperative organizing across time and place. 
 My fifth chapter links historical grassroots strategies to those that still inform 
cooperative and community response to urban land use today.  It discusses cooperatives’ 
role in post-Hurricane Katrina land-use debates, specifically their utopian project to 
rebuild New Orleans while transforming its racial, gender, class, and geographic 
dynamics.  Simultaneously, New Orleans collectives affiliate with national cooperative 
leagues to critique neoliberal economic and political policies they feel perpetuate 
systemic inequality both locally and nationally.  At the same time, I argue that veteran 
New Orleanian cooperators form the backbone of the contemporary cooperative 
movement, firmly linking current cooperatives to the city’s legacy of civil rights and 
cooperative activism.  Drawing on cooperative oral history interviews, I analyze how 
three long-time New Orleans residents have used past cooperative experiences to form 
post-Katrina cooperatives advocating for racial justice in neighborhood, city, and regional 
food systems.  Specifically, Macon Fry’s Gathering Tree Growers Collective, John 
Clark’s Solidarity Economy, and Harvey Reed’s Louisiana Association of Cooperatives 
seek to democratize food production, distribution, and consumption systems to expand 




negotiate the unanticipated consequences of their actions, such as gentrification, 
community disinterest, and City opposition. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Featured Cooperatives.  
 Although cooperatives have been integral to advancing the aims of labor unionists, 
suffragists, consumer organizers, and civil rights activists, they are largely invisible in 
social movement history. Part of cooperatives’ historical erasure is rooted in their lack of 
a satisfying narrative arc. Often ephemeral, contradictory, and stolidly concerned with 
members’ day-to-day existence, cooperatives invite dismissal. While frequently informal, 
small enterprises with a few committed leaders, cooperatives continually spring up in 




They are both intensely local and citywide phenomena, addressing constituents’ 
economic hardship and political disempowerment. However, as expressions of 
neighborhood customs, affiliation, gender, race, class, and religion, cooperatives are 
integral to understanding how people’s lived experiences undergird larger social 
movement history. Indeed, working in sympathy with established social movements, 
cooperatives are dedicated to fulfilling members’ most fundamental needs: food, shelter, 




Chapter 1: “To the Very Danger Line of Incendiarism”: Labor, Race, and Place in 
the New Orleans Cooperative Movement 
 Throughout July 1897, New Orleans’ unemployed laborers had circulated 
mysterious “flaming red hand bills” amongst themselves, inviting all to participate in a 
mass march proceeding from Congo Square’s Globe Hall to Lafayette Square, where the 
amassed workers would demand Mayor Walter Flower address the lingering national 
depression.1  On July 16, the appointed day, a “motley crowd from seventy-five to a 
hundred men, who needed no credentials as to their being out of employment” amassed 
on the hot square. They milled about with “no center, head, nor tail to them.” Hours later, 
there was still no sign of an organizer, and the meeting hall remained locked tight.  
Fearful that the restless gathering would devolve into an angry mob, police quickly 
dispersed the men.  Finally, two figures emerged from the crowd to claim responsibility 
for the march: Eugene Bacarisse and August Graf, leaders of the New Orleans 
Brotherhood of Cooperative Commonwealth, a Socialist, multi-racial cooperative and 
unemployed workers union.  The would-be agitators could neither afford the two dollar 
rent for Globe Hall nor the event permit fee, and the morning culminated in their arrest 
by the sweating and “corpulent form of Sergeant Gabriel Porteous.”2   
 Back at the police station, Police Chief Dexter Gaster sternly lectured Bacarisse 
and Graf on the futility of their cause: Rather than stir up trouble in New Orleans, why 
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didn’t the Cuban-born Bacarisse help his fellow countrymen “lick” the Spanish 
colonizers?  For his part, Graf was surely a “Dutchman, and an anarchist: that’s a dead 
easy guess.” Gaster denounced Bacarisse and Graf as “foreigners over here out of 
employment” who should not presume to “teach the American people anything.”  He 
conceded, “there is a great deal of distress because of men not being able to secure 
employment, but they are never going to obtain any relief from such fellows as you.”3  
Yet Graf disavowed any radical tendencies, stating that far from advocating violent 
revolution, the Brotherhood was forming a labor protective association to peacefully 
resolve worker-employer conflict.  With that, the two men were summarily dismissed. 
     * * * 
 This small scene, portrayed in the local color section of the Daily Picayune, 
symbolizes the promise and the failure of cross-racial organizing in turn-of-the-century 
New Orleans.  Historians point to the late 1890s as the nadir for labor and civil rights 
activism in the city.4   While cooperation among working-class blacks and whites was 
common during the 1880s, and culminated in a general strike in 1892, the labor 
movement’s commitment to racial solidarity crumbled in the face of the 1893 to 1897 
economic depression and violent waterfront riots between 1894 and 1895.  
Simultaneously, in 1896, Louisiana disenfranchised 90 percent of black voters, while the 
U.S. Supreme Court case Plessy vs. Ferguson upheld “separate but equal” public 
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accommodations, further eviscerating Reconstruction’s equal rights legislation.5  Against 
such disheartening events, meaningful interracial collaboration seemed impossible. 
 Yet the story of the New Orleans chapter of the Brotherhood of the Cooperative 
Commonwealth (BCC) decenters this declension narrative.  Cuban-American Eugene 
Bacarisse and German-born August Graf co-founded the BCC as a multiracial Socialist 
cooperative to galvanize working-class blacks, ethnic whites, and immigrants to demand 
unemployment benefits from city and state officials.  Although short-lived, the 
Brotherhood is significant for two reasons: first, formed out of the ashes of the 1894 
longshoremen’s riots and the Populists’ electoral defeat in 1896, the BCC occupies a 
transitional moment in multiethnic collaboration before radical, sustained interracial 
union organizing reemerged in 1901.  Secondly, the BCC briefly transcended class and 
racial antagonisms to capitalize on a revolutionary municipal public works system that 
would employ not just the Brotherhood’s constituents, but also thousands of workers 
across the city in the decades to come.  Very quickly, however, the BCC’s progressive 
politics fell victim to a conservative, segregationist populism that eventually eclipsed 
these organizers’ potentially transformative, firebrand politics.  
 This chapter examines three distinct periods in the Brotherhood’s ten month 
history: the BCC’s activities between February and July 1897; the formation and 
dissolution of its operational arm, the Laboringmen’s Protective Association (LMPA), 
between July and October 1897; and the emergence of a splinter group, the White 
                                                




Laboringmen’s Protective Association (WLMPA), in October 1897.  These successive 
organizations embody three competing intellectual trajectories within the cooperative: 
While Christian Socialist Eugene Bacarisse used the BCC as a mouthpiece for espousing 
French republicanism and universal brotherhood, Creole of Color activists in the LMPA 
tied economic security for black workers to a larger campaign for social and political 
equality.  Finally, August Graf’s leadership within the WLMPA reflected a theatrical 
working-class Socialism that prized craft unionism, direct action, and white ethnic 
identity.  The convergence of Cuban, Creole of color, and European intellectual and 
political currents breathed life into the BCC; however, the cooperative ultimately did not 
survive the philosophical contradictions such conflicting worldviews posed.     
 While the Brotherhood existed for less than a year, its vision of an integrated 
workers’ rights program captures the city’s labor movement in flux, before Jim Crow 
laws and the demonization of racial justice activists stultified New Orleans’s impulse 
toward radical organizing.  Indeed, the Brotherhood’s utopian vision of cooperative 
economics and democratic Socialism coincided with a moment of profound social, 
economic, and political transformation both in New Orleans and nationally.  For 
example, Graf and Bacarisse mobilized ethnically diverse workers in response to: a 
yellow fever epidemic that paralyzed the city’s waterfront economy; diminishing black 
voting rights; Italian immigration’s destabilizing effect on Louisiana’s labor distribution; 
and an expanding transnational solidarity and democratic movement among Cuban 




Spanish American War.  However, the Brotherhood’s alliance with American Federation 
of Labor (AFL) trade unionists presaged the larger labor movement’s abandonment of 
racial and class equality and its embrace of racially divisive “bread and butter” 
organizing around higher wages and worker benefits for white New Orleanians.  
Essentially, this chapter analyzes how narrowing definitions of whiteness and racial 
formation contained a potentially revolutionary social movement.   
Organizational Structure of the BCC, LMPA, and WLMPA 
 Structurally, the Brotherhood modeled cooperative governance.6  Until October 
1897, the organization was open to any man, black or white, and all members voted 
democratically on directors during regular elections.7  The cooperative also decided on its 
plan of action as a group during long, often contentious, monthly meetings.  The men, 
save Bacarisse, were solidly working-class; many were bartenders, machinists, 
dockworkers, and day laborers. They lived along the Mississippi waterfront, or in the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Wards, home to residents of German, Irish, Cuban, and Creole 
(a mixture of African, French, and Spanish) heritage.8  
 Drawing on the Christian Socialist theory that the “Christian principle of 
cooperation [would] improve industrial relations,” Eugene Bacarisse offered Brotherhood 
members an intangible glimpse into the future: by working together, people of all classes 
and races could achieve a new, harmonious society free from the evils of individualistic 
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competition and corporate capitalism.9   The Brotherhood had two goals: to advance 
Socialism and end rampant unemployment among the city’s working class.  To that end, 
it helped establish worker cooperatives, hosted prominent political figures, staged 
unemployment marches, wrote editorials in local papers, and met with city leaders.  
 The Brotherhood also formed a direct-action organization, the LMPA that worked 
in tandem with the cooperative to mobilize laborers to demand unemployment relief from 
the city.  While the BCC concentrated on public education, the LMPA became the public 
face of Bacarisse and Graf’s cooperative program; after July 1897, it increasingly held 
rallies, public meetings, and liaised with government officials.  The LMPA was a 
cooperative labor union; it embraced cooperative organizational principles while uniting 
unemployed workers across industrial lines rather than specific trades.10  Nonetheless, the 
differences between the LMPA and the BCC were largely rhetorical; in the face of fierce 
public and government opposition to black and immigrant Socialists, Bacarisse and Graf 
strategically positioned the LMPA’s radical political and economic activities as 
traditional labor organizing.  Indeed, the two groups shared members, and like the BCC, 
the LMPA had democratically-run meetings, consensus decision-making, and regular 
elections featuring boisterous interjections from members and spectators alike.  However, 
when the LMPA collapsed in October 1897 under the weight of conflicting ideologies 
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and mounting white supremacy, its successor, the WLMPA, rejected a cooperative 
structure to instead emulate mainstream craft unions. 
The Roots of the Brotherhood of the Cooperative Commonwealth 
 The Brotherhood, the LMPA, and the WLMPA were the projects of two 
impetuous and outspoken personalities who, despite their common desire for Socialist 
governance and economic equality, often competed with each other to control the 
cooperative’s philosophy and direction.  While Eugene Bacarisse believed America 
would gradually and peacefully evolve into a Socialist society, 27 year-old August Graf 
imagined he was part of an impending workers’ revolution.  Born in Berlin in 1870, Graf 
immigrated to the United States in 1889 and moved to New Orleans in the 1890s.11  
Living with his father, a machinist, at the edge of the French Quarter in the Marigny, 
Graf quickly joined the city’s German Catholic community, participating in cooperatively 
run benevolent associations such as the Ninth Ward Protective and Improvement 
Association.12  However, Graf became interested in formal cooperative and Socialist 
organizing after he lost his streetcar conducting job during the 1893-1897 national 
depression; for months in 1896 he fruitlessly searched for work to support his family.13    
 Eventually, like many German immigrants, Graf became a bartender.  
Contemporary Germans owned and operated hundreds of saloons, hotels, 
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boardinghouses, and restaurants in New Orleans.14  They also monopolized beer 
production and distribution: platform workers, drivers, salesmen, bartenders, drummers, 
stable keepers, and day laborers were virtually all German during this period.15  Likewise, 
Graf worked at C. Aimes’s saloon and boardinghouse in the “immigrant belt” of the 
Central Business District.16  He and his Irish-American wife Arabella Buras Meade began 
managing the saloon in 1901 and attracted a loyal German and Austrian clientele.17  
 Foreshadowing Graf’s enthusiasm for cooperative organizing, saloons were 
prominent sites of ethnic community cooperation, racial integration, and working-class 
political organizing. First, labor historian Daniel Rosenberg notes that even after the 
collapse of the city’s interracial labor movement in 1894, saloons remained “startling 
examples of continued integration and so-called social equality,” which echoed Graf’s 
initial support of multiracial labor unions.18 Second, as historian John Frederick Nau 
argues, because German restaurant-boarding houses served as “places of recreation and 
rest [and] also as rendezvous, especially for the newly arrived German immigrant,” they 
fostered strong communal bonds among patrons and staff.19 Third, white ethnic bar 
owners served crucial political roles as Democratic political machine precinct captains.  
By dispensing jobs, financial aid, and other charity to loyal party members, they fostered 
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tight-knit neighborhood communities necessary to maintaining the Democratic Ring’s 
control over city politics.20  For example, Graf was arrested several times for registering 
non-citizens to vote and selling illegal lottery tickets to support the Democratic 
machine.21  In return, like many working-class voters, he expected his active campaign 
work to be rewarded with political patronage.22  
 Because Graf’s saloon was a center of German working-class sociability, he 
easily recruited fellow German bartenders and patrons to the Brotherhood.  His 
commitment to his German working-class brethren had distinct political ramifications, 
however.  Despite Graf’s allegiance to Socialist political transformation, he was also 
active in the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, an AFL affiliate.  
As historian Matthew Jospheson argues, the craft union was emblematic of AFL’s 
disavowal of radical politics to focus instead on winning wage increases for skilled white 
workers.23  Ultimately, Graf’s dual allegiance to mainstream trade unions and his white 
ethnic identity would lead him to repudiate cooperative formation and racial justice 
activism for traditional labor organizing and moderate capitalist reform. 
Eugene Bacarisse and Tremé Neighborhood 
 In contrast, Eugene Bacarisse believed the Brotherhood should peacefully 
transform society into a cooperative commonwealth through public education, political 
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action, and government cooperation.  Unlike Graf, whose cooperative inclinations were 
fostered by his participation in craft unions and immigrant benevolent association, 
Bacarisse was inspired by the overlapping cooperative culture of the Cuban independence 
movement, national Socialist and religious utopian experiments, and New Orleans’ 
Creole of color civil rights campaigns. 
 While Eugene Bernard Bacarisse was born in Havana in 1867 to Cuban natives 
Charles Bacarisse and Antoinette Baraliere, his Roman Catholic family had deep roots in 
New Orleans.24  Eugene’s paternal grandmother, Lise Augustine Cohen, was born in 
Cuba to French and Dutch parents, but she grew up in New Orleans.25  As a young clerk 
of 22, Eugene’s paternal grandfather Louis Gerome Charles Bacarisse emigrated from 
Bordeaux, France to New Orleans in 1839.26   He married Cohen a year later.27  
 Involved in Gulf Coast mercantile trading, the Bacarisses frequently moved 
between Cuba and New Orleans.28  Accordingly, the Bacarisses’ lives and finances were 
                                                
24 1870 United States Census, s.v. “Eugene Bacarise,” New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, accessed 
through Ancestry.com; “Batarisse,” Daily Picayune (November 19, 1919): 2. 
25  “Lise Augustine Cohen Bacarisse,” Orleans Death Indices 1894-1907, 3:141, accessed through 
Ancestry.com; 1900 United States Census, s.v. “Augustine Bacarisse,” New Orleans, Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana, accessed through Ancestry.com; 1880 United States Census, s.v. “Lise Bacarisse,” New 
Orleans, Orleans, Louisiana, accessed through Ancestry.com. 
26 “Bacarisse,” (February 2, 1839), Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, Louisiana, 1820-
1902, accessed through Ancestry.com; Amadee Ducatel, “Bacarisse, Lise Augustin Cohen,” Notarial 
Act Index (June-December 1867), 3:2, 
http://www.notarialarchives.org/aducatelindexes/ducatel_amedee_vol_90.pdf; Max Henríquez Ureña, 
“Poetas Cubanos de Expresion Francesa,” Inicio 3, no. 6 (May 1941): 6, http://revista-
iberoamericana.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/Iberoamericana/article/view/1031/1265. 
27   “Augustine Lise Cohen,” Alabama, Select Marriages, 1816-1957 (October 19, 1840), Ancestry.com. 
28 “C. Bacarisse,” Work Projects Administration Transcript of Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New 
Orleans, Louisiana, 1813-1849 (July 29, 1841), accessed through Ancestry.com; “Chas. Bacaresse,” 
Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, Louisiana, 1820-1902 (April 23, 1865); 1870 
United States Census, s.v. “Eugene Bacarise,” New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, accessed 




directly touched by Cuba’s unstable political climate, as well as America’s evolving 
expansionist policies and diplomacy with Spain.  For example, the growing tobacco trade 
and the establishment of cigar factories in New Orleans, New York, and Key West drove 
Cuban immigration to the United States in the mid-1870s.29  Similarly, after weathering 
Cuba’s economic crisis in 1867 and a sugar planters’ political revolt that sparked the Ten 
Years War (1868-1878), the Bacarisse family relocated to the relative safety of New 
Orleans in 1869.30 Significantly, the Bacarisse family’s slippery racial and ethnic identity 
may have made Eugene sensitive to the ways in which race and class privilege 
reproduced inequality. For example, while the 1870 United States Census labeled the 
Bacarisses as “mulatto,” the 1880 census classified most of the family, including Eugene, 
as “white.”31  Some, however, like his grandmother and aunt, continued to be classified as 
black well into the 1900s.  Adding to the confusion, the Bacarisses lived alongside 
Cuban, French, black Creole, and mixed race Fifth and Sixth Ward residents well into the 
1900s.32  Interestingly, the Bacarisses chose to remain in Tremé’s multiethnic 
neighborhood even as white Fifth Ward white Creoles moved to newly drained suburban 
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plots along Lake Pontchartrain during the 1890s.  While the 1893-1897 economic 
depression forced the affluent Bacarisses to downsize from their elegant five-bedroom 
French Quarter townhouse to a modest Tremé shotgun house less than a mile from Congo 
Square, they remained ensconced in a diverse Cuban and Creole of color cultural 
milieu.33  Their neighbors were a mix of white and black Creole stenographers, teachers, 
slaters, grocery merchants, and streetcar conductors.34  While Cubans would have simply 
labeled Eugene a “Creole” for his European ancestry, his Cuban heritage and residence in 
ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods confounded New Orleans’ census takers.35    
 Enjoying a comfortable, middle-class lifestyle, the Bacarisses resided within the 
burgeoning Cuban expatriate community in Tremé, home to the city’s large population of 
French- and Spanish-speaking Creoles of color.36  Cuban nationalists were drawn to New 
Orleans: As an outgrowth of manifest destiny rhetoric that sought to expand American 
influence, New Orleans’ political and commercial interests supported Cuba’s long 
struggle for independence, funding Cuban revolutionaries’ filibusters and liberation 
campaigns.37  Radical Cuban revolutionary and poet José Martí observed that the Tremé 
Cuban community was comprised primarily of educated exiles: veterans of the Ten 
Years’ War and their relatives, as well as lawyers, reporters, pharmacists, and cigar 
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manufacturers.38  Exiles published journals, newspapers, and literature supporting Cuban 
liberation, and they also helped organize and fund the Cuban separatist movement 
leading up to the 1898 War of Independence.39 
 The Bacarisses were well aware of their fellow Cuban émigrés’ political activity 
in Tremé.  For his part, Charles Bacarisse, Eugene’s father, supported Cuban liberation, 
composing romantic odes to both France’s Bastille Day and Cuba’s Tenth of October, the 
beginning of the Ten Year’s War.40   Not only did Cuban political and social 
organizations hold banquets, street parades, and balls throughout the neighborhood, but 
their headquarters were also located at cigar manufacturer and Cuban patriot José 
Echezabal’s residence, close to the Bacarisses’ home.41  Finally, Charles Bacarisse also 
lived near, worked with, and socialized with Cuban nationalist Dr. Juan G. Hava.42  Hava 
and his followers ardently supported Cuban liberation and believed that to avoid 
American annexation, Cuba must maintain socioeconomic stability following a Cuban-
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directed military victory over Spain.43  Economic health could only be secured through 
gradual emancipation of slaves, financial compensation to slaveholders, and labor reform. 
 Against this background of heady revolutionary rhetoric, Eugene Bacarisse 
blossomed into a self-described “thinker, philosopher, poet, sociologist and 
humanitarian,” and, along with the Cuban intelligentsia, became active in various 
associations celebrating French intellectual and political thought.44  For example, in the 
Club of French Democracy, he honored the French Republic of 1792, advocated French 
democratic ideals, and adhered to the organization’s motto “Liberte, Egalité, Fraternity, 
Solidarite.” Fittingly, Bacarisse spoke on “Universal Social Progress” at a Club event in 
the early 1890s.45  Similarly, l’Athénée Louisianais society strove to preserve the French 
language in Louisiana and promote literature and scholarly research.46  Additionally, as a 
stenographer, Bacarisse joined the Stenographic Association, which was indebted to 
French scholarly, philosophical, and aesthetic traditions.47  The organization not only 
promoted shorthand but also provided a forum for discussing academic writings, debating 
contemporary social problems, and staging creative performances.48 These organizations 
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exposed Bacarisse to the egalitarian, democratic principles he would advocate as a 
Brotherhood spokesperson in 1897.  
 Growing up in an integrated neighborhood among radicalized Cubans and Creoles 
galvanized Bacarisse into rebuilding an interracial labor movement fostering harmonious 
class and racial relations.  Tremé was host to a long tradition of intellectual and cultural 
exchange among its black and Cuban populations.  As a child, Bacarisse lived among 
French-speaking Creoles of color who worked as shoemakers, dressmakers, brick 
masons, coopers, and plasterers.49  These skilled craftspeople, along with dockworkers, 
formed the forefront of New Orleans’ equal rights movement as the advances of Radical 
Reconstruction rapidly eroded during the 1880s and 1890s.  Significantly, New Orleans’ 
Creoles of color, like Cuban-Haitian activist Rodolphe Lucien Desdunes, saw Cuba’s 
liberation as part of a larger Caribbean and American movement for political justice, even 
noting Cuban political events in his radical black newspaper, The Crusader.50  
Specifically, Bacarisse’s geographic proximity to politicized black and Cuban cigar 
makers had a particularly radicalizing effect on the young man.51   
 Working alongside each other in cigar factories, prominent Cuban and Creole of 
color activists nurtured extensive and productive political alliances between the two 
Tremé communities. For example, Desdunes’ family owned a tobacco planation and 
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cigar factory, while black medical insurance cooperative organizer Walter L. Cohen 
originally worked as a cigar maker.52  Similarly, the separatist club Los Intransigientes 
(The Intransigents Club) worked closely with revolutionary Juan Martí’s Cuban 
Revolutionary Party and was led by Andrés Alpízar, a cigar manufacturer and veteran of 
Cuba’s first war of independence in 1868.53    
 As a result, even as they supported liberation struggles in their home country, 
many Cuban tobacco workers in New Orleans also supported the cause of 
enfranchisement-seeking Creoles of color.54  When Desdunes and Martinet formed the 
radical Citizens Committee in 1891 to reclaim black enfranchisement, they invited Cuban 
revolutionary and Cigar Makers Union president Ramón Pagés to speak at its subsequent 
meetings.55  While Pagés was a “stranger by his language,” Martinet noted he was “heart 
and soul” with the Citizens Committee’s objectives: “The sun did not divide off a portion 
of its rays for one class and a portion for the other, a part of the whites and a part for the 
blacks; but shone equally for everybody.”56   
 Littering the Brotherhood’s membership rolls, Tremé cigar workers and their 
family members directly influenced the cooperative’s egalitarian organizational structure.  
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Future BCC member and German-American John J. Baltz’s sister worked as a 
bunchmaker in a cigar factory, while Henry J. Desalles, a black Creole and LMPA 
member, had many cigar-making relatives in the Seventh Ward.57  In line with the BCC’s 
cooperative ideology and union sympathies, Cuban cigar workers, galvanized by lectors 
reading political treatises, tended to support anarchist and collectivist ideology.  In New 
York and Key West, Cubans even formed workers cooperatives and political discussion 
groups.58  Similarly, in 1901, cigar packers in New Orleans joined a citywide strike along 
with black and white brewer, painter, and carpenter unions and a union-sympathetic 
brewery cooperative.59  Long committed to cooperative principles and cross-union 
collaboration, the Brotherhood’s cigar worker members facilitated lasting alliances with 
the local Cigar Makers’ Union, the AFL, and many other unions to pressure the Louisiana 
government to implement emergency relief measures for the unemployed.60  
 Indeed, the city’s nineteenth-century Socialist, cooperative, and labor movements, 
while separate entities, frequently supported each other’s aims and adopted elements of 
each other’s organizational structure. For example, historian John Curl argues that 
between 1877 and 1898, the Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance embraced the industrial 
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labor movement’s commitment to working-class revolution; after achieving state control, 
it envisioned transforming modes of production into a national system of cooperatively-
owned factories organized at the union level.61  The BCC would also embrace both the 
cooperative and labor union movements as it campaigned for worker justice.    
 The factor that most directly defined Eugene Bacarisse’s faith in cooperatives’ 
ability to achieve political and economic transformation, however, was his father and 
brother’s employment as stenographer and clerk, respectively, in the nascent Farmers’ 
Union Commercial Association of Louisiana (FUCA) in 1890.62  Part of a Populist self-
help economic initiative, the organization was a wholesale and retail cooperative that 
enabled small farmers to ship produce to a dozen Farmers’ Union retail stores throughout 
the state.63  In the face of rising debt and dropping crop prices, the cooperative believed 
that monopolistic corporations were starving independent farmers; it therefore strove to 
eliminate the exploitative middleman and compete with powerful agrarian operations by 
organizing large-scale, profitable cooperative networks.  FCUA head John Tetts believed 
cooperative economics was the apogee of civilization; Bacarisse would echo this social 
evolutionary theory as he organized the BCC.64 
 The cooperative organization was part of a broader Populist political movement, 
in which reformist Democrats, African Americans, Republicans, farmers and laborers 
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united to eliminate political corruption and improve working conditions and education for 
poor Louisianans.65  In 1891, Populists organized the People’s Party, an integrated 
coalition of farmers, sharecroppers, and New Orleans Knights of Labor unionists, to elect 
a governor and legislature sympathetic to currency, land ownership, and income tax 
policy reform.66  Although the Farmers’ Union headquarters and its retail cooperatives 
failed by 1893, Eugene remained involved in Populist political campaigning; indeed, 
People’s Party would be a key Brotherhood and LMPA ally over the course of 1897.67 
 Ultimately, the Panic of 1893 pushed Bacarisse into labor organizing.  He could 
not find a job with a “living salary,” despite being a “competent stenographer and 
correspondent, having a fair knowledge of the English, French and Spanish languages.”68  
Bacarisse finally quit a low-paying stenographic job to form the BCC.69  Billing itself as 
the first chapter of the Socialist National Union of the Brotherhood of Co-operative 
Commonwealth on February 13, 1897, the 40-member BCC convened in Spiritualists’ 
Hall to ratify its charter and elect directors.70  Attendees were serenaded by bartender Paul 
Banch’s violin stylings, while the blustery Bacarisse held forth on “The Solution of the 
Human Problem and the Advantages of Socialism and Communism.”  Against a 
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background of incredible intellectual foment, radical activism, and repressive politics, the 
BCC combatted government corruption and unscrupulous corporate interests.  
The Intellectual Origins of the New Orleans BCC 
 It was not coincidental that 1897 was the year that the BCC coalesced.  That year, 
both utopian Socialists and Theosophists, the primary intellectual influences on 
Bacarisse’s cooperative philosophy, had launched an ambitious educational and political 
campaign to transform society.71  For example, Theosophists believed that the world had 
experienced a 5,000-year period of chaos, and they prophesied that a new age would 
dawn between 1897 and 1898.72  Founded by Colonel Henry Steel Olcott and Helena 
Blavatsky in 1875, the non-sectarian Theosophist Society was dedicated to fostering a 
class, race, and gender-inclusive “Universal Brotherhood of Humanity.”  To that end, the 
organization studied ancient and contemporary religion, science, philosophy, and art in 
order to better understand the “laws of nature” and the “divine powers in man.”73  To 
prepare for the new world and make manifest the universal brotherhood, in 1896 the 
Theosophical Society mounted an educational “crusade,” touring the nation and 
advocating social reform and cooperation over individualistic self-improvement.74   
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 Interestingly, Bacarisse was tied to the New Orleans’ Theosophical Society by its 
members’ Cuban heritage, geographic proximity, and interest in Cuba’s spiritual 
wellbeing. Sixth Ward residents Dr. Charles J. Lopez, a Cuban physician, and Joaquin 
Parra, a French-American cigar dealer, headed the New Orleans Theosophical Society.75  
Lopez was intimately involved in the Society’s Cuban activities after the Spanish-
American War. He headed the New Orleans branch of the Society’s International 
Brotherhood League, which provided humanitarian aid to war-torn Cuba.76  Believing 
Cuba was an ideal proving ground to implement its program for racial harmony and 
utopian communitarianism, the League arranged for orphaned Cuban children to be 
educated at the national Theosophical Society’s school in Point Loma, California.  Lopez 
even visited the school to personally welcome the Cuban students.77   
 On February 1897, the same month the BCC formed, the New Orleans 
Theosophist Society began proselytizing to French, German, and English-speaking clubs 
to prepare them for the impending new age.78  Bacarisse may have met future BCC 
members at these outreach events, or at the Society’s frequent classes and lectures, held 
at its Central Business District offices on 316 Baronne Street.79  For example, BCC 
secretary Carl Hyldahl joined the local branch of the Universal Brotherhood and 
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Theosophical Society in 1899, which sought to return society to its naturally cooperative 
state.80  The organization also donated money, meal tickets, clothing, and other assistance 
to charities serving New Orleans’ indigent populations. 
 While Theosophists distinguished their “common brotherhood” from Socialism, 
Bacarisse felt Christian Socialism and Theosophy were analogous in their pursuit of 
“truth.”81 Rejecting the racist antebellum science of polygenesis in favor of monogenesis, 
Theosophists believed that humans had a common origin and were bound by the principle 
of universal harmony.82  Specious religious education fostered individualistic 
competition, which hindered society from realizing its cooperative utopia.  Similarly, 
Eugene Bacarisse argued that capitalists’ “survival of the fittest” mentality merely 
justified their continued exploitation of the poor.83  Society had surely matured to a point 
in which no one was “humiliated [or] brutalized” by eking out a “mere physical 
existence.”  Rather than using the animal kingdom as a model for social organization, 
Bacarisse suggested economists and reformers alike turn to “cooperative sociology.”   
 In his discussion of the BCC’s aims, Bacarisse echoed New Orleans Theosophist 
Charles Lopez, who claimed, “Christianity is in its highest and truest 
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sense...theosophy.”84  They believed that society’s laws and commerce had embraced “the 
habits of cheating, lying, etc., [which] have become part of our lower nature.”  To 
achieve the universal brotherhood—to evolve—society must return to its Christian 
origins.  Likewise, Bacarisse argued that Socialism would reclaim society’s communal, 
cooperative roots embodied in early Christianity and would distribute the nation’s 
resources equitably among citizens, regardless of background.85   
 At the same time, the New Orleans chapter of the BCC was an outgrowth of 
utopian Socialist visions of the “cooperative commonwealth.”  In 1887, Socialist Edward 
Bellamy published Looking Backward, a wildly popular treatise on a futuristic 
“cooperative commonwealth” that featured state-owned industry and community 
cooperation as the basis of government and economic structure.86  Looking Backward and 
its sequel, Equality, inspired readers to form “Bellamy Clubs” in cities around the 
country, including in Louisiana.  The clubs not only advocated Bellamy’s vision of a 
Socialist society but formed their own cooperative colonies during the 1890s and 1900s.87     
 Similarly, in October 1895, Populist Normal Wallace Lermond organized two 
Bellamy-inspired utopian colonies in Maine.88  Writing in the New York publication 
Commonwealth, he implored Populist and Socialist readers to form their own locals and 
to affiliate into a national cooperative organization.  The national headquarters, itself a 
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vast colony, would financially and materially support a constellation of pioneer 
settlements.  After two years of agitating, in early 1897, Lermond founded the National 
Union of the Brotherhood of Cooperative Commonwealth out of the ashes of a fractured 
Socialist Party.  The organization’s goals were to educate Americans about Socialism, to 
unite all Socialists into one cooperative society, and finally, to establish a cluster of 
cooperatives that would eventually colonize Washington State, converting government, 
then the nation, to socialism.89  Initially situating itself within the Christian Socialist 
movement, the National Union declared that its colonization program would result in 
“Mutualism or the Kingdom of Heaven Here and Now.”90  In response, Populist and 
Socialist publications advertised the Brotherhood’s activities, and radicals across the 
country donated thousands of dollars to the cooperative project.  
 New Orleans Socialists were similarly swept up in the National Union’s utopian 
vision of a peaceful Socialist revolution. While scholars have characterized the National 
Union as a single, ill-fated Equality Colony in Skagit County, Washington, it had clear 
intellectual ties to New Orleans. National Union President Reverend Myron W. Reed 
began his career as a prominent Christian Socialist preaching in 1870s New Orleans; he 
advocated cooperation and education as the means by which Socialists and laborers 
would create a new, egalitarian society.91 For decades, Reed’s controversial speeches, 
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including one pronouncing Jesus an anarchist, were published in the city’s papers.92  Reed 
directly inspired New Orleans Socialists to create their own labor organization.93   
 Months before the Skagit County colony was formally established in November 
1897, New Orleans had announced the formation of its own local Brotherhood branch.  In 
practice, however, the BCC chapter hardly resembled the Equality Colony’s agrarian 
commune.94  Equality’s rural colonists lived together in apartments or campsites, worked 
in groups, and ate in common dining halls.  They grew and processed their own food and 
educated their children in the colony’s schoolhouse.  In contrast, New Orleans BCC 
members lived and worked across the city and represented a cross-section of its diverse 
labor and ethnic landscape. 
 The BCC not only hosted educational lectures and flirted with mass marches, but 
it also functioned as a consulting service for labor organizations interested in forming 
cooperative businesses to help members regain control over their livelihood.  For 
example, disgruntled workers organized the Mill Hands Union after lumber mill owners 
forced employees to work ten hours a day without compensation during the off-season.95  
With the support of the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, the mill hands struck in 
March and April 1897.96   At a Screwmen’s Hall union meeting, Eugene Bacarisse 
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pledged his support of the mill workers’ cause.  Bacarisse also proposed opening a 
cooperative lumber mill in the lower Ninth Ward to compete with non-unionized rural 
and New Orleans mills.  The mill would operate less than nine hours a day and pay 
laborers high wages.97  The plan enjoyed broad support from “every class of labor” in the 
building trades and the Mill Hands Union sold stock exclusively to mill workers at $25 a 
share.  While the mill never materialized (perhaps due to its high stock price) it reveals 
the BCC’s role in popularizing union cooperatives in turn-of-the-century New Orleans.  
Philosophical Differences Within the BCC 
 Despite the BCC’s acceptance within the city’s labor movement, persistent 
internal conflict hampered its ability to set clear goals and strategies: would the 
cooperative cater to the New Orleans working-class, as August Graf wished, or strive for 
a total transformation of society, as Eugene Bacarisse desired?  Its struggle to reconcile 
various members’ political platforms mirrored the National Union’s own debates over 
industrial workers’ role in the cooperative commonwealth.  While imprisoned after 
leading the ill-fated American Railway Union’s Pullman Strike in the spring of 1894, 
industrial unionist Eugene V. Debs decided Socialism was the best means to achieve 
economic parity for the working-class.98  Impressed by Debs’ commitment to the labor 
struggle, the National Union hired him as its national representative in the spring of 1897.   
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 However, Debs viewed Equality as a refuge for aging or ailing railway unionists, 
rather than as a colonization project to systematically remodel society.99  In contrast, the 
National Union rejected the industrial system, professing an abiding faith in agricultural 
communal labor.  They also strove to organize middle-class professionals and 
cooperative sympathizers as well as the working-class. The National Union and Debs’ 
ideological differences could not be bridged, so Debs left the organization before the 
Equality Colony was established.  While Equality overcame Debs’ defection and 
flourished until 1907, the New Orleans BCC could not resolve the differences between 
Bacarisse’s genteel intellectualism and communitarian ideals and Graf’s commitment to 
working-class unionism.    
 The BCC’s ambivalent gender politics also reflected the cooperative’s division 
between white ethnic unionists and utopian Socialists. Bacarisse, for one, was an 
outspoken suffragist, a conviction perhaps fostered by his Cuban heritage.  Historian 
Louis A. Pérez argues that gender roles in revolutionary Cuba were highly complex; 
women as well as men demonstrated their commitment to Cuban nationalism by 
advocating military action against the Spanish government.100  Similarly, as Cuban radical 
and poet Juan Martí traveled through New Orleans in the 1890s, he noted the singular 
courage and revolutionary zeal of female Cuban expatriates.101  For example, the League 
of Cuban-American Ladies participated in Cuban demonstrations and collaborated with 
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prominent Cuban societies to raise American financial support for Cuban 
independence.102  Many Cubans believed that female insurrectionists provided the 
necessary moral framework necessary to build and sustain a revolution.103   
 Bacarisse also supported women’s political equality as the logical extent of his 
Socialist beliefs.104  He was therefore sympathetic to the National Union’s program of 
gender equity.  At Equality Colony, both female and male adults enjoyed full voting 
privileges, and women earned same wages as their male counterparts.105  Further, in 1896, 
National Union representative Eugene Debs traveled to New Orleans to demand female 
enfranchisement as a requirement for a just society.106  Similarly, as floodwaters 
threatened to breach New Orleans’ levees in April 1897, Bacarisse composed a politically 
conscious poem that argued if women had been enfranchised, they would have voted for 
“herculean levees,” averting disaster.107  Unless women received the vote, he predicted, 
future calamities were inevitable.   
 Yet Bacarisse’s counterpart August Graf ultimately controlled the BCC’s stance 
on women’s equality.  Unlike Bacarisse, August Graf ardently opposed women’s 
presence in the public sphere; accordingly, the local BCC’s was entirely male and was 
dedicated to securing employment for unemployed men, not women.  For example, in 
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June 1897, Graf opined that employers only hired women to cut labor costs, which 
effectively depressed wages for all workers.108  To hire one woman was to take “the bread 
out of the mouth of an entire family.”  Indeed, employing women encouraged child labor; 
children supported parents who had lost their jobs to single women desiring “pin money.” 
 Graf’s line of reasoning stemmed not only from contemporary labor union 
rhetoric, but his bartending experience as well.  The AFL viewed women as potential 
strikebreakers and competition, although the labor organization did not explicitly exclude 
women from union membership.109  As a bartender, Graf was wary of woman’s rights 
advocates who were also at the vanguard of the temperance movement.  In 1907, when 
radical Woman’s Christian Temperance Union leader and suffrage supporter Carrie 
Nation demanded that Graf debate her on the ethics of alcohol consumption, he flatly 
responded that he would never debate a woman, “especially not one I think is crazy.”110 
 Two highly publicized Brotherhood events more clearly illustrate the ideological 
divides between Graf and Bacarisse’s particular brands of Socialism: Jacob S. Coxey’s 
BCC sponsored talk and Bacarisse’s meeting with Bishop Davis Sessums.  Graf modeled 
his labor organizing on Coxey’s Army and advocated direct action to dramatize the plight 
of New Orleans’ unemployed.  In 1894, Coxey had assembled 2,000 unemployed men 
and women into the United States Industrial Army to march on Washington, D.C.111  The 
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BCC incorporated his demands that Congress reduce the 18-percent national 
unemployment rate by placing all unemployed workers, regardless of race, in a national 
public works program.  Yet while he embraced Coxey’s political platform, Bacarisse 
avoided direct action; he believed public education campaigns would persuade New 
Orleanians to join the cooperative commonwealth.  Graf and Bacarisse never reconciled 
these two tactics and publicly attacked each other’s Socialist pedigrees, which the press 
gleefully exploited to undermine the BCC’s credibility.   
 A longtime admirer, Graf persuaded Coxey to discuss his 1894 Non-Interest-
Bearing Bonds Bill at the BCC’s first public event in late February 1897.112  During a 
nearly two hour-long speech on the benefits of Socialism, Bacarisse breathlessly enthused 
that the Ohio gubernatorial candidate initiative would enable the “masses” to “earn an 
honest living” and deliver society from poverty-created “tramps and criminals.”113  
Finally, one man “tugged violently and frequently at the…speaker’s coat tails” to allow 
Coxey to speak.114  After thrilling the audience with exploits of Coxey’s Army, the guest 
of honor declared that the “non-interest bond” was the “sole and only remedy for the 
diseased condition of the American people.”  
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 In order to improve the country’s public infrastructure, Coxey proposed that the 
federal government establish a $500 investment plan.115  The U.S. Treasury Department 
would loan non-interest-bearing bonds in paper currency to municipal and state 
governments to establish public works projects and employ thousands of out-of-work 
laborers.  Rejecting both gold and silver currency standards, Coxey lambasted 
Democrats, Republicans, and Populists alike for serving corporations, which he claimed 
had profited from each party’s economic plan.116  His fiery talk galvanized Graf to stage 
two (abortive) mass parades to demand that Mayor Walter Flower borrow money from 
the state or federal government to fund public works projects for the city’s unemployed, 
replicating Coxey’s non-interest-bearing bonds program.117  
 To secure legitimacy among respectable New Orleanians, Bacarisse also 
cultivated allies among public intellectuals in the city.  For instance, Bacarisse and the 
BCC closely followed the Christian Socialist career of Bishop Davis Sessums of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church of Louisiana.118  Sessums was a controversial figure: he 
believed in the capacity of the “Christian principle of cooperation to improve industrial 
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relations” and solve modern social ills.119  His unabashedly Socialist sermons sparked the 
ire of ministers nationwide who decried Sessums’ “heterodox” religious views.120   
 Hoping that Sessums would endorse the Brotherhood’s cooperative ideals and 
thereby garner the new organization much needed respect, in March 1897 Bacarisse 
visited Sessums to discuss Socialism and the labor movement.121  Since Sessums believed 
a cooperative economy could improve society, Bacarisse hoped he would also see that a 
labor movement instituting a national cooperative political and economic system would 
eliminate “unnatural human miseries and social anxieties.”  However, Sessums rejected 
political action, “as that pertained more to the province of statesmen and lawmakers of 
the country.”  Ultimately, social “evolution was the law, not revolution.” Sessums’ 
assumption that the Brotherhood advocated “revolution” was one that dogged the 
cooperative throughout its existence. 
The Spatial Politics of Race 
 One moment in particular best distills how the cooperative grappled with the 
thorny entanglements of radical protest, racial antagonism, and oppositional grassroots 
performance in late nineteenth-century New Orleans.  Determined to replicate Coxey’s 
Army in New Orleans, Graf called on unemployed men to assemble at Globe Hall in 
Congo Square on June 4, 1897.122  Citing the great desire for economic relief among 
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unemployed laborers, he invited the Carpenters’ Union and other trade organizations to 
march “in a peaceful column” from Congo Square in Tremé to Lafayette Square and 
address Mayor Flower on “how to remedy existing evils.”123  Additionally, the 
Brotherhood would president a petition to Louisiana Governor Foster to borrow from the 
state or federal treasury in order to create an emergency work relief fund.   
 Graf strategically raised the specter of massive, integrated labor unrest to 
dramatize the seriousness of the cooperative’s mission. To that end, he traded on Congo 
Square’s notoriety as a politicized space for black labor organizers.  While Graf assured 
the public that the event would be a “peaceful parade,” he predictably “aroused some 
uneasiness” among city officials “in the face of disturbances in other cities when 
meetings of a somewhat similar kind had been or were attempted to be held.”124   
 Selecting Globe Hall and Congo Square for the site of the BCC’s integrated 
protest was not just provocative; it also embodied the tumultuous confluence of the 
cooperative’s European, Creole of color, and Cuban intellectual currents.  Since the 
1700s, Congo Square had been the site of a heady convergence of Afro-Creole cultural 
practice, religious ritual, and political organizing.125  Consequently, white tourists and 
New Orleans officials viewed it with a mixture of fascination and disapproval.  Until the 
1880s, visitors to Congo Square on Sunday evenings might observe or participate in 
African diasporic musical and dance performances using percussive instruments from 
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Africa and the West Indies. These weekly performances of Afro-Cuban and Caribbean 
percussive music influenced early jazz musicians who also continued to perform at 
Congo Square on Sundays. Additionally, constructed in 1851, Globe Hall was an 
important entertainment venue and meeting space for African Americans: Jazz 
originators Buddy Bolden and Manuel Perez, a Creole of Color cornetist, regularly 
performed for black audiences at Globe Hall at the turn-of-the century.126   
 Further, Congo Square was also an important site of political drama of all kinds: 
organizers of all ethnicities held political events, union meetings, and campaign rallies at 
Congo Square throughout the 1800s.127  The square also harbored less savory, extralegal 
meetings under its dusty, whitewashed trees.  In 1891, after 19 Sicilian Americans were 
acquitted of the murder of Police Chief David Hennessy, a vigilante mob of 10,000 
people, including many of the city’s leaders, dragged 11 Italians from the Orleans Parish 
Prison near Congo Square.  The crowd shot or clubbed nine men to death, before hanging 
one man from a lamppost and another from a tree in Congo Square.128  Graf himself 
clumsily referenced the atrocity in June 1897 when he argued that the BCC’s protest 
march did not need a parade permit because like the vigilante mob, organizers were 
exercising their freedom of expression and assembly. Graf ambiguously referred to the 
riot as a “meeting of the people,” who “had no permit to hold a meeting, yet…were not 
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interfered with” by the police.129  In contrast to the tragic, violent scene, the BCC 
promised to observe all laws.  Yet critics cited Graf’s nod to the Sicilian massacre as 
further evidence of the BCC’s lawlessness and its members’ “inflamed passions.”130 
 Graf’s proposed mass demonstration and calls for public works projects provoked 
outrage from the public, city officials, and members of the BCC.  One Daily Picayune 
editor howled that Graf’s plan revealed his scant knowledge of American politics.131  
Because immigrant agitators like Graf had been “ruled over [by] emperors or other 
autocrats” in their home country, they erroneously believed that American municipalities 
could employ “at a moment’s warning an army of [unemployed] men.”  Further, 
Louisiana was powerless to lend money to cities in need, and the federal treasury could 
not print more money without devaluing the national currency and plunging the country 
deeper into debt.  Finally, the editor propounded that a Socialist government was one in 
which “the government owns everything and the people nothing...A rich man is an 
impossibility.”  True reform could only come at the behest of Congressional leaders; 
Graf’s vision of government welfare was an economically ruinous “fantasy.” 
 In any case, the demonstration was postponed and eventually canceled because 
Mayor Flower and Acting Mayor Abraham Brittin refused to grant the organization a 
parade permit on the grounds that the event was “unnecessary and calculated to cause 
harm.”132   The city leaders argued that New Orleans had no money to provide relief; the 
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event’s “incendiary” speeches would incite unemployed participants; and if Graf wanted 
to address city officials, the BCC should form a committee rather than disturbing “the 
peace and quiet of New Orleans.”133  Not only were New Orleans’ elite wary of the 
BCC’s working-class and multiracial membership, but its status as a member-owned 
cooperative committed to democratic decision-making and economic equality was also 
deeply threatening to conservative city and business interests.  
 Worse yet, Graf’s contentious meeting with city officials jeopardized any 
possibility of a working relationship with the Flower administration.  When Brittin 
refused to give Graf a demonstration permit, Graf “made himself so objectionable that he 
was finally ordered out of the office.”134 As Graf was hustled out of the room, Brittin 
advised the labor organizer that city police would closely monitor future Brotherhood 
meetings.  Brittin was true to his word; subsequent events hosted by the BCC and its 
offshoot organization, the LMPA, were attended by police officers all too eager to arrest 
“unruly” cooperative members.135  Officers forced labor organizers to refrain from 
discussing inflammatory subjects such as political revolution, peaceful or not.136 Police 
presence undoubtedly had a chilling effect on the cooperative’s activities.  
Mounting Tension Within the Brotherhood 
  In addition to close city surveillance, negative newspaper coverage also 
exacerbated tensions within the BCC, whose members already tacked between 
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demanding militant direct action to advance the interests of the working-class, and gently 
encouraging employer-employee cooperation through education and peaceful dialogue.  
Initially, Bacarisse and Graf eagerly exploited the New Orleans press to inform the public 
about the righteousness of the BCC’s aims and the benefits of Socialism in general.  The 
two men were fervent believers in the democratic power of the press, and to that end they 
granted many interviews with the Daily Picayune and invited reporters to their 
organizational meetings.  The BCC believed that print media was a forum through which 
“plain people” could discuss and resolve the city and nation’s social, economic, and 
political ills.137  In order to return society to “more Christian foundations,” Bacarisse 
theorized that a free press would spark a peaceful revolution without spilling a “single 
drop of brotherly human blood.”   Yet Graf’s unsanctioned mass march fed already 
fraught internal debates over the BCC’s origins, philosophies, and organizing strategies.   
 Fearing reprisals from anti-labor opponents, the BCC immediately distanced itself 
from Graf’s public protest and insisted that it rejected class antagonism. In a missive 
printed in the Daily Picayune, Bacarisse and Hyldahl stated that they were confounded by 
Graf’s blatant mischaracterization of the BCC’s ideological foundation and 
organizational goals.138  For example, in one interview, Graf had stated that the National 
Union was headed by Eugene V. Debs and was based out of the Ruskin Colony, a utopian 
Socialist community in Tennessee.139  In actuality, however, Debs served only briefly as 
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the National Union state representative; Reverend Myron W. Reed was its president.  
Further, the Ruskin Colony and the National Union were decidedly separate entities. 
Named after John Ruskin, a British social theorist, the Ruskin Colony believed that a 
network of rural communes would rival and eventually displace the American industrial 
system.140  While National Union organizers had visited Tennessee in the hopes of 
establishing their own agrarian commune, by June 1897, they had settled on Washington 
State as the cooperative’s home.141  Most significantly, while Ruskin colonists advocated 
communitarianism and Progressive reform as merely one avenue for improving American 
society, the National Union proposed a nationwide Socialist colonization plan. 
 After explaining the BCC’s origins, Bacarisse and Hyldahl stifled any whiff of 
anarchism or incendiary rabble-rousing. Hyldahl, a staid, middle-aged Danish 
bookkeeper, reassured readers that “demonstrations of the kind contemplated by Mr. Graf 
are not on the programme of the Brotherhood.”142  Further, soothing fears that the BCC 
consisted of hundreds of angry black and white laborers, the men insisted that the 
cooperative’s membership rolls were quite small.143 Contrary to Graf’s claims, no unions 
had requested a mass protest, nor had the BCC proposed petitioning the governor and 
mayor for unemployment relief.  In short, the two men argued that their organization was 
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eminently respectable; Graf had portrayed the BCC as a volatile mob set on overthrowing 
the city or state government to advance his own self-aggrandizing interests. 
 Although the proposed mass protest was quashed, Bacarisse continued to write to 
the Daily Picayune, imploring readers to understand the organization’s “official” 
perspective on the labor situation.  On June 6, 1897, Bacarisse explained that Graf had 
betrayed the peace-loving BCC by attempting to organize a public, potentially violent, 
demonstration, and damaging the Brotherhood’s reputation in an act of shameless self-
promotion.144  Rather than whipping the unemployed into murderous revolution, the 
Brotherhood’s goal was the “patient education of the people” to popularize “universal co-
operative socialism, both national and international” over competitive capitalism.    
 Most irksome to Bacarisse was that Graf was organizing BCC events without the 
consent of the cooperative as a whole.  Although Graf was “only a simple member,” he 
had circumvented the BCC’s referendum policy rather than formally consulting other 
members.  Given that much of the nation remained plunged in an economic depression, 
staging a mass unemployment protest had far-reaching implications beyond the confines 
of New Orleans, and therefore needed to be carefully organized.  Graf should have 
proposed the event to the appropriate committee, which would have then formally 
presented it to the “entire order throughout the country” for their approval.  Instead, by 
speaking for the cooperative, Graf had seized authoritative control, rejecting Socialism’s 
commitment to the “dissipation of all autocratic powers--whether vested in individuals or 
                                                




in the body politic.”  His individualistic and selfish behavior perpetuated the “social 
conditions that so goes to make of this world ‘such a hell on earth.’”  In short, Graf was 
invested in the very power structure Socialism was attempting to eradicate.  
 Bacarisse and Graf’s disagreement over tactics and philosophy persisted 
throughout the Brotherhood’s lifespan.145  When Graf again organized a protest march 
from Congo Square to City Hall on July 16, 1897, the parade collapsed because 
cooperative members refused to coordinate with each other.  Bacarisse refused to address 
the confused crowd, claiming that Graf had organized the event on his own.  Worse, no 
one arranged parade permits or rented Globe Hall.  The event finally dispersed when both 
Graf and Bacarisse were arrested, and the BCC dissolved shortly thereafter. 
 The BCC’s reluctance to define its philosophical framework and ultimate purpose 
hampered its members’ demands for institutional change and would spell the 
cooperative’s demise after a mere eight months. The BCC was caught between two 
contradictory intellectual impulses that divided radicals at the local and national level: 
whether to mobilize industrial workers for militant political action or to instead embrace 
communitarian ideals.  Graf identified with working-class men, while Bacarisse 
considered himself an intellectual wedded to harmonizing labor relations, broadly 
defined.  While the BCC adapted cooperative, labor, and Socialist principles to suit local 
economic, political, and social imperatives, it did not resolve the fundamental 
contradictions and questions concerning the place of race, class, and radical action in the 
                                                




labor movement. However, the BCC’s last radical action prompted the formation of the 
Laboringmen’s Protective Association (LMPA), the cooperative’s operational arm 
charged with realizing its vision of a “universal brotherhood of man” in practical terms.146 
The Laboringmen’s Protective Association 
 The LMPA formed as the Populist movement disintegrated and political rights for 
African Americans and poor whites evaporated. Louisiana’s integrated Populist 
movement had, until the 1896 defeat of William Jennings Bryan and the People’s Party, 
seriously threatened the Regular Democratic stranglehold over state politics.147 The 
party’s loss had wide-reaching ramifications. That year, legislators required voters to 
reregister after January 1897 and barred electoral officials from assisting illiterate voters, 
effectively disenfranchising 50 percent of the white population in New Orleans, and 90 
percent of the black population.148   
 Many LMPA members had been active within this now rapidly unraveling 
grassroots coalition of progressive Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, and Populists.149 
Joseph T. Faust and R.D. Wilde were AFL chapter secretaries and People’s Party 
members, while Jacob Lang belonged to the Socialist Labor Party.150  Still others were 
vocal Republicans, like August Graf and black longshoreman R.W.B. Gould, while black 
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publisher Julius W. White was a reformist Democrat.151 As the diversity of political 
allegiances can attest, LMPA members constantly debated which worldview best 
encapsulated the cooperative’s goals.   
 Nonetheless, the LMPA’s historical significance lies in its ability to negotiate 
with city officials and private businessmen to ensure New Orleans’ black and white 
laborers’ employment within an emerging municipal public works system.  The LMPA 
was also an important refuge for radicals hoping to repair the city’s broken cross-racial 
labor and political alliances.  However, when a yellow fever epidemic froze trade and 
increased unemployment, the LMPA repudiated ethnic and racial collaboration in order 
to preserve “home labor” contracts. This section will examine the political and economic 
factors contributing to LMPA’s short-lived success and demise. 
 On July 17, 1897, the day after the BCC’s abortive mass march on City Hall, a 
large group of men again gathered around Globe Hall, waiting for the LMPA to convene 
its first meeting.  An offshoot of the BCC, the LMPA functioned as an integrated lobbyist 
organization advocating for workers’ rights.152   By the time Graf and Bacarisse called the 
meeting to order, nearly 400 people swelled the auditorium of Globe Hall, about 50 of 
who were black.  Despite heavy police supervision, the Daily Picayune worried that 
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LMPA meeting would break out into a “race riot.”153  Instead, Bacarisse clearly outlined 
the new organization’s priorities.  Shelving his ponderous lectures on Socialist 
philosophy, he informed members that the LMPA was working with Populists and the 
AFL to negotiate drainage contracts for unemployed workers.154   
 Until 1895, New Orleans’ crushing debt had stalled public works projects such as 
dock renovations, and new drainage, sewage, or water treatment systems.155 The city’s 
repayment of its Reconstruction debt and the creation of the nonpartisan and reformist 
Citizens League dramatically altered New Orleans’ political landscape. Opposed to the 
entrenched Democratic Ring, which had been sympathetic to labor and rewarded loyal 
white working-class constituents with city patronage jobs, the Citizens League was 
comprised of prominent businessmen and lawyers who ran on a platform of commercial 
investment, balanced budget, and improved schools.156  Elected to office in 1896, Mayor 
Flower and Acting Mayor Brittin rejected the old political patronage system.  Instead, 
they funded massive public works projects to generate jobs and reinvestment in the 
economically depressed city.  For example, as a member of City Council, Brittin created a 
single city agency, rather than various private corporations, to oversee public works 
projects that would dramatically modernize New Orleans’s drainage and sewerage system 
and public infrastructure.157 City politicians now funded vast civic improvement programs 
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in order to appease New Orleans voters.158  The LMPA was perfectly poised, then, to 
demand the unemployed be included in the city’s infrastructure redevelopment.159 
Demographics  
 There was significant overlap between the BCC and the LMPA’s membership 
rolls.160  Their rank-and-file consisted primarily of unemployed men, while officers were a 
mix of white-collar workers and skilled laborers.  Most members were German, Irish, and 
black or white Creoles, and a majority were bartenders or dockworkers.   Members’ 
geographic locations were tied to their ethnicity and occupations.  Mirroring the city’s 
demographics, LMPA’s working class white Creoles, Germans, and Irish lived in 
Bywater and along the city’s docks.161  For example, the organization’s four office clerks 
were German-American or white Creoles who lived in the French Quarter, Tremé, and 
the Seventh Ward.162  Likewise, the LMPA’s German bartenders worked in the Central 
Business District’s “immigrant belt” serving working-class immigrants.163 
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Figure 2: Demographic map of BCC and LMPA members’ residences.  White dots are 
Latin American members; light gray are African American, and dark gray are white. 
  
 Unlike the Brotherhood, which only had one black officer for all its racially 
inclusive talk, at least nine African Americans were LMPA directors or committee 
members.164  Black LMPA members lived in predominantly Creole of color 
neighborhoods in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Wards.  They worked at a variety 
of occupations, including plasterers, drivers, day laborers, slaters, sugar weighers, and 
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newspaper publishers.165  With two longshoremen and a black screwman, however, 
waterfront workers members predominated.166  Significantly, black membership shaped 
the spaces the LMPA occupied.  For several months, for instance, the LMPA met at 
Globe Hall and the Hall of the Friends of Hope Society, an important dance hall and 
meeting space for black and white organizations on Tremé Street, bordering Congo 
Square.167  For example, protesting the 1890 Separate Car Act, which legalized the 
segregation of public accommodations, the Citizens Committee regularly met at Hopes 
Hall to draft its Supreme Court lawsuit, Plessy vs. Ferguson.168 
Black Activists in the LMPA 
 While the LMPA was open to African Americans, its contentious second meeting 
was the turning point for sustained black leadership.  Echoing Populist rhetoric, 
Bacarisse’s welcoming speech gestured vaguely (and emptily) to cross-racial cooperation 
when he declared that both white and black workers, enslaved to monopolistic 
corporations, must unite to overthrow their capitalist oppressors.169  Yet white members 
erupted in protest when two men, Paul Galatas, a white painter, and A.J. Holmes, a black 
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customs house employee, were nominated for vice president.170  Finally, Graf declared in 
“fractured English” that as a Socialist he felt Holmes should be permitted to run for 
office, while an unnamed Northerner argued that the city labor movement suffered from 
“dissension with the negro and refusing to organize with him.”  Swept up in racial 
solidarity, the LMPA elected Holmes as first vice president, and later president.171  
Subsequently, Creoles of color and English-speaking African Americans formed the 
backbone of the LMPA and competed with the AFL for control over its direction. They 
demanded respect from white peers: black members and directors “insisted upon having 
the floor” at meetings, served on committees, gave keynote speeches, and met with city 
officials and business leaders.172 
 The LMPA’s black members were well acquainted with the potentially explosive 
racial dynamics of segregated New Orleans.  To them, the lack of equitable working 
conditions and political rights jeopardized their very lives.  For example, LMPA member 
Rudolph Charles, a slater, was murdered by a drunken police officer in 1905.173  Charles 
and his three friends, Creole of color cotton screwmen, had just finished a long day 
working on the levee.  They were playing cards in a Tremé bar catering to African 
Americans when Officer Matthew J. Fredericks walked up to Charles and slurred, “Hello, 
big nigger, what are you doing here?” After a few heated words were exchanged, 
Fredericks shot Charles in the chest.   
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 Given the high stakes of securing black economic and political security, it is 
unsurprising that the LMPA’s African American members were veterans of biracial and 
black political and labor organizing.  Black members tended to be politically engaged and 
active in the labor movement. For example, black LPMA invited guest R.W.B. Gould 
was an important Republican organizer; at the 1896 Republican state convention, Gould 
represented the city’s Tenth Ward, alongside Louis Martinet and Rodolphe Desdunes, 
who advocated a Populist-planter fusion ticket.174 Gould was also a committee member at 
an all-black Republican convention held at Longshoreman’s Hall in New Orleans.175 
 Similarly, first vice president A.J. Holmes was a U.S. Custom House sugar 
weigher at a time when the federal building was a hotbed of black leadership.176  Former 
Republican governor Henry Clay Warmoth was appointed Commissioner of Customs for 
the Port of New Orleans in 1890 and appointed many loyal Republican Creoles of color 
to the Custom House during the early 1890s.  Holmes’ fellow employees included 
assistant weigher R.W.B. Gould, cooperative organizer Walter Cohen, as well as Citizens 
Committee founders Martinet, Desdunes, and Paul Trévigne.177  Holmes’ Port of New 
Orleans position exposed him to the lasting effects of the depression on dockworkers, 
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while enabling him to cultivate relationships with public works and city officials to 
negotiate favorable labor contracts for the unemployed.  
 Other black LMPA leaders aligned with Democratic and Populist parties in their 
pursuit of political equality for African Americans.  For example, a former Populist, 
Julius W. White was an active black Democrat.178  In 1897, his publication, Weekly News, 
organized a state convention for African American Democrats, and White served on its 
executive committee.179  He urged black voters to unite to protect their “future political 
welfare” against the unrelenting movement for disenfranchisement.  A year later, White 
formed a committee of black Democrats urging legislators to retain black voting rights.180 
 One African American LMPA member in particular, Louis Henry Mathieu, was 
intricately connected to Republican politics, Creole of color and Cuban community life, 
and cooperative politics.  A plasterer, in the late 1890s Mathieu lived in Tremé within 
blocks of LMPA members Eugene Bacarisse and Ernest Stoltz, as well as prominent 
Cuban émigré and liberationist José Echezabal.181  His mother, Marie Adele Gomez, was 
herself Cuban-American, and the Mathieus lived alongside Cubans in the Fifth and Sixth 
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Wards.182  Louis’ father and uncle had also been free people of color and worked as cigar 
makers in the 1870s.183   
 Within the context of an increasingly repressive political climate set on denying 
black civic participation, Louis Henry Mathieu and his family’s involvement in Creole of 
color political and associational life is significant.  Mathieu’s father was a black 
Republican appointed to supervise the 1888 presidential elections in the Sixth Ward.184  
He also supported The Crusader, the radical mouthpiece of the Citizens Committee.185  
Also, foreshadowing Mathieu’s interest in cooperative politics, his uncle was a founding 
member of the Franc-Amis Benevolent Association and the secretary of a Masonic 
Fusion Lodge, a Scottish Rite temple with prominent black Creole leaders.186   
 Committed to safeguarding the welfare of black residents, community-based 
social clubs, mutual aid societies, and benevolent associations equitably distributed goods 
and services otherwise unavailable to impoverished African Americans, while also 
serving as a launching ground and recruitment channel for more formal political activity 
for Tremé’s black and Cuban residents.  For example, the Citizens Committee depended 
on the black organizations notary public Louis Martinet incorporated to support its 
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campaign to overturn the 1890 Separate Car Act.187  Martinet would even incorporate 
Mathieu’s medical insurance cooperative in 1897.188 
 Louis Mathieu developed an abiding interest in cooperative principles as a means 
of providing medical and funeral benefits to New Orleans’ black residents.  As early as 
1889, he had served as the secretary of the Senior Co-operators’ Benevolent and Fraternal 
Association, a medical insurance cooperative that provided black Creoles affordable 
access to doctors’ visits, prescription drugs, and burial services.189  It also held social 
events for its members at Congo Square’s Globe Hall.  Similarly, Matthieu was a member 
of the Co-operators Companions Debating Social Circle, which held spirited debates and 
threw picnics and brass band concerts in Loeper’s Park, an important site for the 
evolution of New Orleans jazz.190  
 However, Mathieu’s most important contribution to the city’s cooperative 
movement was his role in forming the Juvenile Co-operators Fraternals Benevolent 
Mutual Aid Association in 1894.  Juvenile Co-operators was a Seventh Ward medical 
insurance cooperative for black Catholic youths and their families that operated under the 
auspices of the Senior Co-operators.191  After turning 25, members could transfer their 
membership to the Senior Co-operators.  As president, in 1897, Mathieu formally 
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incorporated Juvenile Co-operators as a state-recognized organization and defined much 
of its organizational structure.192 Although politically disenfranchised, within the 
cooperative, members democratically voted on directors, a committee supervising 
individual cases to ensure proper medical care, and service providers.193  Mathieu no 
doubt lent his ten years of cooperative experience to the budding LMPA.  
Interracial Organizing and Waterfront Workers 
 While Graf and Bacarisse’s Socialist beliefs compelled at least lip service to racial 
inclusiveness, militant waterfront laborers within the cooperative’s ranks may have 
encouraged the LMPA to remain integrated, despite opposition from some members.  At 
least five veterans of 1880s and early 1890s biracial waterfront unionizing efforts lent 
their organizing expertise to the nascent cooperative.  Three prominent black 
longshoremen and screwmen union leaders, R.W.B. Gould, Lafayette Tharpe, and Victor 
Joachim were all early LMPA members.194 Similarly, the Acadian George Webster 
Delesdernier was a member of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association, where his 
brother served as first vice president.195   
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 New Orleans dockworkers’ possessed an unusually progressive ethic of racial 
collaboration. Labor historians Daniel Rosenberg and Erik Arnesen argue that New 
Orleans’ cosmopolitanism fostered the dockworkers’ unusual race relations at the end of 
century. An influx of European trade unionists influenced native dockworkers’ sense of 
class solidarity.196   Many organized waterfront laborers were also militant black Sixth 
Ward Creoles who ardently fought for both social and political equality during the 1880s 
and early 1890s.197  The multiethnic atmosphere fostered less restrictive racial relations.  
Finally, because work was seasonal, laborers often belonged to more than one union, 
which promoted cross-union cooperation.  The result was a tradition of interracial 
collaboration across and within waterfront unions.198   
 Although many New Orleanians were under- or unemployed, the depression hit 
the dockyards particularly hard.  Competition for work between black and white 
longshoremen and screwmen unions ignited months of racial violence in 1894 and 1895 
as white longshoremen attacked black dockworkers.  The longshoremen riots left a 
legacy of racial antagonism and temporarily destroyed the powerful, biracial dock unions 
in New Orleans.  It took six years for union organizers to repair interracial relations. 
 During the 1894 levee riots, future LMPA member R.W.B. Gould narrowly 
avoided death when, on March 12, two white longshoremen fired shotgun rounds into 
black cotton screwmen loading the steamship Engineer, docked at Harrison Wharf.199  
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That foggy morning, Gould hid between two bales of cotton as a mob of 200 to 300 white 
longshoremen stormed the surrounding wharves.200  While he escaped with a flesh wound 
to his calf, one African American man, John Payne, was murdered. Eventually, Dave 
Burke and John Cullen were arrested, and at the subsequent trial, Gould served as state 
witness, along with many other waterfront workers.  Tempers ran high; one white man 
cornered Gould during a court recess as he allegedly spoke to other witnesses and, 
cursing, accused Gould of colluding with his fellow black laborers.   
 Despite Gould’s brush with death, he and other LMPA dockworkers were 
committed to repairing interracial alliances damaged during the riots.  For example, 
Lafayette Tharpe, a leader of the Colored Longshoremen's Benevolent Association, 
declared that because Democrats oppressed blacks and poor whites alike, they must 
create an independent party.201  Consequently, he and 25 black unionists joined the 
integrated Independent Workingmen’s Political Club in 1894.202  While soundly defeated 
in 1895, the club aimed to reform politics by electing “good men to office” and “place 
principle above party, patriotism above politics.” Tharpe also was president of the 
Colored Laboringmen’s Alliance, and, in concert with other black dockworkers unions, 
began to negotiate with white unions to set work rates and wages.203  One meeting 
between white and black cotton screwmen and longshoremen resulted in both parties 
agreeing to boycott particular companies if they refused to hire union men, regardless of 
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race.204  By 1896, waterfront workers were tentatively repairing ties with their black and 
white compatriots. Unionized dockworkers’ may have therefore viewed their work within 
the LMPA as part of a larger effort to rebuild their shattered coalition.  
Moderation and Compromise 
 However, while the LMPA served as a temporary refuge for racially progressive 
dockworkers, its single-minded devotion to securing public works contracts would soon 
alienate black and politically radical members.  Under fire from the press, police, and 
other labor organizers, the LMPA immediately began to divest themselves of their 
Socialist roots and pursued mainstream business, city, and labor alliances.  Monitored by 
the police, the LMPA avoided outright polemics.  Indeed, in keeping with the AFL’s 
conservative craft unionism, any member using “inflammatory or revolutionary remarks 
or speeches” was fined $1 and required to apologize to the LMPA body.  LMPA officials 
also promised to expel members for a second offense.205  Consequently, Bacarisse’s 
rhetorical methods became increasingly subtle; Bacarisse often skirted the “very danger 
line of incendiarism” before “[tacking] back by declaring he was not advocating violence 
and bloodshed…The American people are now too enlightened for that.”206  
 Additionally, the New Orleans press disparaged radical politics and the labor 
movement, which forced the BCC to first moderate its Socialist ideology before 
discarding it altogether.207  For example, The Daily Press and The Daily Picayune 
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portrayed Bacarisse as naïve and long-winded, given to obtuse pontifications about 
Socialism and the city’s economic ills.208  Consequently, Bacarisse became circumspect 
about describing the “socialistic metamorphosis throughout...the world” to avoid being 
“combated and antagonized” by newspaper staff.209  Evading accusations of class warfare, 
Bacarisse broadened the definition of “laboringman” to encompass “the legitimate, 
honest rich man all the way gradually down to the lowest class or wage earners.”210  
Finally, the LMPA was careful to elect only respectable men as officers, barring divisive 
or unsavory characters to prove the organization’s goodwill.   
 Eugene Bacarisse’s August resignation as LMPA president vividly illustrates how 
the AFL’s growing influence over the LMPA eviscerated its commitment to radical 
economic change and racial equality and led to its dramatic collapse.211  In the 1880s, 
AFL head Samuel Gompers asserted, “working people must organize irrespective of 
creed, color, sex, nationality or politics” and organized integrated state and regional 
assemblies.212  However, in the wake of intensifying supremacist ideology and expanding 
craft unionism nationally, the AFL began to charter segregated local chapters before 
limiting the organization to skilled white laborers.  By the 1893 to 1897 Depression, 
Gompers had dispensed with racial inclusionary rhetoric entirely.  
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 Although a contingent of Socialists within the AFL remained dedicated to 
interracial and industrial organizing, Bacarisse felt increasingly pressured to moderate his 
political ideology to conform to conservative trade union ideals.  After the LMPA 
threatened to oust August Graf for his bravado and political posturing, Graf also felt 
compelled to distance himself from his former revolutionary rhetoric; denying 
accusations that he was anarchist, Graf asserted that while his actions were “at certain 
times…a little excited,” he was “a man of family” who only wished to ensure his loved 
ones’ economic support.213  Similarly, even as Socialists urged the AFL to fundamentally 
reject competitive capitalism by ushering in a national “cooperative commonwealth,” the 
craft union increasingly shunned radicalism and redoubled its reformist resolve.214   
 While Bacarisse had become a cooperative organizer to protest shoddy wages and 
subpar working conditions for all New Orleanians, he was dismayed to discover that the 
LMPA and AFL now rejected his Socialist platform.  He characteristically proclaimed 
that he was “pushed to the very brink of starvation” by both the “plutocrats” unwilling to 
hire a Socialist union organizer, and “the stupid masses of the people” who refused to 
compensate him for his organizing efforts.215  Further, Bacarisse felt stymied by 
capitalists’ fears that he wished to “stir up the masses to discontent, strife, and strikes.”  
Instead, he hoped to promote mutual understanding between capital and labor: peace, not 
revolution.  Therefore, Bacarisse reluctantly stepped down as president.  Furious that he 
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had publicly criticized the organization, the LMPA gladly accepted his resignation and 
continued to censor any remaining radical activists. Ultimately, as pressure mounted to 
secure precious labor contracts from the city, LMPA organizers rejected the utopian ideal 
of the Socialistic cooperative commonwealth as a dangerous liability. 
LMPA, the AFL, and Public Works Projects 
 The LMPA’s demand for municipal drainage and levee work for the unemployed 
was especially timely because New Orleans’ underdeveloped infrastructure was ill 
equipped to accommodate the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain’s frequent 
flooding. Mr. Michinard, Eugene Bacarisse’s Tremé neighbor, remembered that excess 
water from Lake Pontchartrain would often overflow nearby Bayou St. John, Old Basin, 
and New Basin, and other levees during the 1890s.216  He recalled, “The cry would go out 
that the Old Basin was overflowing” and residents would rush with “casks of mud and 
sand to bolster up the banks and try and stop the water coming over.”  Poor drainage also 
caused local flooding, which required residents to travel by canoe or skiff until the water 
subsided.  Tremé and Mid-City could be under water for up to a week, and floodwaters 
spread disease, damaged house foundations, and ruined merchandise “unprotected against 
the ravages of the scummy and dirty waters.” Bacarisse and his fellow working-class 
New Orleanians’ livelihoods were thus regularly imperiled by rising floodwaters.  
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 Just that spring, in fact, a deluge of rainwater had opened thirty-eight crevasses in 
Louisiana and New Orleans’s levees.217  New Orleans historian John Kendall notes that 
the high water persisted between March and May 1897, and “at no time in its history was 
the city in such grave peril of inundation.”218 While the newly created Levee Board hired 
over 2,500 men to feverishly build emergency embankments along the riverfront and 20 
miles of levees, strong winds nonetheless swept water over the Canal and Bienville Street 
embankments, flooding stores.  In response to the continued flooding, the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission aggressively campaigned to rebuild 
levees at a grade of two feet higher than the floodwaters, confident that a comprehensive 
levee system would permanently eliminate the risk of flooding.219  However, when the 
Levee Board could not afford to hire enough workers, City administrators were forced to 
reevaluate their inadequate levee measures and financial inability to respond to city 
emergencies.220  The LMPA was in an ideal position to lobby for public works projects 
that would both redress poor infrastructural design and end chronic unemployment. 
 To that end, the LMPA aligned with the local AFL, a powerful but conservative 
labor organization in the city.  Formed in 1886 out of disaffected Knights of Labor 
unions, the AFL sought to unionize master craftsmen, pressing for higher wages and a 
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shorter workday.221  During the 1893 to 1897 depression, new chapters fanned out across 
the country, and AFL membership exceeded one million by 1910.222  During the summer 
and fall of 1897, the LMPA co-wrote AFL and People’s Party petitions demanding 
drainage commissioners award levee and drainage contracts with a fixed minimum wage 
to unemployed New Orleanians.223  Additionally, German-American draftsman and 
LMPA member Henry Zander used his professional connections with the Drainage 
Commission to enable the LMPA and later, the WLMPA, to receive drainage contracts.224   
 However, the LMPA’s efforts to acquire city labor contracts as a palliative to the 
lingering depression were complicated by increasingly fierce job competition with 
Sicilian immigrants, as well as a yellow fever outbreak that shut down city commerce in 
the summer and fall of 1897.  Collaborating with the stolidly apolitical AFL, the LMPA 
embraced a limited agenda of attaining high wages for “home labor.”225   
Home Labor v.s. Sicilian Immigration   
 Integral to the LMPA and AFL’s campaign to win city drainage and levee work 
for union members were their demand that Sicilians immigrants be excluded from such 
municipal benefits.  Their objection to Sicilian immigration was spurred by the stagnating 
waterfront economy, the unstable sugar industry, and Populist political consolidation, 
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which recruited poor voters within Louisiana’s sugar districts.  During the 1890s, 
Louisianan Republicans advocated sugar tariffs to protect sugar parishes from cheap 
Cuban imports flooding the American market.226  Their actions garnered broad support 
from unlikely allies; for example, in 1895, reform Democrat Walter Flower would briefly 
vote Republican to support the sugar tariff.227  Simultaneously, Knights of Labor and 
Populist organizers attempted to unionize black and white agricultural sugar workers.  
When Populists united with National Republicans in 1896, these potential voters, as well 
as urban laborers, formed the foundation of their electoral power.228 
 As Populists and Republicans constructed their fragile political alliance, key 
Populists within the AFL and LMPA worried that growing numbers of seasonal Sicilian 
sugar workers in would snatch precious jobs from black and white unionists.  Drawn to 
the sugar industry by a high demand for cheap labor as well as labor bureaus, company 
labor agents, and established family and friends’ promise of quick cash, 30,000 Sicilians 
had funneled into Louisiana’s sugar parishes and New Orleans’ dockyards by the late 
1890s.229  Italian migrants labored alongside black field hands or worked in New Orleans’ 
sugar refineries and warehouses along the Mississippi Rive between Canal Street and 
Toulouse Streets.230  Although most Sicilians returned home after a few seasons, many 
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permanently settled in the French Quarter, starting wholesale businesses and expanding 
the New Orleans-Sicily import-export trade.231    
 Further, the LMPA and AFL’s anti-Sicilian policies reflected Populist’s growing 
suspicion that Louisiana’s sugar barons cared little for their impoverished black and 
white employees.232  Rather, rich planters were invested in a Republican-Populist 
coalition for their own economic gain.  Initially, the AFL and LMPA argued, unions had 
tolerated sugar plantations’ circumvention of immigration laws because the economic 
depression compelled cheap labor.233  In 1897, however, President McKinley instituted 
the Dingley Tariff, which imposed high duties on sugar imports, and planters had 
sufficiently recovered.234  Nonetheless, the sugar industry continued to enrich itself by 
hiring itinerant Sicilians at reduced wages, consequently driving down wages for both 
black and white workers.235  
 The LMPA and AFL argued that as Sicilians displaced black field hands on sugar 
plantations, New Orleans experienced an influx of rural black and white workers “in 
direct competition with our city labor.”236  As “pauper labor” flooded the city, they 
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“gradually crowd[ed] the negroes out of the sugar districts of New Orleans.”237   As a 
result, unscrupulous city contractors capitalized on widespread unemployment by 
slashing wages to the point “at which no honest resident laborer could subsist.”238  The net 
effect was “starvation” wages for all New Orleans workers, as well as rampant “crimes 
and depravations” across the city as indigents overburdened charitable institutions.  
Worse, officials were forced to hire more police to monitor vagrants and “keep in order 
this foreign element,” which taxed the city’s already depleted municipal funds.   
 To halt Sicilian and migrant job competition, the LMPA and AFL demanded strict 
enforcement of laws against contract labor at the city, state, and federal level.239  At the 
national level, they commended the “noble and patriotic” U.S. Senator Samuel McEnery, 
a virulent white supremacist, for introducing legislation to strengthen the country’s 
immigration laws.240   At the local level, the groups argued that public works contracts 
would ameliorate job shortages while protecting home labor’s livelihood from “a vast 
army of unemployed.”241  As an efficient and cost-effective drainage system was of 
enormous import to all New Orleanians, the AFL and the Municipal Improvement 
Association implored the Board of Drainage Commission to mandate that contractors 
only hire resident New Orleanians at “living wages.”242 To that end, in July, an official 
joint AFL-LMPA committee met with Acting Mayor Brittin, at his request, to discuss the 
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city’s proposed drainage contract for unemployed laborers.243  The white representatives 
praised Britten for his efforts to assist “home labor” and to mandate fixed, fair wages for 
workers at $1.50 a day.  Acquiescing to the committee’s demands, Brittin presented their 
proposal to the Drainage Board the same day. 
 The LMPA’s promotion of “home labor” contracts had serious ramifications for 
its black members.  For example, the organization successfully persuaded the National 
Contracting Company of New Orleans to promise that “drainage work be given to home 
labor.”244  However, the company also required potential employees to have poll tax 
certificates, indicating the applicant was eligible to vote.  The requirement disqualified 
African Americans from obtaining drainage contracts because few could afford the poll 
tax fee.  While poll tax laws as a means of disenfranchising blacks and poor whites were 
not passed in Louisiana until 1900, the National Contracting Company nonetheless 
reflected a growing association between “home labor” and “white labor.”245  Further, 
while Mayor Flower advocated giving drainage and levee contracts to “home labor 
without regard to color,” in actuality he did little to secure black employment.246  Given 
New Orleans’ narrowing definition of “home labor,” it was but a short step for LMPA to 
reject its multiracial origins and pursue an explicitly white supremacist labor platform.    
Yellow Fever and Quarantine Measures 
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  Depressing laborers’ wages even further, a yellow fever outbreak in August 1897 
ravaged the South and paralyzed New Orleans for months.247  Despite state efforts to 
quarantine southern ports in the fall of that year, the illness spread throughout nine states, 
with 4,000 cases and 500 deaths reported.  Regional trade stagnated in the face of states’ 
conflicting regional public health and security measures.  New Orleans, which had 
recently experienced a large population growth of non-immune residents, suffered 
inordinately, with 300 deaths that season.248  
 The LMPA and a resurrected BCC participated in an interracial regional 
movement to force federal officials to institute national coastal quarantine measures and 
to better regulate trade in the midst of the epidemic.249  Both organizations, along with the 
American Federation of Labor, and the Cigar Makers Trade Union, the Cotton 
Yardmen’s Benevolent Association, the Boiler Maker’s Union, and the Pressmen’s 
Union, argued that yellow fever worsened economic conditions for the workingman 
because quarantine measures froze trade and shut down New Orleans ports.  
 The LMPA committee urged local businesses, city officials, and state government 
to modify the state’s “numerous and cowardly quarantines” of commercial shipping and 
cooperate with the integrated Central Trade and Labor Assembly, a labor body 
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representing the city’s unions, to speedily resume commerce.250 Recalling the LMPA’s 
previous demands, the coalition requested that public health funds provide public works 
and sanitation jobs for the unemployed.  Additionally, in September, the LMPA’s African 
American president A.J. Holmes presented Mayor Flower a petition from the city’s 
unemployed workers that demanded he remove state quarantine centers from low-
income, densely populated residential areas because they jeopardized citizens’ health, 
stifled trade, and compounded long-term unemployment. 251  
 Claiming that Louisiana had abandoned New Orleans in “her hour of need,” 
unionists also lobbied Governor Murphy Foster and other southern governors to permit 
the shipment of goods out of the city after the U.S. Marine Hospital Service fumigated 
and disinfected merchandise.252 Finally, the coalition insisted that interstate commerce 
commissioners regulate imports and exports during future public health crises rather than 
allowing city or state officials to prescribe safety measures that impoverished laborers. 
 In response, Mayor Flower assured the LMPA that the Board of Health would be 
happy to listen to the LMPA alliance’s recommendations.  Further, the Commissioner of 
Public Works was already hiring unemployed workers and private sanitary squads would 
soon pay men to patrol neighborhoods.  The coalition’s employment campaign was 
successful, largely because it dovetailed with Citizen League administrators’ recognition 
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that the severity of the yellow fever outbreak clearly indicated that the city urgently 
needed a comprehensive drainage, sewerage, and water supply system as a matter of 
public health.253 For a brief moment, then, Holmes’ strategy of moderate consensus 
building realized the LMPA’s vision of black and white labor unions working 
collectively to protect New Orleans’ most vulnerable citizens.   
 Ultimately, however, the LMPA failed to reconcile Bacarisse’s idealistic 
Socialism, Creole of color equal rights activism, and white populist trade unionism.  
These competing ideologies consequently stalled the organization’s public health 
campaign, and with it, the hope for a sustained interracial and cooperative labor 
movement.  Locked in stalemate, by October the LMPA had imploded.  For all of Eugene 
Bacarisse’s speechmaking about protecting unemployed workers regardless of their 
“color, race, creed, and previous condition,” Bacarisse, Graf, and other white members 
split from the LMPA to form a new, segregated unemployed workers’ union, the White 
Laboring Men’s Protective Association (WLMPA).254  
The Roots of the White Laboring Men’s Protective Association 
 Bacarisse and Graf’s renunciation of integrated labor organizing is not as 
confounding as it may at first appear.  First, Graf was always more interested in 
advancing the interests of his German unionist brethren over those of his ethnically and 
racially diverse peers.  Indeed, while Germans had always been active in the Brotherhood 
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and the LMPA, their visibility within the WLMPA is striking.  At least twelve WLMPA 
members were working class German or German-Americans.255  Notably, while they were 
a mix of skilled craftsmen and industrial workers, WLMPA’s members were 
predominantly German American bartenders.  One BCC member, John Baltz, clearly 
reflects the close associational, ethnic, and occupational ties German WLMPA members 
shared.  Like Graf, Baltz was also a German-American bartender who worked in the 
Central Business District.256  He was also active within the Bartenders Union alongside 
fellow WLMPA members Graf and Ernest Stoltz in the early 1900s.257  Graf and Baltz 
were also members of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which hosted annual festivals 
featuring contests, baseball, and horse racing.258 At one memorable event, Baltz tended 
the bar while Graf was on “donkey patrol.” Graf exploited his German identity, union 
affiliation, and associational memberships as recruitment channels for the WLMPA. 
 Intriguingly, the spaces the WLMPA frequented are indicative of its German 
identity, as well as its spiritual and political shift away from the internationalism of 
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Tremé.259  Most notably, the WLMPA abandoned the integrated Hopes Hall and Globe 
Hall and relocated to Teutonia Hall in the Central Business District immigrant belt.260  
Located at the corner of Exchange Place and Customhouse Street, at the epicenter of 
ethnic union organizing, Teutonia Hall hosted German social and political functions.261 
German sites of consumption and socializing were part of a rich geographic network that 
nurtured not just ethnic or occupational solidarity, but cooperative organizing.  
 Second, although New Orleans Socialists promoted mobilizing both skilled and 
unskilled workers to advance an egalitarian cooperative society, the party chapter was 
renowned for its particularly politically conservative and racist views.262  After the 
Socialist Party of Louisiana was founded in 1903, for example, the national party refused 
to grant it a charter until it admitted black members.  Even so, the state chapter clung to 
the conviction that “each race [should] have charge of its own affairs”; accordingly, 
blacks and whites should were organized into separate, segregated locals.  
 Further, while Bacarisse was more racially progressive than his segregationist 
Socialist peers, he promoted black economic equality rather than political 
enfranchisement or racial integration.263  For example, Bacarisse argued that although 
African Americans were no longer property, both black and white workers were “in a 
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worse condition of bondage” as industrial wage slaves.264  Given their common 
exploitation, it was imperative to “organize to liberate themselves” from dehumanizing 
capitalism. However, although Bacarisse connected racial subjugation with class 
oppression, he never explicitly advocated black voting rights.  Further, Bacarisse still 
engaged in the casual racism of the day.  At the Stenographers Association’s 1892 
Thanksgiving party, for example, he shared the stage with the Thespian Dramatic Club’s 
“farce” entitled “Darkey Wood Dealer.”265  Always ambivalent about the implications of 
black equality, Bacarisse retreated to white supremacist politics a mere six months after 
launching his Socialist campaign to foment an interracial worker movement.266   
 Bacarisse’s racial politics mirror that of Covington Hall, a Socialist agitator who, 
rejecting the Louisiana Socialist Party’s entrenched racism, created a radical industrial 
unionist organization in 1905.267  Between 1907 and 1913, Hall and his allies fervently 
organized black and white brewery and timber workers.  Nonetheless, despite working 
alongside New Orleans’ black union and political organizations, Hall never endorsed 
black social equality for fear of splintering his fragile interracial coalition.  Hall and 
Bacarisse reflect what historian David Roediger describes as a “persistent, if often 
defeated and compromised impulse to antiracism” that prevented the U.S. labor 
movement from achieving comprehensive social change.268  Bacarisse’s support of an 
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increasingly segregationist Populist Party and his growing identification with white 
Cuban nationalism further alienated him from his former multiracial allies. 
Populists and Race 
 The case of the AFL’s Richard David Wilde provides further insight into why the 
LMPA’s white members rejected their integrationist goals. R.D. Wilde’s trajectory from 
publicly espousing racial integration to just as vocally disavowing interracial political 
organizing illustrates the LMPA’s complicated relationship to black Louisianans’ 
struggle for public rights and social equality. While the Federal Labor Union secretary 
did not support the Brotherhood’s Socialist aims, he was active in the WLMPA’s 
campaign to divest black laborers of work contracts.  In fact, as the Populist Party 
crumbled, in February 1897, Wilde and fellow Populist J.T. Faust bemoaned that civic 
discontent and lingering economic depression were responsible for the rise of the 
competing New Orleans Socialist Party.269  Fearing that organization would siphon off 
precious votes from the Populists’ precarious electoral position, the men were wary of 
cooperating with Socialists of any stripe, including BCC members.270  While Wilde and 
Faust joined the LMPA later that summer, their trepidations foreshadowed the vicious 
ideological battles that would fracture the association along racial and political lines.  
 Further, while for decades both Republicans and Democrats had courted black 
voters to retain political power, by 1896, Louisiana’s organized parties had begun 
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abandoning black voters.  Contending that universal suffrage would inevitably lead to a 
black-controlled state, white Democrats began lobbying for a revised Louisiana 
constitution that would eliminate the black and poor white franchise.271  R.D. Wilde’s 
commitment to protecting black and poor whites’ political power likewise waned in the 
face of mounting white supremacy.  While Wilde had helped build the 1896 state Fusion 
campaign that united Louisiana Populists, Republicans, and some Democrats in a cross-
racial alliance against conservative Democrats and the proposed suffrage amendment, he 
soon grew wary of such political organizing.272   
 By October 1897, Wilde and fellow WLMPA members J.T. Faust and Eugene 
Bacarisse publicly denounced black political equality.273 At a parish committee meeting 
of the city’s Populist ward clubs, Wilde and Faust helped draft platform 
recommendations to present to the state party convention in November.  Bacarisse took 
shorthand notes for the committee. The ward clubs rejected universal manhood suffrage 
because it perpetuated ballot-box stuffing and the buying of “ignorant and corrupt” black 
and white votes to maintain corporate and governmental control over low-income white 
Louisianans.  According to the ward clubs, such an electoral system would ensure 
Republican domination under President William McKinley’s campaign advisor Mark 
Hanna and his “sable allies.” Instead, Populists recommended that when the Louisiana 
Constitution Committee convened in 1898, it should “eliminate any danger of negro 
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supremacy” by disenfranchising black voters. Reflecting the complex interrelationship of 
racial politics and international diplomacy, Bacarisse may have supported Populists 
because Hanna was one of the few senators to oppose U.S. intervention in Cuba.274 
Spanish-American War 
 The Spanish American War was another racially divisive flashpoint that 
exacerbated the LMPA’s ideological friction and sped its dissolution.  Although Cuban-
American Eugene Bacarisse self-identified as white, his claim to “whiteness” became 
increasingly tenuous in the years leading up to the 1898 Cuban War of Independence.  
While Bacarisse prided himself in his European heritage and intellectual influences, 
“simple whiteness” was not enough to grant Cubans’ social and political equality 
according to America’s narrowing racial logic.275  As historian Amy Kaplan argues, 
during the Spanish American War, journalists contrasted “lazy, inefficient, hungry Cuban 
bodies with the spectacle of [white] American manhood.”276  The United States feared 
Cuban self-determination would jeopardize its Anglo-Saxon right to secure Latin 
American and Caribbean markets, thereby exporting millions of dollars in goods, 
stimulating the U.S. economy, and relieving labor-capital tensions.277  In the face of such 
racial animosity, Bacarisse claimed a white identity by distancing himself from his 
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ethnically heterogeneous, and therefore suspect, past.  After the war, for example, he 
continued to maneuver between his American and Cuban national identity while avoiding 
the question of race.  In ship passenger lists to and from Cuba, Bacarisse labeled himself 
as “Cuban,” “Cuban-American,” or simply, “American.”278 
 On the other hand, African Americans argued that enlisting in the Spanish 
American War would illustrate their fitness as citizens.  However, black military 
participation was based on racialist belief that black soldiers were immune to yellow 
fever and could withstand Cuba’s tropical climate.279  Accordingly, when President 
McKinley ordered the formation of black “immune regiments,” black New Orleanians 
were particularly desirable; they joined Louisiana’s Ninth U.S. Volunteer Infantry.  
Former LMPA member Lafayette Tharpe not only recruited black soldiers to this 
regiment but also was Company E’s second lieutenant and chaplain.280   
 However, by May 1898, Louisiana legislators revised the state’s constitution to 
disenfranchise black voters, effectively eliminating military engagement as a strategy to 
regain political power.281  Further, African American soldiers were denied commissioned 
officer status, and their white commanding officers strictly enforced the color line.  
Finally, the war ended ten days before the Ninth Infantry was deployed in August 1898, 
so Louisiana’s “immune troops” never demonstrated their valor in battle.  Instead, 
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infantrymen tended the sick and wounded in eastern Cuba, part of a national public health 
movement to eradicate yellow fever.282  U.S. officials believed that once the military 
“sanitized” Cuba, yellow fever outbreaks spread through the southern export and import 
trade would cease to plague the mainland. 
 Ninth Infantry soldiers were immediately embroiled in political controversy.  
Louisiana Democrats pointed to racial tension between American and Cuban troops as 
evidence of black soldiers’ inherently brutal nature.  National public discourse similarly 
reasserted racial hierarchies.  Media representations of African Americans aided both 
Cuban colonization and domestic white supremacy.283  The press either memorialized 
black soldiers as faithful servants to white masculinity, or castigated them as savage and 
cowardly. In Tharpe’s case, the federal government denied his pension request, forcing 
him to depend on mutual aid societies and religious institutions to survive.284 
 In contrast, the discourse around the Spanish-American War and American 
imperialism enabled LMPA’s white ethnics to enjoy a broadening definition of 
whiteness.  Prior to the formation of the WLMPA, for example, public officials contested 
ethnic white BCC and LMPA members’ “Americanness,” and by extension, the 
soundness of their political critique.  While Graf had lived in the U.S. for eight years and 
became naturalized in 1891, The Daily Picayune persistently emphasized the Graf’s 
“foreignness,” claiming that he spoke with a thick “foreign accent” and was unable to 
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“speak English intelligibly.”285 More ominously, the police denounced Bacarisse and Graf 
as unsavory foreigners who would corrupt American minds.286  Graf himself declared that 
city officials refused to negotiate with him because he was a “foreigner.”287   
  While the ambiguous racial identity of non-Anglo-Saxon whites enabled them to 
wage a sustained critique of American imperialism, they also began to capitalize on white 
supremacist ideology that elevated ethnic whites over colonized others.288  To that end, 
LMPA’s ethnic whites took great pains to distinguish themselves from black residents 
and “bad immigrants,” like Sicilians.  Instead, non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants began to 
downplay their ethnic heritage and identify themselves simply as “Americans.” For 
example, while August Graf prized his heritage and was enmeshed in German 
community life, he positioned himself as an American first, German second.  As 
president of the German American McKinley-Romain Club, Graf campaigned for 
President William McKinley and Armand G. Romain for U.S. Senate in 1896.289  
Delivering German-language speeches on Louisianan, American, and German current 
affairs, he distinguished between American and German political goals: German 
statesman Otto von Bismarck, who supported free silver, “was looking after the interest 
of the Fatherland,” while Germans in America must adopt the gold standard and thus 
protect “the interests of this country, and no longer after those of Germany.”  By the time 
of his death in 1915, Graf’s obituary claimed that he was a “good example of the sturdy 
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German emigrant who comes to this country and makes a comfortable living here.”290  
Crucially, however, Graf’s assimilationist strategies hinged on rejecting his fervent 
integrationist and socialist activities.  
The White Laboringmen’s Protective Association 
 Like the LMPA, the WLMPA depended on politically well-connected allies to 
advance its unemployment relief campaign.  Describing chronic unemployment as a labor 
“emergency,” the WLMPA soothed conservative city and business interests leery of class 
antagonism. City Board of Health clerk and WLMPA president Michael Nestor used his 
professional and political connections with the AFL, city officials, and business leaders to 
successfully secure public works contracts for white laborers.291  Populists and the AFL 
renewed their commitment to working with new WLMPA members; in November 1897, 
J.T. Faust and R.D. Wilde urged Populists and labor organizers throughout Orleans 
Parish to influence their local boards of health to remove the quarantine measures 
squashing trade and starving workers.292  By proposing job contracts that would assist 
white laborers in the short term, the WLMPA retreated from economic and political 
revolution to embrace the “bread and butter” aims of segregationist trade unionism.  
 Addressing the residual impact of the yellow fever epidemic and the final stages 
of the depression remained of primary importance to the group.  Arguing that the 
unemployed chafed under “enforced idleness and its resultant want and suffering,” the 
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WLPMA contended that yellow fever only “[accentuated] the misery and despair of 
thousands of homes.”293  During this state of emergency, the city should take immediate 
steps to prevent further idleness, crime, and suffering.  Significantly, the organization 
blamed mass unemployment not on governmental corruption or corporate greed, but 
instead on “the all-wise creator of the universe.”  By casting the depression as an “act of 
God,” the WLMPA limited itself to serving the immediate needs of out-of-work whites.  
 Along with other labor organizations and Citizens League reformers, the 
WLMPA posited that a city-run public works department would counteract the effects the 
sluggish economy and yellow fever quarantine measures.  Over the course of 1897 and 
1898, WLMPA state organizer August Graf joined members of the Board of Health, 
Municipal Improvement Association, the AFL, and prominent businessmen to protest the 
dispossession of the sewerage franchise to private corporations.294  They feared sewerage 
rates would skyrocket, companies would not build sewer systems in impoverished 
communities, and the city might never regain control of the sewerage system. 
 After obtaining influential businesses’ endorsement, the WLMPA presented a 
petition to City Hall calling for the city to hire white workers to staff its public works 
projects.295 The group estimated that if the city instituted a shorter workweek, it could hire 
more laborers, while a $1.50 weekly salary would relieve over six destitute families.296  
Aligned with reputable white labor, governmental, and business leaders, the WLMPA 
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received a warm reception from Mayor Flower, who incorporated aspects of its demands 
into his public works program.   
 The WLMPA successfully pressured city officials and businesses to provide 
unemployment relief for its members during the 1897 yellow fever outbreak.  In fact, the 
Mayor-Mullen-McGary Relief Plan, which the WLMPA enthusiastically endorsed, duly 
created an emergency fund to employ laborers in public works projects.297  The New 
Orleans Public Works Commissioner W.L. McGary and capitalist Frank P. Mullen paid 
WLMPA members a dollar a day to gravel roads in the city. Additionally, the Louisiana 
Board of Health hired WLMPA members to monitor yellow fever hotspots as private 
watchmen.298  Finally, after the WLMPA accused levee contractors of hiring African 
Americans and transient whites, a sawmill in Bowie, Louisiana, hired 75 members as 
skilled mechanics and laborers.299 Thus, the WLMPA was part of a larger movement of 
southern businessmen and laborers who worked with city and state officials to modify 
quarantine regulations to resume interstate trade.300  
 However, because the WLMPA’s unemployment campaign rested on temporary 
relief measures, it lost its bargaining power when the yellow fever epidemic subsided and 
the national economy recovered at the end of 1897. On December 11, labor organizers 
again met with Mayor Flower, claiming that Drainage Commission’s Florida Canal 
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contractors, as well as the National Contracting Company, were hiring foreign workers. 
When they demanded Flower instruct the Drainage Commission to employ only home 
labor, the mayor was noncommittal.301 By late 1898, the WLMPA had quietly sunk from 
view.302 Ultimately, by rejecting an integrated movement working toward political and 
economic redistribution of power, the WLMPA failed to achieve systemic change.  
Conclusion  
 In the wake of violent dockworkers riots, Populist electoral defeats, and mounting 
white supremacy that threatened New Orleans’ long tradition of cross-racial political 
coalitions, the BCC envisioned a utopian Socialist society free from the evils of capitalist 
greed and government corruption. Yet it was not until Brotherhood members formed the 
LMPA that the cooperative exerted any measurable influence over the city’s economic 
and political landscape.  Negotiating with local business, political, and labor 
representatives, the LMPA pragmatically moderated the Brotherhood’s idealism to solve 
New Orleans’ pervasive unemployment: city public works contracts building levees and 
drainage systems.  However, to do so, the LMPA abandoned Socialism and assured the 
public that its proposed employment relief was a temporary emergency measure rather 
than part of larger efforts to achieve revolutionary political change.   
 Eventually, persistent unemployment, rising rates of Sicilian immigration, a yellow 
fever outbreak, disenfranchisement of black and poor white Louisiana voters, and the 
racial imperatives of the Spanish American War shattered the Brotherhood and the 
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LMPA’s nascent multiracial and multiethnic cooperative movement. By the end of 1897, 
the LMPA had renamed itself the White Laboring Men’s Protective Association, ousted 
its black members, and proposed an end to Sicilian immigration as a means of protecting 
“home labor.” It was not until the 1901 Brewery Workers strike that black unions and 
political activists fully repaired cross-racial alliances among the city’s waterfront laborers 
to achieve measurable change.303  Over the course of three years, the newly organized 
Central Trade and Labor Council and the black-run Central Labor Union collaborated to 
boycott non-union breweries, after which many breweries recognized unions and granted 
wage increases.304 Nonetheless, the history of the Brotherhood, the LMPA, and the 
WLMPA reflects the tension between craft unions’ practical solutions to sweeping urban 
unemployment in New Orleans, and national and international Socialist imperatives to 
forcefully remake society. While individual members would participate in future labor 
struggles along the city’s port, it would be a generation before New Orleans Socialists 
and radical unionists would publicly endorse a broad-scale, multiracial cooperative 
movement.
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Chapter 2: Warriors for Lower Prices and Municipal Cleanliness: The Housewives’ 
League and the Consumers Movement, 1910-1922 
 In one of the few extant photographs of the Housewives’ League Co-operative 
Store, the viewer is greeted with a ghostly sight.  Their features barely discernible in the 
grainy picture, four white saleswomen stand resolutely in front of tall shelves stocked 
with canned vegetables and fruits.1  They are modestly attired with their hair neatly 
pinned in buns.  A small cashier with black, cavernous eyes peers solemnly out from the 
photograph.  A female patron addresses the women, herself a grim specter cloaked in 
black.  Like the photograph’s blurry, faded figures, the Housewives’ League Co-
operative Store was ephemeral.  Located next to the Prytania Street Public Market in the 
affluent area of Uptown New Orleans, the cooperative was open for only nine months 
between February and October 1921.  Nonetheless, the grocery cooperative was the 
culmination of years of women-led cooperative effort to purify abusive production, 
distribution, and consumption systems.   
 First proposed in June 1919, the Co-operative Store was part of the all-female 
Housewives’ League’s comprehensive program for economic and political reform.  The 
League sought to fundamentally transform corporate capitalism by demanding increased 
municipal and federal intervention in the marketplace and the creation of a national 
cooperative economy.  Eventually, it argued, a network of consumer and producer 
cooperatives would guarantee average Americans access to affordable goods and 
                                                
1 “Housewives’ Grocery in Operation,” New Orleans Item Magazine (April 17, 1920): 2. 
 121 
services, while ultimately creating a moral economy that celebrated civic engagement and 
community cooperation.  
 The Housewives’ League’s cooperative efforts are instructive historical examples 
of the broader coalition building necessary for cooperative development.  As members 
campaigned for a federal suffrage amendment to achieve political equality, the League 
also used female cooperative enterprise to confront exploitative capitalism and laissez-
faire government. Demanding the return of World War I government price controls and 
decrying rising inflation and skyrocketing food costs, the League’s progressive ideology 
was pushed further left as it joined a loose confederation of unlikely allies at the local, 
state, regional, and national level.  A mix of social workers, pacifists, consumer activists, 
and Socialist cooperators encouraged League members to place their city-wide reform 
work within a larger context of political, social, and economic change. However, their 
visionary cooperative plan was bounded by League members’ privileged middle-class 
status and adherence to racial hierarchies.  Despite the League’s progressive sympathies, 
its cooperatives functioned as bulwarks against World War I demobilization, a severe 
postwar economic downturn, and a rash of labor strikes and protests threatening to erode 
affluent white women’s racial and class security.   
  Indeed, the narrative defining the Housewives’ League is one that carefully 
contains political radicalism.  To survive, the League cast the cooperative store as a 
forward-thinking business model; the Housewives’ League channeled the language of 
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progress and modernity sweeping postwar New Orleans’s public discourse.2  Most 
significantly, however, it also made strategic alliances with labor representatives, 
commercial elites, and city and state officials otherwise leery of women’s political and 
economic empowerment. To that end, the League engaged in rhetorical obfuscation by 
presenting white women’s autonomy as non-threatening.  By blandly representing the 
organization’s members as “housewives” and “consumers” who desired to cut grocery 
bill costs by opening a cooperative store, the League sidestepped charges of Communism 
dogging other consumer, suffrage, and labor organizations.    
 This chapter examines three women who shaped the Housewives’ League’s 
interventions in the consumer marketplace.  Most importantly, they illustrate the ways in 
which the League’s cooperative ideals shifted in relation to different historical moments 
and the needs of competing constituents.  First, Housewives’ League president Inez 
Meyers defined the organization’s prewar cooperative activities while nurturing a 
coalition of clubwomen, suffragists, politicians, farmers, and labor unions that would 
sustain the League’s cooperative grocery store after World War I.  However, the 
League’s tumultuous encounters with black female unionists exposed the organization’s 
fundamental unwillingness to build alliances with working-class African American 
women.  Instead, cooperatives became a means to assert white middle-class authority.  
Second, as part of a national movement to reduce postwar inflation and protect 
consumers, Edna Egleston formed the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store in 1919.  
Significantly, she downplayed cooperatives’ radical roots even as she explicitly allied 
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with them.  Finally, the chapter analyzes Ida Friend, a Jewish philanthropist and president 
of the New Orleans Consumers’ League.  Friend reflects liberal white Southerners’ 
antiracist activism during the interwar years.  While the lives of each woman overlap and 
intersect, they reveal the League’s delicate negotiations around labor, gender, and race as 
the organization built broad relationships that would expand white women’s autonomy 
and consumer empowerment more generally. 
Inez MacMartin Meyers and the City Federation of Women’s Clubs  
 Speaking before the City Federation of Women’s Clubs in 1912, prominent 
newspaper woman Inez MacMartin Meyers foreshadowed the subversive potential of the 
Housewives’ League Co-operative Store by making the ideological connection between 
cooperation, women’s equality, and Socialism explicit: while other women’s clubs barred 
overtly political or Socialist members, Meyers professed, “I think [women] are all 
socialistic, or will get there soon, the longer we find that we can’t do the things we want 
to do.”3  The Housewives’ League echoed contemporary material feminists such as 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman who proclaimed that women’s political and economic equality 
hinged on their liberation from devalued domestic work.4   
 For example, in Women and Economics, Gilman decried housewives’ economic 
dependence on husbands, arguing that cooking and cleaning were “social duties,” not 
sexual ones.5 The most advanced society would have professionally-run kitchens, 
cleaning services, nurseries, and kindergartens, freeing housewives to pursue careers. 
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Eventually, women should “stand beside man as the comrade of his soul, not the servant 
of his body.” As historian Dolores Hayden argues, material feminists believed that 
industrial capitalism and its attendant gender exploitation would yield to a “completely 
industrialized, socialist society utilizing collective technology to socialize” household 
labor.6  Further, material feminists organized their own consumer and producer 
cooperatives to create a utopian cooperative movement.7  Similarly, the League believed 
a cooperative economy would reorganize both women’s work and the urban built 
environment to achieve female economic equality and the gradual evolution of an 
egalitarian society grounded in communal living. 
 The life of Housewives’ League President Inez Meyers helps elucidate how the 
League was able to press for radical alternative economic programs while also aligning 
with organizations sometimes antithetical to women’s empowerment and economic 
reform.  Committed to expanding women’s economic and political autonomy, Meyers 
was a professional journalist, an ardent federal amendment suffragist, and a leader of the 
coalescing New Orleans consumer movement.  Her background, allies, and political 
sympathies create an important counterpoint to historical representations of New Orleans’ 
white clubwomen as insular, hide-bound socialites. Pamela Tyler, for example, 
characterizes the Louisiana women’s club and suffrage movement era between 1900 and 
1920 as exclusive and aristocratic, tied to the planter-business elite controlling city and 
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state politics.8  Predominantly well-educated, married, and affluent, female leaders 
shunned outsiders, favoring their insular traditions and social circles.  
 However, the women of Housewives’ League were not, for the most part, 
members of the New Orleans plantation or industrial aristocracy.   This heterogeneous 
membership made the League more receptive to meaningful governmental and economic 
change necessary to improving all Americans’ lives.  For instance, Meyers, like many 
Housewives’ League’s directors, was a cultural and geographic outsider in New Orleans.  
While Meyers was born in Iowa in 1868, her father was Canadian, and her mother was 
from Wisconsin.9  As a young woman, Inez and her family moved to Jennings, a rural 
town in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana.10  There, Inez’s sister, Maude MacMartin, married 
the local postmaster, while in 1888, Inez married mail clerk Henry Buford Meyers.11  
Henry Meyers eventually became the superintendent of the United States Postal Service’s 
railway mail department.12  By 1901, Inez had relocated to New Orleans with Henry, his 
mother, and their son.13  Settling into the rhythms of the city’s social life, she quickly 
integrated into its burgeoning women’s club and suffrage movement. 
 The location of Meyers’ home reflects the future Housewives’ League’s racial 
and class politics.  The family lived a large, rambling residence on Jackson Avenue in a 
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historically German section of the Garden District.  They ran the Meyers Printing and 
Advertising Company out of a modest Uptown shotgun home on Arabella Avenue near 
the Mississippi River.14 Most Housewives’ League members also lived in Uptown and 
Garden District neighborhoods, which geographer Richard Campanella terms the “the 
white teapot,” the high ground between marginal swampland, populated by African 
Americans, and the Mississippi River waterfront, inhabited by white immigrants.15  
 
Figure 3: Demographic map of Housewives’ League Co-operative Store members’ 
residences.  Light gray dots are Jewish members.  Dark gray are Protestant or Catholic 
members. 
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 There, wealthy Anglo-Americans built stately mansions and townhouses along St. 
Charles Avenue and Magazine Street.  The Garden District’s urban enclaves were well 
established in the late nineteenth-century, and by World War I, “street-car suburbs” 
serving affluent whites had expanded into the greater Carrollton, Uptown, and Audubon 
Park districts.  Living behind these great estates in cheaper residential blocks were 
African Americans and poor whites, forming a grid of racialized spatial inequality.  While 
the Housewives’ League launched initiatives to assist poor and black women, its middle-
class membership remained concentrated in this wealthy district. 
 Meyers did not confine her energy to the printing business.  For over two decades, 
she lent her skills and connections within the newspaper and printing industry to serve the 
Progressive movement and the suffrage cause.  Meyers was “fearless in her advocacy of 
reforms,” working first as an assistant magazine editor in the 1910s, and then editing the 
New Orleans Item’s woman’s page until her death in November 1923.16 Meyers also 
faithfully served on the General Federation of Women’s Clubs’ press committee.17 The 
Federation’s press chairman called Meyers “one of the best known and most wide-awake 
newspaperwomen of the far south.”18 Working with Club-affiliated newspaperwomen 
across the country, she ensured that female professionals, suffragists, and reformers were 
positively portrayed in the New Orleans and national press.  Meyers thus doggedly fought 
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for the passage of state and federal suffrage amendments, as well as Progressive reform 
efforts to improve film regulation, prison conditions, public health, and family nutrition.   
New Orleans’ Suffrage Movement 
 Additionally, like many other professional women, the suffrage movement was an 
animating force in Meyers’ life.19  As historian Elna Green observed, Louisianan federal 
amendment suffragists were integrated into the “national urban economy, making their 
living by serving the needs of the growing urban workforce.”20  Similarly, Meyers and the 
Housewives’ League’s body of doctors, teachers, clerical workers, social workers, and 
journalists argued they should play integral roles in advancing America’s urban, 
industrial, and governmental infrastructure, and to that end, supported working women 
and their economic independence.21 
 In fact, the Housewives’ League’s future leaders had honed their political 
organizing skills in the Woman’s Club and the Era Club.  The Woman’s Club was 
comprised of career women such as suffragists Jean and Kate Gordon and Progressive 
reformer Sophie Bell Wright.22  The Era Club, a prominent New Orleans suffrage 
organization, also recruited influential and affluent white female reformers.  In addition 
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to advocating female enfranchisement, it lobbied for city sewerage and water 
improvements, child labor laws, juvenile courts, playgrounds and public baths, and 
female factory inspectors and legal witnesses.23  As an Era Club member, Meyers worked 
closely with colleagues Carrie McWilliams, Ethel Hutson, Grace Chamberlain, and Sake 
Meehan, active Louisianan suffragists who would sustain the Housewives’ League as it 
crept cautiously toward radical political and economic action.24  
 Yet despite allying with clubwomen of varying ideologies, Meyers identified 
herself with a coterie of “unusual women” who rejected the racial prejudices of New 
Orleans’ social elites and advocated political empowerment for all women.  For example, 
Meyers co-founded the National American Woman’s Suffrage Association (NAWSA)-
affiliated Woman’s Suffrage Party (WSP).  The WSP was organized in 1913 after Era 
Club founders Kate and Jean Gordon rejected NAWSA leader Carrie Chapman Catt’s 
proposed federal suffrage amendment and ousted all federal sympathizers from the Era 
Club, including Meyers.25  Fearing that a federal amendment invited government 
meddling because it would allow black women to vote, the Gordons allied with anti-
suffragists to block its ratification in Louisiana.26  In contrast, federal amendment 
supporters dismissed the Gordons’ racist diatribes as empty rhetoric.  Further, Meyers 
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and her former Era Club peers had long chafed at the Gordons’ authoritarian dictates and 
initially ran the WSP as an alternative, egalitarian political party.  
 While the Gordons represented an elitist suffrage movement that refused to work 
outside the Democratic Party or their small group of wealthy clubwomen, the early WSP 
recruited working-class women rather than “Lady Bountifuls.”27  Eschewing the 
autocratic labels of “president” and “vice president,” the WSP was democratically run, in 
contrast to efforts “conducted too much along drawing room lines.”  To that end, the 
WSP spoke before women in labor unions, stores, and factories, and even discussed the 
possibility of urban women visiting “the cotton field in order to talk suffrage to the 
workers.”  The party also reached out to other working women as well; in addition to 
selling its journal to female passersby on the street, its Teachers’ Political Equality 
League quickly mobilized 20 teachers who were vocal contributors to the organization.  
The Housewives’ League’s cooperative store would continue the WSP’s commitment to 
democratic process and improved working conditions for women regardless of class.  
Louisiana Women’s Club Movement 
 While suffrage organizing was crucial to Inez Meyers’ understanding of female 
cooperation, so too was her reform work within the women’s club movement.  While the 
national women’s club movement had been organizing women around self-improvement 
and education for decades, it was not until the South began to industrialize and urbanize 
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that the General Federation of Women’s Clubs extended to Louisiana.28  Meyers 
chartered the New Orleans Federation of Women’s Clubs in late 1912 as a concerted 
attempt to address the needs of the city’s women.29  As president between 1912 and 1915, 
Meyers gained access to the national federation’s much-needed institutional framework 
that would unite Louisianan members around local, regional, and national issues 
concerning American women.30  
 While historian Landon Storrs claims that large Southern women’s organizations 
like the General Federation of Women’s Clubs blocked institutional change and enforced 
conservative ideologies antithetical to women’s suffrage or other radical reforms, in fact, 
clubwomen constituted the majority of the New Orleans suffrage movement.31  Not only 
had the New Orleans Federation endorsed suffrage in 1913, a year before the General 
Federation did so, but the city’s suffragists ran the branch federation and other civic 
organizations.32  The Federation also enlisted the Era Club in its efforts to lobby 
legislators to pass industrial and child labor laws.33  Rather than hindering Progressive 
and suffrage efforts, the New Orleans Federation worked in concert with suffragists to 
expand women’s public recognition and legal protections.  
 Indeed, fostering unity among white female activists was of great concern to the 
New Orleans Federation, and Meyers duly incorporated cooperative principles into its 
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project for women’s economic and political autonomy.  Recognizing that “there is force 
in numbers, and 20 or 50 clubs co-operating heartily can naturally accomplish more than 
one working by itself,” Meyers promoted coalition building among women belonging to 
a range of organizations.34  For example, Agnes Morris, a New Orleans public health 
worker and member of both the Woman’s Suffrage Party and the Housewives’ League, 
characterized the model clubwoman as “she who strives for the solution of the questions 
of wage-earning women, of the underage working children, of the Consumers League, of 
the Sanitation Clubs, of the political equality movement.”35  As Anne Firor Scott argues, 
by regularly convening to discuss urban ills disproportionately affecting women, southern 
female club members began to challenge economic and political disparities dividing their 
cities and the nation at large.36  Ultimately, Meyers’ work with women’s clubs inspired 
her to end capitalism’s most egregious conditions.  Female economic and political 
cooperation became her means to achieving this end.  
The “Housewife” and the Female Consumer 
 The Housewives’ League was born out of an emerging consumer rights 
movement that mobilized after the Panic of 1910, when food prices rapidly increased and 
corresponding food shortages in 1912 and 1913 swept the country.  In 1911, Mrs. Julian 
Heath formed the National Housewives’ League (NHL) in Chicago to offset the Panic of 
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1910’s resulting economic recession and rapid inflation.37  Claiming that working and 
middle-class women were responsible for budgeting over 90 percent of their families’ 
annual income, the NHL trained the middle-class American housewife to “recognize her 
economic position” as an efficient and responsible consumer.38  To that end, it published 
a monthly journal explaining current agricultural policy, reporting on branches’ public 
sanitation campaigns, and deploying the theories of New Nutrition and home economics 
to assist women purchasing and preparing clean, cheap food.39  While historian Tracey 
Deutsch posits that pre-Depression consumer activism was largely localized and 
unorganized, the New Orleans Housewives’ League members, nevertheless, saw 
themselves as part of a national effort to feminize government and economic institutions 
that intervened in women’s everyday lives as consumers and citizens.40   
 Specifically, Meyers’ critique of capitalism crystalized around a 1913 regional 
and national economic crisis, which revealed how volatile consumer markets unduly 
impacted women.  Additionally, two severe economic recessions between 1913 and 1915 
and an accompanying food shortage between January 1913 and December 1914 
generated a national debate over how the plunging market would affect workers’ wages 
and consumers’ living standards.41  At the same time, changing labor demographics in 
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New Orleans forced many middle-class women to complete their own housework, from 
cleaning and child-care to shopping and cooking.  Most strikingly, by 1900, seven out of 
ten housewives nationwide performed their own household labor as their domestic 
servants sought better paying industrial work.42   
 In response, Meyers formed the Housewives’ League, a division of the New 
Orleans Federation of Women’s Clubs, to provide white middle-class women with 
money- and labor-saving strategies so that they could turn their attention to public 
reform.43  Specifically, the League’s strove to lower food prices, ensure that retailers and 
wholesalers adhere to standardized weights and measures, inspect public markets, and 
“advance the mutual interests of producer and consumer by supervising daily 
consumption practices and ensuring women’s equitable treatment in the marketplace.”44  
Proclaiming, “food is our most vital necessity,” the League rallied around reforming 
women’s food procurement and consumption, allying with national organizations like the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the National Consumers League, the National 
Housewives’ League, and the National American Women’s Suffrage Association.45  
The Housewives’ League’s Political and Commercial Alliances 
  The Housewives’ League also formed at a moment when the New Orleans 
mayoral administration was slowly conceding to female reformers’ demands for greater 
influence over the city’s economic and political affairs.  At the same time, however, 
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Mayor Martin Behrman resisted their call for political equality.  As progressive reformers 
and suffragists, the League’s members decried politicians who blocked their 
enfranchisement.  They were particularly critical of the anti-suffrage Old Regular 
Democratic Party (ORD), or Democratic Ring, that dominated city and state politics.  
Between 1904 and 1920, Behrman’s administration controlled each of New Orleans’ 17 
alderman positions and rewarded loyal working-class voters with patronage jobs and 
charity services through its machine-controlled precinct organizations.46 Fearing that 
women’s enfranchisement would lead to sweeping political reform, Behrman instructed 
city ward leaders to vote against a state suffrage amendment in 1912 and 1918.47 
 His trepidations were well grounded: With an eventual membership of 1,500 
members, or nearly seven percent of registered white female voters in 1920, the 
Housewives’ League balanced consumer advocacy with political activism.48  For 
example, at a sparsely attended annual Housewives’ League meeting in November 1919, 
“political controversy invaded the discussion of how cheaper gas for the housewives of 
New Orleans may be obtained.”49  Reformist state senators accused Behrman of lavishing 
city funds on Industrial Canal improvements while neglecting citizens’ need for reliable, 
inexpensive fuel.  WSP head Lydia Holmes revealed that many of the League’s husbands 
supported the Ring and had barred their wives from attending the contentious meeting.  
However, she reminded attendees that while women could not vote, they could still 
pressure City Council through “constant, continual, everlasting agitation” to lower fuel 
                                                
46 Tyler, Silk Stockings and Ballot Boxes, 11. 
47 Ibid., 24; McConnaughy, The Woman Suffrage Movement in America, 185, 190-193. 
48 Winslow, Official Register and Directory of Women’s Clubs in America, 179. 
49 “Says Husbands, ‘Ring’ Followers, Keep Wives Away,” 12. 
 136 
costs.  Under Meyers’ leadership, the League “alternatively stormed and wheedled public 
opinion and the powers that be” to advocate for female political and economic equality.50  
 At the same time, Housewives’ League members were closely affiliated with the 
city’s reformist commercial interests, often married to successful businessmen.  
Consequently, the League was deeply invested in the economic growth of the city and 
Louisiana, especially as it affected women’s financial stability.  Convinced that the ORD 
was enriching itself before redistributing monetary resources to the city and state, male 
commercial leaders formed the Citizens’ League, a nonpartisan reform organization that 
ran its own political candidates in order to end both the Ring’s dominance and political 
corruption.51  Mayor Behrman was concerned enough by the opposition party’s gains to 
integrate New Orleans’ reformist commercial elite into city administrative positions, 
which the business community touted as the best strategy to improve government 
efficiency and civic responsiveness.52  
 Examining the Housewives’ League’s alliances with New Orleans’ commercial 
elite in greater detail reveals both the constraints League members faced as they struggled 
for public legitimacy, as well as their subversion of corporate interests.  Although the 
Housewives’ League critiqued commercial and governmental prejudices that glorified 
war and exploited the poor, they were implicated in the very systems of global exchange 
that fueled American imperialism.53  New Orleans in the early decades of the twentieth 
                                                
50 “Women Work for Humanity Cause,” Daily Picayune (September 1, 1913): 29. 
51 McConnaughy, The Woman Suffrage Movement in America, 186; Tyler, Silk Stockings and Ballot 
Boxes, 11; Kendall, History of New Orleans.   
52 McConnaughy, The Woman Suffrage Movement in America, 187. 
53 Evans, Born for Liberty, 153-154. 
 137 
century witnessed rapid infrastructure and port modernization and corresponding 
economic growth.54  Mayor Behrman’s strategic alliance with the city’s commercial 
leaders allowed him to promote “municipally run economic development”; consequently, 
New Orleans’ command over the global marketplace rapidly expanded.  Boasting the 
second largest port in the nation, New Orleans was poised to capitalize on the burgeoning 
import and export trade in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Central America, and Latin America by the 
1910s.55  New Orleans exported items such as cotton, sugar, lumber, oil, and rice, and 
imported coffee, bananas, nitrates, and molasses.  For example, between 1899 and 1902, 
the Vaccaro Brothers and Samuel Zemurray’s Cuyamel Fruit Company consolidated their 
hold over Central American banana importation, ensuring that New Orleans would lead 
the tropical fruit industry.56   
 Similarly, at least 21 Housewives’ League members had husbands or brothers 
employed in expanding export and import industries such as cotton, sugar, molasses, rice, 
oil, chicory, lumber, and feed.  Participating in New Orleans’ infrastructural 
modernization, six other husbands managed engineering offices, dry docks, steamship 
companies, and telephone and telegraph offices.  For example, Edna Egleston’s husband 
Howard was a civil engineer and member of the Association of Commerce.  He had 
helped construct the Panama Canal as well as railroad lines throughout Mexico, Florida, 
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and Louisiana.57  The United States’ acquisition of the rights to build the Panama Canal 
and its support of Panamanian independence in 1903 secured its diplomatic, labor, 
technological, and economic dominance over new South American markets.58  
 It is unsurprising, then, that women whose livelihoods depended on expanding 
domestic and transnational commerce were vocal city boosters.  Times Picayune feature 
writer Julia Truitt Bishop, for example, declared that the city’s waterfront, canal, and 
railroad modernization would guarantee that the Port of New Orleans would become “one 
of the best and busiest and most economical ports in the entire country.”59  The League 
even held meetings at the Association of Commerce library, promoted local goods in 
“Made in New Orleans” campaigns, and co-organized the Association of Commerce’s 
annual Buyers Week to attract corporate investment.60   
 Given their families’ roles in facilitating global markets, the Housewives’ 
League’s determined foray into cooperative economics is especially striking.  The League 
exploited the Behrman administration and the Association of Commerce’s alliance, 
believing that it could lower the cost of living by strategically cooperating with both.  
Recognizing city officials’ mistrust of suffragists and female reformers and excluded 
from a political machine relying on patronage and votes, women’s organizations like the 
Era Club had long attempted to garner civic influence by volunteering on Behrman’s 
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civic commissions.61  Similarly, despite explicitly opposing the Ring, Housewives’ 
Leaguers believed that civic engagement would demonstrate their fitness for political 
equality.  Indeed, the Housewives’ League members’ identification as “housewives” and 
“consumers” constituted a kind of rhetorical gymnastics that legitimized their political 
ambitions.  As historian Allison Parker argues, female reformers often justified political 
activity by extending their maternal and domestic duties to “mothering” the nation.62  
Likewise, by labeling professional women “housewives,” League members practiced 
civic mindedness without threatening gender roles.63     
 Casting women as consumers could be either accommodationist or subversive, 
and the League tacked a fine line between the two.  Because women were positioned as 
both “housewives” and the nation’s primary consumers, the New Orleans government 
and the Association of Commerce often prevailed upon the Housewives’ League to help 
strengthen New Orleans’ economy and modernize its failing infrastructure.64  To that end, 
League members served on municipal consumer commissions and made policy 
recommendations to civic leaders.  For example, in April 1919, the League’s law and 
legislation committee declared that retailers and wholesalers ignored weights and 
measures laws mandating fair, standardized pricing.  Likewise, future Housewives’ 
League Co-operative Store head Edna Egleston petitioned to the city administration to 
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enforce laws mandating that ice trucks contain working scales.65  Her lobbying was 
effective: in response to Egleston’s petition, City Attorney Isaiah Moore instructed 
Mayor Behrman to have police monitor ice delivery wagons.66  The League’s campaign 
to lower food costs for women therefore dovetailed with Progressive campaigns 
formalizing female involvement in the government’s market regulation.  Women enjoyed 
increasing influence over public health, nutrition, and food production, distribution, and 
consumption practices.67   
 Yet the League’s alliance with commercial and civic leaders did not hinder its 
proposal for economic reform, a move that often pitted them against the Association of 
Commerce and the Behrman administration.  For example, even as Howard Egleston was 
constructing railroads and dredging canals to extend the reach of American capitalism, he 
and his wife Edna simultaneously advocated a decentralized system of cooperative stores 
that countered the very same economic and political structures Howard Egleston was 
aiding.  The League saw no contradiction in facilitating global markets and pursuing 
economic cooperation.  As historian Jonathan Hansen argues, cosmopolitan feminists 
“presumed that other cultures would yield obligingly before the advance of Western 
technology and commerce” in order to achieve international harmony.68  Analogously, the 
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Housewives’ League believed national and international cooperative enterprise would 
redeem American capitalism and enlighten global citizens.   
Early Cooperative Projects: The Public Market  
 As state legislators, U.S. Senate committees, and private institutions labored to 
identify the cause of skyrocketing food costs, activists began to form consumer 
cooperatives to circumvent wholesalers and retailers the public largely blamed for the 
national food supply crisis.  To do so, they worked directly with producers and 
processors.69 Similarly, in 1913, the Housewives League launched a far-reaching 
campaign to reform the city’s public markets to provide women access to high quality, 
inexpensive foods. Fearing that unregulated peddlers threatened small farmers’ 
livelihoods, the League “took a deep breath and girded its armor...for...efforts that will 
mean a central market and cheaper meat.”70  Accordingly, the League urged city officials 
to regularly inspect public markets for proper sanitation and equitable pricing.71  It also 
lobbied the city to operate safe and sanitary retail and wholesale markets throughout the 
city so small producers and female consumers could avoid middlemen retailers or 
wholesalers who unfairly inflated produce prices.  Specifically, the Housewives’ League 
argued that small farmers could sell low-cost, fresh bulk produce directly to consumers 
and coordinated between female consumers and small producers, agricultural unions, and 
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cooperative stores.72  Beginning in 1913, the League enlisted the city’s farmers, trade 
associations, and unions to advise members how best to intervene in the marketplace.73  
Most importantly, investigating public market conditions and allying with 
producers and retailers critical of corporate-controlled food distribution encouraged the 
League to establish its own cooperative organizations.  For example, in May 1915, 
responding to a severe, year-long national depression, Meyers announced that the League 
had initiated an experiment in cooperative marketing with the Louisiana State Farmers’ 
Educational and Co-operative Union of America (LSF), a rural Populist organization.74  
The LSF was a branch of the National Farmers Union, a militant regional association 
established in 1902 that extended across the Cotton Belt South.75  Recruiting farm 
laborers and collaborating with trade unions, the National Farmers Union organized 
credit unions and supply-purchasing, marketing, grain elevator, and grocery cooperatives.  
Additionally, it lobbied the federal government to ban commodity market speculation and 
to regulate agricultural prices to aid small farmers.76  The LSF and the Housewives’ 
League increased profits for depressed farmers by facilitating direct trade between 
producer and urban consumers in New Orleans’ public markets.   
 However, the LSF and Housewives’ League struggled to educate both consumers 
and producers about the benefits of cooperative enterprise in public markets.  Two 
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months into the project’s implementation, LSF State Agent J.H. Craig reported that 
farmers refused to coordinate with the organization and instead glutted the public markets 
with their surplus vegetables.77  Women’s market patronage was similarly unreliable, 
largely because of the cooperative stall’s inconvenient location and uneven quality of 
produce preparation and storage.  Nonetheless, the LSF remained adamant that economic 
cooperation between “the farmers or the farm wives and [women’s] clubs” was “a 
recognized condition imperative for the common weal.”  Similarly, when sold in 
“abundance,” the League hoped bulk vegetables, poultry, and fruit would appreciably 
reduce urban food costs while profiting small producers.78   
An Independent Housewives’ League 
 By June 1915, the New Orleans Housewives’ League split from the City 
Federation to become a separate, affiliated body.  After receiving a charter from the 
National Housewives’ League (NHL), the New Orleans chapter fully committed itself to 
achieving that organization’s mandate to improve economic conditions for middle-class 
women.79  Inez Meyers was unanimously elected president, serving in that office for 
seven years.80  Reflecting its members’ ties to urban commercial elites, the League 
established its permanent headquarters in the Association of Commerce’s offices 
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bordering Canal Street and the French Quarter.81  Riding a street car along St. Charles 
Avenue from her peaceful Uptown suburbs to the Association of Commerce, a middle-
class Leaguer would have passed through the Warehouse and Cotton Districts containing 
the factories, banks, agents, and factors dependent on the state’s languishing cotton 
industry, and into the Central Business District, filled with commodity exchange houses 
and businesses supporting New Orleans agricultural trade.82 
 As an independent entity, the League continued to explore cooperative economic 
projects.  It had good reason to: By 1916, food prices had risen by nearly 20 percent in 
response to crop failure, railway car shortages, Allies’ wartime food demands, and a 
domestic shortage of staples like onions, bread, and cabbage.83  To counter rising food 
costs, in December 1915, the League’s market committee established a cooperative curb 
market at the corner of St. Charles and Napoleon Avenues.84  To relieve farmers and 
consumers of the middleman’s mark-up, peddlers were barred from the market. In fact, 
the League’s goal was to demonstrate to retailers and wholesalers that “they can’t hold up 
the people any longer!”85  Committee member Edna Egleston recalled that members 
“twice a week got up at dawn, in rain or shine, in cold or heat, and went to the various 
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market places and sold these fresh country eggs to eager customers.”86  Half a dozen 
wagons “laden as long as anything would stay on” traveled from Jefferson Parish and 
Baton Rouge farms to sell produce on Wednesdays and Saturdays.87  Farmers celebrated 
the arrangement, claiming their profits far exceeded those at public markets. 
 Located by an Uptown street car stop on New Orleans Railway and Lighting 
Company land, the market drew white middle-class women who arrived in “droves” by 
cars or public transit, traveling by themselves, or with their husbands, children, and 
servants.  Additionally, African American domestic workers shopped for their white 
employers and themselves.  Embracing the market as a social event, patrons shared their 
inexpensive, high quality finds with friends, such as “lettuce as big and solid as 
cabbage...excellent sweet potatoes…[and] the finest and tenderest spinach...turnips and 
mustard greens and endive and shallots.” In order to promote women’s economic 
solvency, the League even encouraged women to sell homemade breads and jellies, as 
well as their craftwork.    
 Yet the curb market project’s success was contingent on League members 
maintaining good relations with a confounding range of interests, including transportation 
companies, municipal officials, farmers, market neighbors, and the city’s food retailers 
and wholesalers.  In what would become a common refrain throughout the Housewives’ 
League’s consumer campaigns, in 1916, food retailers and wholesalers accused the 
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organization of conspiring to destroy their businesses.88  Meyers observed, “There has 
been persistent effort exerted to influence the growers against the Housewives’ League 
market.  We know for a surety that many of them, if not all, have been importuned to 
disappoint us, to take their produce elsewhere to market.”  However, the farmers stood by 
“the women patronizing them.”  Sidestepping any hint of anti-capitalist demagoguery, 
Meyers assured retailers that the League aligned with the moderate aims of the National 
Housewives’ League, which “emphasizes most emphatically that its purpose is not to 
fight the middleman.”  Further, she claimed that lower food costs facilitated the city’s 
economic development by attracting potential residents to New Orleans.   
 At the same time, Meyers nevertheless insisted that the League curb market 
constituted a “revolution” in food distribution.  She reiterated that the curb market 
reduced waste and lowered consumer costs by enabling truck farmers to sell directly to 
women, and most importantly, broke wholesalers’ monopoly on produce distribution to 
the “detriment of housewives.”  Noting that with its 800 members the League was a 
powerful force, Meyers declared that her organization was “determined” that small 
farmers would continue to use the market, regardless of produce merchants’ opposition.  
To do so, Meyers continued to draw on the support of city officials.  
 Most importantly, the League’s curb market program inspired the organization to 
continue researching cooperative enterprises.  Looking back in 1920, Edna Egleston 
remarked that the curb market “demonstrated what can be done through co-operation 
[between producers and consumers and among New Orleanian women], for, in a way, it 
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was a movement in that direction.”89  The League taught its female members to handle 
every aspect of the market’s business, appointing a farm products committee, a buying 
committee, as well as a coordinator for transportation, freight, express and parcel post 
deliveries.  Members not only began to understand the nuances of modern food 
distribution systems, but also how to work collaboratively.  Egleston noted that the 
members’ desire to find new “ways and means of economizing” soon led the League to 
research formal cooperative enterprise.90   
 At the same time, America’s entry into World War I and women’s voluntary and 
paid war work laid the groundwork for the League’s renewed participation in food 
distribution reform and cooperative activism.  As the nation readied for war, Progressive 
reformers lauded consumer cooperatives as a vital distribution channel that would end the 
food crisis by cutting out middlemen and connecting consumers directly to cheap food.91   
Moreover, foreshadowing the League’s radical postwar economic and political program, 
renowned New Orleans journalist and reformer Ida Tarbell declared in 1917 that by 
mobilizing “woman-power” around national defense and civilian food supply, “women 
whose minds have dealt so keenly with…successive food problems may become 
dangerous opponents of food speculators and food hoardings.”92  Wartime cooperative 
enterprise would lead to a postwar cooperative democracy that acted “for the sake of the 
whole…based on a sense of national need and national good.” 
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The Housewives’ League and World War I   
While Louisianan suffragists developed collaborative partnerships through a 
vibrant pre-war national peace movement that decried self-interested corporations driving 
global war, World War I work provided a concrete, publicly acceptable platform for the 
League’s evolving cooperative philosophy.93  After President Woodrow Wilson declared 
war in April 1917 and instituted severe restrictions on civil liberties and free speech to 
silence pacifists and radicals, mainstream suffragists backpedaled from advocating 
pacifism.94  Avoiding a political backlash, former antiwar advocate Carrie Chapman Catt 
announced NAWSA would strategically support the war effort as a means to secure 
lasting peace while continuing to advocate for women’s suffrage.  Like other mainstream 
suffragists, the Housewives’ League believed that active participation in the war effort 
through industrial labor, volunteer work, military enlistment, and civilian defense training 
would exemplify women’s fitness for full citizenship.95   
 Taking advantage of Progressive reformers’ new-found influence over New 
Orleans and Louisiana politics, the Housewives’ League’s work in wartime food 
production and consumption forged ties with high-ranking reform politicians crucial to 
the passage of state and federal suffrage amendments.  By enabling women to serve on 
defense committees and domestic commissions on civilian affairs, the war helped 
legitimize white women’s calls for citizenship. Indeed, Housewives’ League members 
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endorsed Louisiana’s reform governors Ruffin Pleasant and John M. Parker’s efforts to 
shut down the New Orleans political machine and, in return, expected them to 
enfranchise women.96  Given his platform of progressivism, future governor Parker was a 
logical ally for the Housewives’ League fighting for both consumer protections and 
women’s suffrage.  Running for governor on the Progressive Party ticket during the Good 
Government movement in 1916, Parker was committed to eradicating the anti-suffrage 
Democratic Ring political machine.97  By 1920, Parker was now a reform Democrat who 
supported suffrage and “business progressivism,” sympathies the League applauded.98  
Parker’s platform included constitutional and administrative reforms, eliminating 
“bossism” in Louisiana politics, and relieving postwar capital and labor tension. 
 During World War I, Parker was appointed state food administrator for President 
Woodrow Wilson’s Food Administration, which monitored the nation’s wartime food 
supply by preventing food shortages, hoarding, price inflation, and food riots.99  The Food 
Administration encouraged citizens to reduce their consumption of staples and hired 
female home economists and food reformers to staff the agency’s state offices.  
Simultaneously, to foster cooperation between the Food Administration and women 
consumers, Governor Ruffin Pleasant recruited several Housewives’ League members to 
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the New Orleans WCCND, a federally appointed advisory organization of eleven women 
coordinating civilian women’s defense work.100   
 As WCCND members, League directors worked closely with Parker’s Food 
Administration.101  For example, after Inez Meyers and her colleagues completed a 
WCCND-sponsored Tulane University home economics summer course, the League 
hosted food conservation and food economy workshops in city department stores.  The 
League instructed women to can their own victory garden harvest, “which we are raising 
in such abundance in response to President Wilson’s call for the south to feed itself.”102   
Also, suffrage supporter and Progressive reformer Parker invited Anna Howard Shaw to 
meet with local WCCND leaders, also ardent suffragists.103  Additionally, Parker, 
alongside prominent League members Eva Dibert and Catherine Van Meter, endorsed the 
Hope Haven Industrial Farm, a cooperative farm opened in 1917 to redress wartime food 
shortages and systemic poverty.104  The League thus garnered credibility as it forged 
government partnerships that would construct a temporary welfare state framed and 
legitimized by patriotic food relief activities.  
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 The League’s cooperative war work was also inspired by the words of Ida Tarbell, 
who in 1917 hailed the WCCND as an unprecedented opportunity for the nation to 
harness women’s vast intellectual resources.105  WCCND volunteers not only performed 
mundane tasks such as making bandages or uniforms, but they also envisioned “great 
economic and social readjustments, reforms and undertakings.”  For example, Tarbell 
observed that WCCND-run cooperatives sprang up around the country to benefit “all 
classes of the community,” ranging from community canning centers and food 
exchanges, to cooperative buying clubs and cooperative food storage facilities.  She 
argued that if women’s organizations could set aside differences to create “democratic 
all-serving food centers” in the service of the national good, they could also establish 
“intellectual and social centers where all women may grapple with community and 
national problems.”  Ultimately, Tarbell contended, women’s collaborative war work 
could inspire a “disinterested co-operative democracy.”  Similarly, by working with the 
WCCND and state officials, the Housewives’ League became convinced that broad-scale 
cooperation could foment peace, economic prosperity, and political enfranchisement.  
After the war, the League would pursue formal cooperative organizing to achieve lasting 
economic reform in the service of women’s political independence. 
Racial Instability, the Housewives’ League, and the Colored Domestics’ Union 
 However, the wartime climate threw League members’ racial, class, and ethnic 
prejudices into sharp relief, which severely constricted the Housewives’ League’s 
mission to build a democratic, cooperative economy.  The League’s cooperative 
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experiments intersected with white women’s political enfranchisement, the streamlining 
of women’s domestic work, and an increasingly unsettled racial landscape.  After 
working with black women in segregated WCCND sections to coordinate women’s 
statewide war work, some League members, like Ida Friend, joined an emerging group of 
white southern women to create sustained, antiracist advocacy organizations.  However, 
for the most part, the League’s interracial and cross-class alliances remained fragile and 
tenuous.106  While directors largely disdained suffragists Kate and Jean Gordon’s rabidly 
racist rhetoric, they did not pursue racial equality as a precondition for true democracy.107  
 In particular, the racial dynamics undergirding white women’s suffrage 
campaigns and war work informed the Housewives’ League’s ambivalent response to 
black women’s social justice and political activism.  African American women’s 
participation in the public sphere was deeply threatening to many middle-class white 
women, including some members of the Housewives’ League.  As black women 
mobilized for wartime volunteer campaigns, they also demanded political 
enfranchisement and a slew of social reforms, all of which threatened to overturn the 
city’s ingrained racial and class hierarchies.108  In contrast, most League members 
resolutely regarded white and black working-class women as beneficiaries of their aid 
and expertise rather than as allies.109 
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 The League’s paternalist model of interracial cooperation was shattered during 
wartime and postwar domestic labor shortages and subsequent black unionizing efforts.  
World War I provided black and white working-class women new opportunities to 
cultivate economic autonomy and demonstrate their patriotic fitness for civic life.  In 
1917, the demand for cotton, sugar, timber, and petroleum skyrocketed and created an 
economic boom in Louisiana for the duration of the war.110  At the same time, the federal 
government expanded the city’s maritime facilities, including three shipyards, a modern 
repair yard, and an expansive warehousing terminal for railcars and shipping.  A labor 
shortage also drove up wages.  Consequently, better paying industrial work and 
immigration restrictions shrank the pool of domestic servants to the extent that white 
middle-class women feared a full-blown “servant problem.”111  
 Over the course of 1918, black domestic workers grew increasingly dissatisfied 
with their private employers, as well as their treatment within wartime non-profit 
organizations and government agencies.  In fact, when Alice Dunbar-Nelson was 
appointed by the Women’s Committee to survey black women’s war activities, she 
discovered that New Orleans’ interracial civil defense collaboration was, in reality, 
merely a facade of “lovely co-operation, and general foggy feeling of goodwill and 
sisterly love.”112  White Louisiana Women’s Committee organizers had not even ventured 
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beyond New Orleans to assist black women’s volunteer efforts.  Most troublingly, the 
city’s maids and nurses reported to Dunbar-Nelson that the Red Cross, the Women’s 
Committee, and the federal government confined black women to low-paid janitorial and 
domestic jobs, regardless of their qualifications.113  
 Demanding higher wages and shorter hours for black female servants, in May 
1918, African American unionist Eleanor Peete formed the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL)-affiliated Colored Domestic Union of New Orleans.114  While her husband 
Sylvester protested dockworkers’ wage reductions as president of the local freight 
handlers’ union, Eleanor recruited nearly 1,000 laundresses, cooks, maids, and nurses to 
the domestic union.115  Pointing to African Americans’ wartime patriotism, fellow 
Colored Domestic Union member Sarah P. Williams admonished white women “not [to] 
stand in the way of the negro woman’s effort to make a day’s…honest pay....We have 
given our sons and husbands [to the war] and without protest.  My race has bowed in 
submission to all laws and is loyal.”116  To Williams, the labor movement was “one of the 
greatest things that has happened in years amongst the negro women” because it provided 
a formal structure for black women to redress their grievances.  
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  Members of the Housewives’ League responded to the Colored Domestic Union 
in divergent ways.  Immediately after the union organized, Carrie McWilliams publicly 
declared that white housewives would rather perform their own domestic work than 
acquiesce to the union’s demands that to pay cooks $25 a month, limit their duties to 
cooking, and reduce their daily work shift to 11 hours.117  To bolster her argument, 
McWilliams claimed that Blanche Armwood Perkins, a respected black home economics 
instructor, had also denounced the union.  
 McWilliams’s pronouncement fractured a delicate interracial alliance forged 
around domestic servant training and middle-class uplift ideology.  Working-class 
African American women and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) were infuriated that Perkins had categorically rejected the domestic 
union’s campaign for a living wage.118  Indeed, Perkins occupied a precarious position 
within New Orleans’s complicated racial and class landscape.  Dependent on substantial 
financial backing, Perkins cultivated white donors by deploying Booker T. Washington’s 
conservative mantra that black economic security would result in social equality.119  For 
example, in 1915, Perkins had opened her first domestic science school in Tampa, 
Florida; a local gas company sponsored the institution to promote its services to white 
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housewives.120  After moving to New Orleans in 1917, Perkins secured funding from the 
New Orleans Gas Company, the YMCA, and white housewife-employers to open the 
New Orleans School of Domestic Science.121  For two years, she taught over 1,000 
women and girls scientific food preparation and wartime food conservation methods.122   
 Yet despite her seemingly accommodationist politics, Perkins strategically tacked 
between conservative and radical racial activism in order to advance a pragmatic program 
of social welfare and civil rights.123   For example, she was an avowed NAACP member, 
suffragist, and anti-lynching crusader.  Therefore, to repair her reputation within the 
black community while maintaining middle-class propriety and white support, Perkins 
publicly explained that she had no position on the Colored Domestic Union.  Rather, she 
was convinced that proper vocational training would enable cooks to command higher 
pay.124  However, Perkins’ diplomacy neither endeared her to working-class women, nor 
did it soothe white housewives’ growing apprehension about the implications of 
organized domestic labor. 
 Indeed, in July 1918, McWilliams called an open meeting at the Suffrage House 
to discuss the “servant problem.”125  The Times Picayune’s women’s page opined that 
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attendees made outlandish, vague accusations that subversive, unpatriotic black 
domestics would prevent white women from their vital war work, which “made the 
meeting quite uncanny at times.”126  When League president Inez Meyers suggested that 
domestic servants could work standardized shifts to more equitably distribute their labor, 
the majority of the audience vociferously rejected her suggestion and resolved to form an 
independent organization to study the issue, the Homemakers’ Association.  The club 
immediately barred servants from taking food home, eating more than one meal at work, 
or arriving late, regardless of “toothaches, illness and society funerals.”127  In fact, fierce 
opposition to the Colored Domestic Union chilled counterarguments supporting 
unionized household staff; in July 1918 the Homemakers Association, anti-espionage 
organization the American Protective League, and city police accused the union of 
harboring spies spreading German propaganda.128  Police Superintendent Mooney 
claimed that the police should carefully investigate the union because “Servants and 
cooks in private households are in a position to learn many secrets which other spies 
could not learn.”  Worse yet, infiltrators overstepped racial boundaries by attempting to 
“dictate to white women what remuneration [servants] shall receive.” 
 Given the Homemakers’ Association’s vitriolic, racist, and anti-union response, it 
is remarkable that any League members recognized black domestic laborers’ concerns.  
Lacking a coherent economic analysis to launch long-term cross-class or interracial 
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collaboration, League members either suggested moderate, individualized strategies for 
better staff management or advised white women to forgo servants altogether.129   For 
example, Catherine Van Meter, founder of the Catherine Club, a home for poor and 
working women, argued “the day of the female tyrant [has] passed.”130 America promoted 
representative government as an integral part of benevolent empire building overseas; 
affluent women, too, must apply these same “Christian virtues” at home by improving 
servants’ working conditions.  One Leaguer similarly espoused white maternalist values: 
“sympathy and kindness are the best way to keep a servant.”131  Ultimately, improved 
communication, better pay, and shorter hours would encourage “our girls” to leave 
unions and exploitative factories and return to former household positions.    
 Increasingly, the Housewives’ League suggested the “modern housewife” should 
eliminate her dependence on troublesome servants entirely.  To do so, Inez Meyers 
brought both mass consumption and cooperative economics to bear on the “servant 
problem” by replacing them with electric appliances.132  On the surface, Meyers echoed 
material feminists in New Orleans and across the country encouraging women to adopt 
“socialized” housekeeping and modern conveniences to improve domestic efficiency.  To 
radical reformers, both the telephone and the cooperative delicatessen would prevent the 
                                                
129 Hayden, Grand Domestic Revolution, 22. 
130 Catherine C. Van Meter, “Women are Striving for Equitable Conditions of Labor in the Household,” 
Times Picayune (July 21, 1918): 4. 
131 “Servant Problem Occupies Meetings of Women’s Clubs,” Times Picayune (October 29, 1920): 1. 
132 “To Show Electric Appliances Tuesday,” Times Picayune (April 14, 1919): 7; “How to Manage With a 
Servant and Without One,” Times Picayune (April 20, 1919): 53. 
 159 
“enormous social waste from educated women becoming mere domestic drudges after 
marriage” rather pursuing professional careers.133  
 However, clear racial and class assumptions restricted Meyers’ cooperative labor 
proposal to the middle-class.  For example, in an April 1919 Housewives’ League 
workshop entitled “Housework Minus Servants,” Meyers suggested that servant-less 
women form cooperative buying clubs to collectively invest in and share large 
laborsaving appliances like washing machines, dishwashers, and vacuums.134  While the 
“wise woman” applying home economic principles would “slowly but surely [be] 
emancipated from the old-time all-day drudgery of housekeeping,” Meyers did not 
explain how domestic servants or other working-class women might also afford 
expensive modern appliances to relieve themselves of the same household work.135  
Meyers resolutely declared that “every woman has the right to be mistress of her own 
home,” yet coded her female audience as white middle-class consumers.136   Unlike 
female reformers who urged both housewives and their servants to socialize domestic 
labor for their mutual benefit, the Housewives’ League conveniently overlooked the 
racial and class inequalities structuring black and low-income women’s lives to suggest 
how white, middle-class women alone could transcend the unstable labor market.137  
Ida Weis Friend and the Consumers’ League  
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 While the Housewives’ League did little to advance interracial or cross-class 
unity, many of its Jewish, ethnic, and emigrant members adhered to more progressive 
racial, class, and gender ideologies.  They often belonged to the local branch of the 
progressive National Consumers’ League (NCL), a key consumer advocacy organization 
formed by Socialist Florence Kelley in 1899 to ameliorate the abuses rendered by the 
market’s “invisible hand.”138  Of the documented Housewives’ League members, a third 
hailed from out of state.  Similarly, as historian Landon Storrs documents, Consumers’ 
League women were frequently either educated outside the region or were recent 
migrants.139  Some were also married to northern men or had northern or non-native-born 
parents.  As we shall see, because Housewives’ League and Consumers’ League 
members had spent significant periods outside the Jim Crow South, they more willingly 
confronted pernicious class, race, and gender stereotypes defining the region’s political, 
economic, and social structures. 
 In 1913, while the South largely ignored the budding consumers’ movement, a 
small group of female consumer activists founded both the NCL and the National 
Housewives’ League’s New Orleans chapters.140  The organizations shared many of the 
same members and directors.141 The Housewives’ League’s seeming indifference to 
working-class and black women can thus be attributed to the two organizations’ different, 
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though related, foci. Although the Housewives’ League promoted legislation to protect 
consumers, its alliance with the NCL ensured that members were also attuned to the 
plight of female laborers.  For example, in April 1920, Florence Kelley spoke before both 
the New Orleans Housewives’ and Consumers’ Leagues about NCL campaigns to 
safeguard women and children factory workers.142  
 The Housewives’ League’s sustained commitment to ethical consumption can 
partially be explained by the consumer reform work of Jewish philanthropist Ida Weis 
Friend, a director of the Housewives’ League, the Consumers’ League, and the City 
Federation of Women’s Clubs. Friend belonged to what historian Linda Gordon 
Kuzmack terms “the Jewish women’s movement,” in which Jewish women seeking 
expanded female autonomy aligned with secular women’s organizations like the 
Consumers’ League and the Housewives’ League.143  Friend’s Jewish identity and liberal 
politics thus represent a significant countervailing trend within the Louisiana club 
movement.  Born in 1869 in Natchez, Mississippi to a wealthy German-Jewish cotton 
factor, Friend was educated in Europe and New Orleans.144  She married a Milwaukee 
native and lived in Chicago for a time before returning to New Orleans.  Similarly, at 
least twelve-percent of Housewives’ League members were affluent German-American 
Jews prominent within the city’s commercial and philanthropic circles.145  
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 Friend and her colleagues were Reform Jews who were distinct from both 
Christian New Orleanians and Orthodox Eastern European Jews. By the late nineteenth-
century, wealthy Reform Jews culturally and geographically distanced themselves from a 
coalescing ethnic enclave of Eastern European Jews concentrated in Dryades 
Neighborhood.146 Dryades Street was comprised of predominantly Orthodox religious 
centers and Jewish merchants, tailors, and jewelers serving black and white ethnic 
immigrants otherwise excluded from segregated Downtown commercial districts.  In 
contrast, Reform Jews lived further west in Audubon Park and St. Charles Avenue 
suburbs, while their offices and stores were located in the Central Business District. 
Similarly, Jewish Housewives’ League members living clustered within a mile and a half 
of each other along the upper reaches of Dryades Street and St. Charles Avenue.147 They 
also worshipped together: most were active in the expansive Touro Synagogue and 
Temple Sinai, two community anchors for prosperous Reformists located near their St. 
Charles homes.148  Likewise, the women were all buried in Hebrew Rest in Gentilly.149 
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 New Orleans’ Jewish community was also segregated from the city’s Protestant 
and Catholic planter elite, which would have important ideological implications for the 
Housewives’ League.150 Excluded from Protestant and Catholic-affiliated social clubs, 
some began to challenge the racial and class-based presumptions that elevated such 
institutions.  Further, Jews’ frequent exchanges with friend and familial networks outside 
the South tended to erode their loyalty to Jim Crow culture.  Consequently, Jewish 
women became vocal participants in progressive, civil rights, and antipoverty campaigns.  
Likewise, with its large contingent of Jewish members, the Housewives’ League became 
a repository for Progressive reform. 
 As head of the New Orleans Consumers’ League and the City Federation of 
Women’s Clubs, Ida Friend also ensured that the Housewives’ League’ program for 
women’s economic empowerment concerned both consumer advocacy and legal 
protections for working women.  Like the Housewives’ League, the NCL believed that 
the government had an obligation to intervene in corporations’ affairs in order to protect 
citizens’ best interests.151  Accordingly, the New Orleans Consumers’ League pressed for 
protective legislation for the “conservation of the health, efficiency and self-support of 
working women and young people, Sunday rest, the short working day, a living wage, 
sanitary conditions of work in factories, and a definite period of rest at night.”152  
Influenced by evolutionary socialism and social democratic thought, NCL members 
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contended that labor laws were essential to extending political and economic equality to 
all aspects of American life.153    
 To achieve its aims, the Consumers’ League, like the Housewives’ League, saw 
white, middle-class female consumers as primary agents of reform.  Both organizations 
proposed that women could change production and consumption practices by altering 
their buying habits, articulating policy recommendations, and even forming consumer 
cooperatives to opt out of exploitative mass markets.154  For example, founding 
Consumers’ League chapter member Jean Gordon explained that consumers could wield 
“enormous influence upon mill and factory owners and proprietors of stores” by 
boycotting products from corporations that exploited workers.155  Accordingly, both the 
Consumers’ League and the Housewives’ League distributed a “white list” of honest 
factories and retailers such as ice dealers, and instructed women to avoid unscrupulous 
retailers.156  Significantly, middle-class women’s campaigns to curb capitalism’s excesses 
meant undermining the very foundation upon which their social class rested.157  Affluent 
consumers exerted a moral influence that would eliminate sweatshop conditions, ban 
child labor, and improve goods for consumers.  
 Like the Housewives’ League, the Consumer League also built alliances with 
government bodies by actively participating on municipal and state consumer and labor 
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committees.158  Over the course of the 1910s, the Consumers’ League researched 
industrial conditions in New Orleans, examined women and children’s salaries, domestic 
life, and working conditions, and requested the City implement minimum wages.159  For 
example, Ida Friend chaired the Women in Industry Committee for the New Orleans and 
Louisiana Divisions of the Council of National Defense.160  After surveying women’s 
economic conditions in industrial and government positions, the committee demanded 
equal wages for female wartime employees.  The Consumers’ League sought to prove to 
public officials that women were rational, ethical consumers above the self-interest of 
either the capitalist or laborer.  It argued, therefore, that women were best suited to 
intervene in the labor market and consumer economy.161 
 As Ida Friend studied working-class women’s labor conditions, she began to build 
cross-class alliances that diluted both the Consumers’ and Housewives’ Leagues’ 
paternalist attitudes. In 1917, Friend and the Consumers’ League collaborated with large 
department stores and the Retail Merchants’ Association to remind the “derelict and 
thoughtless” “leisure class of women” to only patronize shops closing at 6pm for the 
health and wellbeing of female shop clerks.162  To remonstrate “those who should know 
better,” the coalition placed cautionary posters in street cares and distributed “thousands” 
of poems in department store packages. Working with labor unions like the Retail Clerks’ 
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Protective Association, the Consumers’ League investigated the working conditions of 
major retail stores, deploring women’s unequal pay, long, unpredictable hours, and 
buildings’ inadequate heating systems and fire escapes. 
  However, as Storrs observes, while the Consumers’ League urged working-class 
women to “use their purchasing power as a reform tool,” it, like the Housewives’ League, 
still envisioned itself as a middle-class body of non-laboring white women.163 Therefore, 
the Housewives’ League’s lack of a well-articulated plan for aiding poor and African 
American female workers may not only reflect the organizational division between clubs, 
but also the generalized class bias structuring both groups. Ultimately, the League’s white 
middle-class orientation would starkly define its next, more ambitious cooperative effort. 
Anti-High Cost of Living Movement 
 The Housewives’ Cooperative Store formed within the context of demobilization, 
inflation, economic depression, government political repression of radicals and unions, as 
well as cooperative expansion and economic innovation.  Working with cooperative curb 
markets, the NCL, and government agencies during World War I, the Housewives’ 
League discovered the efficacy of federal intervention and cooperative economics in 
reforming consumer capitalism.164  The Housewives’ League’s commitment to collective 
action and federal reform was redoubled in the wake of severe postwar inflation, during 
which the cost of rent, food, clothes, and other living expenses suddenly doubled.165  
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 The postwar economy ignited a second wave of female protest over high 
consumer prices, which drove the Housewives’ League to sharpen its critique of 
capitalism’s deleterious effect on women’s finances and autonomy.166  As prices for 
staples such as butter, eggs, meat, milk, and sugar skyrocketed, women across the nation 
organized boycotts, led marches, and fomented riots.167  The League also organized 
highly publicized boycotts to protest “outrageous” commodities, connecting their 
activities to a larger moral project to purify capitalism.168  For example, in May 1919, 
President Meyers organized a boycott that successfully reduced the cost of butter and 
eggs.  Additionally, when milk prices rose to 19 cents a quart in October 1919, Meyers 
instructed the 1,600-member League to cut their consumption by at least fifty-percent.169  
Every woman, she declared, was “under moral obligation to back up the action as a 
whole.”  Women had suffered “long enough,” and she was confident that several hundred 
families would “fall in line” immediately to “call a halt” to unfair market prices.  
Working in tandem with federal and municipal efforts to regulate the consumer 
marketplace, the “anti-high cost of living” movement sparked a host of innovative 
grassroots efforts led by women to transform conventional food distribution systems.170   
 Other consumer, labor, and community organizations in New Orleans also 
worried that unaffordable basic foodstuffs would lead to riots, which currently plagued 
other cities.  In August 1919, the Association of Commerce held an emergency meeting 
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to stave off unrest.171  One member observed, “Mob spirit is spreading.  If we try now to 
tell people that present prices of food are right and must stand they will not listen.  They 
may act.  Gentlemen, under the circumstances, we must try to feed the hungry for at least 
the next few weeks while awaiting some turn for permanent betterment.” Over the 
protests of wholesalers and food retailers, the Association and the Housewives’ League 
asked the City to halt profiteering and set foodstuffs and essential commodities at 
affordable prices.  High inflation rates and food scarcity prompted prominent citizens and 
politicians to search for “anything that will cut the high cost of living.”172  By 1920, the 
consumer cooperative movement had ignited; the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 
approximately 2,600 cooperative stores and buying associations in the nation, mostly 
concentrated in small towns and farms.173 
 At the same time, the country placed the responsibility for solving the food cost 
crisis squarely on female consumers’ shoulders, rather than on corporation and 
government institutions.  Even National Housewives’ League president Julian Heath 
blamed soaring food prices on “women’s ignorance of market conditions, their naive trust 
of grocers, and sheer laziness result[ing] in wasted food dollars.”174  Additionally, 
proponents of “low cost of living clubs” assumed that small groups of citizens could 
drive down consumer prices by buying in bulk directly from farmers and wholesalers and 
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avoiding grocers’ price markups.175  Frequently organized along racial or ethnic lines, the 
largest buying clubs typically only had between 20 and 300 members.176  Often run out of 
members’ homes, smaller groups of women in Louisiana and Mississippi formed their 
own cooperative buying clubs or supplied New Orleans clubs with inexpensive farm 
products.  Uncoordinated and unaffiliated with larger consumer advocacy organizations, 
they failed to lower consumer costs for southerners more generally.177   
 In contrast, the New Orleans Housewives’ League demanded continued federal 
intervention to safeguard consumers from economic exploitation.  Impressed with 
government wartime regulation of utilities, transport, and food, the League argued that 
high food costs necessitated structural changes such as legislation encouraging 
neighborhood public markets, enforcing stricter anti-hoarding provisions, and welcoming 
consumer and agricultural cooperatives.178  Consequently, between 1919 and 1922, the 
Housewives’ League launched a four-part consumer campaign targeting the individual, 
city, state, and federal level.179  First, the League argued that women could reduce their 
food expenses by preparing less expensive foods and economically growing, canning, 
preserving, and cooking vegetables. Second, members served on League, city, and state 
consumer committees where they assiduously investigated consumer abuse and made 
policy recommendations to politicians. Third, the League joined labor unions and like-
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minded women’s clubs to petition the federal government to reduce the cost of living by 
regulating commodities prices and retaining army surplus stores.  Fourth, the League 
proposed opening a cooperative grocery store owned and operated by women.  After 
seven years of cooperative organizing, the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store was 
the final iteration of the League’s mission to collectively transform morally bankrupt 
corporate and government institutions through collective action. 
Housewives’ League Co-operative Store  
 Cooperative food politics in postwar New Orleans were a site for radical action, 
as respectable society women allied with labor unions, Socialists, and other leftists to 
counter laissez faire politics and corporate capitalism’s stranglehold over average 
consumers.  As part of their effort to lower the cost of living, in June 1919, the 
Housewives League announced that they would open a cooperative grocery store for New 
Orleans housewives.180  Over the course of the next two years, cooperative store president 
Edna Egleston urged housewives to save money by combining their purchasing power as 
owners of the enterprise.  Members would have guaranteed access to store rebates and 
quarterly dividends. Further, by connecting consumers directly to producers, cooperative 
members would eliminate the “present excessive cost of [food] distribution” due to 
retailers’ price mark-ups.181  To Egleston, “the only way the housekeeper can benefit by 
wholesale prices” was to join a consumer cooperative that would contract with 
wholesalers at a reduced price.  Because women were most commonly responsible for 
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food shopping, the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store quietly conflated consumers 
and women to offer New Orleanians a feminized model for ethical consumption. 
 The Co-operative Store was not only a corner grocery store for women, however, 
but it was also a subtle protest against wartime and postwar repression of civil liberties.  
As the cooperative coalesced, government crackdowns on unions, Socialists, 
Communists, and foreigners stifled the radical potential of the mainstream women’s 
movement and narrowed its potential allies.  For example, in 1917, anarchist feminist 
Emma Goldman was jailed for two years for opposing military draft, before being 
deported to Russia.182  After the war, a torrent of government and corporate investigations 
into women’s political organizing spurred moderate activists like Carrie Chapman Catt to 
disassociate from leftist colleagues. As suffragists and reformers, Housewives’ League 
members were also vulnerable to conservatives who branded female activists as “alien 
and subversive.”  Nonetheless, while the Co-operative Store sought acceptance from 
commercial and government entities, it critiqued corporate capitalism.  The League 
would demonstrate women’s political efficacy and civic fitness by transforming the 
nation’s volatile political, social, economic system into a cooperative democratic society. 
Suffrage, the Consumer Movement, and the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store 
 Longtime Housewives’ League member Edna Egleston was central to the 
cooperative store’s development and ideological formation.183  A middle-aged Indiana 
native, Egleston and her second husband Howard married in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 
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1910.184  Two years later, they moved to New Orleans and settled in the newly developed 
Metairie Ridge suburb near Lake Pontchartrain.185  The couple’s wealth was tied to the 
city’s burgeoning infrastructural and commercial development.  From his Hibernia 
Building headquarters in the Central Business District, Howard ran an engineering 
consulting firm and designed railroads and bridges for the Association of Commerce.186  
  At the same time, the couple was deeply committed to egalitarian and social 
reformist values of the Episcopal Church.  They worshipped at the respected Trinity 
Episcopal Church on Jackson Avenue.  In 1899, the church’s Christian Socialist minister, 
Beverly Warner, established the Kingsley settlement house to serve the white working 
class population of the nearby Irish Channel.187  Head resident and future Housewives’ 
League member Eleanor McMain ran Kingsley House, which was affiliated with Jane 
Addams’ Hull House and the National Federation of Settlements.188  
 Further, Edna was an ideal candidate for heading the Co-operative Store because 
the Eglestons had joined consumer cooperatives while living in Indiana.  Indeed, since 
the Civil War, the Midwest had been a bastion of agricultural and consumer 
cooperatives.189 A large contingent of Midwestern women now living in New Orleans 
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were already well-acquainted with cooperative enterprises in their Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Illinois, and Iowa hometowns.190  For example, Mary O’Hara, manager of The 
Catherine boarding house for impoverished women, publicly endorsed the Co-operative 
Store.  Having belonged to a cooperative grocery store in Brainerd, Minnesota, O’Hara 
wholeheartedly believed “in co-operative stores as a method to reduce the high cost of 
living.” Thus appealing to her fellow Midwesterners, Egleston claimed that the Co-
operative Store would fulfill the Midwestern cooperative movement’s reformist legacy by 
“obtain[ing] the best materials at minimum cost.”191   
 The urgency with which Egleston and her female peers assessed cooperative 
economics speaks not only to women’s investment in the outcome of postwar consumer 
rights struggles, but to their commitment to securing political enfranchisement. The 
Housewives’ League Co-operative Store formed during a fierce campaign to ratify the 
federal Anthony Amendment between 1918 and 1920.  League members declared the 
cooperative was part of suffragist efforts to combat corporate and political collusion that 
inflated living costs, exploited female workers, and denied women the right to vote.192  
 The League’s female-centered, democratic cooperative was a rebuke to politicians 
who hindered women’s political advancement. For example, Governor Ruffin Pleasant 
campaigned against the federal suffrage amendment, while John M. Parker, once a close 
Housewives’ League ally during the war, retreated from his public endorsement of 
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suffrage after he was elected governor in May 1920.193  Although in April 1920 Parker 
had appointed suffrage leaders, including League member Ida Friend, to the Joint 
Ratification Committee to prepare for the Anthony Amendment’s ratification, Parker 
betrayed federal amendment supporters’ trust when he blocked its passage in the 
Louisiana legislature that July.194  As Louisiana legislators debated the federal 
amendment, Parker announced his neutrality on the subject and then refused to meet 
suffragists to discuss his position.195  Finally, Mayor Behrman and the Democratic Ring’s 
tepid endorsement of the amendment and a bitter anti-federal amendment campaign 
resulted in Louisiana’s failure to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment.  
  Alluding to women’s political disenfranchisement, Egleston declared that each 
cooperative store subscriber was guaranteed one vote as part of the business’s democratic 
organizational structure.196  The cooperative pointedly demonstrated white women’s 
fitness for full citizenship rights as much as it modeled cooperative economics.  The 
Housewives’ League argued that a successful cooperative venture would reveal women’s 
aptitude for regulating the market and enacting legislation.197  Likewise, the League’s 
politicized consumption practices persisted after the Nineteenth Amendment was finally 
ratified in August 1920.  For example, in June 1921, League members announced that 
they would “use not only their influence, but their votes” to pressure legislators to pass 
laws protecting “a pure food supply” and “the welfare of the home, women, and 
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children.”198  Meyers instructed members to note which legislators voted against such 
protective measures so that “we can find out who to keep at the next election.”   
 The League also endorsed the Capper-Kelly “Honest Merchandising Bill,” which 
would have permitted the federal government to regulate commodity resale prices to 
reduce consumer prices while increasing independent retail stores’ competitiveness with 
powerful chain stores.199  While the bill never passed, retail cooperatives and voluntary 
chains nonetheless expanded because the government began to permit federations of 
otherwise economically vulnerable cooperative stores to collectively fix prices, rather 
than treating cooperatives as monopolies restraining trade.200 
 Most significantly, to many League members, a cooperative store represented 
women’s derring-do in the face of male contempt for both female entrepreneurship and 
cooperative enterprise. Many League members reported that while their husbands 
condescendingly referred to the cooperative as “a worthy scheme,” they dissuaded wives 
from financially investing in the project.201  In response, Egleston urged women’s clubs to 
contribute ideas to the store and to establish committees to sign up subscribers.202 She 
also continually stressed that the store was “primarily a women’s movement” and would 
be staffed entirely by women, “from the sales force to the truck driver.”203  Nonetheless, 
Egleston fumed that although the League had labored for years to help consumers, “many 
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a masculine eyebrow was raised, and many a man of business made dubious conjugal 
comment” concerning the economic soundness of the cooperative.204   
 For example, in April 1920, Edna Egleston served on the Department of Justice’s 
fair price committee to establish fixed rates for household commodities.205  Egleston was 
the only woman on a committee largely “devoted to the interests of many merchant 
members”; its members were wholesale and retail grocers, sugar brokers, and Association 
of Commerce representatives. As the only consumer advocate, Egleston was outraged 
when the committee voted on key price rates without her.  Condemning the Association 
of Commerce and city officials’ pursuit of the profit motive at the expense of the 
common good, Egleston enjoined women to subscribe to the League’s cooperative store. 
The experience only hardened Egleston’s commitment to create cooperative businesses 
rooted in a female-centered, egalitarian economy. 
Cooperatives and the New Orleans Labor Movement  
 Recognizing that women were not only exploited as consumers but also as 
laborers, the Housewives’ League allied with national union, consumer, and cooperative 
organizations seeking to protect workers from the vagaries of the market.  Historian Anne 
Firor Scott argues that as women’s organizations like the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) and the NCL investigated the industrial abuse of working women 
and children, members began to reassess industrial labor and its social, economic, and 
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political impact.206 By asserting that only government regulation could protect working 
women and consumers, middle-class female activists joined what Scott terms “the radical 
aspect of the [southern] labor movement.207  
 During World War I, federal wartime policy favored uninterrupted industrial 
production, and national and local labor arbitration boards often conceded to union 
demands for increased wages and improved working conditions.208  Trade unions rapidly 
expanded in size and number throughout the nation. However, after the war, President 
Wilson terminated local labor adjustment committees and returned state-owned railroads 
and other industries to private hands, while rising inflation and stagnating wages 
exacerbated labor unrest.209  Then, in 1920, consumer prices dropped precipitously.210  
 To compensate for reduced commodity prices, corporations cut union wages by as 
much as 20 percent and fired many workers. In New Orleans, the Association of 
Commerce urged major industries to roll back union advances by endorsing the open 
shop “American Plan.” Further, industrialists abandoned wartime labor mediation in 
favor of mechanization, wage cuts, hourly increases, and strikebreaking in order to 
modernize city infrastructure. Claiming that unions were Old Regular cronies that 
stymied port development, reform mayor John Parker helped commercial elites dismantle 
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labor organizations when elected in 1920. In response, massive strikes between 1919 and 
1921 shut down New Orleans’ ports and railways.211  
 In the wake of growing anti-union sentiment and explosive conflict between labor 
and employers, consumer cooperatives serving unemployed or striking unionists sprouted 
across the country. New Orleans unions proposed funding the labor movement by 
building an alternative economy comprised of a network of union-owned cooperatives.212 
For example, in May 1920, the New Orleans Council of Railway Workers elicited 
immediate interest when it announced plans to open the Industrial Corporation for 
Workmen, a chain of cooperative shoe and dry goods stores.213  
 Yet in a climate of extreme government repression of progressive and radical 
activism, conservatives branded the rapidly expanding consumer cooperative movement 
as subversive.  In order to silence criticism of the war effort and prevent a Russian 
Revolution on American soil, the federal government passed the Espionage Act of 1917 
and Sedition Act of 1918, which effectively banned free speech and free press.214  
Further, during the Palmer Raids, which were carried out in 30 cities, including New 
Orleans, radical consumer cooperatives were targeted for their revolutionary politics and 
support of the labor movement.  
 Regardless of the controversial position that unions and radical consumer 
cooperatives occupied, Egleston explicitly aligned the Housewives’ League Co-operative 
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Store with union-owned cooperative stores.215  Her union coalition-building is also 
unusual because not only did Louisiana suffragists overlook working-class organizations 
as potential allies, but mainstream labor unions, dismissing the unskilled positions 
women normally filled, considered unionizing women a low priority.216 Nonetheless, the 
League worked in tandem with the AFL, which had launched a campaign to circumvent 
profiteering and inflation by establishing union-owned cooperatives across the nation.217  
Similarly, by May 1920, city trade unions announced that they would assist the League in 
securing storefront property on Camp and Canal Streets.218  Because both consumers and 
unionists considered themselves the victims of exploitative capitalists, the League 
depended on trade union support.  
 However, seeking to join the national cooperative movement, Egleston embraced 
radical politics and industrial unionism as well. First, Egleston collaborated with the 
Cooperative League of America (CLUSA).219  CLUSA, one of the most prominent 
Socialist consumer cooperative leagues in the nation.220 Formed in 1916, CLUSA 
proclaimed it was part of “an anti-capitalist, revolutionary movement, aiming toward a 
radical social reconstruction based on all-inclusive collectivism” and a national 
cooperative commonwealth.221 Headed by James Warbasse, CLUSA hoped to construct a 
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national network of consumer cooperatives.222 By 1920, it had formed several regional 
organizations to facilitate local cooperative organizing, coordinate regional wholesale 
activities, and implement educational programs.223 
 Second, Egleston modeled the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store’s chain 
store business structure, then considered the epitome of progressive business, from 
radical, union-affiliated cooperatives such as the Tri-State Cooperative Association and 
the Pacific Cooperative League (PCL).224  Seeking solutions to high cost of living, 
cooperative chain stores offered working-class patrons inexpensive goods by collectively 
purchasing items in large lots, selling the same items across affiliate stores, receiving 
discounts from processors and suppliers, and operating their own processing and 
wholesale subsidiaries.225 While the Housewives’ League acknowledged that its young 
cooperative venture must “creep before [it] can walk,” they also envisioned opening a 
New Orleans-based chain of cooperatives served by a central cooperative wholesale.226  
Pointing to the cooperative networks of meat markets, grocery stores, bakeries, and 
laundries currently aiding union struggles along the Pacific Coast, Egleston asked, “Why 
should not the New Orleans housewife have similar economic advantage?”227 
The Housewives’ League Co-operative Store and Army Retail Stores 
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 The precarious nature of the Housewives’ League’s support network of unions, 
businessmen, women’s clubs, and politicians is most clearly illustrated by the League’s 
spirited participation in public debates over whether army retail stores and cooperatives 
should regulate the consumer market.228 Facing mounting inflation rates, citizens and 
veterans alike demanded that after years of personal sacrifices and austerity measures, the 
federal government must redistribute its wartime food supply as cheaply as possible to 
alleviate economic hardship.229 Accordingly, in 1919, the federal High Cost of Living 
Division began distributing surplus canned foods and dry goods below market price in 
army retail stores in large cities across the country.230  In New Orleans, army 
“quartermaster stores” were very popular; some locations saw between 2,500 and 3,000 
customers a day.231  Consequently, during and immediately after World War I, New 
Orleanians patronizing army retailers enjoyed some measure of price control.  
 Yet by early 1920, the War Department argued that it had become too 
burdensome to maintain the retail stores and began rapidly selling off surplus goods to 
retailers and shuttering the businesses.232  In New Orleans, zone supply officer Colonel 
E.S. Walten announced that reconversion policy dictated that all city stores would close 
by March 31, 1920.233  Believing that army stores were inherently “Unfair, Un-American, 
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Un-Democratic,” produce wholesalers and retailers applauded the decision.234   For 
example, the New Orleans Wholesale Grocers’ Association argued that since the federal 
government was returning railways, telegraph and other service corporations to private 
hands, it must cease meddling with the nation’s food supplies.235  
 In contrast, the Housewives’ League contended that army retail stores were vital 
exercises in public influence over production and distribution systems. Without army 
stores to regulate the market, consumers would be unable to afford soaring food costs.236  
The League staged a letter writing campaign to Congress and state officials to demand 
that army stores remain open.  It proposed that the War Department ship remaining food 
supplies to its New Orleans outpost at cost rather than selling supplies to local retailers, 
who, the organization suspected, would price the goods far exceeding their value.237  
 When the War Department rejected its plan, the League asserted that its proposed 
cooperative store would replace army retail stores by offering affordable goods to 
consumers.238 League members exclaimed that the Co-operative Store would 
unequivocally “eliminate the middle man” and “waged active warfare on behalf of lower 
prices and municipal cleanliness.”239  Condemning unscrupulous retailers who cheated 
unwitting consumers, Egleston had assured frustrated New Orleanians that the 
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cooperative would be “conducted in [consumers’] interests, insuring in all cases the 
highest class of goods and absolutely correct weight and measure.”240   
 The League’s announcement was immediately controversial, and a variety of 
stakeholders opined on the political and economic implications of cooperative-driven 
consumer empowerment.  First, New Orleans’ wholesalers, produce jobbers, and food 
retailers protested that consumer cooperatives were illegal combinations in restraint of 
trade and would put them out of business.241 Egleston did little to allay their fears when 
she proclaimed that the cooperative movement “[furnished] the consumer with all the 
necessities of life at the lowest possible cost, eliminating to a very large extent the 
[middleman’s] present handling charges.”242 
 For their part, as regulatory bodies contracted during reconversion, federal 
officials largely supported the cooperative plan as a practical substitute to government 
intervention in consumer markets.243  For example, army retailers argued that consumer 
cooperatives would continue to moderate economic inflation in their stead.  To do so, 
local army retailers advised the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store to adopt their 
business model and pledged to help the cooperative in any way they could.244  Further, 
both Louisiana District Attorney Adolphe Coco and United States Attorney Henry 
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Mooney promised to prosecute any jobbers or wholesalers refusing service to formally 
organized retail stores, including incorporated cooperatives.245  
 Women’s clubs were also important allies for Housewives’ League cooperative 
organizers.  For example, as early as 1913, Consumers’ League co-founder Eleanor 
McMain proposed that impoverished “back-of-town” residents establish housing 
cooperatives to improve tenement housing, stabilize rent, and enforce sanitation 
regulations.246  Similarly, in 1920, Consumers’ League president Ida Friend argued that 
both consumer cooperatives and government regulation would lower the high cost of 
living.247  Friend declared, “I don’t think there is more than one opinion among women 
on these matters.”  Accordingly, the Consumers’ League spearheaded a letter writing 
campaign to Louisiana congressmen protesting army stores’ closure and endorsed the 
Housewives’ League cooperative store as a worthy replacement.248  
 Friend’s actions dovetailed with the NCL’s plan to use cooperatives as tools to 
reduce living expenses for working-class women.249  While women’s collaborative 
activities were increasingly branded as socialistic and subversive, leading figures of the 
social work and consumers movement nonetheless advocated women’s cooperative 
projects.  Indeed, Florence Kelley, Jane Addams, and the International Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union all promoted cooperative boarding to facilitate unionizing among 
working-class women and encouraged shared housekeeping for middle-class settlement 
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workers.250  Ultimately, national consumer activists’ cooperative experiments lent the 
Housewives’ League Co-operative Store vital credibility: For example, at the 1920 
National Conference on Social Work in New Orleans, Florence Kelley spoke alongside 
Edna Egleston on the benefits of women-led cooperatives.251  
 Finally, New Orleans labor unions also supported both army retail stores and 
cooperatives as tools to lower the cost of living.  In February 1920, the Board of Business 
Agents, representing New Orleans building trades unions, publicly endorsed consumer 
cooperatives and inveighed against any jobbers and retail grocers refusing to sell to 
them.252  Board chairman Miller declared that both army stores and cooperatives “have an 
important connection with the industrial situation here.”  Given the anti-union climate, 
Miller proffered that because army stores and consumer cooperatives reduced workers’ 
living costs, the effect was “the same as an increase in wages.  That is a fact that should 
be taken into serious consideration.”  Therefore, the Board coordinated with the 
Housewives’ League and other cooperative organizations to protect labor.  However, 
while the League carefully crafted a coalition of sympathetic government officials, 
female reformers, and trade unionists, their greatest challenge was neutralizing the city’s 
business interests threatened by alternative economic models. 
Coalition-Building Among Commercial Interests 
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 At the same time Egleston joined trade unionists’ efforts to build cooperative 
networks, she also wooed the city’s commercial elites, hoping that they would financially 
support the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store.  This required softening some of the 
League’s anti-capitalist rhetoric to convince investors that its cooperative posed little 
threat to responsible retailers and wholesalers.  First, to head off accusations that the 
cooperative was the project of bored dilettantes and subversive Socialists, Egleston 
argued that the store would help stabilize the postwar economy.  She legitimized her 
cooperative campaign by pointing to Great Britain’s successful cooperative system and 
the extent to which it had helped Europe rebuild after World War I.253  Egleston claimed 
that one-third of Great Britain’s citizens belonged to cooperatives, and its economy was 
augmented by the “immense wholesale co-operative organizations supplying the 
thousands of retail stores, and being supplied in turn by their own factories, tea and 
coffee plantations, wheat lands, fruit farms, coal fields, etc., the products of which are 
transported in their own ships.”254  Egleston even shamed local commercial interests into 
financing the store by pointedly observing that enlightened Scottish businessmen had 
already bought numerous shares of stock.255  
 Second, Egleston guaranteed that the cooperative would not bankrupt grocery 
retailers or wholesalers by slashing prices and selling substandard goods.256  On the 
contrary, she professed that the cooperative was grounded in modern business 
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practices.257  As Railway and Light Company cooperative manager C.L. Bricksler argued, 
“there is only one way to run a co-operative store, and that is on a clear profit basis.”258  
To that end, Egleston assured investors that the Co-operative Store was “more 
businesslike and better” than either the League’s wartime cooperative curb markets or the 
small, informal cooperative buying clubs then in vogue.259  She argued that the informal 
and temporary nature of both seldom benefited members in the long-term.260   In fact, 
recognizing that cooperatives had much to learn from a “well-managed retail store,” 
Egleston recruited her former nemeses from the New Orleans Retail Grocers’ Association 
to serve on the Co-operative Store’s advisory board.261  
 Rooting cooperative enterprise in liberal economic principles and the civic good, 
Egleston explained to wary businessmen that like a conventional store, the successful 
cooperative must also handle a large volume of sales and markup prices to cover 
overhead costs.262  For example, she predicted that the League’s women-run cooperative 
would have at least 1,000 members.263  Egleston observed that the only difference 
between the two business models was that in a cooperative, capital stock was owned by 
member-owners who regularly shared profits in proportion to their purchases.  Yet, she 
insisted, annual dividends and rebates “helped unbelievably in solving the problem of the 
high cost of living in many communities” around the world.  Indeed, it was the 
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cooperative’s unique rebate and dividend policy that made the store “an instrument of 
universal public interest.”264    
The Housewives’ League Co-operative Store Opens  
 While interest in the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store was initially limited 
to its own club members, regular Times Picayune and New Orleans Item press coverage 
spurred greater public response.  Consequently, between June 1919 and mid-1920, the 
League slowly raised the $10,000 worth of stock necessary to open its storefront in 
1921.265  Prospective members hoped the cooperative would reduce their living expenses 
and eagerly purchased the $10 stocks.266  Egleston claimed that “People from all walks of 
life and from every quarter of the city and from surrounding towns” had subscribed.  
Most had bought small shares in the cooperative, but the League also appealed to the 
city’s affluent class, including a few prominent businessmen.267  For example, one of the 
first male subscribers was Meyer Eiseman, a Jewish real estate magnate, suffrage 
sympathizer, and advocate of “ethical culture” who belonged to other local co-ops.268   
 Following the Rochdale Principle of federating with fellow cooperatives, the Co-
operative Store depended not only on New Orleans subscribers, but on a growing 
network of rural Louisianan and Mississippi clubwomen who not only wished to become 
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members but sought advice on how to establish their own cooperative store.269  In 1920, 
the president of the Mississippi Federation of Women’s Clubs reported that Amory, 
McComb, Vicksburg, Ocean Springs and Laurel clubwomen were organizing or had 
already formed cooperatives.270  They ranged from cooperative grocery stores, repair 
shops, and dry goods stores, and demonstrated “a very decided note of friendly co-
operation and mutual helpfulness” among women.271 
 While the League had raised nearly $5,000 by March 1920, it took nearly a year 
for the League to secure the remaining funds and find a suitable store location.272  In 
January 1921, the organization finally selected a small wooden building on 4900 Prytania 
Street and paid to have it painted, cleaned, and renovated.273  It was a “neat little store” 
with the hand-painted sign “Housewives Co-operative Stores Incorporated” hanging out 
front.274  Not coincidentally, the grocery was located next to the Prytania Street Market, 
where the League had established its produce stand during the 1914-1915 depression.275  
The League hoped that the market’s proximity would help women complete all their 
shopping at once.276  Throughout the store’s renovation, “dozens” of women “passed 
daily...anxious to see how it [was] ‘getting on.’”  
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 On February 27, 1921, the Co-operative Store finally opened its doors. As 
cooperative president, Edna Egleston threw a grand opening celebration for its 
stockholders and New Orleans’ clubwomen.  The Times Picayune reported that attendees 
were invited to purchase goods from the cooperative’s “white enameled shelves” 
featuring a “well-equipped line of groceries.”277   On opening day, flowers from the 
Louisiana Federation of Women’s Clubs decorated the counters, while the telephone rang 
constantly with women ordering goods and sending their congratulations.278   
 Hoping to lower the cost of living for as many people as possible, the Co-
operative Store strictly adhered to the Rochdale Plan for consumer cooperatives, in which 
individuals join a retail association and contract directly with producers and distributors, 
eliminating the middleman’s profiteering in the process.279 The Plan mandated that 1) 
cooperative member-owners retain democratic control over their store; 2) institute market 
rates for all goods sold; 3) require that owners receive regular dividends and guarantee 
patronage refunds, in which the business returned profits to members as a percentage of 
their store purchases; 4) enforce cash-only transactions; 5) educate the public about 
cooperative principles and goals; 6) expand from retail into other industries to achieve 
immediate, lasting economic benefits for members; and 7) federate with neighboring 
cooperatives “with the ultimate purpose of national and world co-operation.”280  
 Accordingly, the League opened membership to the general public, although one 
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did not have to be a stockholder to shop at the store.281  Members received rebates every 
three months, while regular patrons bought goods at fair market rate.282  For example, the 
League sold the least expensive eggs in the city and offered special rates on cheese, 
sugar, boiled ham, and canned items like salmon, sardines, tomatoes.283 Within three 
months, the Co-operative Store had made almost $6,000, which the League touted as 
concrete evidence of what a women-run business could accomplish.284    
 However, the store was not just a consumer cooperative, but a producer 
cooperative as well.  Member-owners prepared foods for general consumption, working 
in the cooperative’s modern kitchen at the rear of the building.285  In addition, League 
members used the agricultural connections they cultivated while running their 
cooperative market to turn the store into a distribution channel for small farmers and 
manufacturers. By cutting out the wholesaler and retailer middleman and mitigating 
unreasonable price mark-ups, the Co-operative Store stimulated regional agricultural 
trade to benefit individual farmers as well as average consumers.  
 To appeal to women’s desire for convenience, customers could telephone their 
orders the day before, requesting pre-made raisin, lemon, and coconut cream pies, or 
cakes made to their specifications.286  The request line was so popular that the League 
added another phone line in May.287  The store made daily home deliveries of foodstuffs 
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such as uncooked and boiled ham and honeycombs in one pound cases.288  It also carried 
fresh, inexpensive eggs and convenience foods such as Hellmann Blue Ribbon 
Mayonnaise Dressing and potato chips wrapped in wax paper.289  Mary Boynton, a 
Housewives’ League cooking demonstrator, managed the cooperative’s delicatessen, 
which prepared “dainty cakes,” pies, salad dressings, and “other delicacies.”290  The store 
even had a lunchroom that sold ice cream, sodas, and sandwiches.291   
 The Co-operative Store aimed to improve both the conventional corner grocery 
store and the modern chain store.  The League believed neighborhood grocery stores 
were complicit in maintaining the high cost of living.292  As Tracey Deutsch notes, 
because corner stores did not post prices, item value was not standardized.293  
Consequently, every purchase required a careful negotiation based on the customer and 
shop clerks’ class, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliations.  To the League, the chain 
store heralded an end to high consumer prices and symbolized efficient, forward-thinking 
business methods.  Similarly, the cooperative advertised itself as an exemplar of modern, 
sanitary food retail and preparation.294  Reporters also touted the cooperative’s “New 
York apartment house efficiency,” enumerating its electric ceiling fans, “commodious 
refrigerator,” and kitchen ovens that “may be raised or lowered like window shades.”295  
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Women could attend cooking demonstrations at the store to learn to use modern cooking 
appliances to create easy, healthful, and economical dishes.296   
 At the same time, the Co-operative Store also retained the intimacy of a 
conventional corner store. As Tracey Deutsch contends, before chain stores emerged in 
the 1920s and standardized the economic exchanges between customer and grocer, 
women commanded respect and authority over their food purchases, much to the 
frustration of retailers, wholesalers, and jobbers.297  Recognizing the potential for both 
corner grocery and chain retailers to supply low quality, over-priced goods, the 
Housewives’ League employed two experienced saleswomen and one African American 
maid to serve female customers.298   Staff was under the direct supervision of Edna 
Egleston and an advisory council of grocery retailers.  Ultimately, the League refused to 
sacrifice good customer service to chain store convenience, favoring a “competent 
manager and sales force” over self-service models.299  The cooperative, therefore, cast 
itself as a middle-class oasis of ethnical consumption and women’s autonomy. 
Beyond Consumption: The Politics of the Co-operative Store   
 Egleston took the Rochdale principle of federating with other cooperatives and 
like-minded organizations very seriously.  In fact, her vision of consumer and producer 
cooperation closely replicated James Warbasse’s 1919 plan to create a national 
cooperative economy in which federations of local cooperatives would socialize farmland 
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and control manufacturing and service industries.300  These cooperative farms and 
factories would eventually supply wholesale products to cooperative stores across the 
country.301  Similarly, the League argued that its Co-operative Store was just the first step 
in creating a national cooperative economy governed by regional and national networks 
of professionally managed, large scale cooperative federations.302  
 Recognizing that the southern cooperative movement was “still in its infancy,” 
Egleston encouraged local cooperatives to affiliate with CLUSA, which she neutrally 
described as a national organization dedicated to educating consumers about cooperatives 
and facilitating cooperative formation.303 Egleston hoped to contract directly with 
agricultural producers to establish cooperative farms to supply a chain of League-run 
consumer cooperatives.304  Building on producer relationships it established before World 
War I, the League continued to collaborate with New Orleanian truck farmers organizing 
cooperative markets. Despite opposition from wholesalers, truck farmers believed that 
cooperative markets were “the opening wedge in tumbling down the structure of...a 
combine among the buyers” to depress farmers’ profits and inflate consumer prices.305   
 Most significantly, connecting the Co-operative Store to the national cooperative 
movement, Egleston argued that cooperatives functioned as moral and political entities, 
arguing, “cooperative in its truest sense can and should go much farther than the mere 
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saving of money for its adherents.”306 Speaking at the 1920 National Conference on 
Social Work, Egleston articulated her fervent belief that cooperatives should educate 
citizens to transform the nation into a true democracy.  While Egleston conceded “we are 
at this time appealing to the people of New Orleans from the angle of the pocket-book,” 
she praised sociologist, feminist, and CLUSA co-founder Agnes Warbasse’s convictions 
that the national cooperative movement would “improve the lot of the world.”   
 Similarly, fellow conference attendees and prominent social workers Allen T. 
Burn, an expert on Americanization and Immigrants’ Co-operative Societies, John L. 
Elliot, a cooperator from the Hudson Guild Settlement House in New York, and NCL 
secretary Florence Kelley all argued that cooperatives were vital tools in solving not only 
the nation’s “industrial and economic problems,” but in making “Democracy more 
efficient.”307  Like Egleston, progressive reformers celebrated cooperatives’ social 
welfare contributions beyond mere economics.  Ultimately, Egleston and her cooperative 
peers hoped to remodel all aspects of life into a grand cooperative experiment.  As she 
asserted, “The idea that the cooperative store is...an ordinary small grocery store...is very 
much belittled by such limit.”308  
End of Housewives’ League Co-operative Store 
 Despite its lofty ideals and powerful allies, problems dogged the Housewives’ 
League Co-operative Store from its inception.  Most troubling was members’ infrequent 
patronage.  Because bureaucratic hold-ups delayed the League from acquiring its 
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storefront, by the time the cooperative opened in late February 1921, Egleston noted, 
“public interest had waned.”309  For example, despite multiple daily deliveries, the 
cooperative’s Uptown location and cultural orientation “lessened its value as a 
purchasing depot to stockholders living below Canal Street,” presumably white Creole 
women living in the French Quarter, along Esplanade Ridge, and in Mid-City.  
Consequently, just two months after the store opened, only a third of the store’s 338 
stockholders remained regular customers.310  Worse yet, stockholders had dwindled to 
281 by October.311  Egleston repeatedly reminded women that the only way to maximize 
their savings was to faithfully buy groceries from the cooperative because they would 
receive dividends proportionate to their purchases at the end of each quarter.312   Despite 
her admonitions, most subscribers were “disloyal in buying stock in an enterprise they 
were not willing to support.”313  
 Low member patronage was related to apathetic membership.  While Egleston 
freely donated her “time and her ability” to run the store and appreciated the “staunch 
backing of a few men and women” who supported cooperative economics, the project 
was ultimately sabotaged by a prevailing attitude of “let George do it.”  Ironically, the 
most involved members were “too busy to cooperate,” so rather than delegate or work 
together, they “did a greater share of the work than co-operation calls for.”  The majority 
of members, in contrast, “promised co-operation (on their stock certificate) [but] failed to 
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cooperate.”  When an October stockholders meeting to discuss the cooperative’s future 
dissolved due to lack of quorum, Egleston finally recognized the “deficiency” in member 
support. By late October 1921, Egleston called for the co-op’s dissolution and declared 
bankruptcy.314  By January 1922, the store’s inventory of state-of-the-art refrigerators, 
scales, slicing machines, electric fans, and remaining stock was valued at $1,540 and 
filed with the Civil District Court as part of the League’s bankruptcy agreement.315 
 While the cooperative’s unique staffing and patronage problems shuttered the 
store after only nine months of operation, its closing was also indicative of the economic 
and political structures decimating cooperatives nationwide.  In early 1920, an economic 
recession caused commodities prices to fall precipitously, and a period of economic 
uncertainty extended into spring 1921.316  Consumer cooperatives like the Housewives’ 
League had attracted their clientele by promising lower prices, but they could no longer 
compete with large retailers who could afford to slash prices and still stay solvent.317  The 
lack of adequate funding, declining membership, and infighting within cooperatives 
resulted in the widespread closing of consumer cooperatives by the mid-1920s.318  
Conclusion 
 Throughout the 1910s and early 1920s, the Housewives’ League sought to 
economically empower white middle-class “housewives” while it supported separate 
charitable institutions for black and poor New Orleanians.  Undeniably, the League’s ties 
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to commercial elite inextricably bound it to southern racial and class politics, city 
infrastructural modernization, and America’s political and economic expansionism.   
However, the League also included a diverse body of Jewish, non-Louisianan, and first 
generation Americans who resisted the Jim Crow logic of their peers. 
 The rise and fall of the Co-operative Store also highlights the necessity of 
coalition building between clubwomen, government, labor, and commercial entities in 
order to economically survive. Not content to remain a small grocery store, the 
Housewives’ League adopted CLUSA’s vision of “co-operative society...made up of co-
operators.”319 Because Egleston recognized the immediate necessity of securing 
mainstream support, she downplayed her Socialist ties. Therefore, the League uneasily 
tacked between assuring the public that its cooperative mirrored corporate business 
practices and reasserting the essential ethical nature of cooperative enterprise.320   
 While the Housewives’ League cooperative collapsed under the weight of patron 
apathy and a changing economic and political climate, women’s interest in consumer 
cooperatives persisted during the interwar years.  Although prior to World War I the line 
between Progressive reformer and Socialist was “fluid and permeable,” the postwar Red 
Scare and vilification of female reform largely chilled Progressive activism.321   Yet as 
Landon Storrs argues, women who continued to advocate for the NCL throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, despite Florence Kelley’s Socialist leanings, evinced radical 
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sympathies of their own.322  Throughout the Depression, for example, NCL leadership 
would work with leftist unions, Popular Front coalitions, radicals, and Socialists.   
 Housewives’ Leaguer Ida Friend is a key example of the continuity between 
Progressive reformers and Popular Front leftists fighting for economic and political 
equality for average Americans.  She participated in the New Orleans anti-fascist 
movement that supported a range of Depression-era civil rights and Popular Front 
activities.  In fact, Friend’s Depression-era activism put her in contact with a new 
generation of cooperative organizers who explicitly paired Socialist politics with radical 
economic alternatives, whom I will discuss at length in Chapter 4.  Arguing that the 
United States was spending $2 million a day on armaments while Americans starved, 
Friend joined the New Orleans branch of the Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom along with New Orleans Socialist Party president Louise Jessen, a 
committed cooperative activist.323  Significantly, she also belonged to the New Orleans 
Committee for the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), a Socialist organization based 
in Tulane University that had ties to Florence Kelley.324  LID hosted talks throughout the 
Depression on consumer cooperatives’ economic benefits. Friend also supported the 
Loyalists (or Republicans) in the Spanish Civil War, along with key figures in the New 
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Orleans radical, civil liberties, and cooperative community.325 Friend is thus an important 
link to the Depression and World War II-era cooperative movement.326 
 Finally, eschewing the white supremacist rhetoric of her suffragist peers, by 1932, 
Friend participated in early, moderate interracial efforts to ease racial tension in the 
South.327  She was one of a growing number of white southern women who used their war 
work as a launching pad for more radical reform, including interracial organizing.  Black 
and white cooperation during WWI inspired Friend and white club women; in the years 
after the war, nearly 1,300 southern counties organized interracial committees under state 
or regional supervision, including the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC), 
established in 1919.328  Similarly, Friend served on the CIC in 1932, participated in the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, and helped form the 
New Orleans chapter of the Urban League in 1938, moderate organizations that 
advocated incremental black advancement within the boundaries of Jim Crow.  
Nonetheless, Friend’s work challenged the discriminatory gender, race, and class policies 
that policed New Orleans citizens.  Finally, as we shall see, her commitment to racial 
equity would be the cornerstone of Socialist cooperative projects during the Depression 
and World War II. 
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Chapter 3: “Civilization’s Supreme Test”: Henry Hermes, the New Orleans 
Cooperative Movement, and the Politics of Place: 1940-1980 
 A fiery Socialist barber named Henry Hermes cut an eccentric figure in the 
twentieth century cooperative movement.  During the Great Depression and World War 
II, Hermes's Freret Street neighbors were as likely to spot him proselytizing Socialist 
doctrine from atop a milk crate as they were to see him shaving local clients in his 
barbershop.  Indeed, Hermes had an abiding interest in the power of democratic 
collaboration and economic cooperation to solve America's persistent racial and class 
inequality.  To that end, Hermes established the Consumers’ Co-operative Union (CCU) 
in 1941 as an integrated cooperative grocery store serving the working-class Freret 
Neighborhood.  Offering a variety of fresh produce, convenience foods, and imported dry 
goods, the cooperative sought to liberate patrons from the stranglehold of modern 
corporations, which undercut the economic and political autonomy of small producers 
and consumers.1  Through a democratic organizational structure, store-sponsored lectures, 
and social events, the CCU demonstrated practical, egalitarian worker-employee relations 
and strategies for consumer empowerment.  Despite World War II rationing and price 
controls, competition from chain stores, and uneven member-owner participation, the 
CCU remained a politicized consumer space until it disbanded in 1965. 
 The CCU disrupts our notion of insular neighborhood cultures, illuminating the 
complicated and overlapping political geography of Popular Front and consumer activism 
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in New Orleans.  Bound to the economic health of its immediate community, the 
cooperative was a microcosm of Freret Neighborhood responses to the Great Depression, 
World War II, and postwar white flight.  Yet even as it coalesced around neighborhood-
specific needs, the CCU depended on Hermes's Popular Front support network that 
extended far beyond Freret Neighborhood to bridge political, racial, gender, and class 
divides.  The fractious dynamic between Freret residents and leftist activists ultimately 
confounded the CCU's ability to establish a community-based cooperative 
commonwealth.  While this coalition disintegrated in the face of white flight, anti-
Communist hysteria, and urban economic decline in the 1950s, Hermes joined the credit 
union movement, by now well-established in Louisiana.  As a member of the LCUL, he 
aligned with mainstream institutions at the local, state, and national level to cope with 
new political realities.   
 This chapter explores key moments in Henry Hermes’s 40-year cooperative career 
to chart the promise and the failures of mid-twentieth century cooperatives in New 
Orleans. First, I analyze the CCU's struggle to replace capitalism with a utopian 
cooperative economy.  Secondly, I study the accommodationist strategies of the 
Louisiana Credit Union League. Both cooperatives illustrate the central tension animating 
the cooperative institutions to which Hermes belonged: how to attract average citizens to 
the cooperative movement while remaining committed to national economic and political 
revolution in an era of extraordinary tumult.  Between the 1930s and the 1980s, these two 
cooperative institutions and their organizational strategies would constantly evolve as 
they navigated mid-twentieth century political, economic, and social movements.   
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Freret Neighborhood 
 Born in Cologne, Germany in 1899, Heinrich W. Hermes immigrated to New 
York to join his father when he was just 14 years old.2  While he was working as a barber 
in Brooklyn, Hermes married Amelia Mendez, a native of Guatemala and resident of 
New Orleans.3  By 1928, Henry and Amelia had moved back New Orleans to be closer to 
her family.4  Settling in the ethnic, working-class Freret Neighborhood not far from the 
Mendezes, Hermes opened a barbershop on Freret Street.5  
   Bordering Tulane University and Loyola University, Freret Neighborhood is 
located in the city's Thirteenth Ward.  Situated in a low-lying, marshy area between the 
elite Uptown and Claiborne districts, the Freret area remained undeveloped until the early 
twentieth century.6  Drainage, railroad, and port improvements, extended streetcar lines, 
and population growth from rapid immigration and improved city infrastructure spurred 
the neighborhood’s rapid development.  The community was close-knit, fostered in part 
by its mixed-use development and pedestrian-friendly layout.  Small entrepreneurs and 
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their families often lived above their stores or nearby, which nurtured community 
responsibility and cooperation essential to the CCU’s success.7   
 By the 1940s, Freret had become a popular and inexpensive shopping district, and 
the St. Charles streetcar line transported eager bargain-hunters to the neighborhood.  
However, Freret remained racially segregated at the street level; while African Americans 
comprised 40 percent of the population, their homes and businesses were concentrated 
along Soniat Street.8  In contrast, small Jewish, Italian, and Eastern European businesses 
such as Cardaro’s Poultry and Seafoods, Herman Bagalman’s Pharmacy, Olga Pollock 
Beauty Salon, and Morris’s Kosher Delicatessen lined Freret Street.9  
 Erasing ethnic divisions while amplifying racial difference, white shop owners 
like Henry Hermes belonged to segregated civic organizations such as the Freret Carnival 
Club, Freret Civic Association, and Freret Business Men’s Association, which lobbied for 
infrastructural improvements to make Freret “the best shopping center this side of Canal 
Street.”10 As in other ethnic enclaves, Freret’s Mardi Gras parades and neighborhood 
events drew much-needed business while establishing a white ethnic identity.11 
 While bound to Jim Crow racial codes, the Great Depression spurred white Freret 
residents to consider economic and political alternatives.  Although many supported 
Governor Huey Long’s racialized populism, residents eventually embraced President 
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Franklin Roosevelt’s activist federal government and New Deal welfare programs that 
protected average citizens.12 Significantly, because Socialists advocated for the 
unemployed and allied with mainstream institutions such as the CIO and the Democratic 
Party, white Freret residents tolerated Henry Hermes’s radical, integrationist politics.13  
For example, the community affectionately dubbed Hermes the “neighborhood socialist,” 
while a few, such as Clifford LeBlanc and Peter Biewer, participated in Popular Front 
and anti-fascist protest.14  Freret’s support was essential to sustaining the Popular Front-
oriented CCU, which depended on black and white patrons’ loyalty.  
Barbers' Union 
 Once established in Freret, Hermes threw himself into the heady world of radical 
labor organizing.  Hermes’s steadfast belief in an alternative economic system was rooted 
in his experience working with local union, Socialist, and cooperative organizations 
during the Great Depression.  Between 1930 and 1936, the worsening national economy 
and vicious factional politics between the Huey P. Long political machine and New 
Orleans mayor T. Semmes Walmsley plunged the city into financial crisis.15   As 
governor, Huey Long and the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO) had brokered an 
uneasy alliance to consolidate power over Louisiana politics and stimulate state 
infrastructural development.  However, the RDO soon grew leery of Long’s anti-New 
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Deal populism and tremendous sway over state politics. Consequently, when Walmsley 
ran for election in 1933, the RDO repudiated its alliance with Long, now a U.S. Senator.  
Angered, Long eliminated state funding for New Orleans and revoked much of its ability 
to regulate its own affairs and collect revenue.  
 Tensions escalated, and on the eve of the 1934 senatorial election Long declared 
martial law in New Orleans.  He deployed 3,000 National Guard members, who, armed 
with tear gas, occupied the voter registrar’s office and posted machine guns in the 
windows facing City Hall.  In response, Walmsley ordered 400 city police officers to City 
Hall.  While the conflict was defused, Long sympathizers in the state legislature 
continued to push New Orleans to the brink of bankruptcy, even after Long's 
assassination in 1935.16  Frustrated with Walmsley's handling of the skirmish, the RDO 
forced Walmsley to resign in 1936 and installed Long loyalist Robert Maestri as mayor.17  
Although Maestri helped the city regain financial footing, he was also a master of 
political patronage and tolerated prostitution and gambling.  The city's staunch anti-union 
views, voter disenfranchisement, political repression, and chronic unemployment 
eventually spurred many citizens to take radical action. 
 Simultaneously, during the 1930s and 1940s, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) launched competing 
campaigns to unionize the South.18  A more radical offshoot of the AFL, the CIO aligned 
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with the Popular Front in 1935 to lobby for collective bargaining laws to organize 
factories.19  Conservatives condemned the organization as a motley group of outside 
agitators and Communists.20  Against this tumultuous political backdrop, Hermes joined 
the Associated Master Barbers of America (AMBA) in 1931 and was elected vice 
president a year later.21  The union eventually affiliated with the CIO, reflecting both 
Hermes's Socialist leanings and New Orleans barbers' support of industrial unionism.   
 Attacking government corruption at the local and state level, Hermes quickly 
gained a reputation for zealously safeguarding his fellow barbers’ economic livelihood.  
For example, in 1932, Hermes had a young bootblack arrested “for practicing barbering 
without a license when [Hermes observed him] shampooing the head of the owner of the 
barber shop.”22  The AMBA was also fiercely opposed to the Huey P. Long 
administration and demanded state intervention to regulate the barber trade.  In 1934 it 
accused Senator Long of stacking the state barber board with cronies who refused to 
enforce sanitation regulations protecting the public.23  These experiences pitted Hermes 
against corrupt city and state officials and spurred his experimentation with radical 
economic and political institutions.  
 Like many New Orleans labor organizations, barbers unions created a vibrant and 
cohesive identity centered on distinctive community and political spaces.  Hermes 
mingled with his peers at fundraisers, picnics, film screenings, and concerts at the verdant 
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Audubon Park.24  For example, the Master and Journeyman’s Barbers Band and Booster 
Club held their meetings at the Benevolent Knights of America headquarters and hosted 
parties on the building’s roof top garden.25  Eventually, the strong social bonds Hermes 
cultivated with his fellow barbers would form the CCU's core membership. By 1949, five 
unionized barbers had become directors of the CCU.26   
 One CCU barber in particular reveals the connection between cooperation, 
unions, and ethnic communities.  Born in Boccadilfaco, Sicily, Onofrio Chiarello lived 
along Esplanade Ridge in the Seventh Ward.27  In 1941, Chiarello was elected committee 
chairman of the local Journeyman Barbers’ International Union of America.28  He was 
also active in the city’s Italian community, which had its own vibrant cooperative culture. 
For decades, Italian immigrants had formed benevolent societies to provide members 
burial insurance and medical services. Mutual aid societies strengthened social bonds 
among Italians by celebrating members’ hometowns and traditions and fostering cross-
class exchange through various social functions.29 Chiarello himself managed the Italian 
Union Hall on Esplanade Avenue, which several Italian mutual aid societies had 
collectively purchased in 1912.30 Befriending Hermes through the barber union, Chiarello 
parlayed his cooperative organizing skills into a position as CCU president in 1947.31 
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The New Orleans Popular Front 
 By 1934, Hermes had channeled his commitment to the class struggle into a 
critical position as secretary of the Socialist Party of New Orleans.32   Hermes joined the 
Party during a heady moment of Socialist organizing in New Orleans.  For example, 
publicly opposing a militant municipal streetcar drivers strike as acting mayor, T. 
Semmes Walmsley had run his 1930 mayoral campaign on a platform of restoring law 
and order.33  Consequently, in 1932 he passed a city ordinance prohibiting the “teaching, 
uttering, printing, or advocating of anarchistic, communistic, or radical doctrines.”  
Despite state repression of political dissent, Socialists vociferously denounced the anti-
union, segregationist, and corrupt RDO stranglehold over New Orleans politics.  For 
instance, in the midst of a vicious mayoral campaign for Walmsley's reelection, Hermes 
was thrown out of a RDO campaign rally for “disturbing the peace.”34  When Central 
Trades and Labor Council president James Dempsey asserted that Walmsley had always 
supported labor unions, Hermes repeatedly cried out, “I challenge that statement!” before 
police seized him and thrust him into a waiting police car.  After drawing the window 
shades, the officers allegedly struck Hermes, bruising his face.   
 Like many radicals, Socialists were outraged by the precipitous decline of New 
Orleans' finances in the wake of the Depression and friction between city and state 
political factions.  Further, because the obstructionist state legislature denied the 
municipal government the power to regulate public utilities, Mayor Walmsley was unable 
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to effectively manage basic city services. The Socialist Party demanded that the city 
government reduce utility rates for average citizens.  For example, in 1934 ran its own 
write-in candidate for mayor, Walter Smith, who proposed that the public “take over, 
own, and operate the [New Orleans] Public Service, and sell electricity, gas, and street 
car service to ourselves AT COST.”35  New Orleans Socialists’ commitment to public 
ownership of municipal services foreshadowed Hermes's interest in social and economic 
alternatives for New Orleans residents, directly leading to his cooperative career.   
 In the mid-1930s, the contacts Hermes cultivated as secretary of the Socialist 
Party coalesced into a diverse body of New Deal leftists and Popular Front allies who 
would sustain the CCU in the decades to come.  Historian Kent Germany describes the 
emerging New Deal welfare state in Louisiana as revolving around market reform, 
economic development, labor regulation, and federal subsidies.36  As conservative 
segregationists rallied to maintain the racial and class status quo, a vast, intricate network 
of leftist coalitions dedicated to expanding political participation and economic justice 
sprang up to protect nascent social welfare bureaucracies. 
 The emerging Popular Front framed much of Hermes’s organizing.  In 1935, in 
response to the Seventh Comintern Congress's call for a Popular Front, the New Orleans 
chapter of the Communist Party proposed a “united front” of black and white 
Communists, Socialists, unions, and progressives promoting anti-fascism and civil 
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liberties.37  Specifically, New Orleans Communists rejected “dictator” Huey Long's so-
called Populism and “Share the Wealth” program as affronts to the working-class.  They 
demanded that like-minded leftists aid Louisiana's urban laborers and its black 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers.  At the same time, southern Socialists seeking to 
consolidate their electoral influence by courting black voters welcomed the Communist 
Party's commitment to racial and class justice.  As historian Glenda Gilmore notes, 
Socialist Party branches became nodes for Communist Party alliances, so that party 
officials like Hermes became brokers for southern Popular Front coalitions.38  
 Although few Communists actually operated in New Orleans, the Popular Front 
nonetheless fostered an activist culture attentive to labor, anti-Fascism, and civil liberties 
issues.39 Similarly, Mayor Robert Maestri, whose ties to Huey Long and Earl K. Long's 
political machine enabled him to assume office in 1936 without an election, spent much 
of his time and resources attacking industrial unions.40  While Huey Long publicly 
supported improving labor conditions and was beloved by craft unions, as U.S. Senator, 
he neither sponsored pro-labor union legislation nor hired non-union workers on state 
construction projects.41  Unsurprisingly, Long’s ambiguous labor position did little to 
counter the state’s virulent anti-union politicians, and in the wake of his assassination, 
Longites like Maestri abandoned his “Share Our Wealth” populism in favor of protecting 
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business interests at the expense of unions.42  For example, in the midst of a CIO 
organizing drive in New Orleans, Maestri enlisted Chief of Police John J. Grosch to stifle 
radical labor activities.  According to historian Adam Fairclough, Grosch “raided homes 
and offices, seized documents, arrested strikers, threatened union lawyers, turned a blind 
eye to the [craft union] AFL’s thugs, and beat up CIO organizers” in jail.43  
 Further, city officials and businessmen portrayed anyone with unpopular political 
views as potential saboteurs, attacking leftist college professors, public speakers, anti-
fascist protestors, and Communist or Socialist party members.  In fact, civil liberty 
organizations reported that conservative New Orleanian businesses, working with the 
police, had blacklisted a variety of political figures, and “Benevolent institutions 
permitting anyone on the list to speak in their buildings are threatened with reprisals, 
including exclusion from the Community Chest.”44  Protestors such as Socialist Party 
president Louise Jessen were jailed for refusing to pay $10 permit fees for street meetings 
and faced sentences of up to 90 days in prison.45  Dissidents accused New Orleans 
officials of police brutality; as a 1936 St. Louis Dispatch headline blared, “Police Make 
Their Own Laws: Their Fists Their Warrants.”46  To avoid police reprisals, “avowed 
Communists and certain labor leaders live in a state of terror.  They dodge from place to 
place in flight from the police, communicating with one another by trusted messenger.”  
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 A well-organized civil liberties community formed in response to this aggressive 
city and state program of police repression against African Americans, unions, and 
radicals. For example, when Hermes was arrested in 1937 for possessing literature 
criticizing Mayor Maestri, the civil liberties community rushed to his aid. Hermes's 
defenders would form the bedrock of the CCU four years later. On August 20, 1937, 
Hermes halted the committee meeting he was conducting for the United Automobile 
Workers and watched warily from the podium as several policemen filed into the 
Socialist Hall in the French Quarter.47 The police harassed the audience before 
confiscating the Socialist Party’s literature. When they discovered a pamphlet linking 
New Orleans gambling interests with politically corrupt state and city officials, the 
officers arrested Hermes. Police Chief Grosch declared that he would “beat [Hermes] to a 
pulp” before “run[ning] him out of town” because the circulars criticized Maestri’s 
administration.48  After a “great deal of rough handling,” the police dragged Hermes off to 
jail. Under the State War Emergency Act of 1917, the New Orleans district attorney 
charged Hermes with “attempting to incite riot by distributing slanderous literature 
attacking our City and State Governments.”49  
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 Hermes’s tribulations did not end there.  In jail, he was kept in isolation for 18 
hours, manhandled by police, and allegedly suffered a nervous breakdown.50  Finally, out 
on bail, Hermes was walking down Cadiz Street to his Freret Street barbershop, when he 
noticed a car following him.  Two men Hermes suspected were cronies for the city’s slot 
machine racket leapt out of the car and kicked the barber to the curb.  As they beat him, 
the men snarled, “So you don’t like our governor, huh?”51  Despite the incident’s 
brutality, police did not investigate.  
 New Orleans civil liberties activists immediately sprang to Hermes's defense, 
using Hermes as a test case for combatting police abuse. The Workers Defense League 
(WDL), a Socialist legal aid organization, claimed that Hermes's civil suit was the first of 
“scores, maybe as many as 100 [lawsuits] involving similar abuses” perpetrated by police 
during CIO teamsters’ and taxicab drivers’ strikes the same year.52 Similarly, the 
Louisiana League for the Preservation of Constitutional Rights (LLPCR) took Hermes’s 
case on the grounds that the arrest violated his civil liberties. Advocating criminal law 
reform in Louisiana and New Orleans, the LLPCR was committed to “maintaining the 
liberties essential to keeping a liberal democratic government.”53 Composed of liberal 
Uptown intellectuals and lawyers, the LLPCR meticulously documented New Orleans 
police and city government harassment of political activists and raised support among 
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local and national civil liberties organizations like the ACLU.54 Although Assistant 
District Attorney Rudolph Becker eventually dismissed all charges in 1938, Hermes’s 
LLPCR lawyers subsequently filed a civil suit against Police Chief Grosch for false 
arrest.55  In response, Grosch smirked, “Hermes’ barber business must be bad...I have 
nothing to worry about.”  
 For their part, both city and national Socialist Party members decried Hermes’s 
arrest and organized letter writing campaigns to government officials and newspapers, 
hosted protest speakers, and provided Hermes legal and financial assistance.56 For 
example, the local branch of the WDL persuaded founder and Socialist Party head 
Norman Thomas to travel to New Orleans to protest Hermes's mistreatment.57 Thomas 
declared that citizens were languishing under a fascist state. Given the city’s pervasive 
political corruption and citizens’ apathy, Thomas concluded, “I found that Louisiana 
could grow almost anything—but freedom...Your land is rich, but you have the poverty 
of exploitation.”58  If Hermes could be arrested for engaging in free speech, Socialists 
argued, so could ordinary Americans.59  
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 Hermes’s arrest galvanized him, and for the rest of the 1930s he was an 
unwavering supporter of the New Orleans’ civil liberties and anti-fascist movements.60  It 
is unsurprising, then, that the CCU's leaders included former Popular Front allies.61 For 
example, many CCU members hailed from the Louisiana Division of the North American 
Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, which Hermes co-founded in 1937.62 Future CCU 
president Peter N. Biewer also bridged Freret Neighborhood's populist politics and 
radical activism.63  Chicago native and Freret resident Biewer was a committed Socialist 
active in the WDL, LLPCR, and the Workers Alliance of America, a largely Socialist 
organization that protested extensive pay cuts, suspensions, and terminations within the 
Works Progress Administration.64  However, Biewer abandoned the Socialist Party in the 
1940s to concentrate on refrigeration sales as well as managing the CCU's credit union.65  
Cooperative Politics 
 By the mid-1930s, Hermes identified cooperatives as tools for radical political 
change.  Indeed, during the Depression many Socialists promoted cooperatives as part of 
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a utopian project by ameliorating racial and class disparities by radically transforming the 
individual’s relationship to the state.  For example, rejecting corporate capitalism as a 
threat to democratic ideals, Upton Sinclair’s End Poverty in California gubernatorial 
campaign inspired the formation of 2,000 cooperatives in 1932.66  Additionally, he 
proposed that California assist its unemployed by creating state-owned cooperative 
colonies, a comprehensive industrial system comprised of worker-owned factories, and 
social welfare programs.   
 Socialists believed that once cooperatively organized, workers could create political 
institutions responsive to their needs.67  Likewise, educational reformer John Dewey 
predicted a strong labor and cooperative movement would promote community feeling 
and direct action necessary to building a “genuinely cooperative society” grounded in a 
worker-controlled system of production and economic distribution.68  On a grander scale, 
CLUSA co-founder James Warbasse and national peace activist Emily Greene Balch 
argued that an international cooperative movement would inoculate nations both from 
totalitarianism and repressive capitalism by engendering world peace.  
 Hermes and the New Orleans Socialist Party were similarly drawn to cooperative 
societies’ utopian potential.  In 1934, the Party hosted Louisianan representatives from 
New Llano Cooperative Colony, a Socialist intentional community in Leesville, 
Louisiana.69  The colony’s “new social fabric” of national economic and political 
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cooperation would soon “cover the back of advancing humanity after the old and torn one 
of capitalism [was] discarded.”70  Additionally, chapter party president Louise Jessen 
taught at Commonwealth College, a Socialist labor school and commune founded by 
former New Llano colonists.71  It modeled cooperative living while training industrial 
unionists to resist imperialism and fascism.72  Finally, at a 1936 New Orleans campaign 
rally, Socialist Party presidential candidate Norman Thomas argued that a national 
“cooperative commonwealth,” a people-centered system of economic collectivism, would 
end soaring unemployment rates and improve living conditions for “the masses.”73  These 
Socialist utopian experiments indelibly marked Hermes’s cooperative philosophy. 
 The national consumers’ movement also directly informed Hermes’s cooperative 
thinking.  As historian Tracey Deutsch argues, during the 1930s and 1940s, organized 
protest over mass retailing and older forms of food marketing and distribution swept the 
country.74  Consumer activists decried supermarkets and chain stores consolidating their 
hold over local retail markets.  Significantly, the consumers’ movement inspired a 
generation of new food cooperatives countering exorbitant consumer prices.75  Most 
largely adhered to the “Rochdale Plan,” a set of economic and organizational principles 
guiding consumer cooperatives’ actions.76  The most prominent proponent of the 
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Rochdale Plan was CLUSA.77  Its Socialist founders hoped to build a national network of 
affiliated consumer cooperatives and socialized farms that would eventually replace 
capitalism.   
 In the mid-1920s, as Socialists and Communists vied for control over CLUSA, the 
organization debated how to interpret the Rochdale principle of political neutrality.  More 
conservative factions opined that “neutrality” barred the organization from engaging in 
any political activity or even discussing Communist, Socialist or other radical political 
and economic theories. Abandoning the Socialist vision for a “universal Cooperative 
Democracy,” by the 1930s, “economic cooperators” applied modern business practices to 
compete within a capitalist framework.78  Cooperatives would no longer campaign to 
replace market capitalism but would instead compete within the system as another type of 
business.79  The mainstream cooperative movement's disavowal of radical politics laid 
bare the central problem facing 1930s and 1940s cooperative activists: How could 
cooperatives construct a national “economic utopia” without also adhering to a well-
defined political-economic theory?80  
 As radicals were nudged out of CLUSA, Socialists debated the implications of an 
apolitical cooperative movement.  In 1933, Unitarian minister John Dietrich tackled the 
ideological divide between Socialists and consumer cooperators.81  Dietrich contended 
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that the two groups fundamentally disagreed over who would benefit from a cooperative 
society.  To rectify class injustice, Socialists organized laborers into worker cooperatives 
like cooperative factories and collective farms.  Further, a Socialist government would 
control the means of production and distribution.  Ultimately, Socialists believed that a 
comprehensive economic revolution required organized political engagement.  
 Conversely, the mainstream cooperative movement posited that consumers, 
“everybody on the basis of their consumption,” were the foundation of a new economy.  
Rather than taking political action, a “non-political, voluntary association of people” 
would coalesce gradually and organically.  No government apparatus was needed because 
cooperators believed that “people can conduct their own business without profit and 
without the state.”  Dietrich's portrait of the two groups captured an increasingly 
polarized debate within the 1930s cooperative movement.   
 However, Henry Hermes was inspired not only by Socialist and Rochdale 
cooperative models, but also by the Southeastern Cooperative Educational Association 
(SCEA), which occupied a middle ground between radical activism and apolitical 
economic activity.  Active between 1939 and 1946, the SCEA was an interracial network 
of regional and sub-regional cooperatives and provided educational resources to southern 
colleges, unions, financial institutions, churches, and non-profit organizations 
establishing cooperatives.82  Influenced by the Antigonish cooperative tradition of Nova 
Scotia, the SCEA argued that southern poverty was rooted in damaging federal 
agricultural policies, as well as rural communities' dependence on exploitative 
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corporations, bankers, and wholesalers.83  Therefore, the SCEA promoted legislation, 
adult education, rural development, and cooperatives that would help southerners regain 
control over the region's economic and political institutions.84   
 Adhering to the Rochdale Plan, the SCEA argued that because all Americans 
were consumers, citizens, whether black and white, rural and urban, should unite around 
their common consumption practices to reform capitalism.85 While the SCEA professed 
that capitalism was essentially sound, it also believed that the cooperative movement was 
part of a larger struggle for political equality and democracy for all citizens.  According 
to SCEA director Ruth Morton, the cooperative store was more than “simply...a business 
enterprise,” but rather, was “one of the means by which the common man attains his 
democratic ideal.”86 Joining the SCEA in 1941, the CCU received vital institutional 
support and, most importantly, entry into the regional cooperative community.87     
Consumers' Co-operative Union  
 After seven years of careful research, Hermes opened the Consumers' Co-
operative Union (CCU) in July 1941.88  Against CLUSA, the Socialist Party, and the 
SCEA's competing strands of cooperative thought, Hermes’ hybridized cooperative plan 
positioned the CCU squarely within a Socialist political framework while still advocating 
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for consumers.  Deeply concerned about Freret Neighborhood’s economic health, Hermes 
located the cooperative grocery store in a modest two-story stucco building near from his 
Freret Street barbershop.89 Drawn to its middle and working-class urban demographics 
and proximity to street car lines, three grocery chains surrounded Freret by 1944.90  
Similarly, when the Schwegmann Brothers Giant Supermarket, New Orleans’ first 
supermarket, opened shortly thereafter, its vast stock and competitive prices quickly 
siphoned off patrons from independent Freret businesses.91 Against this competitive 
consumer landscape, the cooperative grocery store was immediately popular, with 50 
members contributing the one-dollar membership fee.92 Worried that the changing 
commercial landscape threatened their livelihoods, Freret shop-owners and residents 
enthusiastically joined the CCU movement.93 
 The CCU was part of a broader effort among independent retailers to resist 
growing chain store and supermarket competition and protect the vitality of their 
communities. For example, the Independent Grocers Alliance was a national purchasing 
association and voluntary chain of grocers formed in 1926 to combat chain store 
competition.94  However, the IGA was openly hostile to cooperative enterprise, so 
cooperatives were forced to create separate umbrella organizations to withstand 
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competition from large retailers and independent grocers alike.95   Therefore, in 1931, 
southeastern Louisianan independent grocers established the Louisiana Grocers' 
Cooperative (LGC), which provided warehouse facilities and brokered directly with 
producers and suppliers.96   It reduced overhead costs for struggling members as chain 
stores proliferated.97  Unlike the LGC, however, the CCU explicitly protected consumers 
rather than grocery store owners. 
 That ordinary Freret citizens supported the CCU also speaks to the broad appeal 
of the consumer movement nationwide. The rank-and-file cooperative member was, 
according to Deutsch, part of a “broader network of liberal (though not necessarily 
leftist)” citizens who organized advocacy groups to oppose a range of consumer abuses.98 
Likewise, Freret cooperators were Lizabeth Cohen’s prototypical “citizen consumers.”99 
Inspired by New Deal consumer-oriented legislation, they believed that the federal 
government should not only intervene in the market to shield consumers, but that 
consumers had a moral responsibility to protect their own economic interests. CCU 
members held that average citizens could curb exploitative producers and retailers’ power 
by boycotting chain stores, pressing for consumer legislation, and eventually creating a 
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mandate for a national cooperative government and economic program. To do so, Hermes 
wrangled a diverse set of allies around the consumer cooperative movement's tenet 
“everybody is a Consumer, from the day of birth until we die.”100 
    
Figure 4: Demographic map of Consumers’ Co-operative Union members’ addresses.  
White dots represent known Popular Front members.  Light gray are African Americans.  
Dark gray are unaffiliated with the Popular Front. 
 
Female Consumer Activists in the CCU  
 Accounting for half of the CCU's board of directors, radical female consumer 
activists embraced economic cooperation. As Deutsch suggests, the consumer movement 
                                                
100  “The ‘New Orleans Co-operator’,” New Orleans Co-operator (January and February 1944): 2-3. 
 225 
was enriched by the frank exchange of ideas between moderate, liberal, and radical 
female activists of the late 1930s.101 Likewise, three CCU leaders, Lillian Muniz, a 
YWCA clubwoman; Angelina Prior, a unionist; and Mary Allen, a Socialist, were 
important figures in both Popular Front activism and consumer advocacy.   
 Social worker Lillian Muniz illustrates the YWCA's ties to the consumer 
movement and cooperative economics. A working-class New Orleanian of German and 
Spanish parentage, during the 1930s Muniz headed Louisiana State University’s YWCA 
chapter and served on the board of the southern regional organization.102 Anne Firor 
Scott argues that beginning in the 1920s, the YWCA radicalized young southern women 
“seeking...to Christianize the social order” by critiquing labor relations and using 
cooperatives to reform an exploitative capitalist system.103   Since 1920, working-class 
members of the YWCA had endorsed collective bargaining and federal labor legislation 
as the logical manifestation of Protestant social justice and American patriotism.104 
Similarly, Muniz supported the 1943 United Mine Workers strike, declaring that mining 
companies’ “limitless appetites for profit” were aiding “Axis powers”; by undermining 
organized labor, corporations jeopardized miners’ safety and economic wellbeing.105   
 Further, during the Great Depression and World War II, YWCA members were 
active in federal consumer agencies like the Office of Price Administration’s Consumer 
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Division, as well as national consumer organizations like the National Consumers’ 
League.106 Given its commitment to consumer protections, it is unsurprising that the 
YWCA was a staunch ally of the southern cooperative movement and the CCU.107 For 
example, both the New Orleans YWCA and the CCU belonged to the SCEA.108 In fact, 
the CCU’s first public meeting was held in a YWCA auditorium in September 1941.109 
Lillian Muniz’s YWCA affiliations undoubtedly secured an important institutional ally 
for the cooperative grocery store.  
 Female labor activists were also integral to the consumer movement, and 
unionized women in the CCU were no different. For example, during the Great 
Depression, Mexican native and CCU president Angelina Lopez Prior had worked as a 
machinist for a textile company and headed the New Orleans chapter of the United 
Garment Workers Union.110 Prior and her brother participated in Popular Front protests 
and campaigned for Socialist and cooperative enthusiast Norman Thomas’s 1936 
presidential campaign.111 Demanding collective bargaining for unions as well as 
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consumer empowerment, Prior also championed the National Industrial Recovery Act.112  
Notably, the National Recovery Administration enabled both consumers and unions to 
influence recovery efforts by creating the Consumer Advisory Board and Consumers’ 
Counsel.113 Consumer advocates like Prior believed the federal consumer agency would 
enforce product quality standards and integrate “citizen consumers” into an expanded 
democracy. However, soon after World War II, non-war-related industries cut 
employees’ wages by ten percent, igniting a wave of strikes nationwide.114 Amidst 
widespread economic instability and hardening government policies on industrial 
relations, female unionists organized cooperatives to protect laborers and consumers.115 
Similarly, throughout the 1940s, board member Prior lauded the CCU for fostering a 
national cooperative economy.116 
 Finally, Newcomb College history professor Mary Bernard Allen reflects the 
central role that Socialists played in the New Orleans cooperative movement. An ardent 
Socialist and founding LLPCR member, Allen met Hermes through the League of 
Industrial Democracy (LID), a Socialist organization of college faculty and students that 
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posted Hermes’s bail in 1937.117 Repeatedly weathering state probes into the Communist 
infiltration of higher education, Allen built a career defending academic freedom and free 
speech.118  Like Hermes, she was committed to anti-fascism, anti-racism, Socialism, and 
cooperative economics.119 At the same time Hermes and the Socialist Party were 
exploring cooperative models of organizing, LID also hosted a variety of lectures on 
radical cooperative economics.120 As a LID member, Allen believed that the nation 
desperately “need[ed]…a cooperative social order.”121  
African Americans in the CCU 
 Further, the CCU's interest in economic equality dovetailed with black civil rights 
activists' interest in cooperative economics. As black New Orleanians began to suffer 
disproportionately during the Great Depression, civil rights activists hailed black-run 
consumer cooperatives as the most expedient means by which to eliminate racialized 
economic injustice.122 African Americans accounted for half of the city’s unemployed, 
while only comprising a third of the city's population. Further, New Deal social welfare 
programs were segregated, inefficient, and ultimately inadequate.123 In response, long-
established African American mutual aid and benevolent associations provided low-cost 
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medical insurance to black members otherwise excluded from health care services.124 
Setting a precedent for interracial collaboration, Ella Baker and George Schuyler’s 
Young Negroes’ Co-operative League (YNCL) created a host of cooperative enterprises 
in black neighborhoods, including in New Orleans.125 Between 1930 and 1934, the YNCL 
cooperatives bought wholesale from white distributors to provide black consumers low-
cost produce.126 Later, operating in tandem with the NAACP’s national “Don’t Buy 
Where You Can’t Work” campaigns, which protested racial discrimination in stores, a 
new generation of black cooperatives helped members circumvent exploitative retail 
companies and circulate profits within their communities.127   
 Significantly, CCU’s cooperative mission also embraced racial justice. Like the 
SCL, the cooperative proposed that sustained economic development in the South would 
end racism and prevent the spread of fascism among southern segregationists.128  In fact, 
the SCL provided a model for CCU’s integrationist politics.  African Americanss such as 
Dillard University president A.W. Dent, served on the SCL’s board of directors, attended 
workshops and conferences, and delivered speeches on cooperatives’ role in building a 
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biracial civil rights movement.129   Similarly, the CCU recruited black members, while 
its events, held at integrated or black institutions, often featured prominent civil rights 
activists.130  For example, at its January 1947 annual board of directors election meeting, 
the CCU invited the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) to address its 
members.131 An integrated, pro-labor organization, the SCHW sought to bring New Deal 
reforms to the South, including civil rights, electoral reform, and social justice.132 Like 
the SCHW, the CCU proposed that sustained economic development in the South would 
end racism and prevent the spread of fascism among southern segregationists.133   Most 
importantly, while disenfranchised at the state level, black members enjoyed equal voting 
privileges within the cooperative. Consequently, they consistently elected people of color 
to the board of directors.134  Therefore, New Orleans’s 1940s cooperative movement 
offered the potential for lasting interracial collaboration.  
 Fletcher Sherrod, an African American Freret resident and CCU director, 
participated in both the cooperative and civil rights movement in New Orleans.135 Sherrod 
was a mail carrier, a traditionally black middle-class position.136 While postal workers 
were at the forefront of NAACP leadership in the 1940s, they carried a legacy of 
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organized black political activism.137 For example, the National Alliance of Postal 
Employees formed in 1913 to prevent racial discrimination in the field. As Hasan Kwame 
Jeffries argues, cooperative and mutual aid societies established strong social bonds 
among members and fostered a democratic atmosphere congenial to launching radical 
economic reform and racial equality measures.138 Similarly, Sherrod was a recording 
secretary for the Postal Relief and Benevolent Association of New Orleans during the 
Great Depression, a mutual aid society providing medical and burial benefits to postal 
workers and their families.139 Also, Sherrod's brother was a doctor at Dillard University’s 
Flint Goodridge Hospital, which served the city’s black population and offered 
cooperative hospitalization services for the poor.140 While Sherrod encountered 
cooperatives through his benevolent association, his family’s experience in the medical 
field also dramatized the need for an integrated, progressive cooperative economy.   
Community Culture 
 Despite the CCU's heterogeneity, Hermes crafted an imagined community of 
cooperators through social events, educational programs, member services, and a 
monthly newsletter, The New Orleans Cooperator. First, as newsletter editor, Hermes 
reiterated the cooperative store's economic and political principles, thereby unifying 
members around their shared commitment to the systemic transformation of corrupt 
economic and political systems.141 For example, in 1944, Hermes predicted that postwar 
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America faced a grave political and economic crisis. He warned that unscrupulous 
corporations will be “enriched by wartime profits” and “Race and minority problems will 
be loaded with dynamite.  Much of the World [will] hate or fear us.”142  Hermes argued 
that citizens should immediately elect a Socialist government and implement a national 
cooperative economic system. The state should control fundamental industries, regulate 
employment, heavily tax corporations, maintain wartime price controls and rationing, and 
finally, regulate farm and city land speculation to stabilize property values. 
 To ensure long-term economic growth, Hermes declared, the federal government 
should return industries to “the people” as large-scale worker cooperatives.143 Echoing 
Socialist leaders Norman Thomas and George Nelson, Hermes proposed a national 
network of cooperatives would stimulate the postwar economy, improve workers' 
standards of living, eliminate racial tension, and foster democratic feelings among 
Americans.144 For Hermes, too, only a system of “international economic co-operation 
based on democracy and economic justice” could create “the opportunity for the people 
to help themselves to permanent peace.”145 By making Socialist and consumer 
cooperative arguments accessible, Hermes appealed to a broad range of audiences who 
otherwise had little in common.   
 Second, The New Orleans Cooperator's monthly “Gossip” column highlighted 
CCU members' shared experience of World War II to cement a nascent sense of 
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community. Bordering the Gulf of Mexico and featuring many war production facilities 
and training camps, Louisiana was considered vulnerable to Axis attack; several torpedo 
explosions on the mouth of the Mississippi and the Gulf thus fanned public suspicions of 
any group appearing anti-American.146 By illustrating politically, ethnically, and racially 
diverse cooperators' commitment to the war effort, Hermes could head off any claims of 
subversion. For example, columnists bade farewell to members deployed for active duty, 
noted that Henry Hermes's daughter was employed as a nurse while his son had enlisted 
in the Navy, and reported that CCU member Angelina Prior was sewing uniforms for the 
war effort.147  Hermes himself joined the National Defense Council of Louisiana as an air-
raid warden in Freret.148 Additionally, the CCU credit union sold war bonds, explaining 
that they “belong in every budget, as Democracy belongs in every heart.”149 Effectively, 
the CCU associated cooperation with patriotism and civic duty.  
 Third, Hermes constantly highlighted the cooperative movement's progress to 
rally members' support for their own grocery store. Accordingly, Hermes discussed other 
cooperative models he encountered after attending SCEA conferences and touring eastern 
cooperatives.150 Further, CCU’s public meetings and member picnics featured 
representatives from labor unions, churches, and civic organizations who spoke on the 
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individual's role within the cooperative movement.151 Echoing the SCEA, Hermes 
declared that cooperatives could break the cycle of consumer dependency by “supplying 
the inspiration and the ‘know how’ for folks to help themselves.”152 By attending CCU 
workshops and taking advantage of its financial services, citizens could attain economic 
independence. By extension, the CCU argued that members’ daily economic activities 
would aid the broader cooperative movement.   
 Finally, Hermes believed that CCU membership would foster civic pride 
necessary to reform corrupt economic and political institutions. For this reason, The New 
Orleans Cooperator covered city and national politics and urged readers to vote in 
upcoming elections. Rejecting the Rochdale principle of neutrality, Hermes threw himself 
into political campaigning. He was politically pragmatic, however. In the wake of the 
Soviet Union's Great Purge of 1937, the Socialist Party severed ties with CPUSA. 
Consequently, the Socialist Party disintegrated amidst generational factionalism.153 
Similarly, Hermes abandoned the Socialist Party in 1939 and joined the Democratic Party 
to achieve New Deal reforms in the South.154 To that end, after winning his home 
district’s endorsement, Hermes ran for state representative on an anti-Earl K. Long 
administration ticket.155  He supported Roosevelt's Economic Security Act, and along with 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Sam Houston Jones, promoted homestead 
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associations, social security, old age pensions, and an end to government corruption.156 
Nevertheless, Hermes continued to advocate for a socialized government, even as he 
campaigned alongside mainstream political parties.  
 Although Hermes lost the election, he ran again for State Senate in 1943, 
representing the Twelfth and Thirteenth Wards.157  He broadcast his Democratic platform 
on station WNOE, summarizing a decade of political activism: along with his fellow 
Independent Democrats, Hermes would repeal the city and state sales tax, which he 
believed were sponsored by large corporations. Additionally, he would pass legislation to 
create jobs for civilians and veterans after the war, “provide a slum clearance program,” 
and lower utilities rates in New Orleans.158 The CCU closely followed Hermes’s political 
activities, reporting in January 1944, “our Secretary was a candidate for the State Senate 
in the recent election, well, he is still running. Did you hear him on the radio?”159  While 
his party lost during the first state primary, Hermes informed CCU members that their 
electoral participation was crucial: “To preserve Democracy we MUST preserve the 
ballot-box—and vote.” Consumer political involvement and economic empowerment 
were foundational to Hermes's cooperative philosophy.  
Food and CCU Philosophy 
 Even as New Orleans’s wartime munitions factories, military bases, and shipyards 
provided civilians higher wages and spurred greater consumption, the CCU’s humble 
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grocery store sustained a loyal clientele throughout the war.160  Appealing to working-
class women juggling war jobs and domestic duties, the CCU sold convenience foods like 
chocolate syrups and Jell-O.161  Additionally, the CCU purchased produce and dry goods 
in bulk to offer patrons quality items at chain store prices.  Elevating the CCU above 
avaricious corporate retailers, Hermes asserted, “We give the service that people are 
entitled to and paying for but not receiving in the ‘chains.’”162  
 At the same time, the CCU joined national consumer activists who parlayed their 
influence within federal food agencies to press for national social welfare and public 
works programs curbing capitalism’s excesses.163  As a consumer-owned grocery store, it 
fully supported the central concerns of the wartime consumers’ movement, particularly 
federally mandated rationing, grade labeling, and price controls, to protect Americans 
against unhealthful food, inflation, the black market, and hoarding.164  In contrast, 
unscrupulous New Orleans retailers inflated their prices, and grocers blacklisted 
consumer activists who protested.165  While other independent grocery stores threatened 
that the Office of Price Administration’s (OPA) “red tape and technicalities” would force 
them to use the black market, the CCU faithfully followed federal rationing policies.166  
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 During World War II, Americans conflated domestic consumption with good 
citizenship, and the CCU was no different.167 Key to the cooperative’s patriotic identity 
was female food consumption. While both men and women belonged to the CCU, 
American women were responsible for daily food purchases, often squeezing shopping 
trips between wartime work shifts.168 For example, when food administrators encouraged 
Americans to reduce their dependence on scarce canned items by purchasing or growing 
their own produce, Hermes reported that women flocked to purchase CCU’s fruits and 
vegetables, sourced from open-air city markets.169 The store also persuaded women to 
adhere to federal meat substitute campaigns, which featured fruits, such as the avocado.  
Wartime Californian growers marketed avocados to women as a healthful and elegant 
salad topping as well as a viable meat substitute for rationing families: avocados were 
“veritable grenades of glamor.”170 Similarly, the CCU crowed, “we were the first on 
Freret Street with Avocados which sold like hot-cakes.”171 The CCU constructed its 
members as female citizen consumers dedicated to upholding OPA regulations and the 
greater war effort.   
 CCU women’s patriotic character was further bolstered by their status as ethnic 
paragons of wartime consumption.  Government food administrators urged native-born 
Americans to frequent Italian markets and emulate “Deep South” cooks to procure 
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inexpensive food substitutes and eliminate food waste.172 Broadening the definition of 
American identity, the CCU stocked foods that honored its members’ ethnic and racial 
diversity. For example, the grocery store supplied New Orleans staples such as fresh fish, 
lobster, and Carnival, Easter, and picnic hams, while catering to immigrant families with 
imported specialty goods like sardines packed in oil and Pompeian olive oil.173 The 
CCU’s delicatessen also served ethnic and African American customers by providing 
organ meats, neck bones, and hot sausage.174 While the general public long distained 
spicy, garlicky foods or mixed stews as redolent of inassimilable otherness, food 
reformers now hailed immigrant and black housewives for their efficient food-stretching 
methods born out of pre-war economic necessity.175 The CCU’s food selections reflected 
its belief that a racially and ethnically heterogeneous cooperative could demonstrate 
patriotic values while still promoting systemic political and economic transformation.  
Culture Clashes and Compromises  
 Nonetheless, competition from chain stores and supermarkets, military 
conscription, and wartime rationing plagued the CCU’s operations. Like many small 
grocery stores during World War II, the CCU struggled to keep basic items in stock, 
maintain adequate staff, and manage store rushes. As Deutsch observes, shopping could 
be a peculiarly tense experience as limited supplies of paper, coffee, and other items 
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sparked arguments and even scuffles between harried clientele and store employees.176  
Stores were frequently mobbed with anxious shoppers waiting in long lines for frazzled, 
short-staffed cashiers to count their ration points and purchase totals.   
 Hermes enumerated similar wartime headaches. When the CCU’s delivery truck 
broke down in 1944, the store was unable to procure fresh produce, which measurably 
decreased its sales.177 Additionally, the CCU struggled to retain grocery clerks because 
war industries offered higher wages. Hermes conceded, “no-one desires to work behind 
the counter at a minimum pay,” despite the cooperative’s ethical mission. Like many 
Louisianan stores, the CCU was also forced to scale back its delivery service “as we are 
unable to get delivery boys to work all during the day.”178 To reduce staff workloads, 
Hermes implored members to take customer phone orders during the store’s busiest hours 
on Sundays and weekday mornings. For their part, customers should “not wait to be 
called for your order; call up early and daily.”179 
 Given the moral and economic benefits that consumer cooperation offered, 
Hermes was confounded by many members’ apparent indifference to the store’s survival. 
He frequently bemoaned, “It is a big job to make people co-op minded…WHY???”180  
While the CCU's sales trebled between 1941 and 1944, profits remained flat, 
guaranteeing that the CCU existed on a shoe-strong budget.181  Although the CCU kept its 
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prices consistent with those of larger retail operations, its narrow profit margin meant that 
the store could not afford to cut prices any lower. Consequently, looking for bargains, 
“some of our members are still running to that store at the corner or go way out of the 
way to a chain store.”182  Hermes reminded members that by purchasing more shares in 
the company, the CCU could lower prices and increase its inventory.183  Yet Freret 
residents continued to “patronize their competitors” rather than “protect[ing] their 
investment and interest, not mentioning CO-OPERATION.” 
 Hermes confronted two divergent understandings of the CCU’s purpose. While 
Socialists hoped to dismantle capitalism, most Freret residents, like the majority of the 
cooperative movement’s rank-and-file, patronized the CCU primarily to reduce their 
grocery bill.184  Consequently, the CCU, like its cooperative contemporaries, struggled to 
remain relevant after World War II. Fearing that the CCU would compromise its ideals to 
retain members, Hermes lamented, “We had not expected that the co-op would become 
just another neighborhood grocery-store. But that’s what it is to-day.”185   
The End of the CCU 
 Despite Hermes’s worries, the postwar future initially seemed promising for the 
CCU. By 1949, it had expanded to include at least four other cooperative enterprises 
clustered along Freret Street. In addition to the CCU’s credit union and cooperative 
laundry service next door, Mrs. Myrtle Crow managed the Consumers' Co-operative Ice 
Cream Parlor inside the grocery store, while independent meat dealer Rusty Rusbridge 
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ran the cooperative's deli.186 Unfortunately, even as the CCU demonstrated that a 
comprehensive cooperative economy was not only possible but also profitable, the 
political and economic conditions sustaining the cooperative were rapidly eroding. In 
1951 the CCU closed, and, ironically, a deli chain opened in its place.187  
 The CCU began disintegrating against a backdrop of growing political 
polarization, the ascension of the supermarket model, Freret Neighborhood’s 
demographic change, and Hermes's shifting cooperative priorities. By the late 1940s and 
1950s, it was increasingly dangerous to be a cooperative activist fighting for economic 
and political equality in the South. Desperate to preserve “the southern way of life,” 
conservative white Southerners attempted to quash civil rights and unionizing efforts by 
raising the dual specter of black rebellion and foreign agitation. According to Jeff Woods, 
the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) initiated the southern red scare, a 
twenty-year period in which “southern nationalists,” politicians committed to stamping 
out Communist-led racial equality, consolidated their hold over the region’s politics.188  
Established in 1938, HUAC investigated Roosevelt's New Deal coalition of labor, 
Jewish, Popular Front, and black activists. By 1947, federal legislators attempted to 
outlaw the Communist Party, while President Truman initiated a federal loyalty program 
that barred employees from affiliating with “subversive” organizations. 
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 Cooperatives did not escape anti-Communist scrutiny.  For example, during a 
Congressional Ways and Means Committee investigation into the tax status of 
cooperatives between 1949 and 1950, Louisianan businessmen wrote to Representative 
Hale Boggs protesting the “socialistic movement” of unions and cooperatives that 
threatened to “destroy the [capitalist] system which has been in effect almost ever since 
this nation was founded.”189  Critics claimed that cooperatives were tools of wealthy 
plantation owners and entrepreneurs seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of “the 
small business man and the small farmer...the backbone of the Country.”190 One insurance 
agent complained that cooperative insurance companies purposely undersold traditional 
corporations and had exploited tax loopholes to swindle the federal government out of 
billions of tax dollars.191   
 Similarly, Republican Ways and Means Committee member Noah M. Mason 
claimed that “Co-ops run a vast machine” of the nation's production and distribution 
networks, avoided taxes, and colluded with unions to dominate the consumer market.192 
He charged, “Our biggest unions are planning to operate giant co-op supermarkets in 
union towns throughout America, in competition with taxpaying grocers” and would 
“capture” half of domestic retail trade. A New Orleans manufacturer's agent summed up 
the general tenor of cooperative opponents when he observed that U.S. Senator Allen 
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Ellender, a conservative segregationist from Louisiana, “has said that if Communism 
comes to this country, it will come from within.”193 
 Criticism of cooperatives was so virulent that in 1950 CLUSA representative 
Jerry Voorhis testified before Congress, maintaining that cooperatives were bulwarks 
against Communism and totalitarianism, which he defined as the “concentration of 
economic power in the hands of private individuals, depriving the people of economic 
opportunity and causing them to lose the right to determine their own course of action.”194 
He posited that corporate monopolies were more Communistic than were cooperatives. 
To preserve democracy, a system of cooperatives would decentralize economic and 
political power and “both ownership and responsibility [are] restored to the people once 
again.” Rather than operating as agents of extremism, voluntary cooperatives were “a 
middle road between dependence upon government on the one hand and control by 
private concentrations of power on the other.” Despite Voorhis's impassioned defense of 
cooperatives, numbers of non-agrarian cooperatives dwindled over the course of the 
1950s, while agricultural cooperatives purged radical activists critical of American 
domestic and foreign policies from their membership rolls.195  
 Unapologetic radical cooperators faced severe political repercussions. During the 
Great Depression, Louisiana Farmers’ Union organizer Gordon McIntire worked with the 
CPUSA and the Share Croppers Union to unionize black sharecroppers and establish 
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farmers’ cooperatives.196  In 1953 anti-Communist federal investigators targeted 
McIntire, now a United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) official, for 
his former Popular Front affiliations. McIntire described the federal probe’s circular 
logic, which conflated leftist activism with subversive activity:  
All they have against me is that I went to [Socialist labor school] Commonwealth 
College and sponsored the Southern Conference for Human Welfare and worked 
for the Farmers Union.  But all this seems to build up to Communist 
conspiracy….The La.F.U. is said to have been Communist because I was its 
Secretary and I am said to be a Communist because I worked for the La.F.U.197  
 
Nonetheless, the FAO fired McIntire, and the FBI tapped his phone and monitored his 
mail. Also, claiming McIntire was a security risk, the State Department restricted his 
passport and many countries refused him entry.198   
 The revanchist Cold War political climate decimated integrated leftist political 
organizations as white and black New Orleans liberals fled the ranks of alleged 
Communist fronts. Further, the successors of radical New Deal organizations such as 
Americans for Democratic Action, an integrated anti-Communist liberal organization, 
feared alienating moderate white political supporters and were hamstrung by their 
tentative and ambivalent integrationist policies.199 At the CCU, as redbaiting became 
increasingly pervasive, overtly Socialist members faded from view, and Hermes’s fellow 
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barbers and Freret business owners were elected to the cooperative’s board of directors.200 
Further, while key African American CCU members like Fletcher Sherrod and Condy 
Sartor continued to agitate for greater racial equality within New Orleans, Henry Hermes 
moderated his fiery political rhetoric to advocate social justice through legislative 
reform.201 Finally, by the 1950s, the CCU ceased publicly calling for total economic and 
political transformation to concentrate on the logistics of running a business as dramatic 
population change and economic stagnation swept Freret.202 Similarly, many postwar 
cooperatives eschewed politics altogether, instead applying modern business methods to 
compete within a capitalist framework.203  
 As the CCU struggled to maintain a clear sense of purpose, shifting demographics 
patterns in New Orleans siphoned white Freret members from the CCU and the 
neighborhood in general. New suburban tracts sprung up along Lake Pontchartrain and 
the outskirts of New Orleans, and large numbers of working- and middle-class whites left 
urban communities in the Ninth Ward, Mid-City, and the Irish Channels to maintain 
segregated lifestyles.204 Inner city black neighborhoods now encircled exclusively 
wealthy white neighborhoods.205 While housing stock boomed for affluent whites, racial 
covenants and inadequate public housing resulted in a housing crisis for African 
Americans, who squeezed into dilapidated, overcrowded housing stock. By 1950 vacancy 
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rates for African American housing dipped to only 0.3 percent.206   Finally, the 1960 
mandate to integrate Orleans Parish public schools only accelerated the white exodus 
from Freret and other neighborhoods.207 
 Postwar settlement patterns permanently altered Freret Neighborhood's consumer 
culture as well. After the Freret street car line closed in 1946, CCU lost significant 
patronage from cross-town shoppers, while the popularity of the family car drew Freret 
residents to the suburbs and away from the pedestrian-oriented neighborhood.208 
Supermarkets populated new, car-centric suburbs that made Freret Street’s community of 
family-owned businesses and racially diverse residents seem shabby and outmoded in 
comparison.209  Across the city, the rise of the large grocery store spelled the end of corner 
grocery stores, street vendors, and city markets operating without the support of larger 
commercial associations like the Louisiana Grocers Cooperative. Nationally, most 
neighborhood cooperatives failed in the midst of the postwar economic boom and 
dropping food prices.210  Under these conditions, the CCU could not successfully compete 
with supermarkets and chains. It disbanded quietly in 1965, after the store itself had been 
shuttered for over a decade.211 
Henry Hermes and the Credit Union Movement 
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 Although the CCU failed amidst proliferating chain stores and supermarkets, its 
credit union launched the next phase of Henry Hermes’s cooperative career. As the CCU 
floundered, Hermes co-founded the Freret Business Men's Association (FBMA) credit 
union, which he believed would help working-class citizens achieve financial security 
and stabilize the spiraling local economy. Offering easy loan repayment and low interest 
rates, credit unions successfully competed against commercial banks, department stores, 
and small loan companies.212 Soon thereafter, Hermes joined the Louisiana Credit Union 
League (LCUL), a statewide cooperative organization serving low- and moderate-income 
residents.213   While Hermes tempered his Socialist worldview with a more moderate 
vision of cooperative-led reform, he consistently demanded economic and political 
change. As a Freret Credit Union and LCUL representative, Hermes balanced his efforts 
to rebuild Freret Neighborhood with a dedication to improving average Louisianans’ 
economic wellbeing and political influence. Employed by a state credit union body, 
Hermes could now lobby influential political leaders at city, state, and federal levels to 
shape legislation that promoted credit unions across Louisiana, and by extension, better 
integrate low-income earners into state political and economic institutions. 
 First established in 1900, credit unions are cooperative financial institutions 
dedicated to redressing the gap in consumer lending for low-income individuals.214  While 
credit unions populated Louisiana in the 1920s, the passage of the Federal Credit Union 
Act of 1934 facilitated a national system of federal credit unions. The act further 
                                                
212  Edgar Wallace Wood, “Credit Union Development in Louisiana” (PhD diss., Louisiana State 
University, 1967), 54. 
213  “Deaths: Henry W. Hermes,” Times Picayune (June 1, 1987): 19.  
214 Wood, “Credit Union Development in Louisiana,” 5-19. 
 248 
encouraged credit union formation by permitting the organizations to be chartered and 
regulated under either state or federal law. In Louisiana, for instance, credit unions are 
chartered, regulated, and supervised by the Office of Financial Institutions or by the 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), an independent federal agency. 
Consequently, in 1934, cooperators formed the Louisiana Credit Union League (LCUL), 
a state organization of credit unions that promoted economic cooperation, liaised with 
regulatory agencies, provided legal aid for credit union members, and affiliated with the 
Credit Union National Association (CUNA), a national trade and lobbyist organization. 
Further, as president of the Farm Credit Administration Credit Union, LCUL co-founder 
Harold Moses helped shape New Deal federal credit union legislation. Under his 
guidance, credit unions rapidly spread across the Louisiana and the nation. 
 Like radicals and labor unionists around the country, Hermes also believed credit 
unions would expand working-class access to consumer credit.215 In the 1930s and 1940s, 
interest rates at loan offices and financial companies could be three times higher than 
credit union interest rates, and fixed administrative costs often made consumer loans 
prohibitively expensive for less affluent Americans.216  In contrast, credit unions helped 
vulnerable individuals and communities maintain financial solvency by avoiding 
predatory lending agencies.217 Therefore, in keeping with its pursuit of economic justice, 
                                                
215 Gunnar Trumbull, Consumer Lending and America: Credit and Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 19-20; Lee Brooks, letter to SCEA Office, 2 Feb. 1941, folder 4, box 1, SCL 
Records. 
216 Biewer, “Our Credit Union,” 3-4.  
217 Wood, “Credit Union Development,” 1, 7. 
 249 
in 1944 the CCU opened a credit union to “help a member help himself.”218 Members 
pooled money from inexpensive stock shares to open savings accounts, obtain loans at 
moderate interest rates, and receive dividends in proportion to their stock investment. For 
manager Peter Biewer, the CCU credit union was “a miniature democracy” because 
“through group activity we can do much to solve common problems.”  
 Part of credit unions’ great appeal among working-class Americans was that they 
were run by and for the members themselves, unlike for-profit financial institutions.219 
First, directors and committee members were democratically elected, and each member 
had one vote, regardless of how much stock he or she held in the institution. Second, 
because new credit unions tended to be small, members were dependent on each other to 
stay solvent, so credit unions limited their membership to those who shared common 
bonds. For example, while most credit unions were occupational, like Henry Hermes’s 
Barbers’ and Beauticians’ Credit Union, others were residential or associational, such as 
the FBMA Credit Union. Therefore, unlike at large financial institutions, credit union 
members were likely to have established mutual trust.  
 Significantly, the Louisiana credit union community was a refuge for Popular Front 
and New Deal activists run underground by Cold War anti-Communist hysteria. In 
October 1951, LCUL’s Credit Union Day revealed New Orleans’s Depression-era 
cooperative network still intact, twenty years later.220 After being inducted into the 
Founders Club, Henry Hermes hob-knobbed with old cooperators like Right Reverend 
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William J. Castel, one of the Southeastern Cooperative Educational Association 
(SCEA)’s “key people in the Roman Catholic Church.”221 Hermes also reunited with 
former LCUL organizer E.K. Watkins, who had worked closely with the CCU in the 
1940s and was now an international credit union leader.222 In fact, Louisiana credit unions 
had championed the southern cooperative movement. In turn, the SCEA believed credit 
unions demonstrated “the growth of the cooperative philosophy and what it might do to 
help the South.”223  Like other blacklisted or otherwise unemployable leftists in search of 
meaningful work during Cold War anti-Communist hysteria, former cooperative New 
Dealers and Popular Fronters alike gravitated to the credit union movement. While its 
rhetoric of “self-help” seemed less controversial than radical cooperatives' call for 
comprehensive economic and political revolution, it still filled a pressing need among 
low-income Americans for both consumer credit and political empowerment.224 
 Even as Louisiana’s postwar industrializing economy expanded middle-class 
purchasing power and access to consumer credit, working-class whites and people of 
color remained excluded from mainstream lending institutions.225  Shreveport Federal 
Credit Union head Helen Godfrey-Smith recalls, “there was no opportunity for African 
Americans to have legitimate access to financial services that were responsive to what 
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they needed.”226 Considering African Americans “high risk” clients, private banks 
frequently denied them low-interest loans and mortgages.227  Further, while white 
veterans secured federally-provided housing financing through the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, African Americans were forced to pay large monthly 
payments and high interest rates on exorbitantly-priced homes.228  While black credit 
unions had traditionally offered their communities’ a measure of financial stability, 
white-run credit unions finally perceived this service gap and began consciously 
recruiting African Americans to join their cooperatives.229   
 In the 1950s and 1960s, LCUL enrolled thousands of working-class whites and 
African Americans into credit unions, extending reasonable loans to combat rampant 
inflation and job insecurity.230  Significantly, as Godfrey-Smith asserts, “in spite of the 
segregation of the external world, within…[community] credit unions, there was some 
integration.”231  Because all members had the same account policies and voting privileges, 
African Americans could be elected to otherwise majority white credit union boards. 
Committed to securing vulnerable Americans’ economic wellbeing, Louisiana credit 
unions granted increasing numbers of low-rate loans even during periods of economic 
recession between 1957 and 1962.232  Consequently, by 1962, credit unions had 
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superseded small loan companies as the second important purveyors of consumer loans in 
the state, eventually enrolling 200,000 Louisianans in financial cooperatives.233  
 However, although the Louisiana credit union movement embraced expanding 
consumer credit to low-income groups, its state governing bodies resisted racial 
integration. Even progressive white credit union and cooperative activists had 
trepidations about socializing with black peers.234  Further, while local credit unions were 
sometimes integrated, state credit union meetings were strictly segregated. Richard 
Turnley, a civil rights activist who founded the Baton Rouge-based Southern Teachers 
and Parents Federal Credit Union in 1959, recalled that black board of directors and 
managers were forced to wait outside LCUL meetings in the late 1950s and 1960s.235 
Sympathetic white credit union members snuck out to share the League's debates, 
literature, and research so that African American colleagues might disseminate the 
information to their constituents. These cases reveal the disjuncture between the credit 
union movement’s ideological commitment to racial equality and the realities of 
operating within a racist society. 
Freret Business Men's Association Credit Union 
 Similarly, while Henry Hermes was committed to racial and class equality, his 
membership in the segregated FBMA reflects the complicated racial politics of 
cooperative organizing in New Orleans. The FBMA credit union was an entry point into 
Hermes’s statewide cooperative organizing over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. 
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However, while Hermes was committed to the wellbeing of Freret Neighborhood, he 
nevertheless became entangled in a segregationist system he and his Socialist colleagues 
were feverishly working to dismantle.   
 In need of sustained community support, the CCU had joined the FBMA around 
1945.236  The CCU’s crusade against chain stores and large retail operations appealed to 
the FBMA’s small business owners also suffering from corporate competition. In fact, 
financial institutions repeatedly denied Freret storeowners’ loans because they viewed the 
racially diverse community as a liability. The FBMA realized that “the businessmen on 
[Freret] street had to have something to help themselves. Unless the small businessman 
has real estate, he has trouble getting money.”237 In response, in 1951, Hermes formed the 
FBMA Credit Union to foster neighborhood self-reliance.238 While Hermes envisioned a 
multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and gender inclusive cooperative system that would revitalize 
the democratic process and reject capitalism’s exploitative profit motive, the FBMA 
limited credit union membership to white businessmen.  Its mission was to protect the 
economic interests of its storeowners within a capitalistic system, not to abandon it. 
 As a director of both the FBMA and the Freret Civic Association, Hermes was 
also complicit in segregationist opposition to Freret's changing racial demographics. For 
example, in 1949, in the midst of a severe housing crisis, the Freret Civic Association 
unsuccessfully proposed using Federal Housing Act funds to demolish several 
predominantly black residential blocks as part of a “slum clearance” program. 
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Additionally, the FBMA credit union held its meetings at Frank’s Steak House, a social 
center for white residents.239 Its Italian owners, the Barreca family, belonged to the credit 
union. They hosted city and state credit union meetings and conventions at the restaurant 
to draw money into the declining neighborhood economy and physically bring the credit 
union movement to Freret.240 However, the steak house remained segregated into the 
1960s, effectively excluding African Americans from the credit union.241  
 The FBMA and the Freret Civic Association's commitment to preserving Freret 
Neighborhood translating into upholding white supremacy. When the Orleans School 
Board decided to convert the Edwin T. Merrick Elementary into a black school in 1952, 
the Freret Civic Association filed a civil suit against the board. White organizations like 
the FBMA claimed that the board would not have to alter the racial composition of 
Merrick if it were to build schools “where they were most badly needed,” in black 
neighborhoods.242  The suit argued that the school board had purposely transferred white 
students to other schools to justify the conversion.243  Contending that the school was in 
the heart of a white section of Freret and thus constituted “a natural community center,” 
90 white families threatened to move rather than accept the school's transformation.244  
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Renowned civil rights lawyer A.P. Tureaud successfully defended the Orleans Parish 
School Board, and Merrick became the Samuel J. Green Elementary School that year.245 
  Unwilling to accept the conversion, nearly 1,000 whites fled the neighborhood, 
spurring Freret's descent into decades of decades of disinvestment, crime, and racialized 
poverty.246 Although Mayor DeLesseps S. Morrison had stimulated the postwar city 
economy by reforming government, facilitated international trade, and attracted new 
construction projects such as railroads, bridges, and public housing, Freret began to 
deteriorate.247  Between 1952 and 1972, the commercial district lost a third of its 
businesses, and vacant lots depreciated property values and encouraged street crime.248   
Louisiana Credit Union League and the War on Poverty 
 Although the FBMA remained resolutely segregationist, Henry Hermes’s 
participation in LCUL provided the institutional support he needed to continue fighting 
against racialized political and economic inequality. In 1955, Hermes became a board 
member of LCUL and was elected Louisiana director of the Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA) in 1966.249 Because the LCUL supervised hundreds of credit unions 
across the state, it depended on a network of field service district representatives to work 
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with credit unions directly.250  Field representatives organized credit unions, gave 
operating procedure advice, arranged inter-credit union loans, suggested personnel 
placement, helped liquidations and acted as liaisons between LCUL and member credit 
unions. Hermes was one of these representatives and belonged to both the New Orleans 
Credit Union and the East Orleans Parish Credit Union, subdivisions of LCUL.251 During 
the 1950s, Hermes coordinated credit union activity in Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. 
Bernard and Terrebonne Parishes, and supervised a third of New Orleans’s 110 credit 
unions.252 Before he died in 1987, Hermes organized over 20 new credit unions in 
Louisiana as LCUL's national director.253 His cooperative work therefore integrated 
neighborhood credit unions into the city, state, and national credit union movement.  
 LCUL’s postwar concern for working-class consumers extended to its 
engagement with federal Great Society and War on Poverty anti-poverty initiatives. In 
1965, managing director Edgar Fontaine explicitly linked LCUL’s New Deal past and 
Great Society present: not only would LCUL continue to assist low-income Americans, 
but “we have been pioneering Christian principles and practices in the market place long 
before the giants of finance became responsive to consumer needs.”254  In fact, President 
Johnson’s Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 galvanized cooperative activists 
confronting the effects of poverty and institutionalized racism within their communities.  
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 EOA’s Title II had particularly far-reaching implications for cooperative 
organizations. Seeking to “eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty...by 
opening to everyone the opportunity to live in decency and dignity,” it called for 
“maximum feasible participation” among low-income and marginalized populations in 
planning and administering local poverty initiatives.255 Between 1964 and 1970, the 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) funded a constellation of community programs 
across the country and enabled cooperatives to act as grant agencies supervising anti-
poverty initiatives.256 Similarly, cooperative and community action programs in New 
Orleans established credit unions and cooperative health programs, housing, and buying 
clubs to stimulate consumption among black, elderly, and impoverished citizens.257  
 Throughout the 1960s, New Orleans was an important test-site for low-income 
federal and state credit unions looking to expand across Louisiana.  For example, in 1967, 
the city hosted the OEO’s “Project Moneywise,” a Bureau of Federal Credit Unions 
initiative to train leaders of marginalized communities in “wise money management” to 
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achieve neighborhood “economic survival.”258  Officials hoped that community leaders 
would in turn educate low-income residents to be smarter consumers by carefully 
budgeting, patronizing cooperatives and buying clubs, and borrowing at community-
owned financial institutions. During month-long training sessions held in the Old Federal 
Building, participants made “comparative shopping trips,” studied materials, and watched 
educational films like Moneywise Family, in which “Mr. Mighty Wise” saves a family of 
mice from the depredations of “Mr. Tiger Shark,” an unscrupulous loan shark.259   
 Henry Hermes was part of two state and national credit union conferences that 
wholeheartedly endorsed the War on Poverty. In March 1966, the Eighth District of 
CUNA, representing the southern branch of the national credit union organization, 
announced an anti-poverty initiative that entailed lobbying for federal credit union 
legislation and increased low-income membership.260 Two months later, LCUL met to 
discuss its role within the War on Poverty, and key members organizing inner city credit 
unions in New Orleans reported on their efforts.261 President Johnson, as well as high-
ranking Louisiana and federal officials who had 15 years prior attacked cooperatives for 
harboring Communists, now publicly congratulated the credit union cause.   
 Representing credit unions at the local, city, state, and national level, Hermes was 
for the first time able to execute lasting economic policy by working closely with the 
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Democratic Party.262 For example, after Hermes convened a 1968 LCUL conference, 
United States Representative Hale Boggs discussed the role credit unions would play in 
increasing low-income consumers’ purchasing power.263 While Boggs had been wary of 
the “socialistic” tendencies of cooperatives, he now claimed that credit unions were “the 
most essential parts of our consumer economy” and should be established “wherever 
possible.” For Boggs, social welfare programs were springboards to greater personal 
responsibility and civic engagement. Low-income credit unions in “ghetto areas” were 
crucial to ameliorating economic inequality because credit unions, “rather than offering a 
handout, offer a helping hand.” Outlining his plan to pass several credit union measures 
and form an independent federal credit union administration to supervise the nation's 
12,000 federal credit unions, Boggs proclaimed that credit unions had “virtually 
eliminated” the loan shark and “sharp practice operators.”264 Mirroring the language of 
consumer empowerment, Boggs incorporated credit unions into a reformed, ethical 
capitalism. Systemic poverty required incorporating black and marginalized individuals 
into the consumer market.  
 However, rather than investing in broader welfare programs, white government and 
credit union officials exploited the cooperative movement’s principle of self-help because 
it resonated with their calls for the black community to develop greater self-reliance.265 
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As War on Poverty Taskforce member John Baker concedes, “We were just absolutely in 
a system, because we were convinced that in a really tough social structure intertwined 
with economic structure, the only solution for poor folk was to get co-ops.”266 For 
example, in 1967 Project Moneywise director William O'Brien argued that to break the 
cycle of poverty, communities would need extensive job training and consumer 
education.  It was credit unions’ duty to train “economic illiterates” to “save for the first 
time in their lives,” because the poor could not distinguish their needs from their 
desires.267 Similarly, LCUL director Edgar Fontaine echoed white politicians’ atomized 
perspective when he contended that a successful black credit union movement would 
require “[developing] a savings habit in these people; [and changing] their entire concept 
of economics.”268 Although the LCUL was committed to eradicating systemic poverty in 
New Orleans and Louisiana, it conflated economic and racial justice with consumer 
protections.269 Ultimately the onus was on individuals to become better citizen consumers.   
 Despite officials' often condescending and racialized characterization of the poor, 
Louisiana credit unions offered African Americans important avenues for economic and 
political influence as directors of OEO-sponsored cooperative financial institutions and 
nurturing future black political leaders.270 For example, in 1966, LCUL began working 
with War on Poverty organizations such as Total Community Action (TCA), New 
Orleans’ official administrator of OEO funds, the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, and 
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the Social Welfare Planning Council to establish federally-charted, community-run credit 
unions in Desire, St. Thomas, Melpomeme, and Fischer public housing projects.271 LCUL 
regularly spoke before black and low-income public housing residents, offering advice 
for starting credit unions and following prudent saving and credit programs.272  
 For their part, black civil rights organizers used credit unions as tools to engender 
community self-sufficiency, autonomy, and individual political empowerment.273 As 
Greta De Jong observes, many Community Action Programs (CAP) across Louisiana 
combined antipoverty work with political action among poor constituents.274  Ninth Ward 
community organizer Mrs. George Ethel Warren further demonstrates how black 
community leaders used credit unions and civic organizations to prepare them for 
mainstream political action.275  In 1971, Warren ran for state representative, contending 
that her “background and participation in varied activities in the community” best 
qualified her to represent the Lower Ninth Ward. A board member of TCA and the TCA-
administered Ninth Ward Federal Credit Union, Warren was also active in black civic, 
voting registration, and educational organizations serving the Ninth Ward, New Orleans, 
and Orleans Parish.276  Her community organizing experience made Warren “certain I 
know the problems and have some of the solutions” to pervasive economic and political 
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disparity in the neighborhood. Black activists like Warren thus envisioned black-run 
credit unions as part of a wider civil rights agenda to improve neighborhood 
infrastructure and municipal services.277   
 However, despite credit unions’ clear potential for black political and economic 
empowerment, black civil rights activists keenly felt the limits of War on Poverty’s 
racially inclusive credit union initiatives. Even as African Americans increasingly 
assumed credit union leadership in the 1970s, they were isolated and misunderstood 
within the white male-dominated movement. For example, in 1970, tensions flared 
between smaller black credit unions and the National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA) when the national regulating body attempted to close nearly a quarter of 
registered credit unions under the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund.278  Often 
serving low-income and disadvantaged members, black credit unions lacked crucial 
resources needed to adequately function, and ignoring the racial dimensions of their 
insolvency, regulators advocated their closure.  Many CAP, OEO, and NAACP-
sponsored black credit unions buckled under competition from other financial institutions 
and NCUA’s strict regulatory environment. The War on Poverty offered African 
Americans only a tenuous entry into credit unions and, by extension, economic solvency. 
Freret Credit Union and Changing Demographics 
 In Freret, the neighborhood's growing black population and attendant rise in 
black-owned businesses forced the community’s segregated civic organizations to cater 
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to African Americans and admit them as members.279 While initially a bastion of white 
Southern segregationist thought, the FBMA and its credit union were soon swept up in 
the Great Society's War on Poverty. For example, credit union member and lawyer 
Joseph Barreca served as LCUL’s legal counsel and legislative representative in the 
1960s and 1970s.280   He worked closely with U.S. Congresswoman Lindy Boggs in 1973 
to pass the Federal Credit Union Act, which protected federally chartered credit unions 
and expanded their insurance services for low-income Americans.281   
 Even as Hermes moved out of Freret in 1960 to the ethnically heterogeneous, 
working-class neighborhood of Broadmoor, he and fellow Freret residents continued to 
create neighborhood initiatives that provided mechanisms for social, economic, and 
political change.282 By the 1970s, Freret's community organizations like the FBMA Credit 
Union became an outlet for biracial cooperation for the first time since the Consumers’ 
Cooperative Union closed in the early 1950s. For example, in 1971, long-time African 
American resident August Weber attempted to stem declining business by opening a 
successful garden store in an abandoned Church's Chicken along Freret Street.283  To 
attract middle-class customers to the neighborhood, Miler cultivated personal 
relationships with patrons: “Being nice to people, picking up the package for the little old 
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lady…Satisfy the customers…and they’ll come back.”284  His commitment to reviving the 
neighborhood led to his election as co-president of the FBMA's successor, the Freret 
Street Merchants Association (FSMA), in 1981.285  Between the late 1970s and the mid-
1980s, the integrated organization worked with city and federal government revitalization 
programs in an effort to halt the area’s population loss among both blacks and whites.  
Heartened, Weber watched as “everybody [did] some facelifting.”286 
 Freret's efforts to stabilize its community were similar to those of other civic 
leaders striving to save their disinvested neighborhoods during the 1970s and 1980s. As 
sociologists Chava Nachmias and J. John Palen have documented, community activists 
partnered across affected neighborhoods and between public and private sectors in order 
to coordinate local revitalization campaigns.287  In 1978, Ernest “Dutch” Morial, the city's 
first black mayor, established the Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization Program in 
the ailing neighborhood.288 Three years later, the FSMA and the Freret Street 
Development Corporation (FSDC), a non-profit comprised of multiracial residents and 
storeowners, received nearly $2 million in federal and city grants to improve the 
neighborhood’s appearance and infrastructure.289 The FSDC granted commercial facade 
improvement loans to businesses, allowing the Barrecas to renovate Frank’s Steak House, 
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still a beloved community institution, as well as the aging Freret Credit Union building. 
Other “rat-infested buildings” were fumigated and renovated.290  While Freret did not 
fully regain financial stability until after Hurricane Katrina, it provides a model for how 
credit unions and neighborhood associations can pursue a range of funding sources to 
prevent neighborhoods’ physical decay and social dissolution.291  
Henry Hermes, Cooperatives, and the NOPSI Debate 
 While Hermes had largely retired from the barbering business and the credit union 
movement by the 1980s, he participated in one last interracial protest to protect low-
income New Orleanians. His involvement in a heated debate over the reorganization of 
New Orleans Public Service (NOPSI) reveals the extent to which Hermes's cooperative 
career had come full circle. Since 1934, Hermes and other New Orleans Socialists had 
demanded that the public manage its own utilities and that NOPSI impose fair rates for 
individual and corporate customers.292  In 1943, when Hermes ran for Louisiana Senate, 
he again called for rate reductions.293 Socialists argued that rural electric cooperatives, 
which had been at the forefront of rural electrification in Louisiana between 1937 and 
1940, were competitive alternatives to exploitative private utilities companies.294  
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  In response to NOPSI utility rate increases, between the 1970s and 1980s, a diverse 
coalition of citizens again rallied for public-owned utilities as NOPSI consistently raised 
utility rates.  In 1972, the grassroots coalition New Orleanians Fight Against Rate 
Excesses (NOFARE) promoted an explicitly anti-capitalist and cooperative platform 
similar to that of Depression-era Socialists.295  The New Orleans Socialist Union and the 
Community Alliance for Radical Education (CARE), a collective of young, middle-class 
leftists, led the coalition.296  In 1974, CARE declared that rate increases would enrich 
NOPSI while harming poor residents.297  Similarly, dependent on Social Security to 
support himself and his aging wife, Hermes announced to the City Council that exorbitant 
telephone, water, and gas fees “have taken 20 percent of his Social Security check.”298  
Socialists denounced NOPSI as a “monopoly” controlling “some of our basic necessities 
of life.”299   Committed to the “power of working people organized to fight together as a 
class,” NOFARE asked unions to conduct a one-day work stoppage against NOPSI.  
 NOFARE hoped for a complete economic and political transformation. Arguing 
that public utilities companies were only one aspect of the “immensely powerful energy 
industry, dominated by the big oil companies [controlling] most of the world’s 
governments,” NOFARE demanded that NOPSI and “all other corporations” be 
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transformed into worker cooperatives owned and operated by power plant laborers and 
consumers alike. Coalition members believed “rank-and-file” community and workplace 
cooperatives would spark a “national revolutionary democratic socialist movement.” 
Finally, a “new socialist society” would embrace “collective ownership and democratic 
control” over economic production.300  
 Nevertheless, in 1980, NOPSI announced it was again increasing prices, as well as 
constructing a nuclear power plant.301  Further, the Louisiana Public Service Commission 
would supplant the New Orleans City Council as NOPSI’s regulating body. Fearing the 
environmental impact of nuclear power and the economic burden rate increases placed on 
small consumers, a diverse body of African American feminists, students, Socialists, and 
environmentalists packed City Hall meetings. The 82 year-old Hermes declared that 
exorbitant bills have “given people I know high blood pressure and heart attacks.302 
Characteristically dramatic, he predicted “riots in the streets in New Orleans.”  In 
contrast, this loose coalition urged the City to institute flat, “lifeline” rates, or “standards 
providing for the essential needs of residential electric customers below actual cost of the 
service” and again suggested cooperative control over public utilities.303   
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 Despite sustained public opposition, in 1981the Louisiana Public Service 
Commission began supervising NOPSI.304  Furious, progressive organizations called for a 
referendum to keep NOPSI under city supervision and prevent NOPSI mismanagement 
and rate increases.305 The New Orleans Social Ecology Group (NOSEG), a radical 
collective formed in 1983 to preserve “human and natural communities,” argued that 
NOPSI should either become a citizen-owned cooperative or City Council should regain 
control to keep the utilities company responsive to consumer needs. NOSEG’s 
cooperative utilities proposal reflected members' interest in anarchist and social ecologist 
Murray Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” theory. Bookchin argued that capitalism, 
warfare, urban sprawl, and pollution caused the contemporary environmental crisis.306  To 
restore social and ecological harmony, citizens should create a decentralized network of 
municipal confederations and eradicate the nation-state.307  Similarly, NOSEG advocated 
a utopian, cooperative society that rejected “rampant consumerism and irresponsible 
growth-at-all-costs mentality of capitalism.”308 Consequently, the group established 
childcare and buying cooperatives to foster an “organic, non-dominating community.”309   
 While the City Council eventually wrested control from the Commission in 1983, 
two years later NOPSI again raised rates by $123 million to pay for its share of a 
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Mississippi-based nuclear power plan.310 Activists argued that the proposal was too 
burdensome for poor customers and would cripple the city's economy.311  Hermes 
declared, “When I look at my utility bill, I could just holler.” Responding to 28,000 
petitioners’ similar fears, City Council barred NOPSI from elevating rates, instituted a 
prudency review of its operations, and threatened to assume control over NOPSI's nuclear 
shares to protect small customers. While NOPSI never became a cooperative, Hermes 
and his fellow citizens successfully pressured city officials to address their concerns. 
Conclusion 
 The story of Henry Hermes and the Consumers’ Co-operative Union illustrates both 
the promise and the limits of local cooperatives to transform economic and political 
institutions.  For two decades, Freret Neighborhood’s social, political, and economic 
context nurtured Hermes’s Socialist and cooperative ideals.  Simultaneously, Hermes’s 
network of progressive allies comprised the CCU’s core membership, maintaining its 
radical economic and political outlook.  However, as Freret Neighborhood deteriorated in 
response to white flight and disinvestment, the political will sustaining the CCU 
evaporated.  Nonetheless, Hermes never strayed from his belief that cooperatives could 
provoke systemic change.  Joining LCUL as the state credit union movement gained 
momentum, Hermes and his compatriots used War on Poverty antipoverty programs to 
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legitimize cooperative economics, even as southern Cold War conservatives conflated 
economic justice with Communist plots to subvert white supremacy.312 
 Protesting 1980s NOPSI's rate hikes, Hermes joined a new breed of cooperators: 
university-based student collectives aiming to emancipate citizens from capitalism and its 
attendant environmental, social, and political abuses. While there was a profound 
ideological gap between the aging Hermes and student collectives, both sought to reclaim 
public control over dominant economic and political systems. Emerging out of 
ecological, feminist, and anarchist philosophy, radical cooperatives paired their desire for 
spiritual and personal growth with visions of larger social transformation.313 By the 
1970s, New Orleans brimmed with alternative educational, political, artistic, and 
entrepreneurial spaces that would reshape New Orleans’s cooperative landscape. My next 
chapter examines this next stage in New Orleans cooperative development. Between the 
1970s and early 2000s, universities and public housing became major nodes of 
cooperative organizing, a pattern that would persist until Hurricane Katrina dramatically 
redrew the physical and intellectual geography of urban cooperatives in 2005.   
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Chapter 4: Fathers and Sons: A.W. Dent and Tom Dent and Black Cooperative 
Organizing, 1932-1980 
 In Southern Journey, noted playwright Thomas Dent meditates on his New 
Orleans roots, his family’s personal struggles to overcome racial oppression, his own 
civil rights activism, and oral history interviews he conducted with movement veterans in 
1991.  As Dent travels across Mississippi, reflecting on his childhood as well as the 
impact of the long civil rights movement, his swirling narrative traverses time and space.  
Entangled in the movement, Dent’s life mirrors the Mississippi River, itself a central 
motif in the work: gazing into the “strange muddy currents of the river,” the young Dent 
imagines the “past hidden beyond the curve downriver, the future upriver…It was a great 
highway out into the world beyond the street corners, beyond the limitations and 
boredoms of the world I was growing up into.”1 
 Like Southern Journey, this chapter shifts between the past and the present, the 
personal and the institutional, to examine how the legacy of black cooperative organizing 
frames the long civil rights movement in New Orleans.  I analyze how, over the course of 
50 years, Dillard University president Albert W. Dent, and Tom Dent, his playwright son, 
painstakingly constructed a network of cooperative institutions in order to advance their 
particular visions for black political and economic empowerment.  Charting the evolution 
of black cooperative institutions from Albert Dent’s medical insurance cooperative to 
Tom Dent’s cultural liberationist Free Southern Theater Collective, I trace cooperatives’ 
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response to change and continuity within the civil rights movement and the city’s 
economic and political conditions.  
 For example, influenced by black benevolent associations as well as New Deal 
social welfare policy, Albert Dent formed the Flint-Goodridge “Penny-a-Day” Medical 
Cooperative in 1936 to provide access to hospitalization services to New Orleans’ black 
residents. Bookended by the deprivation of the Great Depression and mounting calls for 
black political rights during World War II, Dent’s cooperative depended on a 
constellation of white liberal philanthropists and cooperative activists to fund its low-cost 
medical services.  Yet as patronage withered in the face of postwar anti-Communist and 
racist hysteria, Dent abandoned cooperative organizing to support the NAACP’s 
legislative campaigns and platform of moderate institutional reform.  However, black 
cooperative organizing did not cease in the mid-twentieth century.    
 Indeed, Tom Dent echoed his father’s attempts to build a regional cooperative 
movement; after moving to New York City in 1959, working for the NAACP, and co-
founding the Umbra writers’ collective, Dent returned to New Orleans in 1965.2  There, 
he joined the Free Southern Theater (FST), which traveled throughout the South between 
1963 and 1982, performing plays featuring local student-activists and documenting the 
civil rights struggle for black audiences.  Modeling a participatory ethic of collective 
action through art, the integrated FST married civil rights protest with music, theater, and 
creative writing.  Locating its offices in disinvested Ninth Ward and Central City 
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communities, the FST provided low-cost, politicized community theater and poetry 
workshops to the city’s poorest citizens.  It also allied with southern cooperative leagues, 
theater collectives, War on Poverty agencies, and non-profit funding sources to advance 
its project of cultural resistance.  However, when Richard Nixon began slashing 
antipoverty budgets in the 1970s, the FST could no longer remain solvent.  Although it 
collapsed in 1982, FST members continued to organize politically conscious cooperatives 
to demonstrate the power of democratic decision-making to reshape society.  
 In particular, I examine the similarities and divergences in father and son’s 
cooperatives’ efforts to 1) build cooperative institutions at the local, state, and national 
level, 2) pursue patronage sources such as government, philanthropic, and church 
institutions, 3) cultivate a black working class as a membership base, and finally, 4) 
address local racial justice and economic issues while confronting or negotiating political 
realities.  These factors concretely impacted the Flint-Goodridge Hospital and FST’s 
ability to improve the economic and political status of impoverished New Orleanian 
African Americans. By extension, when we analyze the historical trajectory of black 
cooperative activism in New Orleans, we also gain a more nuanced view of the city’s 
civil rights movement between the 1930s and 1980s.  
 Indeed, as a common thread running through Albert and Tom Dent’s lives, 
cooperatives directly link the two interwar and postwar generations, while providing a 
lineage for social movements more broadly.  While scholars have sometimes suggested 
that a social movement coalesces when “the time is right” or is inspired by the zeitgeist, 
in reality, on-the-ground grassroots activism has been continuous.  As they mobilized to 
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provide black members with essential medical care, work relief, food, and education, 
New Orleans’ ongoing tradition of black cooperatives created the conditions for mass 
civil rights movements.   
 While Louisiana historians like Adam Fairclough and Greta de Jong have 
explicitly discussed the importance of cooperatives in sustaining the civil rights 
movement in the state, their discussion is episodic or contained to rural agricultural 
cooperatives.  Further, de Jong’s 1960s farm cooperative sources admit that they were 
ignorant of earlier efforts to organize rural Louisianans during the Great Depression.  The 
result is a portrayal of the Louisianan cooperative movement as fractured, short-lived, 
and rooted in rural communities.  Yet when one examines the cooperative careers of the 
Dent family, the cooperative movement narrative suddenly becomes fluid, its tendrils 
connecting New Orleans to rural Louisiana and outward throughout the South and the 
rest of the country.  In essence, the Flint-Goodridge Hospital medical cooperative and 
FST are anchors in a civil rights story that examines ruptures and continuities in 
cooperative organizing across time and place. 
A.W. Dent and the Politics of White Patronage 
 Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, Dillard University president Albert W. 
Dent’s conviction in cooperative organizing as the basis for institutional change 
undergirded his racial justice activism.  Further, the connections he made with 
progressive white and black city, state, and national leaders ensured that the Flint-
Goodridge medical cooperative transcended the local to be an integral part of New Deal 
social justice and civil rights organizing.  The elder Dent’s reliance on a diverse support 
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network and his faith in grassroots community cooperation formed the foundation of Tom 
Dent’s cooperative politics decades later.  
 Born in 1905 to a Georgian day laborer and housecleaner, Albert Dent had a 
“starkly realistic sense of political and economic power.  His racial strategies were based 
on the realization that blacks had very little of either.”3 Conceding that large-scale 
institutional change might not be achieved in his or his children’s lifetime, Dent took a 
moderate, pragmatic approach to racial justice reform.  As Dillard University trustee Fred 
Brownlee remembers, Dent was a “past-master in the art of applying the methods of the 
sun.  Some would storm the walls of segregation; Mr. Dent would melt them down.”4 As 
a result, Dent’s civil rights and cooperative work focused on cultivating relationships 
with well-positioned black and white educators and philanthropists who would become 
crucial agents in molding the southern civil rights movement. As a student at Morehouse 
College, Dent was mentored by John Hope, the institution’s president and renowned civil 
rights activist.5 Hope hired Dent as alumni secretary of Morehouse, where he was 
introduced to Reverend William W. Alexander, Dillard University’s acting president.6  In 
1932, Alexander hired the 27 year-old to manage the new Flint-Goodridge Hospital, a 
teaching hospital for black doctors, and Dent moved his young family to New Orleans. 
 It was as superintendent of Flint-Goodridge Hospital that Dent emerged as a 
leader in black cooperative organizing.  Managing the small, poorly funded hospital run 
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out of Dillard University, Dent struggled to maintain the institution’s educational 
integrity and autonomy in the Jim Crow South.7  Private black institutions were often 
supported by moderate white liberals who held prominent government, religious, and 
business positions in New Orleans, as well key posts in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New 
Deal and Lyndon Baines Johnson’s War on Poverty administrations.  They created a 
political climate that expanded black participation in government and business, and most 
importantly, they supported Albert and Tom Dent’s forays into cooperative organizing.  
However, depending on the financial support of white liberals had serious repercussions 
for both generations of cooperative efforts, constraining their social and political goals. 
 Edgar Stern and the Julius Rosenwald Fund are names that reappear over and over 
in both Dents’ organizing history.  The Julius Rosenwald Fund, a northern philanthropy 
funding programs benefitting African Americans, and the General Education Board, a 
charity funding medical and educational programs, together campaigned to create a 
medical and educational center for black New Orleanians.8  In 1930, they merged Flint-
Goodridge Hospital, New Orleans University, and Straight University, a Congregational 
Church Reconstruction college into a new university and hospital complex for African 
Americans. With the assistance of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC), 
white philanthropist Edgar B. Stern gathered black and white financial support for the 
new institution.9  However, the school was immediately embroiled in controversy: White 
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citizens were unhappy that the university was located in Gentilly, a white middle-class 
neighborhood, and were scandalized by rumors that a black president might supervise 
white faculty.  
 In light of public approbation, Dillard board of trustees member Edgar Stern 
recommended Reverend William W. Alexander serve as acting president as a 
compromise.  Alexander, a white progressive preacher, led the university from 1934 to 
1936.10 Alexander was a member of the CIC, a white liberal organization committed to 
exposing the travesties of racism, including lynching, mob justice, and tenant system.11  
As a member of the Resettlement Administration and head of the Farm Security 
Administration in 1937, Alexander strove to ensure that New Deal programs addressed 
African Americans’ needs, particularly farm tenants, and worked to incorporate black 
leadership into New Deal agencies.12   
 As both acting president of Dillard University and administrator for the 
Resettlement Administration, Alexander was uniquely positioned to integrate the young 
Albert Dent into a network of New Deal agencies establishing antipoverty programs for 
southern blacks.  In 1935, for example, Elizabeth Logan, Assistant Director of the 
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National Association of Housing Officials, recommended Dent as manager of a Public 
Works Administration (PWA)-sponsored public housing complex in Atlanta.13 Dent 
asked Alexander for his advice on accepting the post.14  While confident that Dent could 
“handle management of housing project admirably,” Alexander believed Dent’s work in 
public health and hospital administration provided “an opportunity for your greatest 
usefulness.”15  He averred, “I do not think there is anyone available who has your 
background and experience with hospitals and public health.”  Convinced that he was 
needed in New Orleans, Dent remained at Flint-Goodridge. 
 Despite Alexander’s accolades, Dent faced significant challenges as 
Superintendent of Flint-Goodridge.  While contemporary commentators hailed Flint-
Goodridge as an “outstanding example of interracial cooperation,” the hospital suffered 
the same racial inequalities most other black medical institutions experienced in the 
segregated South.16 When Dent assumed his managerial position, the hospital lacked 
experienced medical personnel: out of its staff of 35 licensed black doctors, only 10 had 
completed an internship.  Further, while many modern southern hospitals included 
segregated wards, in New Orleans, no accredited hospital would hire black doctors as 
part of its regular staff.17 Assessing its precarious position, Dent announced that the 
hospital would now serve two functions: it would provide low-cost health care to black 
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New Orleanians while operating as a postgraduate school of medicine for black doctors.18 
Dent was forced to rely on the support of white philanthropists and medical leaders as he 
struggled to establish Flint-Goodridge’s reputation.  Consequently, the hospital’s history 
is inseparable from the politics of white philanthropy and patronage. 
  To that end, in the early 1930s, Dent persuaded Dr. C. Jeff Miller, the president 
of the American College of Surgeons and professor of gynecology at the Tulane 
University School of Medicine to provide Flint-Goodridge with medical consultants 
culled from Tulane and Louisiana State University faculty members.19  While black 
doctors were appointed heads of their departments once they completed their internships, 
administrators worried that “the Negro population would think a Negro doctor was good 
enough for minor complaints, but that really sick people had best call a white doctor.”  
Indeed, across the South, black hospitals fiercely battled the assumptions among rural 
African Americans that white physicians possessed superior skills and resources.20  
Therefore, white consultants remained “de facto heads of each department” and served as 
liaisons between white medical institutions and Flint-Goodridge.   
 Despite such limitations, Dent believed that Flint-Goodridge should be a center 
for medical training and practice for Louisiana’s black physicians, and to that end, in 
1936 he organized a free two-week summer course for any black doctor.21  By 1939, he 
estimated that one-third of Louisiana’s black doctors had attended the course, as had one-
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fifth of doctors from six surrounding states. Dent’s efforts paid off by the late 1930s: 
Flint-Goodridge Hospital was admitted to the Fully Approved List of the American 
College of Surgeons, the highest rating for American hospitals.  It was also on the 
Approved for Internship list of the American Medical Association. 
 Dent’s support of New Deal policies stemmed from his understanding that the 
hospital and its patients suffered from “poverty and the fruits thereof: tuberculosis, 
syphilis, a great need for maternal and infant welfare.”22  He believed that Flint-
Goodridge had a responsibility to provide preventative care as well as to treat existing 
medical problems.  For example, to reduce cases of venereal disease such as syphilis, 
hospital dietitians and social workers hosted lectures and distributed sex educational 
films to colleges and schools.23  As part of its preventative care program, hospital staff 
combatted the social and cultural causes of poverty and illness.  By 1937, the hospital 
offered seven outpatient clinics, treating ailments plaguing poor African Americans, such 
as syphilis, tuberculosis, infant mortality, diphtheria, and diabetes. 
 Additionally, committed to expanding job opportunities for disadvantaged youths, 
Dent established Flint-Goodridge as an employment center for young black men and 
women.  However, the hospital’s training program was fundamentally constrained by the 
realities of the city’s oppressive racial politics; students funded by the National Youth 
Administration were taught to be orderlies and nursemaids.  In the 1930s, all New 
Orleans hospitals employed black orderlies, while nursemaids attended convalescents and 
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performed domestic work.  As Tom Dent recalls, while his father’s generation believed 
that the South would eventually end segregation and racial inequality, “who knew when 
eventually would occur?”24  Fearing black exclusion from medical services, most 
southern African American physicians reluctantly accepted the terms of segregated 
hospitals.25  Consequently, even as he publicly denounced racial discrimination, Dent’s 
training program perpetuated the city’s racialized workforce.26  
The Flint-Goodridge Hospital Medical Cooperative 
 Believing that the role of the “modern health educator” was to “help people work 
out their own solutions to their health problems,” Dent began experimenting with medical 
cooperatives as a means of improving Louisiana’s abysmal prenatal care for black 
women.27  A central part of rural southern black culture, inexpensive midwives performed 
90 percent of women’s deliveries in rural Louisiana and 22 percent of black women’s 
deliveries in New Orleans.28  Competing for patients, Dent claimed that many midwives 
lacked knowledge of basic sanitation or sterilization.  The Rosenwald Fund supplied Dent 
with a social worker to create Mothers Clubs that taught women basic prenatal care and 
advised them to avoid midwives in favor of hospital births.29   
 However, conceding that rural African Americans would continue to solicit 
midwives in the absence of black physicians, Dent also trained Dillard nurses in 
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midwifery to limit African American women’s exposure to poorly trained practitioners.30  
Establishing mobile clinics, Dillard midwives visited parishes lacking black doctors in 
order to reduce high infant and maternal mortality rates.  Additionally, to increase rural 
patronage, Dent offered $10 deliveries at Flint-Goodridge Hospital (the same price as a 
midwife’s services) and provided patients doctors, medicines, hospitalization for a 
week.31  By 1939, Dent boasted, “More white women than Negro women in New Orleans 
now employ [untrained] midwives,” and births had increased 400% at the hospital. 
 Yet Flint-Goodridge remained too expensive for low-income black Louisianans 
seeking other basic medical services.  To expand access to hospital care, Dent researched 
cooperative insurance plans such as Dallas’s Baylor Hospital medical insurance policy, 
and in 1932 he unveiled Flint-Goodridge’s new medical insurance cooperative for black 
public school teachers.32  In return for a small annual fee, members received free hospital 
care for a set number of days per month.  Dent quickly enlarged his group insurance plan 
to cover Pullman car porters, mail carriers, department store workers, hotel employees, 
nurses, church members, and black medical society members, who paid between $7.50 
and $9 a year for the privilege of being admitted to any hospital in New Orleans.33   
 In order to reach destitute black New Orleanians, in 1936 Dent received a $4,500 
grant from the Julius Rosenwald Fund to implement a “penny-a-day” hospital insurance 
plan, which charged members $3.65 a year for full hospital services, including board, 
nursing care, interns, operating rooms, x-ray, routine medicines, and lab work.  Members 
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received three weeks of hospital care per year “as a private patient in a ward bed.”34  
Finally, to reach rural patients to whom black doctors still remained inaccessible, Dent 
planned to use profits from the insurance cooperative to reopen Dillard’s nursing 
school.35  By 1943, over 5,000 people had enrolled in the cooperative insurance plan. 
The Juvenile Co-operators Fraternals Benevolent Mutual Aid Association  
 The rise of the Flint-Goodridge Hospital medical cooperative occurred in tandem 
with that of many other contemporary black medical insurance cooperatives operating 
throughout New Orleans. While Atlanta native Dent looked to large-scale, hospital-run 
medical cooperatives in other cities when shaping his cooperative plan, there were a 
myriad of black benevolent associations in New Orleans serving low-income black 
patients shut out of segregated insurance companies. It is useful to discuss one such 
benevolent association: the Juvenile Co-operators Fraternals Benevolent Mutual Aid 
Association, active between 1894 and 1967. While Dent may not have been aware of the 
Juvenile Co-operators, it supported Flint-Goodridge Hospital’s efforts to promote quality 
healthcare for the city’s African American population. In 1958, for example, it 
contributed to the annual Flint-Goodridge Hospital Drive.36 Although the Juvenile Co-
operators and the Flint-Goodridge Hospital cooperative were contemporaries and strove 
to provide low-cost medical insurance for black citizens, their divergences are striking. 
 Confining its membership to young men under the age of 25, the Juvenile Co-
operators was tied to a very different constituent and support network than Flint-
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Goodridge. Extending its services to the Catholic Creoles of color residing in New 
Orleans’ Seventh Ward, the Juvenile Co-operators operated within a black world 
bounded by religion and place.  While Dent regularly worked with white professionals at 
the city, state, regional, and national level to secure funding and staff for Flint-Goodridge 
Hospital, the Juvenile Co-operators supported black institutions and attended black 
functions, served black constituents, and was itself an all-black organization. 
 Like Albert Dent, the Juvenile Co-operators combatted the brutal effects poverty 
and racism inflicted on their young members’ health.  The cooperative records are littered 
with accounts of members suffering from bullet wounds, venereal disease, chronic 
ailments, diphtheria, and tetanus.37  Others were chronically unemployed and could not 
afford basic treatment. When the cooperative’s president, J.B. Prados, contracted a fatal 
throat disease in 1918, he asked the Juvenile Co-operators to contribute to his medical 
bills because “I have not made a dollar in three months [and] not being able to work, [it] 
would be somewhat hard to face this alone.”38  Recognizing the high cost of funerals for 
poor families, the Juvenile Co-operators and funeral director and embalmer Emile Labat 
provided members a respectful funeral. For $50, they received, “One white or black 
coffin, neatly trimmed, one automobile hearse, 2 limousines, crepe, candles, veil for face, 
recording of death certificate with the Board of Health, etc.”39 
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 By promoting local black-owned businesses and contracting with politically 
conscious African American doctors, funeral directors, and pharmacists operating along 
the North Claiborne black business district, the Juvenile Co-operators were crucial to 
maintaining the neighborhood’s identity, autonomy, and economic stability.  As one 
long-time resident recalls, because Claiborne Avenue contained a “vast amount of black 
businesses that catered to us and that we patronized,” Tremé’s middle- and working-class 
residents could avoid discriminatory stores along the segregated Canal Street.40 
 Additionally, the Juvenile Co-operators ensured that black service providers were 
clearly committed to their young patients as well as to the progress of African Americans 
in general.  During annual election campaigns, prospective and incumbent medical 
professionals appealed to the cooperative board of director’s interest in racial justice and 
race pride.  For instance, in 1933, Dr. Ernest Cherrie, a black general practitioner, 
countered a smear campaign alleging that he had hired a white contractor to build his new 
home.41  Cherrie successfully assured the Juvenile Co-operators that both his architect 
and general contractor were experienced “men of color” and that Cherrie himself was “a 
RACE man in every detail.” 
 Finally, Juvenile Co-operators members actively participated in the larger civil 
rights movement, promoting black economic independence as well as political rights.  
For example, the cooperative financially supported black educational institutions, 
believing that scholarship was a direct means of achieving civil equality.  African 
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Americans’ lack of educational opportunities in New Orleans and Louisiana was dire: 
Until 1940, black Louisianans were served by only four high schools in comparison to 
white children, who had access to 383 high schools.42  To close this education gap, in 
1919 the cooperative donated to the Congregation of Corpus Christi Parish, which 
planned to construct a school and church “to meet the needs of the Colored People in the 
down town section of the city,” specifically, “the large number of children who do not 
attend school through lack of accommodation.”43 Until its dissolution in the late 1960s, 
the Juvenile Co-operators regularly donated to black scholarship funds and even created a 
small fund of its own for college-bound members.44 
 Although the Juvenile Co-operators was securely bound to the Seventh Ward, the 
organization was not insular.  Just as Albert Dent saw Flint-Goodridge’s hospitalization 
insurance as part of a larger effort to ameliorate structural equality, the Juvenile Co-
operators funded national organizations and programs improving the socioeconomic and 
political status of all African Americans. Many members belonged to the NAACP, the 
Urban League, and the Knights of Peter Claver, a large Catholic black fraternal and 
service organization whose offices constituted a central social and political space for 
Tremé’s African Americans.45 The Juvenile Co-operators’ involvement with civil rights 
                                                
42 Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 37. 
43 Adolph J. Moret, letter to Lucien H. Fortune, Henry Tio to “Friends,” April 1919, box 1, folder 1, 
JCFBMAA Records. 
44 “Journal of Minutes,” (May 24, 1959), 29, box 2, folder 1, JCFBMAA Records; “Journal of Minutes,” 
(November 22, 1959), 43, box 2, folder 1, JCFBMAA Records. 
45 Civic Worker is Taken by Death,” Times Picayune (May 29, 1970): 20; “Dejoie Funeral Rites Planned,” 
Times Picayune (April 3, 1967): 7; Vice President, letter to Officers and Members of JCFBMAA 
Board of Directors, 23 Feb. 1919, folder 1, box 1, JCFBMAA Records; “Journal of Minutes, 1935-
1944,” (April 23, 1944), 264, folder 5, box 1, JCFBMAA Records; “Journal of Minutes,” (April 23, 
1961), 74, box 2, folder 1, JCFBMAA Records. 
 287 
and economic self-determination projects demonstrates historian George Lipsitz’s 
observation that low-income black neighborhoods have historically been “resource poor 
but network rich”; their geographically-bounded support networks have long fostered 
economic and cultural survival.46 
 Finally, the Juvenile Co-operators is an important intervention into scholars’ 
declension narrative, which posits that Cold War anti-Communism and relative economic 
affluence either crushed leftist consumer cooperatives or forced them to compromise 
their radical politics in order to stay solvent.47  Mirroring Jessica Gordon Nembhard’s 
study of mid-twentieth black cooperative activists such as Nannie Helen Burroughs, 
Halena Wilson, and Ella Jo Baker, Juvenile Co-operators helped ensure their 
community’s economic survival well into the 1960s. Their cooperative activities 
dovetailed with civil rights work with the NAACP and similar organizations.48  
Medical Cooperatives, Public Health, and Public Housing 
 At the same time, the story of the Flint-Goodridge medical cooperative is also 
closely linked to the rise of “slum clearance” and the construction of public housing 
projects as part of New Deal efforts to address urban poverty.  While Albert Dent 
endorsed housing projects as a means of improving black New Orleanians’ living 
standards, and even applied as manager of an Atlanta housing project, the dual impact of 
                                                
46 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 243. 
47 Curl, For All the People, 191; Paula Giese, “How the Old Coops Went Wrong,” in Workplace 
Democracy and Social Change, eds. Frank Lindenfeld and Joyce Rothschild-Whitt (Boston: Porter 
Sargent Publishers, 1982): 327. 
48 Gordon Nembhard, Collective Courage, 149. 
 288 
urban renewal and public housing construction between the 1930s and the 1950s 
dramatically redrew racial lines and exacerbated racial and class disparities. 
 Beginning in the 1920s, public housing for low-income residents drastically 
reshaped the racial and class demographics of the city.  Environmental historian Beverly 
Hendrix Wright argues that while New Orleans had historically been relatively racially 
integrated, segregated public housing sparked a demographic shift in which the most 
desirable neighborhoods were now exclusively white.49  Public housing construction was 
aided by technological advancements in levee and water management systems that 
expanded New Orleans development as well as intensified racially segregation.  The 
invention of the wood pump to drain swamp water out of low-lying areas encouraged 
development into previously uninhabitable land and sparked new racial settlement 
patterns.  Further, as Wright notes, extended street car lines enabled whites to move into 
newly constructed suburbs in once flooded areas, while blacks moved closer into the city. 
 Further, under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans (HANO) began demolishing older neighborhoods and erected segregated public 
housing projects for poor families in their place.50  While white housing projects were 
located on higher ground closer to the more developed and affluent “front-of-town” along 
the Mississippi River, black projects were situated in lower elevations in the “back-of-
town,” or the impoverished sections of the city spreading away from the Mississippi 
River.  Previously, while many African Americans were concentrated in less desirable 
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neighborhoods, others who worked for affluent whites populated lots behind their 
employers. Only later, as geographer Richard Campanella observes, did “deed covenants 
restrict home ownership to whites only, affecting city’s racial geography, as middle-class 
white families ‘leapfrog[ged]’ over black back-of-town to settle in drained marshes.”51 
 The city’s public housing projects disrupted the relatively balanced racial and 
economic landscape of New Orleans by displacing former “slum” residents.  In certain 
cases, although half of a neighborhood’s displaced population was black, the new, 
segregated public housing project accommodated only white families.52  Because HANO 
did not compensate former inhabitants or equitably replenish housing stock, it 
considerably hindered black residents’ ability to locate similarly affordable housing. 
 Initially, however, black social agencies and progressive organizations supported 
HANO housing projects.  New Orleans’ new housing complexes were attractive: well 
built brick apartments, they reflected local architecture and incorporated green spaces and 
oak trees.53  For his part, Dent believed that the projects were improvements over 
decaying black neighborhoods.  Observing the adverse impact of poor housing on health, 
Flint-Goodridge Hospital even promoted a federal slum clearance program to benefit 
black New Orleanians.54   Dent also believed the Flint-Goodridge medical cooperative 
provided a model for hospital insurance among low-income public housing populations.  
In May 1936, Dent wrote to Atlanta University administrators, proposing that they the 
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institute the Flint-Goodridge medical plan at a PWA public housing project.55  He 
explained that rather than forcing impoverished residents to pay for hospitalization 
services out-of-pocket, officials should create a medical cooperative that “would place 
complete medical care at the disposal of the Housing Project’s Health Service.”  This 
advisory committee would supervise the resident’s health services.56   
 Echoing the Flint-Goodridge cooperative structure, Dent’s generalized medical 
insurance model would charge 50 cents per month per member and would provide 
hospitalization and other essential medical services.57  For instance, Flint-Goodridge 
“[rendered] about one day of hospital service for each member of the group.”  Further, if 
Atlanta University lacked fellowships to hire physicians for the public housing complex, 
Dent recommended they follow the Flint-Goodridge clinic plan: “arrangements would be 
made for the association of a few of the best qualified Negro physicians with some white 
physicians, probably teachers at Emory.”58 
 Yet despite its success, Dent’s medical cooperative plan ended in 1943 when 
Flint-Goodridge joined the Hospital Service Association of New Orleans, which offered a 
comprehensive hospitalization insurance plan covering the entire city.59  Additionally, 
Dent became Dillard University president in 1941, a position for which board of trustees 
member Edgar Stern had been grooming Dent since 1935.60  While the medical 
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cooperative soldiered on two years after Dent’s departure, it did not ultimately survive 
the loss of its charismatic head.   
 Ironically, given the rapid dissipation of the Flint-Goodridge Hospital insurance 
plan, it was Dent’s cooperative politics that swayed the Dillard board of trustees to hire 
him as president.  In the fall of 1940, university trustees began discussing Dent as a 
potential presidential candidate.61  Fred L. Brownlee, Executive Secretary of the 
American Missionary Association, recommended Dent because he was an excellent 
business manager.  Yet the board worried that Dent was not sufficiently interested in “the 
educational game,” and that, despite his humble upbringing, “the Negroes of New 
Orleans for the most part have not accepted him, feeling that he is an aristocrat, etc.”62   
 However, Brownlee decided that Dent was sufficiently committed to higher 
education and community service when the presidential candidate attended a student 
work camp at the Delta Cooperative Farm, an institute created to economically stabilize 
poor black and white farmers.  He was invited to speak on health and community 
problems “and did a corking good job educationally and humanly speaking.”63  Dent even 
“inquired about community service educational projects which he would like to visit” at 
the cooperative farm. In addition to his membership on the Board of Directors of the CIC 
and the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies executive committee and his 
                                                




accomplishments as Flint-Goodridge Hospital superintendent, it was his passion for 
cooperative development that clinched Dent’s candidacy.64 
Building a Biracial Cooperative Network 
 Even as Dent used his position at the Flint-Goodridge Hospital to address 
racialized poverty within New Orleans, he was just as dedicated to building an integrated 
regional cooperative movement, and by extension, a national integrated society. Dent’s 
participation in biracial cooperative organizing dovetailed with his civil rights activities 
and offered more concrete avenues for social change than did his frustrating experience 
with timorous white liberals in New Orleans’ moderate antiracist organizations.   
 Throughout his career, Dent levied his position as hospital superintendent and 
president of Dillard University to pressure white business and government interests of 
New Orleans to address black political and economic rights. To Dent, working with 
biracial organizations to achieve legal integration for blacks was a moral obligation. 
Ultimately, he believed, “the [white] man who keeps me out because of my color is very 
foolish and frequently denies himself the privilege of knowing a real person.”65 Central to 
Dent’s civil rights strategy was his faith that middle-class black community leaders could 
apply “measured pressure” on policymakers to achieve incremental racial progress.66  To 
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do so, Dent allied with prominent black leaders as well as white southern liberals, or as 
he called them, “intelligent Southern whites.”67   
 Yet white resistance and timidity often marred these collaborations.  For example, 
after a year of mounting racial tensions and vicious police brutality, in November 1943, 
the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce feared explosive race riots and convened an all-
white committee to quickly harmonize the city’s race relations.68  Dent and NAACP 
leaders A.P. Tureaud, Edward Wright, and Revered A.L. Davis demanded that the 
committee integrate and concretely redress black disenfranchisement and mounting 
police violence.  However, the Chamber of Commerce insisted on focusing on economic 
issues rather than political inequality, and, most damningly, refused to meet with them.  
 Angered by his experience with the Chamber of Commerce, Dent and the Council 
of Social Agencies organized another integrated race relations committee, the Citizens 
Committee on Race Relations. It campaigned to desegregate Lake Pontchartrain, 
pressured the City to hire black police, and arranged French Quarter hostel arrangements 
for black seamen. Yet the Citizens Committee dissolved in 1945 without affecting any 
policies. Adam Fairclough argues that integrated racial justice organizations failed to 
change the racial dynamics of wartime New Orleans because blacks had little political or 
economic leverage, while Jewish, northern, and immigrant white liberals’ small numbers 
and social ostracism made them fearful of aggressively opposing Jim Crow laws.69  
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 Yet their transience does not mitigate the significance of interracial civil rights 
organizations in the 1930s and 1940s, especially if one considers contemporary biracial 
cooperative activity.  Dent’s participation in integrated cooperative institution-building 
reveals the significant overlap between antiracist cooperative activism and the southern 
civil rights struggle. While white southerners belonging to mainstream political 
organizations were largely unwilling to seriously tackle institutional racism, the Southern 
Cooperative Educational Association (SCEA)—of which Dent was an early member—
attempted to foster dialogue with its black and white members.  It believed that African 
Americans should be integrated into a new, community-driven cooperative economy.  
Further, the SCEA argued that economic collaboration would lead to political equality, 
regardless of one’s race.  Cooperation was part of a moral economy in which all 
Americans participated in democratic institutions.70 
 Initially, the SCEA worried that an integrated membership and commitment to 
political and economic equality would hinder its coalition work in the Deep South. 
Director Ed Yeomans prevaricated, an integrated convention is “all fine and dandy as far 
as our immediate group goes, but here we are hoping that key people in labor, agriculture, 
etc. will come, many of whom will be people whom we don’t know at all. Mightn’t some 
of them, upon finding themselves in a mixed dinner, suddenly go back to the old reaction 
and give us a terribly black eye as far as the rest of the meeting was concerned?”71  To 
white SCEA officers’ credit, however, they did not allow such fears to prevent coalition 
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building with black cooperative activists.  
 As he sought to improve medical and educational services to black New 
Orleanians, the SCEA connected Dent to state, regional, and national networks of black 
and white government, religious, educational, and labor organizations.  In 1941, at the 
SCEA’s “first bi-racial ‘Conference on Co-op Education’ ever to be held in Louisiana,” 
140 black and white attendees listened to New Dealers report on existing agricultural 
cooperatives, credit unions, and buying clubs and outlined methods for expanding the 
southern cooperative movement.72 For example, Dr. Jacob L. Reddix, the president of 
Jackson College, a historically black university in Mississippi, spoke on the tremendous 
success of his Gary, Indiana-based Consumers’ Cooperative Trading Company. It 
operated grocery stores, a gas station, and a credit union to help employ black residents 
thrown out of work by steel mill closings.73 Reddix later contended that “black people in 
the United States could lift the burden of economic exploitation from their backs by 
organizing a nationwide system of cooperative businesses” for themselves.74 The SCEA 
thus provided Dent another channel through which to press for racial equality.  
 Like many other black cooperative activists, Dent was an integral and respected 
member of the SCEA, serving on its board of directors for three years.75 At the 1941 
conference, the Dillard University president announced that the Flint-Goodridge’s 
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cooperative hospitalization plan had successfully delivered low-cost, high quality hospital 
services to black patients.76  He also assured SCEA leadership that, “Dillard will actively 
promote purchasing cooperatives on the campus and the teaching of cooperation, and will 
promote establishment of medical cooperatives in the New Orleans housing projects.”77  
 Further, as an active SCEA committee member, Dent collaborated with diverse, 
even surprising allies to promote cooperative economics for African Americans. For 
example, he joined an action committee to organize educational, religious, and labor 
organizations in New Orleans; fellow members included Reverend William J. Castell, a 
white pastor at St. Rita’s Catholic Church, and radical labor organizer F.C. Pieper, a 
United Transport Workers Industrial Union member and Highlander Folk School 
supporter.78  Despite his seemingly moderate politics, Dent’s committee members reflect 
his embrace of New Deal and even Popular Front coalitional politics as he advanced 
economic and political justice for African American citizens.  
Postwar Civil Rights Work 
 However, Dent’s tolerance of radical politics as a measure of political expediency 
quickly waned. As a lifelong NAACP member and “staunch friend” of head lawyer 
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Thurgood Marshall, he was unafraid to endorse direct action to confront racial injustice.79  
Yet over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, Dent grew increasingly suspicious of radical 
leftists and joined a conservative element in the southern civil rights movement that 
viewed Communists with great alarm.80   The southern wing of the NAACP even pressed 
headquarters to purge membership of Communists and other radicals.  Even so, Dent 
believed his position as the public face of Dillard University necessitated political 
moderation and worried that increased campus civil rights activism might reduce white 
philanthropic funding.81  To that end, Dent began vetting faculty for “iconoclasts” and 
monitored student behavior.82  
 Although Dent shied away from radical activism, equitable access to education 
became the cornerstone of his civil rights work.  At a 1950s educational conference, Dent 
contended that academics and teachers should unite to join the legal battle for school 
integration.83  For Dent, education moved people to action: “I think very little of that form 
of education which gives only information to us.  I think of education as being more 
important when it develops attitudes in people, and I think as we develop attitudes we are 
likely to develop along with the impulse to do something about our attitudes.” Further, 
not only did education provide the impetus for black mobilization, black institutions’ 
policies on racial non-discrimination should be models for the country’s entire 
educational system: “are we going to fail in our obligation to provide the type of 
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education for the young people in this country which in many instances the Negro school 
can provide?”84 Explicit in Dent’s articulation of the benefit that black colleges provided 
was the hope that integration would spur an exchange of ideas and values across races.    
 As Albert Dent promoted cooperative organizing as a hospital administrator and 
university president, he exposed his son, future civil rights activist Tom Dent, to a 
practical model for social justice activism the young man would use throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.  As the Free Southern Theater’s (FST) chairman between 1965 and 1967 and 
an influential staff member until 1971, Tom Dent significantly impacted the collective’s 
philosophical and aesthetic goals.85 Like his father, who strove to connect the city’s black 
population to the wider black intellectual and political world by hosting important 
international dignitaries such as Emperor Haile Selassie, Tom sought to connect local 
black writers to renowned national and international black artists, bridging New Orleans 
and the African Diaspora.86  It is therefore crucial to understand how the FST bridged two 
generations of black cooperation to build a southern black arts movement.   
A.W. Dent to Tom Dent: Two Generations of Cooperative Organizing 
 Indeed, cooperative organizing framed Tom Dent’s life: Albert and his wife, 
Ernestine Jessie Covington, began experimenting with cooperative Mothers Clubs to 
improve black prenatal care just as Tom was born at Flint-Goodridge Hospital in 1932.87  
Albert’s connections to formal cooperative, educational, medical, and civil rights groups 
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also instructed the younger Dent in the art of networking with funding institutions.  For 
the Dents, cooperative organizing was inseparable from civil rights campaigning, and 
they inculcated in Tom a strong racial identity and political consciousness.  While Albert 
Dent was reluctant to explain why racism existed to his children, who “were supposed to 
become aware of the more subtle and unpleasant vagaries of race via osmosis,” he 
nonetheless introduced his children to black intellectuals and instilled in them the 
importance of working within and for one’s community.88  Similarly, as wife of the 
Dillard University president, Jessie Covington Dent regularly entertained and hosted 
national African American luminaries, while she was also active in women’s antipoverty 
and racial justice organizations throughout her life.89 
  Just as significant, Covington Dent was a concert pianist and music educator who 
imbued in her family a love of the creative and performing arts.90  Growing up in the 
Creole of color Seventh Ward with a passion for music, Tom Dent confronted the city’s 
black, working-class, participatory musical traditions, such as jazz music and second line 
parades.  For many black Seventh Ward residents, the neighborhood’s oak-shaded 
Claiborne Avenue was a magnet for community gatherings; camped out on the grassy 
median strip, residents held parties, picnics, and watched Mardi Gras parades roll past the 
street.91  However, these radical, democratic, and often oppositional performative modes 
were at odds with the Dent family’s assiduously cultivated middle-class status.  
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Organized by black Social Aid and Pleasure Clubs and Benevolent Associations, second 
lines were confined to poor black neighborhoods.  As Adam Fairclough explains, New 
Orleans’ black middle class shunned jazz funerals and Zulu Social Aid and Pleasure 
Club’s Mardi Gras parades, believing the “grotesque” expressions of “lower-class 
hedonism” threatened “middle-class respectability.”92 Nonetheless, Tom Dent was 
inspired by black working-class religious and cultural expression and later incorporated 
its participatory forms into his writing and the FST’s organizational structure.93  
 Tom Dent’s passion for indigenous religious and cultural forms reflected his 
simultaneous connection and deviation from his father’s older civil rights and cooperative 
goals. Dent recalls that his family “anchored their lives in the church, [and] learned to 
read and write in schools that churches built and supported, education having become the 
religion of racial advancement after Emancipation.”94 Although by the 1940s members of 
both the clergy and the working-class became increasingly involved in NAACP’s black 
voter registration movement, Fairclough contends that ministers sometimes failed to 
effectively lead the grassroots rank-and-file because they were steeped in class-based 
hierarchy.95 Unsurprisingly, then, organized by experts and funded by middle-class 
religious leaders to help the deserving poor, the Flint-Goodridge Hospital medical 
cooperative exemplified the hierarchical structure of middle-class black institutions in the 
1930s and 1940s.  This top-down orientation was reinforced in SCEA, as Albert Dent 
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worked alongside respected educators, ministers, rabbis, and priests to spread cooperative 
ideals among their students and congregants.96  
 Believing that education would lift African Americans out of poverty and racial 
oppression, Albert and Jessie Dent sent Tom to Gilbert Academy, an elite, private high 
school run by Methodists.  Located on St. Charles Street, it was one of the few New 
Orleans secondary schools serving black children.97  Other notable civil rights activists 
graduated from Gilbert before it closed in 1949, including the lawyer Lolis Elie and 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference vice president Andrew Young.98  Further, to 
educate Tom about racial politics and current affairs, Albert sent Tom to work as a teen 
reporter for the Informer, a Houston black weekly newspaper.99  There, Dent recalls, he 
“obtained a much more realistic sense of what life in the segregated world was like,” as 
well as how the country’s legacy of racial prejudice informed current events.  
 Albert Dent’s educational and professional networks connected his son to key 
black and civil rights organizations; these mainstream institutions would later be critical 
avenues for establishing the FST’s credibility on a national scale.  Like his father, Tom 
Dent attended Atlanta’s Morehouse College in the early 1950s.  He recalls that curricula 
was “designed to help us make the best of a restricted situation, and to overcome it via 
learning and accommodation, not confrontation.  Change would come...but we had no 
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target date in mind.”100 Accordingly, his family and instructors encouraged Dent to leave 
the South in search of better opportunities.  
 As expected, Dent moved to New York after serving in the Navy, where he began 
working as a reporter at a Harlem paper in 1959. His father’s friendship with Thurgood 
Marshall secured Dent’s position as press attaché for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
between 1961 and 1963. While living in New York, Dent co-founded the writer’s 
workshop and magazine “Society of Umbra” with prominent black writers like Ishmael 
Reed and LeRoi Jones (Amiri Bakara).101 As FST artistic director between 1966 and 
1970, Dent invited colleagues like Alice Walker and Toni Morrison to work with New 
Orleanian writers, while also establishing touring ensembles to perform New Orleanian 
plays across the country. Most importantly, he would transfer Umbra’s dedication to 
egalitarian collaboration to FST’s artistic process and organizational structure.   
 In 1965, Dent returned New Orleans, intending to stay there only briefly.  
However, while working with Mississippi’s civil rights movement, he encountered the 
FST.102  The theatrical collective’s politically conscious living theater galvanized Dent, as 
did his encounters with second line and New Orleans jazz performances.  As fellow FST 
member Kalamu ya Salaam recalls, shortly thereafter, Dent recommitted himself to living 
in New Orleans in order to advance the southern civil rights project, provide “a creatively 
nurturing environment for black youths,” and foster a strong black creative arts 
                                                
100 Ibid., 13. 
101 Michna, “We Are Black Mind Jockeys.”   
102 Dent, Southern Journey, 1-2. 
 303 
movement in New Orleans.103  Significantly, while performance scholars like Catherine 
Michna mark the late 1960s as the climax of the FST’s cultural creativity, when 
antipoverty funding structures supported its cultural programming, examining the Dent 
family’s cross-generational legacy of cooperative organizing places the FST’s political 
work within a much broader civil rights history.104   
Free Southern Theater 
 Historians have often examined Southern radical black theater collectives such as 
the FST within the context of the cultural politics of black liberation.  In the case of the 
FST, academics have argued that the organization’s significance is grounded in its 
connection to the Black Arts Movement and more generally, the racial politics of the late 
1960s and 1970s.105  But FST’s structure as a collective is also significant; FST’s 
permanent ensemble of 8 to 16 actors strove to develop “a collective method of theater 
work” that would demonstrate the liberatory potential of democratic decision-making to 
reshape society.106  Additionally, while Michna argues that second-line participatory 
traditions grounded the FST’s theatrical aesthetic and defined its relationship to its 
audience, the collective was just as inspired by radical leftist and Communist cooperative 
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organizing.107  To that end, members practiced collective remediation, group writing 
sessions, and equitable distribution of roles.  The FST selected actors for its repertory-
touring ensemble based on their commitment to cooperative principles, Black Liberation, 
and the FST’s revolutionary goals.   
 Further, even as the FST’s programming and structure were marked by 
indigenous cooperative and radical collective principles, it also allied with moderate 
economic and civil rights-oriented cooperatives in order to build black democratic 
institutions across the South.  In other words, the FST was concerned with more than 
politically conscious theatrical programs; it embraced cooperative economics as part of a 
broader program for black political and economic empowerment. Focusing on FST 
coalition building, we can better understand how shifting national social, political, and 
economic trends and city demographic change between the 1960s and 1980s 
reconstituted New Orleans’ black collectives and influenced the direction of their local 
political projects. While it integrated an older African American cooperative tradition 
with an outward-looking political philosophy and experimental aesthetic, the FST reflects 
the challenges cooperatives faced as they transferred the national conversation about civil 
rights and citizenship to the local community.  
 Throughout its history, the FST struggled to reconcile a range of competing 
geographical, aesthetic, and political alliances within the group.  Serious cleavages 
emerged concerning 1) whether the collective would rely on New York patronage sources 
and play aesthetics or relocate to New Orleans and serve black New Orleanians; 2) 
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whether the collective would remain a biracial organization with societal integration as its 
primary goal, or transform into an exclusively black organization performing black-
authored material to a black audience; 3) how politics would be incorporated into the 
group’s performances, and whether Marxism or the rhetoric of cultural nationalism 
politics would guide its creative process; and finally 4) which community the FST should 
serve and what role it would play within the collective.  
 Specifically, the FST, like the Flint Goodridge Hospital medical cooperative 
movement before it, balanced the needs of its New Orleans constituents with its desire to 
address rural poverty and political disempowerment in order to build a lasting black 
cooperative movement.  To that end, I examine two moments in the FST’s career that 
reflect the intergenerational connections between black cooperative movements in New 
Orleans.  The FST’s relationship to New Orleans community organizations in Desire and 
Central City and its work with the Episcopal Church’s General Convention of Special 
Programs continued earlier African American efforts to create a network of black 
cooperatives across the city and nation.  Ultimately, the FST was concerned with much 
more than its theatrical programs: like Albert Dent, it embraced a cooperative society as 
part of a broader program for expanding black political and economic power. 
The Free Southern Theater’s Collective Roots 
 FST’s early members reflect the intersection of civil rights activism and black 
theater.  Founders Doris Derby, John O’Neal, and Gilbert Moses formed the FST in 1963 
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out of the Tougaloo Drama Workshop at Tougaloo College, Mississippi.108  Initially the 
FST recruited “anyone who said ‘We dig civil rights’” to act in its touring repertory 
group.109  Early member Woodie King was a founder of the Detroit-based Concept East 
Theater, a civil rights-influenced organization that embraced African Diasporic traditions 
and served as a model for the FST.110  Moses was a reporter for the Mississippi Free 
Press, a weekly civil rights paper published by a multiracial activist coalition, including 
Medgar Evers, while Derby and O’Neal were Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) field directors.111  
 In fact, the FST considered itself the “cultural arm” of SNCC; the collective’s 
communitarian structure and civil rights mission were directly informed by members’ 
participation in 1964’s Freedom Summer, and Mississippi’s Freedom Schools in 
particular.112  Proposed by SNCC field secretary Charlie Cobb, Freedom Schools were 
alternative educational institutions that fostered black students’ civic engagement and 
community activism.113 Presaging the quotidian setting of FST performances, classes 
were held in community spaces such as churches, homes, and parks.  Most significantly, 
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the volunteer-run schools rejected hierarchical instruction, instead promoting student-
centered learning based on discussion, critical thinking, and leadership training.  
 Inspired by the Freedom Summer, the FST connected community theater with 
racial justice work. Interested in wedding cultural production with “the struggle of Black 
folk,” SNCC representative Cobb championed the FST’s political theatrics.114  For 
example, Freedom School staff used FST’s performance of Martin B. Duberman’s In 
White America (1963) as the foundation for its curriculum.115  The play attempted to 
describe to a white middle-class audience “what it has been like to be a Negro in this 
country (to the extent that a white man can describe it).”116  As John O’Neal recalls, “The 
whole curriculum of the Freedom School was built around the play, because the play was 
built around the struggle of African American people….We’d read it and give a context 
to people who taught and organized the community that we were performing in.”117  
Reprising their experience as Freedom School and SNCC volunteers, FST’s actors 
performed in black neighborhoods and lived among local black families and civil rights 
activists while touring Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama.118  
  Ultimately, the collective sought to “stimulate creative and reflective thought” 
among southern African Americans by nurturing a black-directed theatrical movement 
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combining “art and social awareness...which relate to the problems within the Negro 
himself, and within the Negro community.”119 Additionally, FST’s community theater 
programs reflected its faith in cooperative structure and collective process.  FST practiced 
participatory theater rooted in African “call and response” traditions and 1930s New Deal 
“living newspaper” plays.120  For example, Dent recalled one 1965 improvised play about 
Bogalusa’s civil rights demonstrations and subsequent racial violence that featured local 
black students and demonstrators.  Remarking that virtually “the entire Negro community 
has come” to see the FST perform “the determination of the Negro citizens to fight back, 
to fight for their rights, and to take action to insure their safety while protesting for their 
rights,” Dent noted that “the audience responds to the subtleties, humor, truth of every 
situation as it develops on the makeshift stage.”121  
 Interestingly, even as the FST propelled itself to the vanguard of black 
community theater, their early productions explicitly tied the collective to Old Left 
radical politics familiar to Albert Dent’s New Deal and Popular Front generation.  For 
example, living newspaper plays were popular among progressive New Orleanians 
during the Depression.  The New Orleans Group Theatre produced Lenox Antony’s 
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Headlines in Review as an antifascist fundraiser.122 Community members contributed to 
the production, both as actors and as audience members. 
 At the same time, the FST’s dedication to collective theater reflected the radical 
theater movement of the 1960s.  For example, Richard Schechner, the group’s white 
producing director and a drama professor at Tulane University, was a strong proponent of 
community participation and the personally liberatory potential of experimental drama.  
After Schenchner left the FST, in 1967 he started the experimental theater troupe The 
Performance Group, which rejected artifice in search of authentic bodily expressions and 
radical collective actions.123 Audiences moved freely through the production space and 
were involved in the play.124  Troupe members collaborated in encounter groups, physical 
and emotional exercises, and exchanged ideas on production decisions in order to bond 
creatively, while Schechner controlled the ultimate direction of the plays.125 
 Further, Schechner’s interest in cooperative theater deeply influenced the FST’s 
organizational structure.  Offering free performances of socially relevant material, the 
FST mirrored guerrilla theater groups such as the San Francisco Mime Troupe.  As 
democratic collectives, the Troupe modeled egalitarian social relationships and formed 
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cooperative partnerships with like-minded organizations.126  Other radical collectives like 
El Teatro Campesino fervently believed that collective creative organizations would 
confront repressive political and economic institutions that sought to dominate 
marginalized populations.127 Finally, the Living Theater countered hierarchical power 
structures with communal and cooperative creative production.  In the 1960s, members 
wrote plays together and lived communally to model their anarchist and pacifist ideals. 
Desire Housing Project 
 While initially the FST was committed to furthering the civil rights movement in 
the rural South, the theater’s move to a disused New Orleans warehouse in 1964 presaged 
a sea change in the theater’s political outlook and creative choices.  As an influx of native 
writers and artists swelled its staff, the FST began to adapt the broader civil rights 
movement to the needs of the immediate New Orleans community.  Its connection to the 
city’s working-class black neighborhoods solidified in 1966, when the collective acquired 
an abandoned supermarket on Louisa Street near the Desire Housing Project; it had been 
badly damaged during Hurricane Betsy, a storm that disproportionately affected black 
communities in the Lower Ninth Ward.128  Desire was the one of the most dangerous and 
densely populated neighborhoods in New Orleans.  Rapid white flight and large-scale 
urban redevelopment projects displaced and concentrated 13,000 black residents in the 
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increasingly dilapidated housing.  While President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty 
initiatives aided anti-poverty programs in Desire, flooding and structural damage from 
Hurricane Betsy accelerated the area’s decline.129  Despite city and non-profit 
organizations efforts to provide social services, and Desire residents’ urgent requests to 
help plan and evaluate those services, the housing project continued to suffer.130  By 
1973, Desire’s young, black, and female residents experienced 1,000 percent jobless rates 
than did the middle-class white suburb of Lakeview.131  Additionally, juvenile 
delinquency rates in Desire were some of the highest in the city.132 
 The collective was well aware of municipal hypocrisy; city and federal 
redevelopment programs segregated New Orleans’ inner city black residents while giving 
lip service to an integrated society.  The FST labeled Desire as “a forgotten ghetto,” 
home to “thousands of imprisoned black people.133 Foreshadowing the 1970 shootout 
between police, Black Panthers, and Desire residents, FST member Murray Levy 
predicted in 1966, “The situation is very close to exploding in the face of ‘charming’ 
New Orleans.”134 Similarly, in fellow member Roscoe Orman’s poem, he describes Desire 
as girding for change: “All beauty in chains/Rumbling deep somewhere-between-the-
stomach-and-the/brain.”135   
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 To speed its liberation, the group strove to expose Desire’s racialized 
disinvestment to the general public. Its poetry program Ghetto of Desire, which 
scathingly portrayed the housing project as “dreamed up by a city planner at Auschwitz,” 
documents residents’ spatial isolation—cut off from the city geographically by railroads 
and canals, and subjected to inadequate educational, occupational, and recreational 
opportunities.136 Alerted that the program would be included in Look Up and Live, a 1966 
CBS documentary about regional theaters, New Orleans mayor Victor Schiro, Police 
Chief Clarence Giarrusso, and HANO objected that Ghetto of Desire unfairly portrayed 
the city and project and “engenders racial disharmony.”137  While the show aired 
nationally, local media outlets censored the documentary.138  Nonetheless, the public 
response to Ghetto of Desire galvanized FST members, who discovered that their 
productions could potentially make powerful changes to the city’s racial relations.139 
 At the same time, black members encouraged the collective to create a 
community-based theater that more accurately reflected Desire residents’ political, 
economic, and social needs.  As a result, the FST’s offices on Louisa Street would 
eventually house both a theater and African American cultural center.  Believing that the 
“Afro-American has been divided for too long from his background and has been 
alienated from his great culture,” the center strove to educate residents about the “art and 
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science of the non-white races of the world.”140  Its objective was to instill ethnic pride in 
its black visitors.  The theater collective performed original plays, host forums, poetry, 
song, improv, film nights, and “bull sessions.”  For example, one 1967 touring poetry 
show featured Dent’s manifesto poem, “Uncle Tom’s Secondline Funeral,” which 
imagines a series of working-class second line parades celebrating the death of black 
intellectual, spiritual, and political “race traitors” hindering the civil rights movement. 
Dent asserts, “for the black public official who believes we have made enough 
progress…we bequeath lifted hats, three deep bows, a long, long memorial service 
replete with history of Harriet Tubman through Malcolm X.”  We “lay him to rest—then 
jump with jubilation that he is dead and gone.”141 The FST also performed plays in a 
range of working-class spaces, from stores and bars, to churches and schools, and 
attracted diverse audiences, including children, laborers, and the elderly. 
 Further, the FST offered workshops in acting, writing, and stagecraft so that it 
could eventually recruit actors and playwrights from the Ninth Ward.  To allow greater 
access to FST resources, admission was free, supported by tax-deductible donations.  The 
FST also promoted discussion and dialogue with community participants after shows.  As 
an outgrowth of these conversations, O’Neal implemented the “story circle,” in which 
workshop attendees shared and exchanged creative ideas around a central theme.142  Story 
circles often led to other collective activities such as dramatic composition. 
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 In response, Desire residents welcomed the collective.  White FST member 
Murray Levy noted, “they will give us a chance to earn our keep.  Why is it that black 
people in this country are always more gracious than white people?”143  Because members 
believed they would enrich and be enriched by working-class citizens, they fervently 
advocated sustained resident participation: Levy continued that, the neighborhood “brings 
ideas to it, argues with it, and needs it.” For example, future member Kalamu ya Salaam 
had grown up in the Ninth Ward resident and regularly attended FST workshops.  He 
infused his poetry with the improvisational and egalitarian imagery of brass bands and 
second line dancing of New Orleans.  In 1969’s “Leader,” Salaam questions the 
legitimacy of middle-class African American civil rights leaders who reject working-
class participatory culture.  He “saw a Negro at a dance/ last nite who called himself/ my 
leader & that nigger/ couldn’t dance to save his life/ so how he gon lead me!”144  
Similarly, in “All in the Street” (1968) invoking the “tidal wave of us dancing in the 
street with brass bands,” Salaam declared that black mass performance would lead to 
revolution: “the cities are next.” 
 The FST also worked closely with Desire and Ninth Ward community 
organizations to more concretely address the area’s crushing poverty.  While the 
mainstream consumer movement largely ignored politics, cooperative economics 
permeated the Ninth Ward’s network of government-funded community antipoverty and 
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economic development organizations.145  For example, during the late 1960s, the New 
Orleans Coalition’s weekly newsletter reported on cooperative programming offered by 
Desire-area FST performances, the Desire Area Community Council, and Total 
Community Action’s neighborhood tutoring programs.  In order to “meet the immediate 
and long-range problems of residents,” the Urban League successfully organized 
cooperative tenants unions in each of the city’s public housing complexes, including 
Desire and Florida.146  However, despite the support of like-minded community 
organizations, in 1965 the FST was forced to suspend operations for five months as it 
scrambled for funding.  Although they welcomed its presence, low-income Desire 
residents did not have the resources to financially support FST.  In contrast, the city’s 
conservative black middle-class was reluctant to support black liberationist theater.147   
 The FST’s struggles in Desire revealed serious internal rifts as well. Dent and 
more radical members claimed that the theater’s early material reflected initial members’ 
middle-class, northern background rather than their constituents’ lived experiences. 
Native, often working-class New Orleanians argued that it was pointless to perform 
Waiting for Godot and In White America in black neighborhoods unfamiliar with 
theatrical conventions.148  Further, the FST’s exclusively black audiences needed few 
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reminders of what it was like “to be a Negro.” While the FST originally supported the 
integrationist goals of the civil rights movement, by the late 1960s, New Orleans’ black 
creative writers rejected New York production aesthetics and philanthropic organizations 
they felt no embodied reflected FST’s evolving aesthetic and political mission. 
Black Arts Movement 
 Simultaneously, inspired by the coalescing black liberation and Black Arts 
Movement, between 1965 and 1967, Tom Dent and his allies demanded that FST become 
a community-based incubator for local black creative writers and performers in New 
Orleans and the South.149  Historians of the Black Arts Movement claim that the black 
militant Revolutionary Action Movement, Maulana Karenga’s black nationalist US 
Organization, and the Nation of Islam influenced the Black Arts Movement’s ideological 
framework.150  FST member Kalamu ya Salaam recalls that the Black Arts Movement 
was “a conglomeration of local initiatives throughout the country that all worked from 
their own similar vision of Black Arts, while being influenced by the national 
movement.151  For example, black FST members concentrated on political practice and 
revolutionary theater influenced by the seven principles of Kwanzaa, or Nguzo Saba, a 
“holistic value system” one practices daily to become spiritually whole that stresses 
collective work, unity, creativity, and cooperative economics.152 Drawing on 
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revolutionary nationalist rhetoric, Gilbert Moses and Tom Dent rejected professional 
theater models and proposed that FST recruit actors from the black community while 
raising residents’ consciousness about societal and political problems.153 Similarly, John 
O’Neal began to critique the weaknesses of a civil rights movement focused on 
legislation and federal intervention and instead embraced black cultural liberation.    
 Galvanized by the black liberationist ideals of the Black Arts Movement and 
SNCC’s efforts to build a radical black political apparatus, FST ousted its white members 
in 1968.154 As Moses wrote to O’Neal in 1967, the FST should be “a theater for the Black 
people established by Black people—and not a white liberal idea established for the good 
of the Black people.”155  Accordingly, they dropped In White America from their 
repertoire and began performing black-authored plays such as Black Arts Movement 
founder Amiri Bakara’s Slave Ship as well as original FST work.  These plays explored 
racial identity to heighten audiences’ self-awareness as politicized black people.156  
 For example, Tom Dent’s 1968 play Ritual Murder reflects what FST member 
Quo Vadis Get calls “the yelling years” of the late 1960s: “Most of our performance 
pieces required raising our voice in one way or another and railing against one system or 
another…[yet] there was also a concerted effort to talk about the beauty of being member 
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of a [black] community.”157    Similarly, Ritual Murder examines the communal pleasures 
of black creativity as well as structural racism and classism that drive violence within the 
black community.  Reflecting the FST’s black liberationist rhetoric, both themes are 
“unknown to the white world.”158  Speaking in rhythm to the strands of “Summertime,” 
Ninth Ward characters deconstruct the brutal stabbing of a young black man by his friend 
Joe Brown Jr.  While Brown’s teachers, lovers, family, social workers, and police officers 
fail to understand his “homicidal act,” Brown acknowledges that “Something began to 
come loose in me, like my mind would float away from my body…No one ever 
suspected, but my mind was trying to define me, to tell me who I was the way other 
people see me, only it couldn’t because it didn’t know where to begin.”  
 Yet black psychologist Dr. Brayboy underlines the play’s central argument, that 
Brown’s murder is “a form of group suicide,” born out of systematic racial oppression. 
After years witnessing a grisly procession of black bodies “bleeding, blood seeping from 
the doors of the taxicabs,…icepicks and knives,” he theorizes, “When murder occurs for 
no apparent reason but happens all the time…it is ritual murder.” However, while James 
Roberts, the victim, concedes that the hopelessness some African American communities 
feel inevitably leads to self-violence, he hints at the necessity of black militant action: 
“Friends kill each other all the time…unless you have an enemy you can both kill.”  
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Ritual Murder thus reflects the FST’s new philosophical worldview that the daily 
experiences of working-class African Americans should drive liberatory theater.159  
Central City 
  No longer subscribing to integrationist goals, when the all-black FST relocated to 
Dryades Street in Central City in 1969, the collective abandoned its vision of biracial 
cooperation that it had previously propounded. Central City encompasses a broad area: it 
stretches into the downtown Central Business District, all the way to the Mississippi 
River, and is bordered by affluent, white, uptown communities.160  Over the course of the 
1950s and 1960s, Central City’s demographics radically changed as white flight to the 
suburbs increasingly concentrated low-income blacks within the neighborhood.161  In 
1968, nearly 7,000 families lived in poverty, the largest number out of New Orleans’ six 
most impoverished neighborhoods.162  Further, integration throughout the city encouraged 
black businesses to leave Dryades Street, so that by 1969, what once had been a bustling 
commercial thoroughfare was now a disinvested, decaying street.163 Once established, the 
FST devoted itself to creating specialized cultural and educational programs that would 
unite, educate, and mobilize black Central City residents to achieve radical self-reliance. 
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 FST joined a number of civil rights organizations confronting the neighborhood’s 
abysmal economic state. For example, Total Community Action (TCA) established 
Central City as one of six “target areas” to receive federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity antipoverty funds providing job training, youth leadership and tutoring 
programs, and out-patient clinics.164 TCA’s Central City neighborhood council used a 
variety of methods to propel social and political change in the community, such as letter 
writing campaigns, marches and boycotts, and finally, citywide coalitions that pressured 
city officials to address civic concerns.165   
 Significantly, Central City’s TCA branch also advocated cooperatives as a means 
to empower low-income citizens to improve their community and secure gainful 
employment.  Not only did it establish cooperative stores, buying clubs, credit unions and 
producer cooperatives, but it also supported the FST’s community-oriented educational 
goals.166 For instance, it funded the library of the Congo Square Writers Association, a 
FST offshoot. Additionally, in 1971, student graduates of FST’s community theater 
workshop performed African American playwright and Woodie King mentee Ron 
Milner’s The Warning: A Theme for Linda before TCA’s Lower Ninth Ward 
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Neighborhood Improvement Council at Alfred Lawless Junior High School.167  While set 
in Detroit, Milner grimly intones that the play “could be in any black neighborhood in 
any city in the country.”168 The Warning chronicles the struggles of an idealistic young 
woman, Linda, and the hopes she pins on her boyfriend Donald, an aspiring writer, to 
deliver her from Detroit’s crushing cycle of poverty, neglect, and abuse.  
 Despite the TCA’s enthusiasm for FST programming, Dent felt the organization 
was too focused on individual political gains and lacked the political will to support far-
reaching social and economic programs for African Americans.169 Echoing resident 
concerns, Dent argued that for real political access, black New Orleanians needed 
revolutionary leaders who “answer primarily to the interests of the community—not the 
power structure.”170 With homeless rates at 10 percent, Central City residents demanded 
more and better paying jobs, while pressing for improved public housing.171 
 While the FST largely dismissed War on Poverty institutions as reformist rather 
than revolutionary, it embraced the constellation of black-run progressive stores and 
activist organizations residing along Central City’s Dryades Street. Tom Dent recalls that 
in 1970, “There was the bookstore down the street, the poetry journal, activist and 
political newspapers, the beginnings of a network of artists and activists.  There was the 
Nation of Islam, which was attractive to many ex-Movement people because of its 
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philosophy of economic self-determination.”172 Further, educated residents often 
volunteered within housing projects or disinvested communities.  In short, the FST was 
part of a “small black cultural [center]…[which] helped provide a place where these 
activities and interactions could take place.”  Central City’s cultural and political foment 
“happened within a black world with few white participants except for the most radical.”  
 Additionally, the FST partnered with established Central City religious or 
community non-profit organizations to administer community theater and creative 
writing programs.173  As Beth Turner, founder-editor of Black Masque, notes, most black 
theater companies began as community-driven projects and were “allied to an antipoverty 
agenda.”174 Some of these non-profits either were themselves cooperatives or were 
interested in starting cooperatives as part of a larger program of community survival.  For 
example, the FST exchanged plays and actors with the Dashiki Theater, a community 
theater formed in 1968 by Dillard University graduates to provide black cultural and 
political role models for Central City residents.175 The theater also ensured that more than 
half of its members were Central City residents. By assisting cultural liberation 
organizations, the FST “encourage[d] and support[ed] the revolutionary struggles of the 
Black Nation in America and oppressed people throughout the world.”176   
FST and Working-Class Black Performance  
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 In order to appeal to African Americans otherwise unfamiliar with theater, Tom 
Dent and other native New Orleanians continued to push FST to incorporate working-
class participatory musical and religious traditions.  Performance scholar Jan Cohen-Cruz 
argues that the civil rights movement’s connection to the black church, central to 
southern black culture, “provided the Free Southern Theater with a particular moral and 
spiritual orientation” immediately accessible to its neighborhood community members.177  
Similarly, John O’Neal believed that as they captivated their audiences, black artists and 
preachers were inspired by common spiritual, aesthetic, and moral qualities.178  Reflecting 
their diverse religious backgrounds, FST members embedded black Baptist and Catholic 
call-and-response and other cooperative elements into plays, poetry, and music to ensure 
audiences’ active participation.179  Likewise, Karen Kaia Livers describes the impact of 
communal religious traditions on FST offshoot Alliance for Community Theater: “In 
community theater, the invisible wall [between performers and audience] was broken a 
long time ago. It excites us if somebody yells something from the audience….productions 
are very much involved in pulling them up and bring them on stage.”180 
 Just as important, Dent and FST’s working-class native New Orleanian members 
drew on the city’s benevolent associations’ jazz funerals and second line parades for 
creative inspiration and structural organization.181 As cooperative structures rooted 
freedmen’s benevolent societies, and religious reform groups after the Civil War, mutual 
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aid and pleasure clubs defray the cost of members’ grocery, rent, and medical bills and 
funeral services.182  The societies and their second lines, or the dancers and revelers who 
follow the club members and band, are neighborhood-specific and often tied to public 
housing complexes. Belonging to a mutual aid club or dancing in a second line, then, 
reflects one’s community identity.   
 As the central community event of working class African Americans, mutual aid 
and pleasure clubs parade every Sunday down Central City’s streets, and as many as a 
thousand people can dance for eight miles on a Sunday afternoon.183  Member dues enable 
each club to hire a brass band and provide food during their annual two regular parades a 
year, as well as funeral marches for members.  During the parades, brass bands play 
elegiac and celebratory music, while club members follow in coordinated suits.  The 
second line is last, a body of community members who dance together but as the spirit 
moves them, revealing individual creative expression while solidifying community 
bonds. Cooperative activist Sally Stevens claims that the second line is “the most 
democratic activity happening in America today,” not only because the barrier between 
performer and audience is low, but also because it embraces collective improvisation.184  
 To that end, the FST’s 1985 jazz funeral reflects the culmination of the 
collective’s celebration of black communal and religious musical genres.  Marking the 
end of a twenty-two year career, former members of the FST and southern activist theater 
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members paraded from the FST theater to Congo Square in Armstrong Park, while the 
seminal Rebirth Jazz Band played “Just a Closer Walk with Thee.”  After a eulogy, in 
which former members placed mementos into the FST coffin, a second line parade 
danced out of the burial site to celebrate FST’s life, playing “We Shall Overcome” and 
“Good Golly Miss Molly.”185 Commemorating the FST through a New Orleans black 
working-class funeral tradition communicated the collective’s commitment to collectivity 
and common experience.  
 However, the FST’s jazz funeral nods to the second line’s history as a tool for 
black resistance to decades of urban disinvestment.  As historian George Lipsitz argues, 
black mutualistic traditions turn “segregation into congregation,” by “fashioning 
ferocious attachments to place” in order to unite residents around ethnic and community 
survival.186 Similarly, Mindy Fullilove contends that black New Orleanians’ 
neighborhood support networks constitute “emotional ecosystems” that bind residents by 
shared “space, place, and race.”187 These ecosystems nurture community solidarity and 
mobilize resistance to institutionalized racism and classism.188  Indeed, second line 
parades are often vehicles for organized protest around public housing shortage or 
demolition.189  By holding the FST jazz funeral in Congo Square in Armstrong Park, 
collective members honored the musical roots of working-class blacks, as well as 
oppositional politics centered in black communities. 
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FST’s Cooperative Structure  
 At the heart of the FST was its collective structure, a conscious organizing 
decision that became a model for other Southern progressive black community theaters 
for decades.  After ousting its white members, the FST adhered to a cultural nationalist 
philosophy, which united people of African descent according to a perceived common 
diasporic culture and a shared history of oppression and slavery.190 Its mission was to 
help other organizations produce plays and other cultural products “of the highest artistic 
quality possible” to in order to advance domestic and international African Diasporic 
liberation projects.191  As an educational resource, the FST hoped to use theater to “unify, 
educate, and inspire” black people in New Orleans and the Deep South to achieve self-
determination and community autonomy.  Its revolutionary labor was grounded in the 
precept that politics and culture were integrated: the FST existed as a “cultural 
organization whose artistic work is thoroughly and consciously political in all aspects.”  
 Further, to build a broad revolutionary movement, the FST allied with and helped 
form a range of politically conscious black cooperatives and community theater groups 
across the nation. In the early 1970s, activists interested in forming their own political, 
agricultural, or creative cooperatives requested O’Neal as a strategist and trainer.192  
Hired by the Cooperative College Center in Syracuse, New York, O’Neal flew FST poets 
to the institution to model the collective’s performance style and organizational 
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principles.193 Additionally, to assist their creative and political endeavors, the FST sent 
plays and literature to other non-profit theaters starting their own collectives or expanding 
their operations.  For example, when the Miami-based Theatre of Afro-Arts and Battle 
Creek, Michigan’s Black Theatre formed in 1969, they solicited John O’Neal for advice 
and to connect with similar organizations.194  By sharing resources with other collectives, 
radical theater groups and cooperatives hoped to “keep abreast of what’s really 
happening” in the black liberation struggle.195 
 The FST also researched other black theater collectives to improve its own 
operations. In 1972, Joe Stevens, the collective’s technical director, toured black theater 
organizations around the country and reported on his findings.  He visited theaters in 
New York as well as the South: Harlem’s National Black Theater and New York City’s 
Afro American Studio for Speech and Theater and Olantunji’s School of African Culture 
were included in the itinerary, as were the Atlanta’s Blk Image Theater and Boston’s 
National Center for Afro-American Artists.196  The extensive tour prompted the FST to 
seriously reevaluate its political and creative purpose, and it would lead to a completely 
revised mission statement the following year. 
 After John O’Neal assumed directorship over the FST in the early 1970s, the FST 
incorporated Marxist study groups and collective discussions alongside a renewed 
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commitment to community-driven theater.197  O’Neal’s embrace of Marxism echoed the 
political bifurcation within the black nationalist movement.  Tom Dent recalls that Amiri 
Bakara argued that as colonized African nations struggled for independence, political and 
economic power for Africans and people of African descent would not heal extreme class 
divisions.198  Rather, a Marxist critique of European and American capital was necessary 
to dismantle systems of economic and political oppression.   
 Similarly, O’Neal argued that poverty, political disempowerment, and racism 
were imbedded in the capitalist system.199  Indeed, large corporations were responsible 
for global economic disparity, the 1970s recession, and imperialist wars.200  As an 
antidote to a capitalist system that privileged the interests of the business and political 
elite, the FST envisioned a system of true democracy that protected the “collective 
interests of the oppressed masses” over the economic elite.201 Therefore, as a tool for 
revolution, O’Neal advocated black economic cooperation to transform the competitive 
marketplace into a collective society.  
 However, while the FST envisioned itself as a “mass cultural organization” and 
aimed to recruit leaders from the “working class masses of the Black Nation,” it was not 
a purely grassroots collective.  Although Michna asserts that the FST featured a “second-
line epistemology” that celebrated working-class cultural forms, by the late 1960s, the 
collective was structured as a cadre organization, a small group of activists striving for 
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liberation.202  Matt Robinson, former Common Ground volunteer who worked with 
founder and Black Panther Malik Rahim, observes how Rahim defined cooperation:  
 [To] the Black Panthers in the ‘60’s, a “collective” meant a group of people that 
 was outside of the social systems...with a very sturdy chain of command.  You 
 know,  everybody works for the collective good, and the collective good 
 is...organized almost  along hierarchical principles….[W]hen Malik Rahim said, 
 “We have a collective,”…what he was really saying was, “We have a collective, 
 and I am at the top, and you are collectively...granting me your power—or the 
 power to act on your behalf.”203 
Similarly, because the FST believed that “all people are not at the same stage of 
development,” activists who had attained a revolutionary consciousness through 
dedicated work and study had a responsibility to instruct community members.204  While 
collective member Gilbert Moses believed the black New Orleans community would 
eventually support FST, it needed to be awakened to the necessity of such support: 
“We’re grafting the idea [of socially conscious theater] onto a community.  The graft will 
slowly heal and FST will become one with the community.  Finally the community will 
change and create its own type of theatre.”205  Until the community was sufficiently 
educated, the collective was divided into two levels of membership: the central leadership 
and the masses, or those sympathetic to the FST’s cause.   
                                                
202 Michna, “We are Black Mind Jockeys”; Christopher Leon Johnson, “The Spirit that Protects the 
Youth: Maroonage, African-Centered Education, and the Case of Kamali Academy in New Orleans, 
Louisiana,” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2012), 137. 
203  Matt Robinson, interview by author. Cooperative Oral History Project.  June 5, 2012.   
204  Free Southern Theater, “Basic Program Guidelines,” 6. 
205  “Gilbert Moses Commentary,” Free Southern Theater by The Free Southern Theater, 33. 
 330 
 Reflecting its Marxist orientation, in 1976 the FST published its “Basic Program 
Guidelines,” hoping to inspire other black cultural organizations to develop their own 
collective process and theoretical framework to guide their radical activities.206  First, the 
FST required members to democratically discuss and agree upon their statement of 
purpose.  For example, in the FST’s evaluation sessions, core and supporting staff 
defined the organization’s purpose and philosophical principles.  Second, cooperative 
ideals also guided FST theatrical workshops and productions. The FST’s permanent 
ensemble followed a collective labor model; roles were equitably distributed among 
members, and actors were hired based on their specific “utility to the group.”  The 
collective selected actors for its repertory touring ensemble based on their demonstrated 
commitment to black liberation and the FST’s revolutionary goals, as well as their ability 
to work with the collective and abide by its principles. Third, the FST’s remediation 
policies were rooted in democratic process.  While members addressed concerns about 
individual policies with appropriate director heads, the staff collectively assessed flaws in 
the group’s overall directives and presented revision recommendations to the Board of 
Directors.  If the Board rejected the proposal, it was required to explain its decision to the 
entire collective.  Committed to consensus and democratic decision-making, FST 
collective members continued to organize cooperatives long after the FST folded in 1982. 
Funding Struggles 
 The FST’s outspokenly radical ideology and creative aesthetic made securing 
sufficient funding for its operations a serious and recurring issue. The FST’s radical, 
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cultural liberationist theater operated against a shifting political landscape in 1960s 
community organizing.  Embracing individual and community direct action as curatives 
for deeply institutionalized racism, poverty, and inequality, President Johnson’s War on 
Poverty administration supported cooperatives and community organizations.207    
Specifically, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 mandated the creation of 
Community Action Agencies at the state and local level to administer antipoverty 
programs.208  By forcing neighborhood organizations, unions, non-profits, educational 
institutions, and municipal and federal governments to embrace an integrated society, the 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) stimulated Louisiana’s stagnating economy and 
opened new political channels to black citizens at the city, state, and federal level.209   
 While OEO and northern philanthropies funded the FST until the late 1960s, the 
collective’s cultural liberation programming increasingly perturbed its white, New York-
based funding sources. By 1969 Dent observed, “The white financial establishment 
seems to love to fund a craft and techniques program, they love that more than they can 
possibly accept the critical and militant work the professional theater should be 
doing...It’s saying ‘we give these people some money to hold workshops so they won’t 
go out and riot and generally make trouble.”210  Equally troubling, by the early 1970s, 
federal officials had largely ceased antipoverty aid to black community development after 
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President Richard Nixon abolished Title II of the Equal Opportunity Act.211  
Consequently, without reliable sponsorship, few radical black organizations survived.  
 In contrast, the connection between New Orleans social justice activism, 
community organizing, and faith-based oppositional traditions remained intact. Desperate 
to fill the funding gap, FST and other black cooperatives appealed to religious institutions 
for financial support. For example, in 1970, the FST received funding from the General 
Convention of Special Programs (GCSP), an initiative within the Episcopal Church to 
financially “support the liberation struggles of oppressed people.”212  It did not evaluate 
an applicant’s political radicalness, but rather the extent to which the organization would 
spur marginalized communities’ development and political empowerment.213  Granted a 
measure of financial stability, the FST continued its creative operations, while O’Neal 
began working with the institution to advance the rural black cooperative movement.   
Southern Rural Cooperatives and Regional Institution Building   
 In addition to serving black New Orleanians, the FST had an abiding interest in 
the wellbeing of rural southerners; throughout the 1960s and 1970s they helped civil 
rights and antipoverty activists establish black self-help agricultural and consumer 
cooperatives throughout the region. Consequently, the FST’s radical program directly 
influenced more moderate regional cooperative leagues’ philosophical and political goals.  
Therefore, examining the FST and mainstream cooperatives’ extensive interactions 
substantially narrows the gap between black nationalist thought and integrationist civil 
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rights organizing.  At the same time, the FST’s work with rural cooperatives illustrates 
reflects the legacy of cooperative organizing on the long civil rights movement.   
 Civil rights activism, antipoverty initiatives, and rural cooperative organizing 
each developed out of pre-existing black mutualistic institutions; by the 1960s and 1970s, 
they were inextricably linked together. For example, what started as a grocery buying 
club for Reverend Albert McKnight’s rural black congregation led to the formation of the 
Southern Consumers Cooperative, which eventually organized 2,000 Louisiana residents 
into 20 cooperatives.214 Black farmers already broadly familiar with cooperative 
principles flocked to civil rights cooperative associations, believing that agricultural 
cooperatives, stores, and credit unions would circumvent exploitative white businesses 
and landowners.215 Like New Orleans’ urban community action programs, the Federation 
of Southern Cooperatives (FSC) received considerable OEO funding to help 
impoverished, mostly black, farmers regain economic stability within a rapidly 
industrializing agricultural system.216  To do so, it formed a network of cooperatives and 
retraining centers in the Deep South.  Accordingly, the FSC partnered with McKnight’s 
Southern Cooperative Development Fund, which also organized low-income 
cooperatives and credit unions across the region.217   
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 While criticized on the left for being insufficiently revolutionary, civil rights and 
antipoverty cooperatives were also hounded by conservative politicians.218  Because they 
participated in civil rights organizing, rural cooperative organizers were targets of 
segregationist leaders.  Local and state political elites found cooperative organizing, 
when paired with social, political, and economic justice activism, deeply disruptive to the 
status quo.  For example, the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American 
Activities’ denounced Father McKnight and progressive members of the OEO-sponsored 
community action program Acadiana Neuf as communistic, and FBI and police surveilled 
CORE cooperative organizers working with McKnight.219  Because McKnight worked 
with civil rights organizations like CORE and NAACP to secure black citizens’ political 
rights and economic autonomy, political leaders decried Louisianan and southern 
cooperatives as subversive and racially divisive institutions.  
 Although the Federation of Southern Cooperatives primarily organized rural 
agricultural and consumer cooperatives, it nonetheless frequently collaborated with FST 
members.  Interested in the Federation’s mission, the FST subscribed to its newsletters, 
attended the organization’s meetings, and corresponded with Father McKnight about the 
future of southern black cooperatives.220  Additionally, the Federation benefitted from 
FST’s funding role.  As the GCSP’s funding advisor, John O’Neal visited black-run 
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cooperatives throughout the South and reviewed their grant applications.221   While he 
preferred funding politically radical cooperatives, O’Neal recommended the GSCP 
support any organization that fostered concrete community development and political 
engagement.  For example, in 1971, O’Neal debated funding the Grand Marie Vegetable 
Co-op, a Louisiana sweet potato cooperative that had offered indigent black farmers a 
steady source of income since 1965.222  While it was one of the oldest civil rights 
movement-affiliated cooperatives still operating, O’Neal complained that white CORE 
organizer John Zippert had founded Grand Marie.  After grudgingly conceding that 
Zippert’s “influence did not appear detrimental to the project,” O’Neal approved the 
cooperative’s application.  
 However, feeling betrayed by vanishing government funding, O’Neal was 
reluctant to approve grant applications from mainstream cooperatives, fearing that they 
were hamstrung by precarious funding and conservative political views. Reflecting a 
common feeling among young, radicalized urban civil rights activists of the 1970s, 
O’Neal displayed both “a respect for indigenous [rural] black culture…[and] a profound 
skepticism about the possibilities for meaningful political change” from mainstream 
movement leadership.223 For example, when the OEO-sponsored Southeast Alabama 
Self-Help Association at the Tuskegee Institute applied for GCSP monies, O’Neal sniped, 
“the operators are, in my judgment, off base ‘politically’.  In the jargon of the day they 
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would be identified as ‘negroes’ rather than Black.”224 However, he observed approvingly 
that the association registered rural voters and organized community-driven cooperative 
businesses. Mollified, O’Neal eventually approved the association’s application because 
“their motive is a good one. Their continued involvement [in cooperative economics] will 
teach them” political consciousness.” Ultimately, O’Neal hoped that a cooperative 
economy would “create a political power vane” for rural Southerners; once registered to 
vote and economically stable, they could attend to the larger project of societal 
transformation. 
 Similarly, the FST-offshoot BLCKARTSOUTH, initially a workshop for New 
Orleans creative writers, looked outward to the broader South.225 In 1970, Dent partnered 
with Mississippi-based Delta Ministry and Mary Holmes College to develop a 
community-centered arts program cultivating creative and artistic talents.226  After several 
years organizing black educational and economic cooperatives with OEO support, Delta 
Ministry and Mary Holmes College had access to a network of Mississippi cooperative 
and community-based organizations that BLCKARTSOUTH lacked. Together they 
created a poetry and drama program, while a touring troupe hosted poetry readings and 
discussions in Mississippi towns.  Relying on religious institutions throughout the 1970s, 
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Dent thus incubated black southern playwrights and disseminated cooperative political 
and economic principles across the region.227  
 In turn, the New Orleans black liberation movement’s philosophy and principles 
influenced rural Louisiana cooperative efforts.  By the late 1960s, Father McKnight was 
particularly impressed by New Orleanian black liberationists’ tenets of “community 
control, self-reliance, self-determination, and self-defense.”228  After immersing himself 
in black nationalism and Pan-Africanism philosophy, McKnight crafted a sustained 
critique of “White capitalism” and a more nuanced analysis of racism.  Significantly, he 
regarded Ahidiana Co-operative member Mtumishi St. Julien as his “mentor in 
Blackness.”229 Started by former FST members, Ahidiana was a New Orleans black 
liberationist school and collective practicing the principles of the Nguzo Saba.  McKnight 
applied the concept “ujamaa,” or African-inspired economic cooperation, to his 
traditional and faith-based cooperative model, as did other politicized black cooperatives.   
 Until the collective’s demise in 1982, the rural South continued to be an important 
space for community organizing for the FST.  Maintaining its headquarters in New 
Orleans while touring rural Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, the FST had always 
balanced the needs of its New Orleans constituents with the desire to address rural 
poverty and political disempowerment in the Deep South.  However, by the late 1970s, 
FST was at a crossroads; given its shrinking budget, which community should the 
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collective serve: rural or urban African Americans?  By 1979, FST was inactive, 
searching for funding and a new direction.  Could the FST exist without substantial 
external funding, and if so, O’Neal queried, “would it be more economical to work from 
a rural rather than an urban base?”230  Advocating different sides of this debate, members 
created offshoot programs targeting city or agricultural communities. For example, Tom 
Dent’s BLKARTSOUTH became an autonomous organization that fostered collective 
theater throughout the rural Deep South.  O’Neal similarly contemplated shifting away 
from the FST’s New Orleans constituency in order to raise the cultural consciousness of 
black rural southerners.231  In contrast, until it closed in 1982, Kalamu ya Salaam’s 
Ahidiana Work Study Center sought to build lasting black-owned cooperative institutions 
to liberate urban New Orleanians from racialized poverty.  Salaam continues to model 
community activism and collective pedagogy at Students at the Center, a Freedom 
School-inspired writers workshop for high school students.    
Congo Square Writers Workshop 
 Finally, examining one last iteration of the FST, the Congo Square Writers 
Association (CSWA), brings the Dent family story full circle.  Its history connects Tom 
Dent to traditional fundraising sources and educational institutions long sustaining 
middle-class civil rights organizations while also celebrating New Orleans’ working-class 
musical forms, rural cooperative economic development, and national cultural liberation 
projects.  Carrying on the cooperative legacy of Albert and Tom Dent, the collective 
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continued to incorporate democratic process into its organizational structure as well as its 
creative work.  It pronounced itself a “cooperative of Black artists in all disciplines.”232 
 Tom Dent, Lloyd Medley, Felipe Smith, and Chakula Cha Jua formed the CSWA 
in 1974 as a writer’s collective and workshop connecting black New Orleanians to the 
larger civil rights movement and literary world.233  While the collective migrated to the 
Uptown neighborhood of Broadmoor, an ethnically heterogeneous community badly 
scarred by postwar white flight, Dent’s programming paid homage to the politically 
oppositional black musical traditions of the Seventh Ward and Central City.234 The 
CSWA’s name honored “the famous meeting place of slaves and free blacks adjacent to 
the French Quarter in New Orleans, an important location in the history of jazz and black 
cultural survival,” and events were often held in Tremé, a locus of historical and 
contemporary black music.235 Meeting in homes or the Broadmoor library, members 
documented their collective “mental and physical experiences, as southern black folk,” 
believing that “by doing so the awareness of blacks everywhere will be heightened.”236 
 Like the FST, the CSWA viewed New Orleans and the South as a lynchpin of 
black creative development and sought to support young writers. Accordingly, the 
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collective used the workshop to refine poetry, essays, fiction, and drama for publication 
in the FST’s literary journal Nkombo or the CSWA’s non-commercial anthology, 
Baboula. Further, the CSWA subsidized members’ book publication and distribution to 
journals, community organizations, and schools supporting black literary arts.237 Finally, 
just as Albert Dent hosted black national and international figures to speak at Dillard 
University, Tom Dent also sponsored prominent African diasporic writers and historians 
such as Andrew Salkey, a Caribbean poet, essayist, and journalist, in order to forge 
aesthetic and political ties between New Orleans and the Global South.238   
 Simultaneously, like both Albert Dent and the FST, the CSWA continued to build 
collective and cooperative networks in the rural South.  In 1979, the CSWA formed the 
Congo Square Theater to tour the South, often jointly producing plays with rural or small 
town community organizations.239  While it initially performed preexisting FST-authored 
plays like Tom Dent’s Ritual Murder and A Black Experience, the black, volunteer-run 
community theater also produced new CSWA-authored plays that explicitly addressed 
New Orleans and southern black audiences and their perceived concerns.240  
  The CSWA’s funding sources also replicated Albert Dent’s middle-class 
philanthropic and government donors. While Tom Dent had previously criticized Total 
Community Action and mainstream institutions for their reformist aims and fundamental 
                                                
237 Tom Dent, letter to Rev. Milton Upton, 10 January 1975, 2; Congo Square Writers Association, 
Bamboula (1976), folder 5, box 188, Tom Dent Papers. 
238 Tom Dent, letter to Rev. Milton Upton, 10 January 1975, 2; Tom Dent and Quo Vadis Rex, letter to 
Congo Square Writers Union, 12 March 1981, box 3, folder 1, John O'Neal Papers. 
239 Chakula Cha Juais was a paid employee.  Congo Square Writers Association, “Congo Square Theater,” 
2-3, folder 3, box 188. 
240 Congo Square Writer’s Association, press release, “Congo Square Writer’s Workshop of New Orleans 
Presents A Poetry Reading” [nd], folder 3, box 188, Tom Dent Papers.  
 341 
inability to address the root causes of racialized poverty, now CSWA financially 
depended on moderate social welfare, governmental, and educational institutions similar 
to those Albert Dent relied upon to support his medical cooperative.  For example, in 
order to combat the “cultural isolation” and “provinciality of black New Orleans,” 
CSWA received financial and programmatic assistance from TCA, the University of New 
Orleans, and the Louisiana Committee for the Humanities, which co-sponsored the 
collective’s lectures, film screenings, literature events, and discussions.241   
 Additionally, like Albert Dent, who deployed experts to disseminate cooperative 
principles among the general public, the CSWA’s cooperative structure increasingly 
deviated from the FST’s proletarian roots and sharply demarcated members from non-
performers.  For example, when it opened in 1997, the CSWA’s Griot House, a Mid-City 
community center and performance venue, was hailed an authentic expression of African 
diasporic cultural identity but cultivated middle-class, well-educated patronage.242 Griot 
House’s hierarchical structure and costly membership fees may have discouraged 
working-class engagement.  For a five-year membership fee of $1,000, core members 
governed the organization and programmed its events, while patrons paid between $100 
and $500 per year to attend events and paid staff lacked decision-making power. By the 
time of Tom Dent’s death in 1998, his arts collective had in some ways circled back to 
his father’s civil rights philosophy, in which professional cooperative activists and racial 
justice leaders developed programs to aid the poor.  Similarly, CSWA performances, 
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while resolutely political and Afro-centric, became increasingly uncoupled from 
community-centered civil rights activism and working-class participation.   
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, the FST’s philosophical and geographical divide permanently split up 
the group.  Not only did the dissipation of the Black Power and Black Arts Movements 
weaken the FST’s creative and revolutionary fervor, but the collective’s perennial 
struggle to secure funding also led to its collapse.243  As Camara notes, frustrated with the 
FST’s meager finances, many talented artists moved to New York City or, no longer 
afford to live on the organization’s stipend, searched for work within a capitalist system 
“they wrote, sang, and performed against.”244  
 Yet from its inception, the FST believed it could be a model for other theatrical 
collectives.  FST members viewed themselves as history-makers, both as part of the civil 
rights movement and as a “cultural force in the Black Liberation Movement.”245  As such, 
members carefully documented the collective’s history, organized conferences about its 
civil rights origins, and preserved FST materials in institutional archives for future study 
and imitation.  At the same time, however, it is rooted in the cooperative past.  The FST’s 
legacy cannot be evaluated only on its influence on black community theater, but also on 
its members’ lifelong dedication to building a new moral economy rooted in black 
community organizing and cooperative economics.   
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Chapter 5: “I Have Hope that People Can Live that Life”: Rupture and Continuity 
in the Post-Hurricane Katrina Cooperative Movement 
 In June 2008, three years after Hurricane Katrina decimated large swaths of the 
city, the United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives (USFWC) met in a slowly 
recovering New Orleans for its fourth annual conference.1  Two hundred worker 
cooperatives from around the country discussed how the cooperative movement might 
achieve economic justice and equitable redevelopment in a city whose cash-strapped 
government embraced neoliberal proposals to privatize essential city services.  Setting the 
tenor of the conversation, New Orleans Citizen Participation Project director Khalil 
Shahyd affirmed that worker cooperatives modeled on the USFWC could establish a 
“solidarity economy” grounded in democratic, community-based economic development 
to swiftly, and justly, rebuild New Orleans.2    
 The 2008 USFWC meeting revealed a national network coalescing between New 
Orleans cooperatives and cooperatives around the country.  In fact, after a week 
volunteering around the city, USFWC attendees pledged their commitment to lasting 
collaboration between Louisianan, southern, and national cooperative organizations.3  At 
the same time, however, the USFWC and other contemporary cooperative activists often 
overlooked New Orleans’ long history of cooperative development, instead viewing 
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Hurricane Katrina as the flashpoint for cooperative organizing, largely at the behest of 
outside activists.  Representing post-Katrina New Orleans as a “blank slate” for 
cooperative formation, conference members often asked New Orleanian presenters how 
the contemporary “co-op message” was being received in Louisiana, implying that 
residents were ignorant of cooperative principles.4  
 In contrast, while USFWC cooperatives proffered their organizational success 
stories, Louisiana Association of Cooperatives (LAC) director Harvey Reed maintained 
that the rich legacy of African American cooperatives provided a strong indigenous 
model for New Orleans and Louisiana’s economic recovery.  From religious benevolent 
associations to the Federation of Southern Cooperative’s (FSC) 1960s agricultural 
cooperative campaigns, Reed celebrated black cooperative traditions as essential tools for 
combatting poverty and racial injustice.5  Indeed, the massive physical and economic 
devastation from levee failures and flooding during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
galvanized the LAC and the FSC to revive and expand the state’s dormant network of 
agricultural cooperatives for small, economically disadvantaged producers. 
 Reed encouraged contemporary cooperatives to use marginalized communities’ 
preexisting network of social aid to foster sustained economic development and 
community revitalization.  He therefore envisioned the LAC and the national cooperative 
movement as another layer of institutional support for farmers and urban residents 
already relying on cooperative methods for economic survival.  Ideally, worker and 
                                                
4 Reed, “Welcome, Cooperatives in New Orleans and Louisiana.” 
5 Ibid. 
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agricultural cooperatives should operate in conjunction with government officials, 
national cooperative organizations, and community religious institutions to build a more 
equitable Louisiana and New Orleans.  Additionally, Reed placed the reemerging 
Louisiana cooperative movement within a global context, acknowledging that while the 
state’s cooperatives were currently “just tiny,” Louisiana organizers should emulate 
countries like Costa Rica to create a comprehensive, cooperative-based economy.  
 Like Reed, I argue that the story of post-Katrina cooperatives is actually one of 
rupture and continuity.  As the preceding four chapters have demonstrated, New 
Orleanians of all backgrounds have repeatedly formed cooperatives to achieve 
community economic security and social justice.  However, the city’s post-Katrina 
devastation spurred veteran activists to redouble their efforts to implement a system of 
cooperative governance and economics to abolish the racial and class inequities 
imbedded in New Orleans’s geographic, economic, political, and cultural landscape.  In 
fact, New Orleans cooperative organizers at USFWC conference highlighted the 
continuity of the city’s cooperative history as often as they acknowledged the rupture that 
community experienced during and after Hurricane Katrina.  
 Similarly, my chapter contends that Katrina provided an impetus for veteran and 
neophyte cooperatives alike to unite around a shared understanding that cooperatives 
should influence rebuilding efforts to ultimately transform the city.  Specifically, I 
examine cooperatives’ efforts to influence city decision-making processes and implement 
alternative economic, political, and land-use planning models that critique large-scale 
government and market forces shaping local conditions.  I argue that the cooperative’s 
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physical and conceptual presence in its community alters the city’s geography in ways 
that can both benefit and harm local constituents.  In essence, New Orleans cooperatives 
are a lens through which to study how reform-minded organizations struggle to redress 
social and economic disparity without reproducing the same social, political, and 
economic disparity they seek to ameliorate.  
 In particular, this chapter analyzes how three contemporary cooperatives address 
persistent food and land insecurity among low-income New Orleanians in order to 
construct a broad-based, interracial social justice movement.  For several years, the city’s 
sustainable food movement has sparked debate over its contradictory role in expanding 
nutritious food access for poor residents of color while simultaneously hastening 
gentrification in vulnerable neighborhoods.  To that end, I examine how veteran 
cooperative activists Macon Fry, John Clark, and Harvey Reed understand cooperatives’ 
impact on their communities of concern.  Their respective cooperatives, Gathering Tree 
Growers Collective, Solidarity Economy, and the LAC, represent cooperative initiatives 
at the neighborhood, city, and state level.  All are committed to racial justice and food 
security, yet each cooperative differently configures its responsibility to its members and 
neighbors, its relationship to the state, and the role of cooperatives in social 
transformation. Consequently, each cooperative’s conception of the ideal relationship 
between citizen and state has unique implications for the city’s cooperative movement 
and its cultural and physical geography.   
 First, I examine a neighborhood cooperative garden, the Gathering Tree Growers 
Collective, and its head, Virginia native Macon Fry.  The 1980s oil bust and Hurricane 
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Katrina and their attendant land use debates frame Fry’s vision of cooperative gardens as 
tools to transform neglected city lots into productive urban farms. Second, the democratic 
cooperative coalition, Solidarity Economy, organizes collectives and cooperatives at the 
city level. New Orleanian John Clark, an anarchist philosopher, channels his experience 
with 1970s cooperative organizing to Solidarity Economy’s efforts to establish a 
cohesive, citywide cooperative community.  Finally, the LAC organizes and supports 
agricultural cooperatives across the state.  New Orleans native Harvey Reed, the 
Executive Director of the LAC, links the intersection of Louisiana’s civil rights and 
cooperative movements to marginalized farmers’ ongoing attempts to secure economic 
stability.  I argue that Fry, Clark, and Reed’s unique socioeconomic backgrounds and 
cooperative philosophy have indelibly marked their appraisal of cooperatives’ role within 
post-Katrina New Orleans’s economic and political systems, their solutions to pervasive 
racial and class disparity, and their concrete impact on their communities.  
New Orleans Cooperatives and Urban Land Use Debates 
 Macon Fry, John Clark, and Harvey Reed became active in cooperative politics 
during the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of significant economic turmoil and population 
flux.  It is crucial to analyze how mass tourism between the 1980s and early 2000s 
restructured the city’s economy and remolded its geography because it directly informed 
cooperatives’ later desire to create community-driven development initiatives 
fundamentally at odds with post-Katrina neoliberal economic policies. 
 Financially dependent on the oil industry, a 1980s oil bust stagnated New Orleans’ 
economy.  At the same time, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974’s 
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Section 8 Program provided low-income families vouchers to rent privately-managed 
residences and expanded the city’s supply of low-income units in multifamily housing 
complexes.6  The two phenomena spurred thousands of white and middle-class African 
American families to move to neighboring Jefferson Parish and the city’s outer suburbs.  
As a result, while in 1980, African Americans constituted 45 percent of the city’s 
557,515 residents, in 2000, they comprised over 60 percent of only 484,674 residents and 
were concentrated primarily in its increasingly impoverished urban core.7  
 To counter this trend, in the 1980s and 1990s, developers and city planners touted 
New Orleans as a mecca for cultural tourism and banked on drawing tourists to the 
French Quarter and Canal Street to ensure the city’s recovery.8  To attract potential 
homebuyers and investors, city administrators and developers began to revitalize large 
areas of downtown real estate close to employment centers and cultural districts.9  In 
response, increasing numbers of young white professionals and retirees seeking closer 
access to geriatric services began settling in pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods with 
attractive pre-World War II historic housing stock close to affluent or gentrifying 
communities.10  Against this backdrop, Fry, Clark, and Reed independently began to seek 
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alternative economic and political solutions to confront the city’s stagnating economy, 
while staving off neoliberal incursions on essential municipal welfare services. 
Macon Fry: Community Gardening During the Louisiana Oil Bust 
 
 Long drawn to Louisiana’s food and culture, in 1981, Fry moved from southern 
Virginia to New Orleans.  There, he wrote about the region’s music and food for various 
publications and worked with Orleans Parish Public Schools as an educator for autistic 
young adults.  Growing up in a “homogenous” suburban community, Fry was enamored 
by the city’s independent restaurants, affordable housing, and “incredible old-school 
musicians.”11  He soon discovered first-hand the region’s precarious economic 
conditions, however.  While Louisiana had been the second largest producer of refined 
oil in the nation and the center of the petrochemical industry since 1945, its economic 
growth was dependent on the benevolence of the oil industry, which heavily influenced 
state economic policies and legislation.12  Fry recalls that with the influx of oil money, 
developers during the 1980s had begun “investing in buying vacant lots and buying run-
down properties to renovate them.”13  But then the oil industry “busted big time.”   
 Only a few years after Fry settled in the city, the 1984 oil bust decimated 
Louisiana’s economy.  When oil companies fled the city to invest in oil production 
abroad, the state’s unemployment rate hit 13.2 percent, the highest in the country.14  Fry 
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notes that while he was attracted to the city’s “benign neglect,” which warded off the 
homogenizing effects of chain stores and large corporations, by 1985, “businesses closed, 
everything was for sale…There were blighted cars—every block had three or four cars on 
it that were sitting there, dead...And [blight is] progressive.”15  The effect of the oil bust 
was so profound, Fry recalls, that “on a small scale, and with much less repercussions, it 
was like a mini Katrina, because there were so many blighted properties in the city.”   
 Reflecting on his gardening career during the 1980s oil bust and the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, Fry maintains that during both periods, he explicitly addressed the 
ways in which local food production could counter crushing economic loss.  As the city’s 
economy spiraled downwards, Fry began training as a master gardener with the Parkway 
Partners community garden program, established in 1982.16  Founded by Flo Schornstein, 
a former director of Parks and Parkways, the organization was a public-private 
partnership created to “maintain green spaces in the City, at a time when budgets were 
stretched really thin, and there was a huge amount of blight because of people leaving 
town from the oil bust.”17  The community garden program, run by Kris Pottharst, 
attempted to convert abandoned lots into gardens.  At its height, Parkway Partners had 
formed over 100 community gardens scattered across the city.  
 Yet the community garden program contained several “fatal flaws” that would 
have serious implications after Hurricane Katrina, and Fry has assiduously avoided 
replicating these “time bombs” in his current work with the Gathering Tree Growers 
                                                
15  Fry, interview with author. 
16  Ibid.; “About Us,” Parkway Partners, accessed July 10, 2014, 
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17 Fry, interview with author. 
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Collective.  Specifically, Fry contends, the program lacked land security.  At the height of 
the oil bust, Parkway Partners received permission from the City to build community 
gardens on steadily accumulating “adjudicated properties,” private lots held for judgment 
on back taxes when owners defaulted on their loans and abandoned their property.  Fry 
claims that the city’s agreement placed Parkway Partners in a vulnerable and ambiguous 
legal position because the city had no “process to either collect the money or to get rid of 
the lots.”  Further, because the City did not technically own the adjudicated properties, 
the owner could return to claim his or her land at any time.  Consequently, “there was 
never a clear sense [that] those gardens would not be sold” by their original owners, 
making Parkway Partners and nearby residents uniquely vulnerable to the vagaries of 
private property owners and developers. 
 Fry compares Parkway Partner’s tenuous hold on its gardens to the post-Katrina 
phenomenon of “guerrilla gardening,” in which activists like those belonging to the 
Common Ground Collective transformed abandoned lots between buildings and houses 
into productive, environmentally sustainable gardens to provide food security for flood 
ravaged communities.  As Common Ground co-founder Scott Crow argues, the 
collective’s bioremediation program revitalized old gardens and created new ones that 
were “gathering places for conversation, beautifying unoccupied and derelict spaces that 
gathered garbage even before the storm.”18  Matt Robinson, a former Common Ground 
volunteer, recalls that immediately after the storm, his fellow activists believed the 
“chessboard was empty...So it seemed like anything was possible. You just take a piece 
                                                
18 Scott Crow, Black Flags and Windmills (Oakland: PM Press, 2011), 156. 
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of land, start growing stuff on it, and boom!  You have a community garden.  Irrespective 
of who owns the property, where they are, what are they going to do with it, what the 
condition of the property is, and all that.”19  While he admires the impulse to help 
residents grow nutritious and inexpensive produce, Fry argues, “if you’re trying to do 
community building around the garden, it’s a non-starter to not have land security.”20 
  The primary weakness in the community garden program, however, was that 
while Parkway Partners could claim to be one of the largest privately supported 
community gardens system in the nation, it failed to maintain most of the gardens it had 
initiated.  Fry observes, “it’s sexy to start a garden, you know?  Everybody wants to start 
a garden.  And [local business owners and politicians] get [their] picture in the paper with 
the little kids from the neighborhoods with the shovels...And funding comes in, and you 
build more gardens.”  Yet when Fry was promoted to Parkway Partners’ community 
garden cooperator in 2001, he discovered that of the organization’s stable of 120 
community gardens, only about 20 were adequately maintained. He recalled that the vast 
majority were entirely derelict: he either could not locate the gardens or “I’d find that the 
sign had fallen down and was laying in the back...under a bunch of beer cans...And even 
harder than finding the gardens, though, was finding gardeners.”   
 The problem was rooted in the fact that Parkway Partners was a greening 
organization rather than a community-building organization.  The program was not 
intended to “build a cooperative or a collective.  They were there to put in gardens on lots 
                                                
19 Robinson, interview with author. 
20 Fry, interview with author. 
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that were blighted.”  In essence, the organization’s role was to “[save] the city 
maintenance work” rather than to create sustainable food security programs.  Indeed, 
after twenty years in operation, Parkway Partners’ gardens were scattered “with some 
abandon around the city.  And ‘abandon’ being the operative word later, you know, 
because they hadn’t done the footwork in getting proper support” from community 
members to commit to cultivating the gardens.    
 Fry contends that the city’s changing demographics and a corresponding profound 
cultural shift over the past thirty years dramatically impacted the longevity and health of 
the Parkway Partners community garden program.  Fry acknowledges, “If you’re talking 
about the people in gardens, and what has happened with those gardens, you have to talk 
about race.”  When Fry moved to New Orleans, the African American population 
hovered around 60 percent.21  While younger generations of New Orleanians were 
uninterested in gardening, the Parkways sites were staffed primarily by elderly African 
Americans between 70 and 85, sometimes over 90 years old.22  The African American 
population of New Orleans tripled in the two decades after World War II as thousands of 
rural migrants seeking work in the burgeoning oil industry and shipyards.23  Fry argues 
that this population “brought their interest in gardening and their skills.  And there were 
some very, very good gardeners that needed a lot of help because of their age.”   
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 However, by the early 2000s, this generation was rapidly shrinking, and most of 
the staff’s elderly gardeners had either died or relocated after Hurricane Katrina.  
Consequently, the older African American population crucial in Parkway Partners’ early 
days was no longer present to sustain the community garden program after 2005.  As a 
result, Fry argues, “if community gardening is your model for a so-called cooperative 
effort, they just very often end up not being truly cooperative. It ends up being 
individuals brought in, that may or may not have mutual interest…into a space where 
they’re rubbing elbows. And it just doesn’t surprise me that that type of social experiment 
might not work.”  Therefore, on the eve of Hurricane Katrina, Fry was looking for a new 
model for urban agriculture to draw community members together.  The Gathering Tree 
Growers Collective would allow Fry to retain ownership over the cooperative garden and 
guide its cultivation, while providing training and resources for budding gardeners.  
John Clark and New Orleans’ Countercultural Cooperatives 
 
 In order to understand Solidarity Economy’s vision for a utopian New Orleans, 
we must examine the background of one of its founders, long-time anarchist John Clark.  
For Clark, Solidarity Economy is the manifestation of his philosophical and political 
theory and practice over the past forty years.24  Growing up in a devoutly religious ethnic 
white-working class community of St. Roch in the 1950s and 1960s, Clark was steeped in 
a culture of Protestant church-based voluntarism that would train him in the principles of 
cooperation and activism long before he encountered the formal cooperative movement.  
As a philosophy graduate student at Loyola University in the late 1960s, Clark 
                                                
24 John Clark, interview with author, June 28, 2012.  Cooperative Oral History Project. 
 355 
encountered radical libertarianism, decentralism, and anarchism, which compelled him to 
“break with individualism” and embrace social cooperation and mutual aid as a model for 
complete social and political transformation. 
 Clark did not have far to look for practical applications of cooperation. His first 
experiment with cooperation was in the early 1970s when he and his fellow neighbors, 
mostly graduate students living near Tulane University and Loyola, started the University 
Free School Co-op for infants and toddlers.  Parents hired teachers and volunteered at the 
day care one day a week per enrolled child.  Soon after, in 1971 or 1972, a parent from 
the day care cooperative organized the Broadway Food Co-op, a cooperative buying club, 
which Clark would run the following year. 
 As organizer of the Broadway Food Co-op, Clark immersed himself in New 
Orleans’s burgeoning food cooperative movement, which, since the late 1960s, had 
advocated ecologically-responsible food production and consumption and consumer 
empowerment.25  In line with Clark’s newfound admiration of radical ecological and 
anarchist philosophy, historian Doug Rossinow argues that many New Left-era 
cooperatives embodied “a vague social vision of innumerable and decentralized small 
units” while offering an alternative to capitalist worker-employer relations.26  Similarly, 
Clark advertised the cooperative as an expression of Murray Bookchin’s theory of social 
ecology, which posited that cities should operate on a human scale that embraced civic 
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participation and individual autonomy.27  Ideally, society should reject both capitalism 
and socialism, instead embracing a cooperative, egalitarian, and ecologically sound 
community-centered system of governance.28   
 Clark advocated food cooperatives, and Broadway Co-op in particular, as an 
accessible way for New Orleanians of moderate incomes to improve food quality, 
eliminate third party price inflation, and advance ecological principles by avoiding waste 
and buying food in bulk.29  Most importantly, however, Clark argued that cooperative 
membership and contact with similarly-minded cooperators clearly demonstrates to 
residents that “constructive, practical activity can be accomplished through mutual aid 
and voluntary association, and that profit-making is not necessary to achieve our ends.” 
 While for its first few years Broadway Food Co-op had as many as 75 members, 
low participation rates encouraged the club to restrict membership to about 15 individuals 
or families who agreed to a “system of equally rotated work and an extremely simple 
[organizational] structure.”30  For over ten years, the Chapel of the Holy Spirit, a student 
chapel across from Newcomb College, let the cooperative use its space as a staging 
ground.  After deciding collectively what produce to purchase, everyone contributed 
between $5 and $6.50 and appointed a member based on a rotating schedule to make 
weekly trips to the French Market to buy groceries.31  Every Saturday morning, Clark and 
a few volunteers would purchase vegetables in bulk directly from farmers before stopping 
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at a local bakery and cheese shop.  Each member family would congregate at the Chapel 
to receive packages of eight different fruits and vegetables, a pound of cheese, and two 
loaves of whole grain bread, which would comprise the bulk of their food for the week.  
 Further, as Clark made his weekly rounds through the farmers market, he realized 
he was part of a larger cooperative buying impulse.  In fact, throughout the 1970s, 
recognizing the popularity of food cooperatives, the Mayor’s Office of Consumer Affairs 
created the Central Food Co-op Office, which supported the establishment of new 
cooperatives.32  In April 1976, for example, the office hosted “Food Week” and “Food 
Co-op Day,” which featured a potluck banquet and speakers ranging from the president 
of the local sugar workers union, New Orleans Socialist Union member Jim Stodder, 
local food cooperative activists Phyllis Parrun, and national cooperative representatives.33 
 Indeed, “there were lots of little food coops,” Clark recalls. “I’d run into them 
when I’d do the shopping.  I’d see five or six other groups at the French Market.”  
Offering members organic, high quality fresh produce as well as the experience of “a 
social gathering where working together breaks down the impersonality” of supermarket 
chains, Uptown Food Co-op and the French Quarter Co-op were among at least a dozen 
other food cooperative buying clubs operated in tandem with Broadway, ranging from 
tiny to very large.34  Additionally, by 1975, the Community Co-op Food Store opened 
along Esplanade Avenue at the edge of the French Quarter, complementing neighborhood 
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buying clubs by selling dry goods rather than produce.35  It targeted “persons interested in 
the ‘back to nature movement,’ college students, and older persons who used to eat whole 
grains but got out of the habit,” by offering its several hundred members discounted 
natural foods in bulk, like brown rice, cracked wheat, nuts, oils, natural tea, dried fruit, 
and honey.36  Observing the rise of food cooperatives across the city, it seemed inevitable 
to Clark that cooperative activists like his Social Ecology Group and interested residents 
alike could cultivate a citywide network of diverse cooperatives. 
 For a brief moment in the 1970s and early 1980s, Clark hoped that cooperative 
activists, inspired by the counterculture, student protests, antiwar demonstrations, and 
theories of the beloved community and personal liberation, would reshape society.37  He 
declared breathlessly in 1983 that the “possibilities are almost endless” if using 
cooperatives as tools for total societal transformation.38  However, historian Warren 
Belasco argues that over the course of the 1980s the mainstream food industry steadily 
contained and marketed progressive cooperative’s “natural” foods, while “hip 
entrepreneurs” increasingly compromised their own countercultural ideologies and 
eliminated their cooperative structure to survive competition.39   
 By the end of the 1980s, many cooperatives declared bankruptcy as federal fiscal 
policies favored corporate growth while undercutting small businesses: federal tax cuts to 
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corporations, cut-throat competition, and slashed government spending for social 
programs resulted in a rapid decline of cooperative ventures.40  Community Co-op 
member Patrick Battle bemoaned in 1977, for example, that after federal grants for 
community-centered cooperative development dried up, many of the city’s neighborhood 
food co-ops vanished.41  Similarly, despite organizing educational presentations on food 
cooperatives and relentlessly promoting cooperation to Clar’s Social Ecology group, 
Broadway Food Co-op ended in 1983 when many of its original members moved away.42 
 Despite the demise of the Broadway cooperative, Clark has been committed to the 
pursuit of creating an agrarian, ecological cooperative community since the early 1970s, 
when he encountered philosopher Martin Buber’s Paths in Utopia.43  Written three years 
before Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948, Buber celebrated the Israeli kibbutz 
as a utopian socialist model for complete cooperative living.  He described the kibbutz as 
an opportunity for social healing, in which Palestinian and Israeli members could live, 
work, produce, and consume together in a cohesive cooperative community.44   
 Inspired by Buber’s account of an egalitarian, racially harmonious collective, 
Clark became convinced that contemporary cooperative land trusts were the ultimate 
manifestation of utopian cooperative ideals.  He investigated the Miccosukee Land 
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Cooperative, an intentional community in Tallahassee, Florida, as a potential model for a 
land trust serving Mississippi and Louisiana.  Miccosukee consisted of 100 families each 
owning one to three acres of private property, while over 90 acres were designated as a 
nature preserved owned collectively by the Cooperative.45  The Cooperative also included 
a town council, community center, swimming pool, and other recreational and 
community institutions.  Inspired, between the early 1990s and 2005, Clark and his ex-
wife bought over 70 acres of clear-cut land to start a similar community in Hancock 
County, Mississippi, hoping to divide acreage between collective and individual projects.  
Before Hurricane Katrina flattened most of the land, he had been reforesting the area, 
constructing trails, and holding retreats to promote and develop large scale “true 
communities.”  After the storm, Clark renewed his efforts to both create an urban 
cooperative network and a rural cooperative land trust in order to radically transform 
Louisiana’s repressive political and exploitative economic conditions. 
Harvey Reed and New Orleans’ Black Cooperative Traditions 
 Finally, examining Louisiana Association of Cooperatives (LAC) director Harvey 
J. Reed, III’s cooperative career vividly links the history of civil rights and antipoverty 
movements in New Orleans to contemporary social justice organizing. While Reed was 
unaware of the Louisiana cooperative movement until the 1990s, he was nonetheless 
familiar with the principles of cooperation from a young age.  Born in 1950 in Tremé, 
Reed grew up in the Lafitte Public Housing Projects and attended public schools within 
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walking distance of his home. Reed recalls, “people functioned like cooperatives...the 
situation...[allowed] you to come together and take your goods and services and trades 
and market to those who are going to use it.  So I saw folks do that.”46  Religious, social, 
and informal cooperative enterprises would expose Reed to the necessity of mutualism 
long before he encountered agricultural cooperatives as an adult.     
   As an adolescent, Reed relied on a close-knit community that embraced mutual 
cooperation, while he was simultaneously thrust into Tremé’s burgeoning civil rights 
movement.  He recalls that in the 1950s and 1960s, “we understood how to get around 
[racial strife]” through small acts of resistance as well as coordinated protest.  For 
example, “We would remove the barriers [white officials] would put up without anybody 
knowing about it….Signs on the bus saying ‘colored to the rear of the bus,’ we would just 
throw away...and occupy the bus.” Reed also directly encountered black activists fighting 
Louisiana’s civil rights battles.  For instance, he recalls that NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund attorney Thurgood Marshall and his staff established temporary offices 
in the Knights of Peter Claver Building during the parish school desegregation crisis in 
1960 and 1961.  Galvanized by civil rights activity, Reed’s strong sense of racial justice 
would influence his cooperative organizing many decades later. 
 Similarly, the 1965 Hurricane Betsy disaster demonstrated to Reed the extent to 
which racial and class discrimination was ingrained into the city’s infrastructural 
development and the dire need for community action to redress systemic inequity.  That 
year, Reed won a football scholarship to attend Southern University in Baton Rouge, a 
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historically black college.  Two weeks after Reed began classes, Betsy slammed into 
New Orleans, flooding the Lower Ninth Ward, a low-lying, poorly drained neighborhood 
of poor blacks and whites.47  Eighty people died, and the neighborhood suffered $1 
billion in damages.48  While historian Kent Germany argues that initial government 
apathy spurred a rise in black political participation at the neighborhood, city, and state 
level, Beverly Wright and Robert Bullard contend that the Ninth Ward never received 
adequate state or federal assistance to fully recover, causing the neighborhood to rapidly 
decline as residents left seeking better opportunities.49  
 To Reed, Betsy demonstrated the necessity of sustained resident cooperation and 
neighborhood self-reliance in the absence of adequate government response.50  In 
Tremé’s Lafitte Projects, residents relocated to the highest floor of the building, gathering 
friends and stranded non-residents alike to shelter with them during the storm.  
Afterwards, Tremé residents reached out to affected Ninth Ward neighborhoods so that 
“no one starved.”  Black cooperatives ranging from church groups, social aid and 
pleasure clubs, mutual aid societies, and medical and life insurance groups helped 
flooded neighborhoods slowly recover.51  As they organized their own recovery efforts, 
black New Orleanians demonstrated characteristic resiliency stemming from decades of 
oppression: “We knew how to survive,” Reed says.   
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 Reed’s college career was another politicizing moment.  Although his schooling 
was interrupted when he served in the air force during the Vietnam War, after his tour, 
Reed enrolled at Southern University’s New Orleans (SUNO) extension campus located 
in Pontchartrain Park, a new suburban neighborhood built for African Americans.52  Reed 
pursued a bachelors degree in transportation management and a minor in accounting, 
noting that racial discrimination restricted black students’ employment options.  Often, 
black students were forced to “choose what was given to us.”53  However, Reed attended 
SUNO as the civil rights and black liberation movements were sweeping SUNO’s 
campus, spurring many students to critique their educational training as they fought for 
self-determination in all aspects of their lives.54 
 For example, in 1969, the Afro-American Society, a group of civilian and veteran 
students, demanded that SUNO President Emmett Bashful respond to the changing 
political climate by engaging in meaningful dialogue with students, faculty, and staff.   
Specifically, the organization urged SUNO to create an autonomous Black Studies 
program, improve campus facilities and resources, freeze tuition increases, expand the 
library’s collection of black-authored texts, and form a Black Draft Counseling Center.55  
When neither the school administration nor the state governor acceded to the protestors’ 
demands, students occupied a campus building until the National Guard marched on the 
school.  Months of protest did result in some concrete change, but for the remainder of 
the decade SUNO largely maintained its educational status quo.  Nonetheless, Reed 
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describes his experience at SUNO as a “gift”; as he completed his business degree, he 
gained a broader understanding of world and national affairs, which he lent to his future 
cooperative organizing career. 
 By 1986, in spite of the oil bust, Reed was running a successful horticulture 
business serving as Outreach Coordinator for Delgado Community College’s Horticulture 
Department.56  A long-time civil rights and community organizer, Reed taught Orleans 
Parish prisoners horticulture skills and implemented a high school summer program.57  In 
the mid-1990s, he befriended Ben Burkett, a small farmer and the Mississippi coordinator 
for the FSC.  At the time, Burkett was working with the African American-owned Indian 
Springs Farmers Association in Mississippi, shipping cooperative members’ produce to 
New Orleans, Chicago, and the greater South.58  A food sovereignty advocate, Burkett 
contended that indigenous producer cooperatives could ensure access to wholesome, 
locally produced food that also sustained indigenous agricultural practices and 
communities.59  Inspired by his discussions with Burkett, Reed independently researched 
cooperatives and was amazed to discover Louisiana’s vibrant black cooperative history.60  
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 Reed was struck by the similarities between civil rights and anti-poverty initiatives 
and the cooperative movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  He was most impressed with 
black farmers’ recognition that “the one thing you have is all this land, but no one is 
buying your goods because you’re black or another color…[So] the best thing is to come 
together as group.”  Once they organized into cooperatives, “no one wanted to tackle with 
these farmers; they were resilient, active, strong.  [White officials and large farmers] did 
not want to handle them wrong—If they handled one person wrong, the entire group was 
against them.” Racial and economic justice organizers staunchly believed that this 
system of black-owned cooperatives would ameliorate rural African American poverty 
and political powerlessness.61    
 Reed was so impressed with the record of Louisianan cooperatives’ economic 
development that he applied for a position with the FSC.62  The FSC sent Reed to Jamaica 
to work with the State Department and the large cooperative business Land O’Lakes, 
which were assisting local agricultural cooperative prepare and ship watermelons to the 
United States.  Over the course of two weeks, he learned about Jamaican cooperatives’ 
environmentally sensitive and high-yield agricultural techniques, as well as their 
democratic organizational structure.  Inspired by the practical applications of agricultural 
cooperatives, Reed would eventually dedicate his career to incubating cooperatives for 
socially disadvantaged small farmers. 
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 At the same time Reed became increasingly interested in farm cooperatives, two 
agricultural agents who had helped him establish the Delgado Horticulture Program 
urged him to enroll in the Louisiana State University Agricultural Leadership 
Development Program as its first black student.  Over the course of two years, 
agricultural leaders attended lectures and travel seminars designed to strengthen rural 
economies by exposing local practitioners to national and global agricultural theories, 
methods, and resources.63  At first Reed was reluctant, insisting that his “civil rights days 
are over.  I’m tired of being the first [African American].”64   Further, he was the only 
horticultural expert in a program catering to wealthy white owners of large farming, 
ranching, and agricultural sales industries.   
 Nonetheless, the two-year training course was a formative one; Reed gained 
comprehensive knowledge about the agriculture business, and the class also traveled 
throughout Argentina and Brazil for three weeks to observe South American farming 
practices.  The program culminated in a weeklong World Health Organization 
conference, in which Reed chaperoned agricultural ministers, economic development 
agents, and financiers from around the world.  Reed credits the experience with 
connecting him to important large-scale agricultural industries, as well as broadening his 
understanding of diverse agricultural practices and policies across the globe.  Most 
importantly, Reed would use these domestic and global networks after Hurricane Katrina 
to seek institutional support for Louisiana’s marginalized farmers. 
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Hurricane Katrina, Rebuilding, and Gentrification 
 
 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Fry, Clark, and Reed began to experiment 
with cooperatives to remediate and rebuild the city.  They acted in direct opposition to 
accelerating city efforts to gentrify transitional communities and demolish public housing 
to redevelop inner city neighborhoods.  Examining New Orleans’ post-Katrina urban land 
use debates illustrates how Fry, Clark, and Reed positioned cooperatives as an 
ameliorative to persistent racial and economic inequality.  Urban planner Kristina Ford 
argues that after Katrina, developers and architectural firms viewed the city as “a place 
where they could win contracts to write plans for recovery from the disaster based more 
on their pet planning theories than on what they knew about the city.”65  As Ford 
observes, the Urban Institute and Bring New Orleans Back Commission’s first rebuilding 
plan, unveiled to the public in January 2006, called for a smaller city footprint more 
resilient to flooding.  To do so, it concentrated rebuilding efforts along natural levees, 
historically the wealthiest part of the city.66  Proposing that the devastated Lower Ninth 
Ward be transformed into parkland, it offered no plan for rehousing displaced residents.67   
 When citizens rejected the Bring Back New Orleans plan, Mayor Ray Nagin 
announced a new rebuilding policy based on free market principles: if a critical mass of 
residents returned to a neighborhood, the City would extend services to the area.68  As 
anthropologist Vincanne Adams argues, rather than reducing the city’s dependence on 
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federal government aid, Nagin’s “market-driven governance” allowed the City to benefit 
from “the market and its rationalities of profit” by transferring government-supervised 
social and economic programs to individuals and the private sector.69 Nagin’s laissez-
faire rebuilding initiative dovetailed with inefficient and insufficient state and federal 
Road Home recovery funds that forced residents living outside of tourist destinations like 
the French Quarter and the Garden District to largely coordinate rebuilding efforts 
themselves. The policy pressured non-profit charities, churches, and volunteers to help 
recovery efforts and bridge the gap in government social and economic services. In 
response, over 70 neighborhood organizations formed to advocate for their community, 
create a neighborhood plan, and independently begin rebuilding.70 
 At the same time, despite the flooding of 60 percent of the city’s housing stock, 
higher rents, and housing shortages, Hurricane Katrina provided city officials and 
developers a compelling reason to raze public housing and gentrify New Orleans’ most 
vulnerable communities.71  Hoping to redevelop valuable central city property and draw 
tourism dollars, city council members aligned with corporations, HANO, and HUD to 
attack public housing.  Between 2005 and 2008, the city demolished four intact public 
housing complexes, attempted to deny residents’ “right of return,” and erected mixed-use 
residential apartments with thousands fewer affordable units than before.72    
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 In contrast, public housing advocates like John Arena, a member of the direct 
action organization Community Concern Compassion/Hands off Iberville (C3), declared 
that only the state could properly ensure safe, sanitary, and affordable housing for low-
income people of color, 70 percent of whom faced housing discrimination years after the 
storm.73  However, during a closed December 19, 2007 City Council meeting, anti-
demolition protesters were pepper sprayed while council members delivered a unanimous 
decision to demolish public housing and stalled on financing new affordable housing 
units.74  Further highlighting the need for vastly expanded public housing rather than 
private affordable housing alternatives, after the 2008 economic crisis, disproportionate 
numbers of unemployed, low-income, and marginalized homeowners lost their homes 
during the 2008 subprime mortgage loan crisis.75  By the end of 2007, the damage was 
done: both Florida and Desire were razed, generations of public housing residents were 
dispersed, and the city began constructing mixed-use, mixed-income housing that critics 
claim will spur further gentrification.76    
 Cooperatives have long emerged out of and served New Orleans’ now demolished 
public housing complexes.  For example, using Desire as its base of operations, the Free 
Southern Theater incorporated public housing residents into its cultural programming.  
Magnolia’s rich community of musicians nurtured cooperative record company executive 
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Harold Battiste, while Rhythm Conspiracy is recruiting former residents to join its music 
cooperative.  Also, St. Bernard resident Harvey Reed would later form the Louisiana 
Association of Cooperatives.  The destruction of public housing and subsequent urban 
renewal threatens the legacy of community-based cooperative organizing.   
 Additionally, urban redevelopment has broader implications for the city’s low-
income residents by exacerbating pre-existing racialized settlement patterns.  
Historically, Richard Campanella argues, the city’s racial demographics has been 
spatially represented by the “white teapot,” a high concentration of affluent whites living 
along the strip of higher land bordering the Mississippi River between Carrollton and 
Bywater and encompassing the French Quarter.  In contrast, as a result of historic 
segregationist practices such as deed restrictions, impoverished blacks largely live in low-
lying drained marshland disproportionately vulnerable to flooding.77  Today, Campanella 
observes that the “white teapot” has fattened in response to rising rates of white migration 
into the city, subsequent gentrification, and black out-migration into surrounding 
suburbs.78  The result is dramatic: In some gentrifying neighborhoods such as 
Campanella’s own Bywater, residents of color have declined by as much as 64 percent 
over the course of the decade.79 
 Most troubling, although the City unveiled its Master Plan in 2011, which 
mandated meaningful neighborhood participation to implement a cohesive system 
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governing land-use decisions, critics argue that planning documents were vague, obscure, 
and ineffective.80  Similarly, environmental justice activist and historian Robert Bullard 
argues that Regional Planning Commission, the entity responsible for creating and 
implementing comprehensive land use policy for the New Orleans region, is weak, 
applies to few parishes near New Orleans, and is disproportionately influenced by 
wealthier, whiter, and less populated parishes like Plaquemines Parish.81  These 
characteristics favor “suburbanization, decentralization, and low-density development” in 
exurban areas and consequently drain state and federal resources away from rebuilding a 
more environmentally just and sustainable New Orleans.82  Ultimately, many activists and 
residents fear, city leaders, mainstream conservationists, and well-connected white 
businesses ignore the needs of impoverished residents of color and instead desire to 
rebuild a “smaller and more upscale” New Orleans.83  
 In contrast to the “disaster capitalism” governing much of the city’s rebuilding 
efforts, cooperative activists hoped that New Orleans could be a “proving ground” for a 
more humane, grassroots-led, participatory economy.84  Yet cooperatives occupy an 
ambiguous place within New Orleans’s changing physical, economic, and political 
landscape.  While most cooperatives strive to mitigate the abuses of a capitalistic 
marketplace, their record of community engagement is mixed.  Observers have criticized, 
for example, the spread of cooperatives that feature a significant racial, class, and 
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political disjunction between the low-income, transitional neighborhoods in which 
cooperatives are often located and their actual membership.85  Idealistic, culturally 
middle-class, educated young people who are committed to improving the city’s 
economic and political disparities confront conundrum of facilitating gentrification and 
perpetuating the very inequality they sought to ameliorate.86  
  Indeed, evidence suggests that food cooperatives can both benefit from and drive 
gentrification. New York Times’ Vivian Yee reports, for example, that the Bushwick 
Food Co-op’s financial success is largely the consequence of gentrification in the 
formerly majority-Hispanic neighborhood.87   Part of a new complex of lofts, espresso 
bar, and a craft store, the cooperative is directly linked to escalating property rates that 
drive resident displacement.  Likewise, when Portland’s Alberta Co-op Grocery opened 
in 2001 in a predominantly black neighborhood, the area was rapidly gentrifying.88  Over 
the past decade, the cooperative’s membership and profits have grown significantly, 
mostly due to its new clientele of affluent whites.  Organizations like the New Orleans 
Food and Farm Network recognize that the white-dominated local food movement is 
often unaware of the racial and class disparities shaping the city’s geography and food 
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politics, and cooperatives’ presence in a vulnerable neighborhood can exacerbate social 
and economic disparity by accelerating gentrification already in effect.89   
 A primary example of the inadvertent ways in which cooperative economics can 
speed urban renewal is the New Orleans Food Co-op, which in 2011 opened along St. 
Claude Avenue in the New Orleans Healing Center.  Located at the edge of the Marigny, 
a neighborhood that has been gentrified since the 1970s, and St. Roch, a low-income 
African American community, the New Orleans Food Co-op seeks to serve both 
communities despite their different demographics and needs.  Even before opening its 
doors, the Co-op was embroiled in debates over the rapid gentrification of poorer areas of 
the St. Roch, Marigny, and Bywater neighborhoods, which Richard Campanella argues 
has created a bifurcated area characterized by “distinct race and class lines,” producing 
“sub-cities, separate communities that happen to abut each other, but otherwise do not 
interact.”90  Recently, accelerating urban renewal and rising rental prices in the Marigny 
have pushed artists into the St. Roch community across St. Claude Avenue.  The presence 
of Richard Florida’s young “creatives” has attracted college-educated whites and mid-
career professionals to this largely disinvested black neighborhood.91   
  Admirably, the Food Co-op hopes to bridge the city’s pervasive food deserts, in 
which low-income residents procure expensive yet poor quality foods from convenience 
stores and fast food chains, by allying with the city’s network of farmers’ markets, local 
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farms, and community-supported agriculture organizations.92  Before opening the store, 
for example, the cooperative partnered with Market Umbrella and the Second Harvest 
Food Bank to operate a mobile food market to provide fresh produce to underserved 
populations.93  Now, to ensure that less affluent residents can join, the cooperative offers 
limited-income membership for $25, a quarter of its “individual share investment.”94   
 However, the food co-op’s leftist credibility was damaged when it announced its 
storefront location in the New Orleans Healing Center.  The center’s developer, Pres 
Kabacoff, has been the key architect in rebuilding post-Katrina New Orleans along free 
market neoliberal principles.95   In addition to renting space to non-profit progressive 
organizations, the Healing Center envisions itself as a community center and small 
business hub that promotes the “physical, nutritional, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, 
economic, environmental, cultural, and civic well-being” crucial to creating a democratic 
and cooperative society.96  At the same time, the organization houses a variety of upscale, 
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for-profit cafes, yoga studios, galleries, and juice bars that clearly attract a more affluent 
demographic rather than the low-income St. Roch community located across the street.97   
 Kabacoff’s strategies mirror those of developers across the country who tout 
expensive residential and commercial building plans that incorporate only minimal 
environmental design elements as “green” and “sustainable” to attract affluent families to 
a gentrifying neighborhood, while ignoring that development’s potentially harmful effect 
on marginalized residents.98  For example, in 2008, when Kabacoff first began building 
the Center, St. Claude residents charged that the developer made little effort to outline the 
details of the complex and even mischaracterized the kinds of stores the Center might 
attract in order to acquire neighborhood approval.99  
 The New Orleans’ Food Co-op therefore faces a troubling conundrum: how can it 
address persistent racial inequality shaping food access and neighborhood viability when 
it resides in a complex Kabacoff explicitly designed to drive gentrification in Bywater 
and the Marigny? Kabacoff has positioned the Healing Center, and by extension, the New 
Orleans Food Co-op, as an anchor for new development along St. Claude, which itself is 
predicated on demolishing public housing and dispersing thousands of low-income 
residents across the city.  Arguing that “density is good as long as you don’t concentrate 
the poor,” in 2013, Kabacoff razed 59 out of Iberville Public Housing Projects’ 75 
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buildings.100  While he promises to eventually construct 820 mixed-income new units on 
the site and throughout New Orleans, only 227 have been funded, with no concrete plans 
to rehouse former low-income residents.101  Instead, Kabacoff’s development company, 
Historic Restoration Incorporated, recently completed a 75-unit affordable housing 
apartment complex for artists in Bywater, anticipating the movement of thousands of 
newcomers into the city seeking housing near downtown while embracing “authentic” 
culture and entertainment.102  Consequently, the explosion of redevelopment in low-
income neighborhoods that has threatened this community by inflating property values in 
by 30 to 60 percent over the past four years.103   
 Unsurprisingly, while the New Orleans Food Co-op advances a model for racially 
inclusive food systems and community economic stimulation, observers contend that the 
cooperative has yet to sufficiently attract low-income residents.  For example, Restaurant 
Opportunity Center cooperative organizer Reese Chenault argues that few working-class 
people of color patronize the Healing Center or the food co-op, preferring to eat at nearby 
fast food restaurants along St. Claude Avenue.104  He notes that St. Roch residents trust 
packaged junk food over fresh produce because conventional grocery store vegetables are 
sometimes rotten, and the New Orleans Food Co-op often offers expensive and 
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unfamiliar products.105  Although the Co-op sells natural and organic foods to improve 
resident nutrition, provides educational services about environmental and health issues, 
and seeks to connect with Louisiana farmers to expand the New Orleans food economy, 
Chenault maintains that the cooperative’s goods must be affordable for the low-income 
community it purports to serves.106   
 If cooperatives alone cannot halt gentrification or neighborhood disinvestment, 
what can? Cooperatives run by marginalized residents may better address their 
neighborhood’s economic and political needs than those located in vulnerable 
communities but serving affluent members outside the neighborhood.  Community-led 
cooperatives, such as Macon Fry’s Gathering Tree Growers Collective, John Clark’s 
Solidarity Economy, and Harvey Reed’s Louisiana Association of Cooperatives, attempt 
to solve racialized food and property disparities by transforming the city’s political and 
spatial geography.  Significantly, these grassroots cooperatives are partnering with 
cooperative allies at the city, state, and national level. 
Gathering Tree Growers Collective 
 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Macon Fry organized a sustainable farming 
experiment station, the Gathering Tree Growers Collective, near Xavier University in 
Mid-City’s Gert Town.  He and his assistant gardener, Jocine Velasco, argue that 
sustainable urban gardening disrupts the conventional food distribution system, is 
environmentally sensitive, and can promote community bonding among neighborhood 
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residents.107  In Gathering Tree, Fry has striven to create an egalitarian cooperative 
gardening project that models both environmental sustainability and community 
sociability to strengthen communities and expand food access to needy residents. 
 The Gathering Tree Growers Collective is both a manifestation of Fry’s political 
philosophy as well as a product of the tremendous resurgence of interest in community 
gardens and urban farms after Hurricane Katrina.  Activists hoped a grassroots network 
of urban agriculture projects would help underserved communities of color access fresh 
produce, spur community redevelopment, improve resident health, and ensure 
neighborhood food security.108 A gardener of two decades, Fry was well placed to exploit 
the city’s coalescing urban farm movement.  To staff the collective, he deployed the 
contacts he made as the mentor farmer at the Mid-City Hollygrove Market and Farm and 
as farm advisor and mentor farmer at Grow Dat Youth Farm, a non-profit City Park 
organization that trains socioeconomically diverse teens to grow food and sell or donate 
produce within neighborhoods with limited access to fresh foods.109  
 Fry charts the dramatic transformation of the community garden movement after 
the storm: The absence of an important body of African American gardeners, the 
depopulation of the city, and the flooding of most of the garden plots, save for a handful 
residing on a narrow strip of high ground, a starkly racialized space, all had significant 
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political implications for community gardening in post-Katrina New Orleans.  Fry 
observes that in the wake of the storm, “suddenly...there were lots more vacant lots” to 
garden on, but the lots’ ownership, as well as their disposal and distribution, “became 
highly politicized,” particularly in un-flooded areas of Uptown.  The community garden 
movement confronted the racial dynamics of the city’s historical demographic settlement 
patterns, with unsettling consequences.   
 Pressure to develop vacant land was further heightened as increasing numbers of 
wealthy, well-educated white migrants resettled the white teapot.110  Consequently, 
Uptown community gardens “that had survived the development of the early 2000s, the 
[economic] growth...and hadn’t been developed, were suddenly really valuable” to 
investors.  The contested property “simply became...too valuable” to use for community 
gardening.111  In contrast, while there had been many community gardens in African 
American neighborhoods in Lower Ninth Ward and Gentilly, those areas were flooded 
and depopulated.  Further, the dearth of long-time black gardeners, who had either died 
or been evacuated during the storm, “really put the whammy on the gardens” that 
“already had been decimated by poor planning, overdevelopment, lack of follow-up, 
[and] lack of community-building.”  Consequently, “after Katrina the number of gardens, 
the number of gardeners, there was nobody here…[it was a] tabula rasa.” 
 The frustrations Fry encountered within the community garden movement before 
and after Katrina pushed him to experiment with other kinds of food sustainability 
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strategies. He argues, “if community gardening is your model for a so-called cooperative 
effort...they just very often end up not being truly cooperative.”  Participants may not 
work together toward the garden’s mutual benefit because they are only invested in their 
own “little spot in their backyard.”  Ultimately, “it just doesn’t surprise me that that type 
of social experiment might not work.” Observing that the most successful Parkways 
Partners community gardens were those that had institutional support, gardened on 
institution-owned land, and had a strong leader with continued resident participation, Fry 
strove to create a collective garden reflecting these qualities.    
 Specifically, Gathering Tree Growers Collective emerged out of Fry’s belief that 
small market gardens could revitalize vacant city lots and help needy families.  After 
establishing demonstration market gardens at Mid-City’s Hollygrove Market and Farm, 
Fry replicated the experiment in a flood-damaged Parkways Partners community plot 
near Xavier University, a Catholic institution primarily serving students of color.  At the 
time, the largely black working-class Gert Town neighborhood was almost completely 
depopulated.  Collective member Jocine Velasco notes that the “scrappy” Mid-City 
neighborhood’s housing stock was severely damaged in the storm, and seven years later, 
several houses near the garden still stood empty.112  However, Velasco observes, “people 
come and go, but there are also a bunch of really old families that have stayed here for a 
really long time that came back or never left after the storm.” Returning residents 
clamored to revitalize their old community garden, so Fry recruited over 100 housing 
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rehabilitation volunteers to transform the “total junkyard” back into a working garden.113  
He recalls, “we cleaned this garden down to the bones.  I mean, by hand got out every bit 
of grass.”  After the garden was remediated, Fry gave Iola and Leola, two elderly Gert 
Town residents and ardent community gardeners, their old plots.  Fry used the remaining 
parcel of land as his own market garden, recruiting especially dedicated Hollygrove 
volunteers to harvest the Gert Town garden.  Eventually, Fry turned the garden into a 
collective farm, while he served as “benevolent dictator,” or mentor gardener.   
Organizational Structure  
 
 Fry envisioned the resulting Gathering Tree Growers Collective as a project that 
would both reflect an egalitarian, cooperative organizational structure and demonstrate 
methods for sustainable urban agriculture.  To ensure that the garden remains productive, 
Fry acts as head gardener, supervising the collective’s work and outlining the week’s 
tasks.  In addition, the collective elected Jocine Velasco to manage the garden in the 
summertime when Fry flees New Orleans to escape the oppressive heat.  However, in 
practice, the collective runs on a consensus model; all responsibilities are shared among 
members and they often decide the garden’s course as a group.   
 Velasco relishes the democratic nature of the collective.  Because everyone “has a 
complete stake” in maintaining the lot, she believes “it’s really important that we ask 
every single person...what we want to grow, and when we’re going to help out.”  To that 
end, each week the collective’s 13 members divvy up labor tasks among themselves, 
although Fry trains everyone on all aspects of the garden’s cultivating duties.  As Velasco 
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describes, “We make a calendar, and see what everybody’s availability are.  And we just 
decide from there.”  Each individual is responsible for completing a small task at least 
one day during the week, such as watering or harvesting.  For example, members 
coordinate several daily irrigation shifts during the summertime.  If the members fail to 
maintain the garden by neglecting to coordinate vacations or forgetting to consistently 
water and weed, Velasco says, “we have to take ownership of the problems...and try to 
alleviate [them] together.”  
 Similarly, Fry and Velasco contend that the collective’s democratic structure 
nurtures close relationships among members in ways absent in other urban agricultural 
projects.114  Velasco says of her fellow members, “everybody is a myriad of really funny 
people coming together really for the sake of being curious and wanting to learn how to 
urban farm...It’s really fun getting to meet people I wouldn’t otherwise get to meet 
before.”  Most of the collective’s young members are predominantly white, idealistic 
transplants who joined the group to establish a sense of community in their new home as 
well as participate the urban agricultural movement.  For example, twenty-something 
Velasco was born in the Philippines and raised in Florida.115  A few years after graduating 
college, she moved to New Orleans to pursue a career in urban and sustainable 
agriculture.  Velasco first volunteered at the New Orleans Food Co-op on St. Claude 
Avenue, drawn to its mission to make nutritious food accessible to the African American 
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St. Roch community.  Velasco’s desire to eventually run an urban farm of her own led 
her to volunteer with Hollygrove and then Gathering Tree Growers Collective.   
 Collective members bond through weekly communal workdays, which blend 
labor with socializing.  Sundays “feel more like a collective, I guess,” explains Velasco, 
because all members convene to “tackle a lot of really big garden issues,” like mending 
and weeding.116  The collective usually spends the early morning volunteering first at 
Hollygrove before driving or biking to Gathering Tree.  Members usually eat lunch 
together after their Sunday gardening shifts and often invite each other to parties.117  As 
Fry notes, “it’s really neat that there’s been a sense of community generated around this 
garden that I...seldom was able to generate in a community garden space, where 
people...tended to their own little plot.”118  Rather than perpetuating New Orleans’s 
reputation as being “sort of a lone wolf, no club type place,” Gathering Tree is an 
important site for cementing social ties among members.119 
 Similarly, while the collective has fostered a tight-knit community amongst 
members, it also attempts to serve the nutritional needs of Gert Town’s African American 
community.  Prior to Katrina, the Parkways Partners community garden had been a 
vibrant site for local food production, and Velasco notes, “people in this neighborhood 
have always known that this was a garden.”  Not only do residents raise vegetables on the 
site, but other neighbors know that Gathering Tree is “a place where they can get food if 
they needed it.”  For example, one neighbor, Mike, “has picked cumquats off this tree for 
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as long as it’s been around here.”  On Sunday harvest days, collective members fill 
wheelbarrows with greens and root vegetables, and passersby can take as much as they 
wish.  Frequently, the collective has a substantial surplus of produce, so “if we have too 
much, we kind of just knock on [residents’] doors.”  To that end, collective members join 
with the firm understanding that they will only plant crops to eat themselves or donate the 
surplus to the surrounding neighborhood.  Because Gathering Tree is primarily a 
demonstration garden, the collective can sell produce at local farmers markets only if it 
still has remaining vegetables after donating the food to the community.  
Permaculture  
 
 Secondly, Gathering Tree Growers Collective’s mission is to promote 
community-driven sustainable agriculture to transform the city’s abandoned lots, many of 
which are still contaminated by residue in Katrina’s floodwaters, into productive 
spaces.120  Velasco argues that after bioremediation of the soil, the lots are “perfect places 
to grow food, as community gardens, for personal use, or...to sell to markets.” Gathering 
Tree specifically practices permaculture, or the practice of “closed loop” living that 
rejects large-scale farming and food production that exploits human and non-human 
animals and fosters environmentally destructive habits.121  The collective contends that 
sustainable agriculture conserves dwindling fossil fuels and other non-renewal resources.  
Ultimately, permaculture adherents seek to create a cooperative, affordable, and 
sustainable lifestyle for all citizens. To do so, practitioners educate residents about 
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ecological technologies and strategies to satisfy shelter, food, waste management, water, 
and energy needs in an urban environment.122 
 Similarly, Gathering Tree argues that permaculture principles offer a new model 
for individual and neighborhood self-sufficiency and food security.  Gathering Tree 
aligns with sustainable agriculture advocates around the country who argue, “working-
class neighborhoods deserve community gardens, green spaces, and easy access to 
healthy food, transportation, and services.”123  As Velasco contends, by no longer relying 
on expensive or poor quality supermarket produce, “you’re feeding yourself, and you’re 
feeding a lot of people with [the garden] in a very small space.”  To that end, Velasco 
seeks to educate Gert Town residents, collective members, and New Orleanians in 
general about sustainable and cooperative farming principles.  For example, Gathering 
Tree’s small, intensively cultivated plots depend on “reusing materials...making your own 
potting mix, say, and reusing that potting mix.  A lot of seed saving.  Using as little of our 
precious resources as possible.”  Further, the collective grows seasonal and local produce 
appropriate to coastal Southern Louisiana.  Such practices, the collective believes, can 
empower neighborhood residents to question over-consumption and dependence on large 
companies and agencies for their basic needs. 
 The success of Macon Fry’s Gathering Tree Growers Collective is inseparable from 
New Orleans’s burgeoning local food movement. For example, vegetarian and vegan 
restaurants have spread across the city, and as Velasco states, there have “been pop-ups 
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and speakeasies and restaurants opening all the time that have those alternatives.”124 
Restaurants like Maurepas Foods in Bywater advertise a “farm-to-table mentality about 
their food” by procuring locally-sourced ingredients. Also, since 2010, the NOLA 
Locavores have organized an annual “Eat Local Challenge,” sponsored by over 40 
restaurants and food purveyors, in which New Orleanians are encouraged to produce or 
eat foods grown within 100 miles of the city for one month.125 Locavores range from 
vegan activists and farmers market directors to inner city community organizers, and they 
strive to preserve Louisiana’s indigenous foods while fostering a local food economy 
accessible to all New Orleanians.  As social geographers Patricia Allen and Clare 
Hinrichs argue, the local food movement has rapidly gained momentum across large 
segments of the public as community gardens and other grassroots urban agricultural 
projects are increasingly “seen as fostering direct democratic participation in the local 
food economy and cultivating caring relationships among people in a community.”126   
Gentrification and the Local Food Movement 
 
 As Gathering Tree seeks to improve resident access to environmentally 
sustainable and healthful food while also modeling an egalitarian non-profit organization, 
they, like other permaculture activists around the country, have become increasingly 
attuned to the complex racial and class dynamics of food advocacy. Velasco notes that 
the garden provokes some measure of curiosity among black residents because “the 
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members of our collective are a.) not from here [New Orleans], and b.) don’t [live]...in 
the same neighborhood…So there’s kind of a gentrification like that here….But, you 
know, no matter what, you’re kind of a part of this thing that’s happening.”127  While 
Velasco commends the rapid acceptance of the local food movement and cooperative 
economics, she remains ambivalent about the unintended impact food cooperatives may 
have on the communities they desire to help.  As community activists Scott Kellogg and 
Stacey Pettigrew similarly contend, permaculture must “also include consciousness about 
gentrification and class to be truly effective.”128 
 On the other hand, Fry maintains that despite the recent influx of white urban 
gardeners into New Orleans, “my point of view on urban agriculture and these types of 
community projects in general...is [that] showing people success is a good thing,” 
regardless of the activists’ race or class.  If a community garden or cooperative can 
inspire neighborhood participation, particularly among African American youth, then the 
project is meaningful.  Fry concludes, “as much as I would like to engage all the 
segments of the city,” his priority is to strengthen the city’s urban agriculture network 
disrupted by Hurricane Katrina in order to build a sustainable, permanent food justice 
movement.  The New Orleans Food and Farm Network supervises Fry’s work for the 
Hollygrove and Grow Dat Youth Farm, for example.  Network Executive Director Sanjay 
Kharod argues that food justice requires a complex and nuanced understanding of the 
city’s racial and class dynamics and advocates for collaboration among people of color 
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and white activists.129  Specifically, it liaisons between the urban farm movement and 
“neighborhood food clusters” of residents, non-profits, institutions, and businesses to 
ensure that local citizens and activists influence urban food policy.130  
 Regardless of members’ position on urban renewal, institutional forces unrelated 
to Gathering Tree’s presence are transforming Gert Town, with serious ramifications for 
the organization’s constituency.  Since Katrina, Gert Town’s rehabilitation has lagged 
behind other neighborhoods; industrial pollution continues to contaminate the area, 
neglected roads wash out, a flooded anchor school has been demolished, and finally, 
Xavier University has rezoned a dozen properties in order to build dormitories.131  
Community activists accuse Xavier University of hurting the neighborhood by unduly 
raising property values and pushing out long-time residents.132 
 Ultimately, while Gathering Tree Growers Collective promotes environmentally 
conscious agricultural practices, it has lacks a systematic framework of economic 
cooperation that can facilitate halt deleterious gentrification or build a community-driven 
alternative to current urban planning models.  The collective functions more successfully 
as an experimental station for permaculture methods rather than as a part of the city’s 
movement for cooperative-led racial and economic justice. Despite working with the 
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Louisiana Association of Cooperatives, Fry was hard pressed to name a single co-op in 
New Orleans, claiming that the movement has not yet reached the city.133   
 Further, despite its democratic organizational structure, Gathering Tree operates 
largely at the behest of Fry, who owns the garden property.  The collective is primarily an 
outgrowth of his interest in the urban agriculture rather than a manifestation of any 
cooperative ideals; without his continued interest, the garden would cease to exist. 
Consequently, Gathering Tree operates independently from the broader cooperative 
movement in New Orleans, and any environmental, economic, and political impact it 
may exert is therefore isolated to Gert Town and its specific collective members.  In 
contrast, one citywide New Orleans cooperative coalition, Solidarity Economy, is 
explicitly aligned with the broader cooperative movement, while also placing land 
security and racial justice at the center of its program for social transformation.   
Solidarity Economy 
 In 2012, Loyola philosophy professor and long-time cooperative and 
environmental activist John Clark helped found Solidarity Economy as a cooperative 
think tank and study group.  The group aimed to pinpoint the failings of previous 
cooperative efforts and brainstorm concrete action plans to sustain meaningful economic, 
political, and social change in the city.134  In weekly meetings, often held at Loyola 
University’s library, members study historical and contemporary cooperative models and 
discuss their current and proposed projects to physically transform their communities.  
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While the organization encompasses cooperatives addressing a broad range of political 
and economic issues, I will limit my analysis to the coalition’s campaign to revolutionize 
the city’s exploitative food production, distribution, and consumption systems.135  
Solidarity Economy is a counterpoint to the neighborhood-specific Gathering Tree 
Growers Collective: it identifies atomistic cooperatives as the primary barrier to building 
a cross-class and interracial city-wide cooperative movement, and it labors to connect 
radical, anarchist, and progressive cooperatives into a loose coalition to better achieve 
community-based governance and economic cooperation. 
 Solidarity Economy is the outgrowth of several recent cooperative and radical 
movements centered on social justice, community empowerment, and alternative 
economics.  First, Hurricane Katrina spurred a resurgence of anarchist and cooperative 
activism to challenge neoliberal government and development initiatives.  For example, 
after returning to New Orleans shortly after the storm to assist with relief work, Clark 
was inspired by anarchist activists who streamed into the city to help stabilize devastated 
communities.  Clark was particularly impressed with New Orleans community organizer 
and former Black Panther Malik Rahim’s collaboration with Austin anarchist Scott Crow 
to establish the Common Ground Collective in Algiers and the Lower Ninth Ward.136   
 A radical, democratic, and anti-oppressive organization, Common Ground offered 
free medical treatment, food, and clothing to survivors.  The collective’s organizers drew 
explicitly on survival tactics from the Black Panthers, Zapatistas, and American 
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anarchists to craft an alternative to failed city, state, and federal relief efforts, and it 
hoped to quickly turn its operations over to returning local residents.137  However, local 
activists and Common Ground founders worried that high turnover rates of volunteers, 
the slow return of hurricane refugees, and white, affluent, and outside volunteers’ 
prejudice would blunt Common Ground’s potential to overturn institutionalized racial 
and class inequality.138  After Solidarity Economy formed out of the ashes of Common 
Ground and other collective organizations, Clark and his fellow activists invited former 
Common Ground members to participate in a renewed effort to build a radical, 
egalitarian, and cooperative economy.139 
 Second, the economic recession of 2008 constituted a new impetus for 
cooperative organizing as New Orleanians who had lost their jobs, savings, and homes 
through corporate malfeasance looked for community-driven solutions to economic 
instability.140  As Anne Knupfer argues, after 2008, the cooperative movement rapidly 
expanded as under-employed and unemployed citizens formed small businesses, 
collectives, and cooperatives.141  Third, several Solidarity Economy members had 
belonged to the anarchist New Orleans Free School Network, which John Clark created 
in 2010 as a free, anti-authoritarian volunteer organization devoted to “the development 
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of accessible, relevant, community-based education.”142  Fourth, young activists in the 
2011 Occupy Wall Street Movement also comprised the core of the coalition.  Acting in 
solidarity with New York City protestors, Occupy New Orleans coordinated mass 
marches protesting a wide gamut of local and national social, economic, and political 
issues ranging from police brutality, the prison-industrial system, political corruption, 
economic inequality, and neoliberal policies governing Hurricane Katrina rebuilding 
efforts and post-2008 home foreclosure measures.143   
 Finally, Solidarity Economy formed directly out of the international solidarity 
economy movement, which critiques capitalism by uniting worker cooperatives, 
intentional communities, farmers markets, time banks, and other alternative economic 
models to transform capitalistic economic and political systems.144  Solidary economy 
activists believe that by sponsoring reinvestment programs, researching community 
needs, and monitoring public programs, cooperatives can help residents control 
revitalization in their neighborhood.  Similarly, Solidarity Economy’s 20 members 
represent diverse cooperative projects throughout the city and state, including time bank, 
free schools, land trust organizations, farmers markets, community gardens, and a variety 
of worker cooperatives.   
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 Although many of coalition members are recent additions to the New Orleans 
activist community, the group draws on the experiences of long-time cooperative activists 
John Clark, a native New Orleanian, Sally Stevens, a resident since the 1990s, and Don 
Paul, a denizen since 2006.  All three channel their previous cooperative work, analyzing 
their failings and offering suggestions for current cooperative organizers. 
 In a June 2012 Solidarity Economy meeting, veteran and new cooperative 
members bluntly assessed the hurdles facing the city’s cooperative movement.145  Central 
City activist Sally Stevens observed that while many cooperative activists are doing 
important work within their neighborhoods, their larger impact is dampened because they 
are dispersed across the city.  In order to unite scattered cooperatives and educate the 
public about their presence, the coalition must reframe the cooperative economy as 
beneficial to New Orleans as a whole.  Concurring with Stevens’s assessment, Restaurant 
Opportunities Center of New Orleans (ROC) organizer Reese Chenault contended that 
black and white cooperatives must bridge geographic isolation by improving interracial 
communication and building a broad, citywide cooperative movement.   
 To that end, John Clark urged members to look to large churches as models for 
community outreach. For example, St. Roch’s Franklin Avenue Baptist Church had 7,000 
members, largely because it was “in touch with people’s real needs.”  Clark criticized left 
wing activist groups for spouting revolutionary rhetoric but “not helping when members 
are sick, or die,” unlike many faith-based organizations.  He pointed to the civil rights 
movement’s “beloved community” as touchstone for Solidarity Economy.  Similarly, 
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Don Paul, the former Operations Director for Common Ground, instructed members to go 
out to impoverished neighborhoods to ask residents directly what they needed.  Activists 
must “get over our egotism,” he said.  “What does everyone want us to do?”  Pointing to 
his experience with Common Ground’s offshoot cooperative projects, Paul observed that 
cooperatives fail when they do not provide services that the community needs. Chenault 
agreed: “Communities must want you, or you can’t survive.” 
 Given Clark’s experience with food cooperatives, it is no surprise that Solidarity 
Economy addresses racial and class disparity in the city’s food distribution, production, 
and consumption systems.  In June 2012, for example, Chenault outlined ROC’s efforts 
to mobilize restaurant workers for workplace justice, campaigning for living wages, safe 
working conditions, job training, and professionalization programs.146  ROC was building 
community partnerships between neighborhood churches and Solidarity Economy to 
encourage black St. Roch and the Seventh Ward residents to join the nearby New Orleans 
Food Co-op and organize their own worker cooperatives.147  By circulating money within 
the community, reducing crime, and providing healthful food to residents, a critical mass 
of community-based cooperative restaurants and grocery stores might reverse racialized 
disinvestment and achieve neighborhood stability.   
 To that end, Chenault announced that in 2013, ROC planned to open a 
cooperative restaurant called Colors, modeled after ROC efforts in Detroit and New York 
City. The restaurant would serve the St. Roch community, which suffers from poor 
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nutrition and an over-abundance of fast food chain restaurants. Worker-owners would be 
paid a living wage, create their own menus, and grow food on site.  To fully embrace a 
“solidarity economy,” Don Paul members suggested that ROC work with the Louisiana 
Association of Cooperatives to purchase produce from agricultural cooperatives.    
 To complement Chenault’s worker cooperative campaign, Clark urged his 
Solidarity Economy colleagues to revive cooperative buying clubs to eliminate food 
deserts in the city’s poorest neighborhoods.  If modeled after Clark’s Broadway Food Co-
op, buying clubs’ minimal membership fees would fund weekly French Market 
excursions to buy bulk produce, while target neighborhoods would benefit from reliably 
sourced, affordable, and nutritious food. Paul suggested asking the New Orleans Food 
Co-op to stock cooperative fruit and vegetable vendors, which would circulate throughout 
the city, much like beloved Arthur “Mr. Okra” Robinson’s traveling fruit truck. 
Community Land Trusts and Neoliberalism 
 While Clark and Solidarity Economy promote food cooperatives to empower 
consumers, they also believe cooperative land trusts can democratize food production and 
housing.148  Likewise, Scott Kellogg and Stacey Pettigrew argue that only community-
driven initiatives such as rent controls, tax limitations, and land trust programs can slow 
or stop gentrification and ensure working class communities’ continued autonomy.149  
Similarly, Don Paul announced, “New Orleans development doesn’t have to roll over 
people.  People feel disempowered, and not included” in the planning process.  Therefore, 
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community land trusts constituted a “huge opportunity” to transform the city’s neglected, 
empty land into productive agricultural plots.150 Accordingly, Paul met with the LAC to 
plan a cooperative urban farming campaign. With between 75 and 85 percent of Lower 
Ninth Ward lots still vacant, Paul and LAC head Harvey Reed theorized that the area was 
an ideal place to form small urban agricultural cooperatives.  The group could form a 
land trust to buy an empty lot or an entire city block and farm it.  In this way, Solidarity 
Economy hoped to achieve a basis for sustainable cooperative living.  
 In a free market economy that disincentivizes equitable housing, cooperative 
activists also advance community land trusts as practical means of helping low-income 
residents locate affordable housing.  Community land trusts are private, non-profit 
organizations that purchase and permanently control property for the benefit of their 
community.151  Ideally, because its occupants collectively own the property, housing costs 
remain affordable for all stockholders. Organized as a cooperative, voting members 
consist of both land trust residents and outside community members, ensuring, 
theoretically, that the organization remains answerable to its neighborhood constituents.  
Concurring that public housing “concentrates poverty,” attracts crime, and perpetuates 
dependence on government social programs, in 2006, the Urban Institute enthusiastically 
promoted community land trusts to increase private homeownership and affordable rental 
rates among low-income citizens.152   
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 Respected cooperative activists like Gar Alperovitz advance community land 
trusts as a tool to prevent displacement and gentrification in low-income 
neighborhoods.153  Accordingly, several non-profits have started community land trusts to 
help vulnerable communities equitably rebuild.  In the midst of the City’s decision 
between 2006 and 2008 to demolish much of New Orleans’s public housing, the non-
profit Peoples Hurricane Relief Fund received funding from the Venezuelan government 
to establish an affordable housing community land trust and credit union in the Lower 
Ninth Ward.154   Similarly, in 2008 Common Ground co-founder Malik Rahim dismissed 
state-delivered social services in favor of anarchist non-profit organizations.  
Consequently, the collective briefly, albeit unsuccessfully, converted former public 
housing into cooperative housing.  
 More recently, fearing that a proposed Whole Foods and upscale residential 
development would raise property values and displace low-income Mid-City African 
American renters, in 2013 the Crescent City Community Land Trust partnered with Jane 
Place Neighborhood Sustainability Initiative to build an affordable housing apartment 
complex in the area.155  The Trust claims that public housing is no longer sustainable 
because federal funding only ensures that housing is affordable for five or ten years 
before the property reverts to market-rate value.  In contrast, as urban studies professor 
Maria Nelson argues, community land trusts located in gentrifying neighborhoods will 
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“take real estate off the speculative market and ensure long-term affordability for renters 
and low-income homeowners” by acquiring property under long-term, renewable leasing 
contracts.156  The Trust and Jane Place hope that land trusts will facilitate community-led 
neighborhood improvement absent within the city’s public housing projects.157 
 However, Solidarity Economy’s enthusiasm for community land trusts is 
complicated by an aversion to state assistance.  Because many of its members are 
anarchists who reject the state’s authority to intervene in individual and community 
affairs, the organization as a whole has preferred to work with other cooperatives and 
non-profits to build a grassroots cooperative movement, rather than demanding 
municipal, state, or federal assistance for cooperative development and support.  For 
example, Matt Robinson, a collective member of R.U.B.A.R.B., a Ninth Ward 
community bicycle workshop and Common Ground offshoot, observes that there is a 
“really strong undercurrent among folks who are anarchist-minded to not engage with the 
government in any way.”158 He recalls that deciding whether to apply for federal non-
profit status in order to have legal standing “was just pulling teeth, because folks would 
be like, ‘we don’t need to do that. We’re not here to be part of the government; we’re just 
here to work with kids and fix bikes.’” 
 Yet by promoting decentralized networks of cooperatives as an alternative to 
government institutions, anarchists can be implicated in the state’s efforts to privatize 
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economic and social programs.  Political scientist Cedric Johnson argues that lacking a 
cohesive citywide rebuilding plan that accommodates public housing residents, city 
leaders instead legitimize non-profits’ “various agendas of community empowerment and 
grassroots rebuilding.”159  By giving non-profits the authority to direct rebuilding efforts, 
the government has shifted the onus of reconstructing New Orleans to the private sector. 
 Indeed, critics contend that community land trusts legitimatize government efforts 
to abandon public housing, health care programs, public schools, and other social 
services in favor of their management by corporations and private, nonprofit 
organizations.160  While a robust democratic grassroots movement among public housing 
residents and activists demanded that officials halt demolition and retain all remaining 
public housing, social scientist John Arena argues that anarchists and radical leftists 
undercut this campaign by creating private nonprofits to replace public housing units.161  
As a result, Common Ground, Peoples Hurricane Relief Fund, and other community land 
trusts effectively supported a neoliberal policy of privately managed social programs. 
 Further, the Urban Institute concedes that, unlike public housing, community land 
trusts are vulnerable to shifting property values.162  Once the neighborhood has been 
targeted for urban renewal, land values can skyrocket, out-pricing community trusts 
dependent on private donations to acquire property.  Consequently, opponents maintain, 
cooperative housing should complement, not replace, a comprehensive system of 
federally regulated affordable housing.  By potentially shoring up neoliberal policies they 
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oppose, Solidarity Economy may adversely affect their communities of concern by 
potentially exacerbating racial inequality.  Instead, cooperatives run by marginalized 
citizens that build governmental alliances and demand municipal accountability may 
achieve more permanent political and economic change. 
Louisiana Association of Cooperatives 
 The Louisiana Association of Cooperatives (LAC) provides a final model for 
cooperative organizing. LAC believes cooperatives are just one tool among many to 
make the state accountable to its citizens; alongside cooperative development, activists 
must work directly with government officials to redress the economic and political plight 
of underserved agricultural communities in Louisiana. Key to the LAC’s success, 
therefore, is its role as intermediary between its dispersed network of small-scale local 
cooperatives and government agencies. Tracing LAC director Harvey Reed’s 
involvement in cooperative development reveals the continuity and rupture the Louisiana 
cooperative community experienced in the years after Hurricane Katrina.   
 Since 2007, the Gretna-based LAC has constituted the vanguard of interracial 
cooperative formation across the state and has been integral to reconstructing rural 
communities and reinvigorating the Louisiana cooperative movement after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in 2005 and the Gulf Coast Oil Spill in 2010.163 While it primarily 
organizes agricultural cooperatives, the LAC also participates in the New Orleans food 
justice movement, networking with city farmers markets, cooperative projects, and 
community gardens to equitably connect Louisiana’s small growers to disadvantaged 
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consumers. It therefore works with local communities and state and federal agencies to 
concentrate economic and political power among Louisiana’s poor residents of color.  
 Reed was slowly recovering from cancer when Hurricane Katrina slammed into the 
Gulf Coast states on August 29, 2005.  He felt “the need to do something [positive] 
without having pity party,” so he aided the FSC’s recovery and relief efforts.  
Immediately after Katrina, the FSC trained citizens to apply to federal relief programs 
and provided cooperative and credit union workshops to rebuild marginalized Gulf Coast 
communities.164  Reed traveled across Louisiana, meeting with small fishermen and 
farmers to identify their most pressing needs.  For example, Cameron Parish fishermen 
were “wiped out” after Hurricane Rita inundated coastal areas on September 24, 2005.165  
At the opposite end of the state, Plaquemines Parish lost 80 percent of its commercial 
fleet and virtually all of its docks, equipment, and coastal businesses. 
 After speaking with these small fishing communities, Reed discovered two 
immediate points of concern: first, Hurricane Katrina and Rita had exposed the systemic 
economic inequality long plaguing independent, marginalized fishermen.  In both 
parishes, low-income fishermen were forced to use large commercial docks for 
processing their seafood hauls, which significantly reduced their already meager 
profits.166  Historical racial and cultural antagonism between African Americans, Native 
Americans, Southeast Asian immigrants, and whites militated against marginalized 
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fishermen’s interracial collaboration.  However, the widespread devastation provided an 
impetus for multicultural cooperation to ensure speedy economic recovery.167 The FSC 
promoted interracial cooperatives to equalize marketing and distribution systems that had 
depressed all independent fishermen’s wages.168 
 Second, small fishermen worried that Governor Kathleen Blanco’s Louisiana 
Recovery Authority (LRA) was overlooking independent commercial outfits by 
channeling limited recovery funds to the wealthy, well-organized Louisiana Fishing 
Community Recovery Coalition, an advocacy group for large fishing corporations and 
recreational boaters.169  Until small fishermen received adequate government support, 
they would not be able to resume their livelihood.170  Addressing their concerns, Reed 
suggested marginalized fishermen form cooperatives to pool their resources to recover 
their losses and represent their interests to the LRA.  He cautioned, however, “if you 
agree, you must promise me that you will stand right next to me, not behind me.  And not 
in front of me because you don’t know what you’re doing.”  In return, Reed would train 
the fishermen in cooperative principles and represent them at LRA hearings to receive 
equitable recovery funds.  Further, Reed connected new cooperatives to private and 
federal funding sources and worked to expedite the funding process.  This way, “if it 
takes too long for a federal program to get the cooperative’s loans approved, we can do it 
                                                
167 Jane Livingston, “Miracle on the Bayou,” Rural Cooperatives 74, no. 2 (March and April 2007), 
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/mar07/miracle.htm.   
168 Federation of Southern Cooperatives, press release, “Cooperative Support for New Post-Katrina 
Fishing Co-op in Louisiana” (February 27, 2007), 
http://www.federationsoutherncoop.com/press/feb2707.htm. 
169 Jeremy Alford, “Board Develops Plan to Help Fishermen with Storm Recovery,” Houma Today 
(January 13, 2007). http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20070113/NEWS/701130305. 
170 Reed, interview with author. 
 403 
quicker, with less collateral, so that a cooperative member does not have to put up their 
house or farm.  So many times, banks have auctions.  People lose their land and homes 
because they didn’t have adequate [expert] advice.”  
 In 2007, Reed helped incorporate the first post-Katrina Louisiana cooperative: the 
South Plaquemines United Fisheries Cooperative, a racially diverse 50-member 
marketing cooperative that sold shrimp, crab, and oysters.171  Yet the nascent 
cooperative’s crucial rebuilding work was slowed because the Louisiana Secretary of 
State did not understand the nature of the cooperative.  Although the federal government 
had recognized the legal status of fishing cooperatives in its Fishermen’s Collective 
Marketing Act of 1934, it still took three weeks for the agency to approve the South 
Plaquemines charter.172  Similarly, many cooperatives across the state and country divert 
much time and energy from their daily operations to educate public officials about their 
status as legal entities and their protections under the law.173  Nonetheless, Reed’s 
persistence was rewarded, and he used the Plaquemines charter as a template to rapidly 
incorporate many other Louisiana cooperatives. 
 Like many observers, Reed is sharply critical of the LRA’s distribution policies.  
Directly controlling over $10 billion in federal recovery funding, LRA often ineffectively 
administered aid to New Orleans and Louisiana’s devastated population and legitimized 
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the privatization of housing, workforce development, and health care services.174  Its 
fishery recovery program was no better.  In the years following Katrina, Reed served as 
Plaquemines and Cameron parish fishing cooperatives’ advocate, speaking before LRA 
Infrastructure Task Force meetings in Baton Rouge.  Reed recalls, “LRA would [also] 
hold meetings in all these outlying places so people couldn’t get to them.  [But] we would 
go to the meetings—we didn’t care where.  We were speaking for the fishing co-ops.”175  
 Armed with personal accounts from independent fishermen, confidential data 
Wildlife and Fisheries officials had provided him, and his own research, Reed often 
scolded the LRA for “taking care of the big boys” like recreational boats and large 
commercial fishing outfits and “forgetting about the small fishermen.”  At one meeting, 
he pointedly asked the council, “‘Between recreational boating and the fishing industry, 
which generates the most tax dollars?’  They couldn’t answer.  Recreational boating 
generates zero tax dollars, while fishing boats generate $54 billion in taxes.  They were 
rescuing recreational boats without putting their tax dollars to work...[At the conclusion 
of his presentation,] there was silence from the council.”  The experienced dramatized to 
Reed the crucial need for government officials to engage in direct dialogue with low-
income communities, as well as cooperatives’ duty to demand accountability for 
government distribution of economic and political resources.  
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    The LAC continued to demand LRA equitably distribute funds to independent 
fishermen.  For example, in February 2007, Reed argued that the LRA should allocate its 
$20 million Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) should provide 
impoverished Louisiana fishermen, processors, suppliers, and dock owners “start-up 
capital, replacement or repair of boats, inventory, docks and ‘gap collateral’ for 
borrowing money from other financial institutions.”176   Further, individual outreach 
centers should collaborate with underrepresented groups “that have never been 
approached [for policy input] in the past” to democratically dispense recovery funds to 
rebuild houses and businesses.  Also, outreach centers should hold frequent, bilingual 
public meetings in fishing communities to explain how residents could receive recovery 
funds and assist with application processing.   
 Finally persuaded, the LRA allocated $20 million to small businesses through the 
Small Firm Loan and Grant Program.177  Consequently, the LAC’s Gulf Coast Fisheries 
Cooperative in Cameron Parish received $1.1 million in direct aid.178 By 2009, Gulf 
Coast members jointly owned seafood-processing equipment and planned to construct 
their own dock.179 Similarly, the South Plaquemines Cooperative received a LRA 
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Community Development Block Grant to build a docking facility, while FSC and USDA' 
technical assistance enabled members to locate better markets and increase profits.180   
 To better coordinate cooperative development across the state, Reed founded the 
Louisiana Association of Cooperatives in December 2007.  Run out of a small office in 
Gretna, Louisiana with a staff of nine, it educates the public about cooperatives, 
collaborates with other cooperative organizations and government agencies, and 
advocates for cooperatives at the local, state, and federal level.181  Further, it avoids the 
often apolitical and Eurocentric Rochdale consumer cooperative model.  Believing that 
consumer cooperation by itself cannot satisfy the complex economic, political, and 
cultural needs of Louisiana’s producers, Reed promotes the International Cooperative 
Alliance’s (ICA) expansive definition of cooperation as the “autonomous association of 
persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and 
aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.”182 By 
aligning with the ICA, an independent organization that promotes and supports 
autonomous cooperatives, particularly in developing countries, Reed connects the 
struggles of Louisiana’s agricultural producers of color to the global struggle for land 
security and sovereignty.183 As the ICA’s network of cooperative affiliates seeks to 
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achieve “self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity,” the 
organization dovetails with Reed’s commitment to economic and political equity for all.  
Scarcity of Funding and the Future of the Southern Cooperative Movement 
 The LAC’s shoestring operations require it to heavily rely on the continued support 
of non-profit organizations and government agencies such as USDA Rural Development, 
Oxfam, and the Cooperative Development Foundation.184  For example, committed to 
maintaining sustainable economic development in marginalized communities, the 
Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation helped the LAC establish the Gulf Coast United 
Fisheries Cooperative to assist Cameron Parish fishermen rebuilding their homes and 
livelihoods.185  Despite this funding, the LAC’s precarious financial position was exposed 
in 2009, when small farmers interested in starting cooperatives clamored for the 
organization to provide them technical support and representation.  As the only paid staff 
member, Reed recalls that the LAC had to temporarily halt its support services because 
“there were too many calls, and not enough manpower to work with everyone.”186  
 Indeed, the scarcity of consistent funding places considerable strain on the 
cooperative movement as organizations are forced to compete among themselves to win 
vital foundation and government grants.  In particular, the once amiable relationship 
between the FSC and the LAC rapidly deteriorated amidst conflicting organizational 
purposes and contested jurisdiction.  While historians Jessica Gordon Nembhard and 
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Greta De Jong praise the FSC for its commitment to rural economic development for 
African American and other marginalized farmers, Reed describes the partnership as 
frustrating and competitive rather than collaborative.187   
 Reed’s experience in some ways mirrors the tense relationship between the FSC 
and the LAC’s predecessor, the Louisiana-based Southern Cooperative Development 
Fund (SCDF), run by Catholic priest and ardent cooperator Father Albert McKnight.  
While both organizations worked together to disperse Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) funds to foster cooperative development across the South, the partnership splinted 
in 1972 as government and non-profit funding evaporated.188  As the Nixon 
administration scrutinized War on Poverty initiatives, the OEO suddenly demanded that 
the FSC and SCDF merge in order to receive funding renewals.  When the FSC refused 
and the SCDF conceded, the organizations descended into bitter infighting.  Former 
SCDF and FSC member John Zippert argues that the feud ultimately “caused a division 
on the state association and co-op level.”189  The rancor between state and regional 
cooperatives would again resurface with the LAC’s statewide cooperative initiatives. 
 According to Reed, after the LAC began incorporating more cooperatives in 2009, 
the FSC requested that the LAC become an affiliate so that it could oversee Louisiana’s 
operations.  Reed refused to relinquish the LAC’s autonomy, and further, he argued, “Co-
ops aren’t run like that [hierarchically]. They are independently run...That’s the only way 
we’re going to get along.”  The two organizations severed their relationship shortly 
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thereafter.  Yet rather than agreeing to cover different regions, Reed claims that the FSC 
has resurrected a long dormant affiliate, the Louisiana State Association of Cooperatives, 
Inc., to compete with the LAC.190  Indeed, the FSC publicly claims that its “recent 
recovery work in Louisiana has rejuvenated the Louisiana State Association of 
Cooperatives, which includes the beginning stages of the creation of 6 new cooperatives, 
including the South Plaquemines Parish United Fishing Cooperative.”191  Nowhere does it 
state that the LAC was actually responsible for such organizing work, or that the two 
cooperative organizations are separate entities.  Unfortunately, their fractious relationship 
hinders cooperatives’ ability to share resources and information necessary for a 
productive regional cooperative movement and substantive change across state lines. 
 Consequently, alluding to “adversaries” who “slander” the LAC, as well as New 
Orleans’ legacy of police abuse and government corruption, Reed has enforced a strict 
policy of protective secrecy and above board dealings.  Within the context of police 
repression of civil rights organizations, widespread “disaster capitalism,” and rancorous 
cooperative competition, Reed argues, “the only way the LAC has survived so long is 
because we went under the radar.”  For example, the organization has no website or 
public relations staffer.  Its weekly e-newsletter never discusses LAC-specific actions, 
only government policies and agricultural issues.  Reed carefully guards the LAC’s 
initiatives until he is ready to implement them, and he does not publish “what area we 
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cover, who we’re working with; that’s secret unless we hold a conference.”  At the same 
time, the LAC flatly refuses to be embroiled in “impropriety or cutting deals or 
propositions.  What we can do is to assist you with technical assistance.  No deals.  You 
can watch TV everyday, and someone’s going to jail for some deal or padding the 
books.”  However, Reed’s distrust may enforce a chilling effect on the cooperative 
movement by disincentivizing the free exchange of ideas, a hallmark of the movement. 
Race, Class, and the National Cooperative Movement  
 While its history with the FSC has been contentious, the LAC has cultivated a 
lasting working relationship with other agricultural cooperatives across the state and 
nation, which provides the LAC’s cooperative members crucial job opportunities and 
contracts within the movement itself.  At the same time, however, the broader 
movement’s stark racial and class orientation illustrates the immediate need for activists 
of color to participate in the state and national cooperative movement to truly achieve 
equity for all producers.  In 2007, recognizing the Louisiana Council of Farmers 
Cooperatives (LCFC) political clout and potential for collaboration, Reed joined the 
Council, a powerful agricultural cooperative association of white farmers cultivating vast 
tracts of land. Significantly, the LCFC also represents the LAC’s independent affiliates.   
 Shortly thereafter, Reed was the first African American elected to the Council 
Board.192  He now represented small independent cooperatives, as well as large 
cooperatives at the state level.  Soon, the LCFC appointed Reed as state representative to 
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the National Council of Farmers Cooperatives, which lobbies federal officials for 
agricultural legislation shielding cooperatives from corporate competition.193  As one of a 
handful of black members, Reed was elected to the organization’s National Conference 
of State Councils, where, alongside leading cooperatives such as Land o’ Lakes and 
Ocean Spray, he drafts national agricultural cooperative policies.194   
 Although Reed works with small farmers, he maintains that large regional and 
national cooperative organizations listen when he discusses the need for racial justice for 
marginalized producers.  He observes, “I’ve watched the way the civil rights movement 
works around the country and in Louisiana.  There’s a subtle point about civil rights in 
Louisiana.  It’s not that you’re going in [to predominantly white cooperative associations] 
as a sell-out; it’s that you’re...saying, this need has to be met [or] it will affect 
everybody...the whole industry.”  For example, in 2012, Reed advised Louisiana’s large 
rice cooperatives “to start dealing with the small, minority farmers and buyers.”  
Preferring to sell large lots of rice by the tons, “old liners” refused to sell to small ethnic 
businesses catering to the Asian, Greek, and Spanish community in Louisiana. However, 
by marketing to specialty consumers, rice cooperatives would eventually move the same 
amount of product.  If they did not sell to ethnic consumers, Reed warned that another 
corporation might corner that market, destabilizing the entire cooperative rice industry.   
 The limits of cooperative solidarity within the context of lingering racial 
discrimination, finite government resources, and pervasive poverty can be stark.  For 
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example, Reed foresaw problems convincing the rice cooperatives of his soundness of his 
business plan.  He declares, “If [the rice farmers] don’t want to [listen to me] because I’m 
black, fine.  Sell [the rice] on out.”  That so few low-income and black members hold 
influential positions within the mainstream agricultural cooperative movement is 
troubling.  Mainstream cooperative organizations must embrace the large-scale 
integration of cooperative members from all classes, ethnicities, and backgrounds.   
 On the other hand, Reed also serves as liaison between marginalized cooperative 
members wary of their peers and large, predominantly white cooperative businesses.  
Their distrust can sabotage the LAC’s vision of economic security for small producers of 
color.  For example, when Reed deployed his National Council of Farmers’ Cooperatives 
contacts to connect ConAgra with sweet potato cooperatives in northeastern Louisiana.  
However, the producers “talked themselves out of cooperation,” and the project stalled.  
Reed says in frustration, “You don’t invest millions in something that won’t work.  
[National cooperative] members are looking for patronage returns” and will work with 
small cooperatives, but low-income farmers still “complain” about their situation.   
 Reed attributes these persistent disagreements to members’ misunderstandings 
about the nature of cooperation and poor internal leadership.  For example, some people 
formed cooperatives to pursue quick profit without understanding cooperative ethics.  
Reed cites several cooperatives that disbanded after being disabused of the notion that 
they could act as middlemen brokers for producers and thereby inflate profits--an action 
antithetical to the cooperative movement. Others grew frustrated with the logistics of 
running a cooperative and refused to acknowledge that a cooperative might take two or 
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more years to be profitable.  As a result, Reed concedes that some of his older 
cooperatives, including the South Plaquemines United Fisheries Cooperative, are 
withdrawing from the LAC to revert to private associations or clubs.195   
 The LAC’s travails are similar to those of their predecessor, Father McKnight, who 
discovered that many 1960s and 1970s Louisiana cooperatives failed because board 
members wished to solely benefit either the consumer or producer, rather than helping 
both.  He notes that the Southern Cooperative Development Fund “eventually 
identified…‘capitalistic personalities’—those individuals who join cooperatives solely 
for their personal gain and are willing to allow the cooperative to be destroyed as long as 
they gain financially.”196  Likewise, the LAC now screens potential cooperatives before it 
admits them into its cooperative training program or provides technical assistance.  While 
Reed maintains that sustained technical advice and training is crucial to perpetuating 
healthy cooperatives, “some co-ops are going to survive and others won’t.”197 Although 
the LAC staff periodically meets with members to discuss leadership and cooperative 
principles, the organization cannot “admonish” independent affiliates, “so if they say they 
don’t need our services, we just back off and let them go.”  
 In order to explicate the LAC’s core values and avoid attrition rates, the cooperative 
league has implemented an extensive training program to both educate potential 
cooperatives about alternative economic enterprises and assist them in establishing their 
business.  To that end, when a cooperative matriculates into the LAC’s cooperative 
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196 McKnight, Whistling in the Wind, 32. 
197 Reed, interview with author. 
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training program, the LAC prepares a training manual for the new organization and 
expects the new cooperative to adhere to International Cooperative Alliance’s 
principles.198  These values consist of: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic 
member control defined by regular voting and egalitarian organizational structure; 3) 
member economic participation, in which members contribute equally to the 
cooperative’s financial resources; 4) cooperative autonomy; 5) training for members and 
educational outreach to the general public and political officials; 6) collaboration among 
cooperatives at the local, national, regional, and international level; and finally 7) 
community development.  By agreeing to the tenets of the ICA, Reed inculcates in its 
member organizations a sense of solidarity.  He explains, “wherever they go, they know 
they’re part of the international cooperative movement.”199 
USDA 
  While linking independent Louisiana farmers to powerful national cooperatives is 
critical for building a state cooperative movement, so is establishing productive relations 
with state and federal agencies.  Reed is by no means conciliatory, however; he pressures 
his government contacts to pass legislation protecting disadvantaged small producers.  To 
do so, Reed struggles to relieve black farmers’ persistent distrust of state and federal 
agricultural agencies, a legacy of decades of discriminatory agricultural polices.  Because 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other federal institutions often 
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refused to approve loans to small black farmers, black-owned farmland has shrunk from 
15 million acres in the 1920s to only 3 or 4 million acres today.200   
 However, in 1999, the FSC filed the Pigford vs. Glickman lawsuit in which 15,000 
farmers of color argued that between 1981 and 1996, the USDA unfairly denied them 
loans because of their race.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia awarded 
the claimants $1 billion in reparations and demanded that the USDA concretely address 
its racist and classist lending policies.  A second settlement in October 2011 allowed 
thousands of farmers who missed the deadline to participate in the lawsuit to apply for a 
$1.2 billion claim.  The same year, the consulting firm Jackson Lewis Corporate 
Diversity Counseling Group published a comprehensive study recommending key 
changes to the USDA’s technical and financial aid programs to ensure “fair access for all 
USDA customers.”201  Consequently, Reed consistently holds the USDA to the court 
rulings when advocating for small farmers: “when we go back to the USDA we let it be 
known that ‘you need to change this, this, and this.’”202   
 Despite the USDA’s self-proclaimed “New Civil Rights Era,” the LAC remains 
vigilant that its cooperative members receive reasonable loans.  While Agriculture 
Secretary Tom Vilsack promised to “ensure that [USDA] assistance programs are 
administered equitably and in full compliance with civil rights and equal opportunity 
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laws,” Reed maintains that “nine times out of ten [USDA staff] in field ignore the 
[Jackson Lewis] report.203  For example, Reed references one cooperative member who 
applied for USDA loan but forgot to list his place of employment.  The USDA denied the 
loan rather than informing the member of the error.  To avoid local agency resistance, the 
LAC now works directly with state USDA directors.  In this case, the LAC called the 
Louisiana director, who ordered the local field office to inform the farmer what 
paperwork he needed to complete.  Reed exclaims, “the field officer didn’t like it, but I 
didn’t care.  It’s our tax dollars that are keeping you employed.”   
 Reed argues that if the USDA expects farmer compliance, its staff must follow with 
its own policies.  For example, after Reed organizes a cooperative, he immediately seeks 
financial assistance from the USDA to start the enterprise.  These funding opportunities 
range from start-up loans like the Business and Industry Guaranteed Loan Program to 
grants for cooperative training like the Rural Cooperative Development Grant Program 
and the Small Socially-Disadvantaged Producer Grant Program.204  If Reed meets any 
local resistance, he leverages his considerable network of cooperative and governmental 
contacts to enforce compliance.  Referring to the widely read e-newsletter the LAC 
publishes weekly, Reed tells recalcitrant field officers, “we’ll put [the story] out; don’t 
threaten us.  Don’t say you can’t [provide the loan]…. We know that the Secretary of 
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Agriculture pumps a lot of money into to Louisiana and Mississippi for rural economic 
development.  The money can’t stop in Baton Rouge.”  
 Largely due to Reed’s tenacity and the USDA’s efforts to remediate discriminatory 
rural funding programs, the LAC has succeeded in obtaining consistent USDA support 
for its cooperative development projects.  For example, it was one of the first Louisiana 
organizations to receive a $200,000 grant from the USDA Rural Development's Small 
and Socially Disadvantaged Producer Grant Program.205  Seeking to increase job 
opportunities by developing businesses and cooperatives in rural African American 
communities across the country, the grant enabled LAC to purchase furniture, equipment, 
and supplies for its affiliate cooperatives.206  A subsequent grant provided essential 
training and salaries for employees.  Government funding has provided LAC a measure 
of stability; it now trains over 200 cooperative members a month, hosts events and 
workshops for target communities, and strives to organize all 64 state parishes. 
Consequently, one federal official credits the LAC with revitalizing the state’s small 
farmer cooperative movement.  He quipped to Reed, “if you die today, it won’t stop the 
cooperative movement; people are now moving in that direction.”  
Conclusion 
 The case studies represented here, Gathering Tree Growers Collective, Solidarity 
Economy, and Louisiana Association of Cooperatives, reveal the extent to which 
cooperative activists’ confrontation with historical examples of food, land, and job 
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insecurity have defined post-Hurricane Katrina organizing efforts.  While the storm and 
subsequent flooding exposed the painful legacy of the city’s race- and class-based 
political and economic structures, it also reinvigorated an already active city cooperative 
movement.  While recent cooperative transplants have certainly expanded the city’s 
cooperative landscape, their collaboration with veteran organizers more familiar with the 
city’s particularities, nuances, and needs can counter neoliberal policies and foster real 
community-driven economic development.  Cooperatives’ longevity and influence 
depends on vital local, regional, and national support networks that transcend class, 
gender, and racial divides.   
 Based on the diverse organizing experiences of Macon Fry, John Clark, and Harvey 
Reed, I argue that New Orleanian cooperatives’ continued relevance to their 
neighborhood hinges on their ability to address constituent needs while mobilizing 
residents to pressure local and state institutions for social, economic, and political 
change.  Most importantly, a cooperative movement that works in concert with, rather 
than opposed to, government social and economic programs may provide more effective 







 Traversing today’s cooperative landscape is similar to island hopping; clusters of 
cooperatives are scattered across the city or operate as lonely buoys amidst a vast ocean 
of citizens often unaware of their existence.  New Orleans activists’ difficulty in creating 
a broad-based cooperative movement is rooted in the state’s confusion about cooperative 
goals, organizational structure, and ideology.  In a right-to-work state that has decimated 
unions, government officials and business leaders are leery of working with cooperatives 
they suspect are socialistic or subversive.1   
 Further, conservative print media largely conflates cooperative organizing with 
nefarious unions set on labor agitation and absconding with federal funds.2  Reminiscent 
of the 1949 and 1950 federal investigation into cooperatives’ tax status in which critics 
shrilled that communistic cooperatives and unions would bankrupt honest, small 
businesses, in 2013 Times Picayune journalist James Varney lambasted the Restaurant 
Opportunity Center of New Orleans (ROC) for receiving a $200,000 Centers for Disease 
Control grant to develop “healthful menu options” among Pacific Island and Asian-
American restaurant workers in New Orleans.  Attacking the 501c(3) tax-exempt non-
profit ROC as a “hard-left union front that models itself as a warm-hearted community 
group,” Varney scoffed at using public monies to help a small segment of the city’s 
population and predicted that ROC would only use this “nice pot of money” to foment 
labor unrest and lobby for minimum wage increases.   
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 Similarly, the Pelican Institute for Public Policy, a Louisiana free-market think 
tank, dismissed ROC’s mission for restaurant worker justice.  In the wake of ROC’s 
successful lawsuit against French Quarter restaurant owner Tony Moran, Pelican Institute 
director Kevin Kane declared, “They should not interfere with other businesses here in 
New Orleans…We already have an industry characterized by innovation, service, 
diversity, value and opportunity.  Owners, employees and customers benefit from this 
flexibility and we should be wary of union advocates who seek to restrict it.”3   
 In response, cooperative activists attempted to educate Times Picayune readers 
about ROC’s purpose in the article’s comment section. Organizer Sally Stevens explained 
that in the restaurant industry, “labor abuse and wage-theft is the daily reality...Restaurant 
workers are undervalued, underpaid, mistreated with regularity in a variety of ways and, 
except for ROC, unrepresented in any way...by either the public or private sector.”4  
However, her comment was quickly buried under a flood of anti-union diatribes.   
 The Times Picayune editorial illustrates a through line in New Orleans’s 
cooperative development: from the 1890s to the present, cooperatives—from the 
Brotherhood of Co-operative Commonwealth to Solidarity Economy—have been 
controversial because they disrupt the Big Easy’s tourist friendly narrative: beyond the 
“bowls filled to the rim with gumbo, late nights in dark jazz clubs, strolls through historic 
neighborhoods, and tantalizing festivals throughout the year,” politically and 
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economically disempowered residents struggle to make ends meet.5  Yet despite fierce 
opposition, successive generations of New Orleans cooperative activists have devoted 
their lives to the movement, and the strength of their convictions imbues their past, 
current, and future cooperative endeavors. Viewing the history of New Orleans through 
the lens of the city’s cooperative movement sharpens our appreciation of both the 
persistence of community-led oppositional traditions, as well as their fragility.    
Economic and Political Tension 
 First, a fundamental anxiety with which each case study  has grappled is how to 
offer humane alternatives to market capitalism while continuing to operate within this 
economic and ideological system.  For the Laboringmen’s Protective Association, for 
example, Socialists, trade unionists, and black equal rights activists failed to achieve their 
“cooperative commonwealth” because they could not agree whether to compromise with 
segregationist, anti-union politicians and industrialists relentless chipping away at the 
biracial labor movement, or to completely overhaul a morally bankrupt economic and 
political system.  The Housewives’ League also had to couch its radical program for 
economically and politically empowering women within accommodationist language; 
battling conservative husbands, anti-suffragist officials, and anti-Communist businesses, 
the League struggled to finance its cooperative store.  Similarly, while the multiracial 
coalition of Freret residents and Popular Front activists initially supported the 
Consumers’ Cooperative Union’s vision for a socialized government and cooperative 
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economy, the grocery cooperative ultimately could not survive postwar anti-Communist 
hysteria, white flight, and the popularity of large supermarkets.   
Government Attitudes Toward Cooperatives 
 Second, contributing to cooperatives’ difficulties transforming abusive social 
systems is contradictory government policy.  While Albert Dent and Henry Hermes 
celebrated New Deal reforms like the Farm Security Administration and the National 
Recovery Act that encouraged cooperatives as a way for small farmers and consumers to 
achieve economic stability, other federal agricultural agencies like the Farm Bureau and 
the Agricultural Extension Service favored wealthy planters and rejected the fundamental 
societal restructuring that a cooperative economy would necessitate as fundamentally at 
odds with traditional individual land ownership.6  Yet as high-tech machinery and large-
scale farming replaced sharecroppers, tenants, and small owners, federally-subsidized 
cooperative farms might have helped poor people successfully acclimate to this 
agricultural revolution.   
 Similarly, during the 1960s, the Federation of Southern Cooperatives received 
Office of Economic Opportunity funding to create black-run farm cooperatives while the 
USDA concentrated markets. Louisiana Association of Cooperatives director Harvey 
Reed daily confronts the legacy of racist and classist agricultural policies as he organizes 
socially disadvantaged producers with otherwise limited access to operating and 
investment capital, credit, and state and federal services.7   
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 Many cooperatives have also fought to overcome hostile city administrations 
actively working to dismantle them.  Rhythm Conspiracy co-founder Sally Stevens 
documents the tremendous barrier to post-Katrina cooperative development within a city 
that views cooperative economics as “too socialistic.”8  Although the worker cooperative 
attempts to educate city economic and workforce development agencies about the 
economic benefits of worker and consumer cooperatives, Stevens reports that the “City is 
reluctant to support indigenous musical forms except in highly contained, commodified 
ways” that justify “wholesale demolition and gentrification” of black communities as part 
of the relentless push to redevelop New Orleans and attract tourists and wealthy 
corporations. Nonetheless, she asserts, “We look at cooperatives as way around the 
[state’s] decimation of collective bargaining; cooperatives mitigate abuses of the private 
market and expand the commons.” Thus, Louisiana’s cooperatives poignantly illustrate 
how a matrix of federal and state policies, often operating at cross-purposes, have 
historically shaped local conditions and marginalized residents’ livelihoods.   
Interracial Organizing and Racial Tension 
 Third, New Orleans cooperatives augment our understanding of the promises and 
perils of interracial collaboration in social movements. Each cooperative case study 
wrestled with racial fissures and racial separation, even as they labored to build 
collaborative relationships.  For instance, in 1897, the multiracial Brotherhood of 
Cooperative Commonwealth offered a utopian vision of workplace relations in which a 
socialist welfare state would protect all laborers from the vagaries of the market.  
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However, while Graf and Bacarisse supported the idea of economic equality for all races, 
in practice, the pressure of procuring work in the midst of a depression splintered the 
cooperative along racial lines. Although Bacarisse hailed from an ethnically 
heterogeneous family, as legal racial distinctions intensified and work refused to 
materialize, he allied with white segregationists and conservative trade unionists at the 
expense of a broad, interracial labor movement. 
 Similarly, although the Housewives’ League proclaimed that cooperative 
economics would usher in a morally advanced civilization that would protect all women 
workers and consumers, they faltered at the possibility of concretely improving working 
conditions for their own African American domestic servants.  As black women 
unionized to demand better wages and working hours, the League redeployed cooperative 
economics as an agent of Jim Crow segregation. Organizing cooperative buying clubs to 
finance newfangled labor-saving cleaning and cooking technologies would liberate white 
middle-class women from the burdens of negotiating shifting class and race dynamics.   
 Today, too, contemporary cooperatives struggle to overcome the city’s legacy of 
institutionalized racism.  For example, Gathering Tree Growers Cooperative has no black 
members, even though it is situated in the heart of Gert Town, a African American 
neighborhood adjacent to Xavier University, a Catholic institution with a large black 
student population.  Director Macon Fry, a Virginia native and long-time gardener, was 
unaware of the city’s rich African American cooperative history. Despite working with 
Grow Dat Youth Farm, an urban farm and youth development program for at-risk African 
Americans, he opined that New Orleans nurtures “an independent streak here,” perhaps 
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“because of the demographics and the racial makeup of the city. Not that there aren’t 
African American owned [cooperatives]...I’m just guessing.”9 
 In contrast, the Upper Ninth Ward community bike shop, Rusted Up Beyond All 
Recognition Bikes (R.U.B.A.R.B.), illustrates the power of small, neighborhood-based 
cooperatives to concretely improve low-income African Americans’ daily lives.  The 
shop offers tools and training to children and adults who rely on bicycles as their primary 
mode of transportation and provides a safe community space for students after school.10 
Serving the working-class black community near the old Florida projects, 
R.U.B.A.R.B.’s radical and anarchist volunteers see the space as an opportunity to 
“practice what they preach” by directly working with community members to halt 
gentrification and ameliorate racial and class divisions in the neighborhood.11  
Class Divides 
 Finally, New Orleans cooperatives have historically wrestled with class divisions 
within their ranks and between organizers and their constituents.  For example, the 
Brotherhood of Cooperative Commonwealth’s inability to agree on tactics and goals 
largely coincided with members’ diverse classes and political affiliations. Brotherhood 
co-founder Eugene Bacarisse portrayed compatriot August Graf as an autocrat cloaked in 
crass populism. While the classically educated Bacarisse vaunted cooperation’s 
intellectually and spiritually uplifting merits, he decried the working-class Graf’s parades 
and mass meetings as dangerous rabble-rousing.  Similarly, while the middle-class 
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directors of the Housewives’ League Co-operative Store believed that all classes would 
benefit from cooperative economics, they specifically appealed to fellow affluent female 
professionals and housewives for financial backing and moral support.  In other words, 
their short-lived grocery store was designed to serve the people, but was not of the 
people.  Overlooking working-class women as co-organizers drastically limited the 
cooperative’s membership base and pool of reliable store volunteers.  
 Additionally, the contemporary activities of the Free Southern Theater Collective 
(FST) reflect the ongoing struggle to reconcile its program of black cultural liberation 
with deep class divides between its performers and the disadvantaged New Orleanians for 
whom they advocate. In October 2013, the FST celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in a 
symposium entitled “Talkin’ Revolution.” Like Tom Dent watching the black Mississippi 
River waters lap against the dock, meditating on his city’s history and his future journey, 
conference participants shifted back and forth across time and space to consider the 
“historic and continued impact” of the FST.12  Over the course of four days, audiences 
listened to founders and alumni like John O’Neal and Dr. Doris Derby discuss the FST’s 
civil rights influences, watched Junebug and FST performances, and traveled along the 
conference’s civil rights trail, marking the city’s racial justice accomplishments.    
 Further, the conference functioned both as a space to reflect on the FST’s political 
and aesthetic contributions and as a meeting grounds for veteran and new activists and 
performers to discuss how to merge art and politics as they confront persistent racial 
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injustice.  Audiences participated in a cross-generational conversation about the ongoing 
relevance of democratic organizational structure and politicized performance between 
FST members and young artists. Echoing the FST’s participatory collective meetings, 
participants formed a “fishbowl conversation” at Ashé Cultural Arts Center. FST alumni 
sat in an inner circle and discussed the collective’s “impact on their lives, careers, and 
communities.”13  Artists, cultural workers, students, and teachers sat in the fishbowl’s 
outer circle and could ask alumni questions. Afterwards, panelists and audience members 
collectively sang movement songs. The event culminated with a networking lunch with 
social justice organizations to foster sustained collaborations between creative artists, 
academics, and activists across the city and region. 
 However, for all the event’s attempts to illustrate the continuing importance of 
politically engaged art, the symposium revealed how far the memory of the FST has 
traveled from its working-class roots.  For instance, rather than targeting the New Orleans 
community at large, or African American public housing residents that the FST was 
committed to serving and recruiting as members, the conference invited scholars, 
performers, and activists to attend.14 This culturally middle-class orientation is also 
reflected in some of the conference’s event locations.  For example, organizers held a 
featured artist showcase at Café Istanbul in the New Orleans Healing Center, an 
institution that is directly implicated in the St. Claude Avenue Corridor’s accelerating 
gentrification. Residents from St. Roch largely avoid patronizing the Center.  Further, 
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while some performance events were free, others, such as dinners and speaking 
engagements, cost between $30 and $40, potentially prohibitively expensive for low-
income citizens.  These choices inadvertently positioned the FST and its successors as 
culturally exclusionary, reproducing the class biases original members like Tom Dent and 
Kalamu ya Salaam dedicated their careers to eradicating.   
A Cooperative Model  
 While the legacy of the FST continues to inspire politicized performers, other 
post-Katrina cooperatives attempt to address the daily inequities impoverished residents 
of color confront. The sustainability of the contemporary cooperative movement hinges 
on honoring the city’s cooperative roots, while constructing coalitions reaching far 
beyond its borders. To that end, the Louisiana Association of Cooperatives provides the 
most promising vision for a permanent, statewide cooperative movement. Enriched by 
cross-class and interracial coalitions with local, state, and national cooperative 
organizations and government agencies, the LAC offers a strong model for rural and 
urban economic development for all citizens.  Focusing on land security, racial justice, 
and political empowerment for marginalized communities, LAC can transform how 
economic and political power is distributed in Louisiana.  
 The LAC’s associational network reflects racial justice and environmental 
activists’ vision for “metropolitan regional equity” in which the general public, 
government officials, and developers democratically discuss how a community functions 
to benefit everyone.  As architect and activist Carl Anthony argues, true “smart growth” 
should facilitate conscientious planning to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, curb 
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environmentally unsustainable suburban sprawl, and halt gentrification adversely 
affecting vulnerable communities.15  Comprised of labor unions, civil rights activists, and 
social justice activists, the metropolitan regional equity movement dovetails with the 
LAC’s demand that communities of color influence both public policy and the free 
market to ensure equity for all.16   
 Regional metro equity can be a guiding principle for cooperative development.  
Echoing Harvey Reed’s argument that unequal conditions for small farmers adversely 
affect an entire region’s agricultural economy, environmental justice activist and scholar 
Robert Bullard contends in his proposal for designing more equitable cities that “Central 
city poverty and inequality...across a region can stifle a whole region’s development.”17  
In contrast, he argues that “community based regionalism” can combat regional 
inequality and promote equitable, sustainable development.18  To achieve community 
based regionalism, Bullard outlines an economic and political system remarkably like 
Louisiana’s decentralized cooperative network, which concentrates decision-making 
authority in the hands of independent cooperatives while regional and national 
cooperatives provide vital training, education, technical, and financial support.   
 Drawing on historian John A. Powell’s theory of a racially just “federated 
regionalism,” Bullard contends that individual communities should help shape regional 
and national planning strategies such as tax credits, developer incentives, and fair housing 
laws that extend equal opportunities to both suburban and urban communities suffering 
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from concentrated poverty, racial segregation, and social isolation.19  For example, the 
metropolitan regional equity movement encourages policy makers and developers to plan 
neighborhoods around good schools, affordable housing, parks, grocery stores, public 
services, and access to good jobs both in the neighborhood and in the region.20  Because 
city development patterns and national social, economic, and political trends have for 
generations undercut neighborhood-driven efforts to counteract racial isolation, 
depopulation, and disinvestment, metropolitan regional equity activists are forging broad 
regional coalitions of marginalized communities to create meaningful institutional change 
and economic upward mobility. 
 The need for New Orleans and Louisiana to join the metropolitan regional equity 
movement is clear.  Between the 1970s and 2000, New Orleans experienced a profound 
outmigration of white residents, and with them, thousands of jobs.21  With largely 
undeveloped regional transit, low-income African American and Latin Americans living 
in the city’s deteriorating urban core have been increasingly isolated from well-paying 
jobs.  After 2000, low-income families began to move to the parish suburbs to find jobs, 
and without access to educational services or professional development, demographic 
change has begun to reproduce the unequal economic and social conditions of inner city 
New Orleans.  To Metropolitan Policy Program directors Amy Liu and Bruce Katz, 
“reducing spatial disparities” between low-income residencies and jobs, while 
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simultaneously developing dense metropolitan areas with higher concentration of jobs, 
will reduce economic disparity and raise local governments’ tax bases.22 
 However, while Liu and Katz focus on regional planning’s need for transportation 
justice and job development, the LAC envisions a “hub-and-spoke” regional food system.  
As food advocate James McWilliams theorizes, the hub-and-spoke model will equitably 
reorient food production by selecting central nodes most conducive to environmentally 
sensitive, high-yield agriculture and then distributing low-cost food from the nodes to 
more distant markets.23  To stimulate regional economies, the LAC connects New 
Orleans food cooperatives to the state agricultural network, while providing healthful, 
inexpensive food to low-income city residents. For instance, it collaborates with Crescent 
City Farmers Market, Solidarity Economy, and the New Orleans Cooperative 
Development Project to develop training and job development programs for vulnerable 
New Orleanians.24 LAC also trained and supported both the Latino Farmers Cooperative, 
a Mid-City urban farm and resource center for underserved Latin Americans, and the 
New Orleans East-based VEGGI Farmers Cooperative, established after the Gulf Coast 
Oil Spill threw many Vietnamese fishermen and farmers out of work.25  It hopes the 
cooperatives will be integrated into a New Orleans-based food hub.26   
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 To promote food hubs, when Reed attends agricultural conferences, he 
immediately asks his hosts, “‘Where did you buy this [catered] food?  Did the [local] 
farmers bring the food or did you buy it from some of the other companies?...If your 
conference is on farmers, then farmers should bring their bounty to share.  What you’re 
doing is taking a dollar out of their pocket and putting it in someone else’s who doesn’t 
even care about you.’”27  As the local food movement has become increasingly popular, 
however, “Now the first thing [my hosts] tell me is, ‘Harvey, this came from so and so.’”  
If the LAC’s progress is any indication, food hubs are promising examples of regional 
metro equity. By drawing strength from Louisiana’s history of black cooperative 
organizing and organizing far beyond New Orleans’ city limits, Reed constructs a model 
for cooperative development that can survive the transience of individual cooperatives 
and provoke substantive policy change benefitting small farmers and consumers alike. 
 Ultimately, the story of New Orleans cooperatives is one of simultaneous erasure 
and persistence, continuity and rupture.  The most successful New Orleans cooperatives 
have been those emerging from the city’s residents themselves; while inspired by local 
and national political, economic, and social conditions, organizers have consistently 
adapted cooperative ideology and practice to their particular constituents’ concerns and 
needs.  However, New Orleans cooperatives have resisted operating in geographical and 
intellectual isolation.  On the contrary, activists have carefully constructed complex 
social networks of governmental, cooperative, labor, and business officials at the local, 
state, and national level in order to further their cause.  Ironically, while these broad webs 
                                                
27 Reed, interview with author. 
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of sympathetic allies have provided budding cooperatives logistical and financial support 
vital for sustaining a permanent cooperative economy, they have just as frequently 
contributed to local cooperatives’ demise.  Dependent on the vagaries of philanthropic 
foundations or politically precarious government funding agencies, many cooperatives 
wither with shifting national political or economic tides.   
 At the same time, when assessing the success of the New Orleans cooperative 
movement, it is essential to consider its larger historical trajectory.  Despite individual 
cooperatives’ failures, many members were sufficiently convinced of cooperative 
economics’ benefits to continue organizing collective organizations throughout their 
lifetime.  Further, persistent racial and class inequality reinforces community 
cooperatives’ reputation as viable institutional alternatives, ensuring their reemergence 
across the city at key moments of economic and political flux.  Addressing people’s 
immediate needs for financial stability and civic influence, cooperatives’ pragmatism 
appeals to members seeking a direct line to participatory democracy.  As John Clark 
poignantly remarks, the successful cooperative movement must instill “Hope.  The hope 
that people can live that life.  Let’s show what we could have.”28 
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